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The Competition Act 89 of 1998 applies equally to all firms with regard to anti-competitive 
behaviour regardless whether it is privately or publicly owned. Therefore it applies to state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) if their actions fall short of the Act. There is however one aspect 
relating to SOEs which is not covered by the application of the Competition Act but may 
have a significant impact on free and fair competition and can be of big concern for private 
competitors of SOEs. Since discriminatory policies during Apartheid have created a huge 
inequality gap in post-Apartheid South Africa, the government has to be actively involved in 
the economy to address the inequality. Therefore the government uses SOEs as vehicles to 
achieve its developmental goals. As a result SOEs in South Africa which are active market 
participants may always rely on the financial support of the state. They may do so purely 
because of their crucial governmental mandates regardless of financial mismanagement, poor 
corporate governance and deep seated corruption in almost every SOE. Even though the 
fundamental need for the existence of SOEs in South Africa is acknowledge, it is argued that 
state financial aid could qualify as a state-initiated constraint on competition in South Africa 
as it creates an uneven playing field between SOEs and their private competitors, which is 
always skewed in favour of the SOEs. It may create warped incentives and SOEs may not 
compete efficiently if they know that they are protected by a state sponsored safety net. This 
dissertation asks the question whether the time has not arrived in South Africa for state aid to 
SOEs to be subjected to a certain degree of scrutiny in order to bring about a level playing 
field between SOEs and their private competitors. It is recognised that privatisation of SOEs 
is not always the better option as it could threaten the delivery of basic services and goods to 
poorer South Africans. Hence, the dissertation investigates whether a state aid control model, 
based on the European Union state aid rules, is not perhaps a solution to address the potential 
distortion of free and fair competition by state financial aid. It proposes a customised state aid 
control regime for South Africa which provides for an active role by the competition 
authorities in state aid decisions and it presents draft legislation which could be used as a 
basis for the implementation in South Africa of a regulated system of state financial aid to 





Die Wet op Mededinging 89 van 1998 is gelykerwys op alle ondernemings van toepassing, 
ongeag of die onderneming in privaat- of staatsbesit is. Gevolglik is dit ook van toepassing of 
ondernemings wat in staatsbesit is wanneer hulle nie-mededingend optree. Daar is egter een 
aspek wat verband hou met staatsondernemings wat nie deur die Wet op Mededinging gedek 
word nie maar wat ‘n groot impak op vrye en regverdige mededinging kan he en wat kan 
kommer wek by mededingers van staatsondernemings. Aangesien die beleid van Apartheid 
tot erge ongelykheid, ook in post-Apartheid Suid-Afrika gelei het, is die regering tans aktief 
betrokke om die ongelykheid reg te stel deur onder andere van ekonomiese maatreёls gebruik 
te maak. Gevolglik gebruik die regering ondernemings wat in sy besit is om sosio-
ekonomiese doelwitte te bereik. As gevolg hiervan kan hierdie ondernemings, selfs al is hulle 
deelnemers in die markte, altyd staat maak op die finansiёle ondersteuning van die staat. 
Hulle kan dit doen bloot op grond van hulle mandate, selfs al word hulle gekenmerk deur 
finansiёle wanbestuur, swak korporatiewe beheer en erge korrupsie. Hierdie proefskrif gee 
erkenning aan die bydrae wat ondernemings in staatsbesit maak tot die staat se 
ontwikkelingsplan. Daar word egter geargumenteer dat die staat se finansiёle ondersteuning 
van hierdie ondernemings kan kwalifiseer as beheer oor mededinging wat deur die staat 
geїnisieer is, aangesien dit lei tot ’n ongelyke speelveld tussen ondernemings in staatsbesit en 
private mededingers, wat altyd in die guns van die staatsondersteunde ondernemings is. Dit 
kan verder lei tot die afwesigheid van motivering in staatsondernemings om effektief met 
privaat ondernemings mee te ding. Hierdie proefskrif bevraagteken of dit nie nou die tyd in 
Suid Afrika is om staatsbefondsing van staatsondernemings aan ‘n mate van evaluering 
onderworpe te stel nie en sodoende ’n gelyke speelveld tussen staats- en private 
ondernemings mee te bring. Dit erken dat privatisering nie altyd die beter opsie is om die 
kwessies met staatsbefondsing van staatsondernemings op te los nie, aangesien privatisering 
die lewering van goedere en dienste aan finansieel kwesbare persone in Suid-Afrika kan 
affekteer. Gevolglik ondersoek die proefskrif of ’n stelsel vir die beheer van staatsbefondsing 
van ondernemings wat aan die staat behoort, gebaseer op die Europese Unie se model vir die 
beheer van staatsbefondsing, moontlik die oplossing vir die kwessies onderliggend aan 
sodanige befondsing kan wees. Die vraag wat beantwoord moet word is spesifiek of sodanige 
beheer die bedreiging van vrye en regverdige mededinging deur staatsbefondsing sal 
verwyder of beperk. Die proefskrif stel ’n stelsel vir die beheer van befondsing aan 




aktiewe rol speel. Dit stel verder ’n konsepwet voor wat kan dien as die basis vir die 
implementering van ’n stelsel vir die beheer van staatsbefondsing vir staatsbeheerde 
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1 Background to the research problem 
 
The end of Apartheid1 in the early 1990s also ended South Africa’s economic 
isolation from the rest of the world economy. One consequence of this seminal 
moment in South Africa’s history was that the South African government2 had the 
opportunity and was required to create legal equality and security and to enact 
legislation which established accountability of each citizen including corporate 
citizens. In order to achieve this, South Africa’s legal framework had to be completely 
overhauled in many legal areas. First and foremost the legal system had to be 
cleansed of discriminatory Apartheid laws. However, legal changes were also 
required to align the South African economy, that was isolated by sanctions, with 
global trends and to promote economic development which would be inclusive of and 
beneficial to all South Africans regardless of their race.  
 
The Competition Act 89 of 19983 (henceforth the Competition Act) is an example of 
legislation which was to bring South Africa’s economy in line with global 
developments and aimed to ensure that the South African economy is “open to 
greater ownership by a greater number of South Africans”.4 The Competition Act was 
enacted to regulate competition amongst enterprises in a free and fair market. Its 
purpose is to promote and maintain competition within South Africa.5 Sutherland and 
Kemp state that:  
 
“Competition law concerns economic competition in free markets. It is an aspect of a 
government’s competition policy, that is of the policy regarding the structures within 
and the processes by which competition takes place.”6 
 
                                                          
1 For comprehensive reading on the end of Apartheid see D Welsh The Rise and Fall of Apartheid (2009). 
2 The terms “government” and “state” are used interchangeably throughout this study. 
3 See D Lewis Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (2013) for a 
comprehensive discussion on the prior governmental talks and actions which ultimately culminated in the 
Competition Act.  
4 See the Preamble of the Competition Act. 
5 See Section 2 of the Competition Act. 




Lewis also highlights the importance of competition law when he states that 
competition law keeps markets as open as possible by guarding against collusion, 
anticompetitive mergers and dominant firms.7  
 
It would seem that the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was not carefully 
considered in the development of the current Competition Act. Lewis observes that 
initial debates regarding the post-Apartheid economy focused on “concentrated 
ownership” and the possibility that antitrust rules could assist the government to 
break up conglomerates owned by a small number of white families. He also notes 
that insufficient attention was paid to the role of SOEs as an integral part of the 
South African economy8  
 
Nevertheless, it was accepted from the outset that normal competition rules would 
apply to SOEs.9 The Competition Act10 applies to all economic activity within or those 
having an effect within South Africa with few exceptions.11 At present there is no 
exact definition of what “economic activity” for purposes of the Competition Act 
entails and Sutherland and Kemp correctly point out that not “every activity which 
has economic consequences can be so described.”12 Hence, the authors are of the 
opinion that this needs to change and a more precise meaning needs to be 
developed for purposes of the Competition Act.13 Until that moment, however, for as 
long as an activity by a firm has economic consequences, that activity will come 
within the ambit of the concept. The meaning of the notion outside of South Africa 
will be discussed extensively in chapter five.14 It suffices to state at this point that 
                                                          
7 D Lewis Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (2013) 12. 
8 D Lewis Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (2013) 8. 
9 P Sutherland & K Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2017) para 3.2.3 and the sources referred to. 
10 For a comprehensive discussion of the enforcement of competition rules within South Africa see D Lewis 
Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (2013); and P Sutherland & K Kemp 
Competition Law of South Africa (2017). The application of the Competition Act is also fully discussed in para 
2 of chapter 5. 
11 See Section 3 of the Competition Act. The exceptions listed in this section are collective bargaining within the 
meaning of section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 and the Labour Relations Act 
No 66 of 1995; a collective agreement as defined in section 213 of the Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995 and 
concerted conduct designed to achieve a non-commercial socio-economic objective or similar purpose. 
12 See para 4.4 of chapter 4 of P Sutherland & K Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2017). 
13 See para 4.4 of chapter 4 of P Sutherland & K Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2017). 
For more reasons why perhaps a more precise meaning of “economic activity” is required see para 4.4 of 
chapter 4 of the aforementioned book. 




South Africa is not the only jurisdiction grappling with the exact meaning of the 
notion.  
 
The Competition Act is also applicable to economic activity of the State. Section 8115 
provides that the Competition Act binds the State. As a result of section 81, the 
Competition Act applies to the activities of some of South Africa’s SOEs16 which are 
listed in the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)17 and operate in key industries 
such as aviation, telecommunications and transport.18 Hence, SOEs are not shielded 
from the provisions of the Competition Act which prohibits anti-competitive 
behaviour. It is therefore generally as straightforward to determine whether the SOE 
has contravened any of the provisions of the Competition Act, which prohibit anti-
competitive behaviour, as it is for any other firm. 19 
 
SOEs20 such as Telkom, South African Airways (SAA) and South African Express 
(Pty) Limited (SA Express) are all examples of enterprises to which the Competition 
Act applies. All of them are juristic persons which carry on business and provide 
goods and services in accordance with ordinary business principles and are primarily 
financed from sources other than the National Revenue Fund and taxes.21 SOEs 
                                                          
15 Section 81 and its effect are more comprehensively discussed in para 4.3.8.4 of chapter three and para 1.1(b) 
of chapter 5. 
16 Throughout this study the term “state-owned enterprises” will be used although government-owned 
enterprises are also referred to as parastatals, public entities or public enterprises. Since this study is done from a 
competition law perspective, commercialised SOEs and those operated in accordance with normal business 
practices are the focus. Therefore when reference is made to SOEs it should be understood to refer to these types 
of SOEs unless it is otherwise clearly stated. The very nature of state-owned enterprises known as government 
agencies, boards and commissions excludes them from the scope of this study.  Although the discussion in the 
study mostly focuses on “national public entities”, all recommendations that are made in chapter five of this 
study should be extended to “provincial public entities” and entities on municipal level as well.  
The Cambridge Business English Dictionary (Cambridge University Press, 2011) abbreviates state-owned 
enterprises as “SOEs”. 
17 Act 1 of 1999.  
The PFMA and its purpose are comprehensively discussed in para 1.2.3 chapter 5. 
18 See Schedules 1 and 2 of the PFMA for a complete list of SOEs in South Africa.  
19 See AEC Electronics (Pty) Ltd v The Department of Minerals and Energy [2009] 2 CPLR 379 (CT); and 
Phutuma Networks (Pty) Ltd v Telkom SA Ltd [2011] 1 CPLR 213 (CT), which state that the antitrust provisions 
of the Competition Act is applicable to the economic activities of the state.  
See paras 1.1.2 and  3.3.5  of chapter 5 for further reference to these cases. 
20 A detailed discussion of South African state-owned enterprises follows in chapter two of this study. 
21 See section 1 of the PFMA which defines a “national government business enterprise” as an entity which:  
“(a) is a juristic person under the ownership control of the national executive; 
(b) has been assigned financial and operational authority to carry on a business activity; 
(c) as its principal business, provides goods or services in accordance with ordinary business principles; and 





such as the aforementioned ones also have private competitors within the sector in 
which they operate. Sappington and Sidak are therefore correct when they state that, 
“SOEs compete directly with private, profit-maximizing enterprises in many important 
markets.”22 Because of section 81, the competitors of SOEs are protected against 
any anticompetitive behaviour by the SOEs.  
 
There is however one aspect relating to SOEs which is not covered by the 
application of the Competition Act but may have a significant impact on free and fair 
competition and can be of big concern for private competitors of SOEs. Due to their 
ownership and mandates, SOEs including the ones which perform economic 
activities may rely on the financial backing of the state. Their ownership and 
mandates entitle them to enjoy privileges which their private counterparts do not 
have. These privileges include (i) monopoly power, (ii) credit guarantees, (iii) 
freedom from paying investors an expected rate of return, (iv) exemption from 
bankruptcy, (v) tax exemptions, (vi) direct subsidies, and (vii) immunity from antitrust 
prosecution, disclosure requirements, and other regulations.23 The never-ending 
state funding of SAA on numerous occasions in order to protect the airline from 
financial disaster, often caused by financial mismanagement and poor governance, 
is a perfect illustration of the privileges enjoyed by SOEs. The competition legislation 
is only applicable insofar as the economic activities of these enterprises are 
concerned, even though these privileges may impact just as much on the 
competitive process as anticompetitive behaviour does. 
 
All these privileges may create an uneven playing field for SOEs and their private 
competitors that operate in favour of SOEs. This may create warped incentives. 
SOEs may not compete efficiently if they know that they are protected by a state 
sponsored safety net.24 Not only does uncontrolled state aid to SOEs which perform 
economic activities impact negatively on the competitive process in the present but 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(i) the National Revenue Fund; or 
(ii) by way of a tax, levy or other statutory money;” 
22 DEM Sappington & JG Sidak “Competition Law for State owned enterprises” (2003) 71(2) Antitrust Law 
Journal 479 479. 
23 RR Geddes Competing with the Government: Anticompetitive Behaviour and Public Enterprises (2004) xi. 
24 See V Gumede Political Economy of post-Apartheid South Africa (2015) 81 where the author states that 





even if there is ever a decision by the government to sell its ownership of an SOE, it 
is likely to become a dominant privately owned business that creates a threat to 
competition. Hence, this study is in agreement with Ahlborn’s and Berg’s observation 
that “state aid raises competition concerns where it allows inefficient undertakings to 
survive artificially in a competitive market to the detriment of more efficient 
competitors”.25 It has therefore become important to determine whether the 
privileges which are enjoyed by SOEs should not be subject to scrutiny in order to 
bring about a level playing field between SOEs and their private competitors. In order 
to do so there has to be a closer look at the reasons why SOEs are part of South 
Africa’s economy, why they are funded by the state, why their funding has become 
such a contentious issue and why it has become paramount to scrutinise and 
regulated some forms of state financial aid to SOEs. These matters are 
comprehensively discussed in chapters two26 and five27 respectively. Hence, it 
suffices to provide a concise position on these aspects for purposes of this chapter. 
 
1 1 The indisputable need for SOEs in post-Apartheid South Africa  
 
The need for the existence of SOEs in South Africa is acknowledge in this study.28 
They play an important role in the development of South Africa. SOEs are used by 
the state to provide pivotal services and goods which are needed for socio-economic 
development. In terms of the South African Constitution the state has a duty to 
ensure that basic services and goods are provided to all South Africans.29 The 
government is further under political pressure to ensure that these services are 
provided. The state uses SOEs to fulfil these duties and responsibilities. The South 
African government’s intervention in certain industries is driven by its ambition to 
bring positive change to the lives of South Africans. The government therefore uses 
                                                          
25 C Ahlborn & C Berg “Can State Aid Control Learn from Antitrust? The Need for a Greater Role for 
Competition Analysis under the State Aid Rules” in A Biondi, P Eeckhout &  J Flynn (eds)  The Law of State 
Aid in the European Union  (2004) 41 50.  
26 See para 3.3 of chapter 2. 
27 See para 2.1 of chapter 5. 
28 Chapter two will provide a broad discussion for the reasons SOEs are part of the South African economy. 
29 In terms of the Preamble of the Constitution, the Constitution is the guide to elected representatives of the 
people of South Africa, to “improve the quality of lives of all citizens and free the potential of each person”. 
Rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights such as the right to adequate housing, healthcare services, sufficient food 
and water must be respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled by the state. See section 7-39 of the Constitution 




SOEs to promote economic equality for all South Africans. It will become clear from 
the discussion below and the more comprehensive discussion that follows in chapter 
two that there are good reasons for having SOEs as part of the South African 
economy. Through the use of SOEs the government tries to achieve socio-economic 
goals. The existence of SOEs in certain sectors is thus of great importance. 
Ramamurti30 notes that it is a widely held belief that private firms do things right even 
if they not always do the right things while SOEs are expected to both do things right 
and to do the right things. It is important to acknowledge that SOEs in South Africa 
often “do the right things”31 and it is crucial that they do the right thing to achieve the 
socio-economic goals of post-apartheid South Africa. However, it is fair to remark 
that SOEs are not always doing things right.32 They are often tainted by inefficiency 
and corruption which causes them to be less efficient than private enterprises. This 
also prevents them from achieving their crucial mandates such as their mandates “to 
do things right” or it unnecessarily increases the cost of doing the right things.  
 
1 1 1 SOEs as past and present role players in South Africa’s economy 
 
It is also not a new occurrence for the post-Apartheid government in South Africa to 
be actively involved in the economy through SOEs. South Africa has a rich history of 
having SOEs as part of its economy.33 This aspect is extensively discussed in 
chapter two34 and it suffices to state here that SOEs were already part of the South 
African economy long before the dawn of democracy. Clark states that the South 
African state played “a growing interventionist role” after World War I in order to “deal 
with structural imbalances in the economy and the legitimation crisis”.35 Hence, 
                                                          
30 R Ramamurti “Controlling State-owned Enterprises” in R Ramamurti & R Vernon(eds) Privatization and 
Control of State-Owned Enterprises  (1991) 206 207. 
31 R Ramamurti “Controlling State-owned Enterprises” in R Ramamurti & R Vernon(eds) Privatization and 
Control of State-Owned Enterprises  (1991) 206 207. 
32 See para 1.2 of chapter 5 for a discussion on the failures of governance and good financial management in 
South African SOEs which validates the argument that they do not always do things right. 
33 See in this regard for example: CH Feinstein An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination 
and Development (2005); NL Clark State Corporations in South Africa: Manufacturing Apartheid in South 
Africa (1994);  and H Borat, A Hirsch, R Kanbur & M Ncube The Oxford Companion to the Economics of South 
Africa (2014) 203. 
34 See para 3.3 of chapter 2. 




SOEs were already integral to the economy of the Union.36 Moreover, according to 
Clark the role of SOEs became particularly visible and prominent during the 
Apartheid era.37 Many of these enterprises helped to shape South Africa’s economy 
when it was isolated from the rest of the world economy because of its policies.38 
During Apartheid SOEs such as: Eskom created independence in electricity 
generation and supply; Iscor produced steel to provide for the local demand; Sasol 
satisfied the need for gas, petrol, diesel and other liquid fuels; and Armscor made 
South Africa more or less self-sufficient in the manufacturing of weapons. It is 
therefore not surprising that SOEs continue to play a significant role in the economy 
of a democratic South Africa.39 Although Sasol and Iscor, two of Apartheid’s most 
prominent SOEs, were privatised before the commencement of the democratic 
dispensation,40 little has changed in regard to the importance of certain SOEs in 
South Africa. Today Eskom is still the biggest and only provider of electricity and 
Armscor still manufactures armaments for the South African military.  
 
1 1 2 SOEs as role players in addressing socio-economic issues in South 
Africa 
 
The moral function of some essential SOEs in post-Apartheid South Africa is 
condensed in a statement made by Berdyaev41 when he noted that: 
 
                                                          
36 The Electricity Supply Commission, today known as Eskom, was established in 1923 while the establishment 
of the Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation (Iscor) followed in 1928. See chapter two for a more detailed 
discussion of these SOEs. The Union of South Africa came into being after the unification of the two former 
Boer republics and the two former British colonies in May 1910. It was also referred to as “a self-governing 
dominion within the British Empire”. See P Merrington “Masques, Monuments, and Masons: The 1910 Pageant 
of the Union of South Africa” (1997) 49(1) Theatre Journal 1 1. 
37 NL Clark State Corporations in South Africa: Manufacturing Apartheid in South Africa (1994) xi. 
38 Roberts and Rustomjee observes that the SOEs such as ISCOR and Sasol were “nurtured” by the Apartheid 
regime as these SOEs were strategically important as they prolonged the existence of the Apartheid regime. See 
S Roberts & Z Rustomjee “Industrial Policy under Democracy: apartheid’s grown-up infant industries? Iscor 
and Sasol” (2009) 71 Transformation 50 50. 
39 The importance of SOEs as part of the South Africa economy is generally acknowledged. See D Fourie “The 
role of Public Sector Enterprises in the South African Economy” (2014) 7(1) African Journal of Public Affairs 
30 30 where the author states the following: “For South Africa, SOEs are vital to the growth of the economy and 
in the development of the country’s strategic sectors, especially energy, transport, telecommunications and 
manufacturing.” 
40 Sasol was privatised in 1979 and Iscor was privatised in 1989. See para 1.2.1 of chapter 5 for the discussion 
on the impact which the privatisation of Iscor had within the market in which it operates. 





“The government exists not for turning life on earth into paradise but for preventing 
it from turning into a complete hell”  
 
That is exactly what the South African government tries to achieve through its use 
and financing of SOEs. If it were not for SOEs, millions of poor South Africans would 
not have had access to certain products and services, which include affordable 
electricity, water and sanitation, affordable railway transport and postal services. 
Statistics South Africa states that 89.9 percent of households in South Africa have 
access to piped water, 77.9 percent of households have access to improved 
sanitation, 85.4 percent of households have access to electricity as an energy 
source42 and postal services are provided by 1520 fully fledged branches and 702 
agency points of representation.43 These are impressive numbers considering that 
South Africa has such a high level of inequality and poverty and people might not 
always have the resources to access such services and goods. The transfer of state 
ownership to private owners through privatisation could threaten the delivery of these 
services and goods to poorer South Africans. Socially immobilised South Africans 
are therefore able to afford such services and goods due to the involvement of the 
state in the economy through its SOEs.  
 
1 1 3 Socio-economic development 
 
Koch44 states that “state-owned companies that provide the backbone of an 
economy can be expected to help spur economic growth and development”. SOEs 
such as Eskom and Transnet truly form the “backbone” of the South African 
economy because of the services and goods which they provide. In light of the 
continuous and growing importance of SOEs, Cyril Ramaphosa, the deputy-
President of South Africa at the time and currently the President of South Africa, 
undertook a trip to China in 2015 to learn more on the role of SOEs in the Chinese 
                                                          
42 These figures are provided by Statistics South Africa. See http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/ (last accessed on 26 
August 2019). 
43 https://nationalgovernment.co.za/entity_annual/1358/2017-south-african-post-office-(sapo)-annual-report.pdf.  
(accessed on 26 June  2019). 
44 S Koch “The secret to successful state-owned enterprises is how they are run” The Conversation (22 January 
2016) 




economy and how South African SOEs can be used to stimulate growth of the South 
African economy while also addressing poverty and unemployment.45 It is clear that 
SOEs will continue to be important vehicles for socio-economic development.  
 
1 1 4 SOEs as employment creators  
 
SOEs are not only relevant for the products and services they provide. They are also 
strategically positioned to create employment in South Africa with its high 
unemployment rate which on 4 December 2019 stood at 29 percent.46 These 
enterprises also had significant roles in job creation before the democratic 
dispensation. Clark notes that Jan Smuts47 created Eskom to satisfy “whites facing 
rural poverty and urban unemployment” and that Iscor was created for the same 
reasons which were “to promote industrialization and to provide jobs for whites”.48 At 
present SOEs are also being used to create employment.  
 
1 2 Why there should be some degree of scrutiny and regulation of state 
financial aid to SOEs in South Africa49 
 
It is known that state aid to SOEs, whether through recapitalisation by the National 
Treasury50 or the granting of government guarantees,51 costs the state annually 
                                                          
45 See the then-Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa’s,  address on South Africa-China State-Owned Enterprises 
at a Seminar, Beijing 15 July 2015”  
(http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/deputy-president-cyril-ramaphosa-address-south-africa-china-state-
owned-enterprises-seminar) (last accessed on 16 March 2017).  
For a comprehensive discussion on the position of SOEs in China see Y Liu “A Comparison of China’s State-
Owned Enterprises and Their Counterparts in the United States: Performance and Regulatory Policy” (2009) 
69(S1) Public Administration Review S46 S46-S52. 
46 http://www.statssa.gov.za/ (accessed on 29 August 2019).  
47 Jan Smuts is the South African statesman who became first prime minster in 1919 after the death of Louis 
Botha but lost an election in 1924 to JBM Hertzog. See NL Clark State Corporations in South Africa: 
Manufacturing Apartheid in South Africa (1994) 60. 
48 NL Clark State Corporations in South Africa: Manufacturing Apartheid in South Africa (1994) 69. 
49 See para. 1 of chapter 5 for a comprehensive discussion of the reasons for the proposed extension of the 
application of competition law to state financing of SOEs. 
50 See for example the  cash transfer which the National Treasury made in terms of section 16 of the PFMA  for 
the recapitalisation of SAA  
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2017/2017070101%20SAA%20recapitalisation.pdf). The types 
of state aid which is regularly given to SOEs will be comprehensively discussed in chapter 5.  
51 Although government guarantees may not have an immediate effect on public funds, it still has a negative 
implication for public funds in the event that SOEs have to draw on the guarantees.  The different government 





billions of rand. In light of the important roles of SOEs in the South African society 
and economy as pointed out above and the crucial governmental mandates of 
SOEs, it is at least tenable to argue that the granting of state aid in various forms to 
SOEs which operate in key industries is often required for reasons of social and 
economic development. SOEs might be at a disadvantage in comparison with their 
private competitors if state aid is not provided as they have to achieve both their pure 
commercial goals and deliver their governmental mandate. It is therefore unrealistic 
to expect the government to stop all state aid to SOEs and it is acknowledge that 
SOEs should be able to rely on the financial support of the state in order to deliver 
their mandates.  
 
Nonetheless, even with all the crucial roles which SOEs play, it is important that 
these enterprises should curb their reliance on state funding as far as possible. 
Instead of helping to spur economic growth, at present these SOEs weigh the 
economy down when they require regular state financial intervention.52 
 
Free and fair competition is one of the crucial driving forces behind any country’s 
business and thus economic success.53 State funding of SOEs may cause significant 
problems for competitors of SOEs as it may impact on their business operations and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
guarantee from 31 March 2017 to 31 March 2023. Eskom has used R187 billion of the R350 billion government 
guarantees and the National Treasury estimated that R218.2 billion will be utilised by 2016/17 year-end. 
 In regard to SAA the National Treasury states that “the carrier remains technically insolvent. Its going-concern 
status depends on state guarantees totalling R19.1 billion.”  
In regard to the South African Post Office the National Treasury states as follows: “Since 2014, government has 
granted SAPO guarantees of R4.44 billion,[..] Government reprioritised other expenditure to provide SAPO 
with a recapitalisation tranche of R650 million in April 2016.”   
In regard to the South African National Road Agency (SANRAL) the National Treasury states that “Over the 
medium term, government has allocated R1.2 billion to SANRAL to compensate for the reduction in the 
standard toll tariff on the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project from 60c to 30c per kilometre, and the halving 
of monthly caps.”  
The position at the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) follows suit. National Treasury states that 
“Over the medium term, the Department of Transport will provide a capital transfer of R49.3 billion to 
PRASA.” 
See the National Treasury’s Budget Review (2017) 100-102 
(accessible at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2017/review/FullBR.pdf). 
52 S Koch “The secret to successful state-owned enterprises is how they are run” The Conversation (22 January 
2016) 
(accessible at http://theconversation.com/thesecrettosuccessfulstateownedenterprisesishowtheyrerun53118). 
53 What is referred to as the “German Miracle” serves as support for this observation. Erhard observed that 
“Competition is the most promising means to achieve and to secure prosperity. It alone enables people in their 
role of consumer to gain from economic progress. It ensures that all advantages which result from higher 
productivity would eventually be enjoyed”. L Erhard Prosperity through Competition: The Economics of the 




further skew an already uneven playing field between SOEs and their competitors. 
Unrestricted and perpetual state aid to SOEs which perform economic activities is 
not compatible with the aims of a free and fair competitive economy. Such a position 
is unsustainable in a country which aims to achieve inclusive economic growth. 
South Africa cannot continue to have a situation where we want all enterprises to 
contribute to the growth of the economy on the one hand but on the other hand we 
allow the competitive imbalance between SOEs and private enterprises to continue 
regardless of the presence of internal failures of many SOEs.54 It is therefore 
questioned whether unlimited government-granted privileges and immunities to 
SOEs, regardless of the dire circumstances relating to financial management and 
corporate governance, should remain the norm. This is particularly important if the 
SOEs operate within sectors where they have or may have private competitors. It is 
submitted that the correct evaluation of state aid to certain SOEs and its impact on 
competition has become imperative for maintaining healthy competition between all 
enterprises. In order for South Africa’s competition laws to do exactly what it is 
intended to do, namely to protect free and fair competition between all enterprises 
regardless of ownership, South Africa needs to address the risk which is posed by 
unrestrained state financing of certain SOEs.  
 
Competition spurs efficiency and competitive SOEs that are adequately disciplined 
by market forces will also be able to translate that efficiency to the delivery of 
government mandates. There accordingly is an important synergy between the 
promotion of competition with regard to the economic activities of SOEs and the 
delivery on their government mandates. 
 
Furthermore, the dependence of SOEs on government funds diverts money away 
from other pressing socio-economic needs such as health care, education and social 
security. As a result South Africans are the biggest losers when it comes to 
inefficiently operated SOEs which regularly require state financial aid.  
 
                                                          
54 State aid may contribute to failures of governance and good financial management in SOEs. These 




It is therefore submitted that there can be little doubt that South Africans on the one 
hand have an interest in having this issue addressed and competitors of SOEs on 
the other hand would prefer government financial intervention that takes place in 
accordance with a recognised structure and with transparency. Judge Sutherland in 
regard to the funding of an SOE (in this case SAA) remarked that: 
 
 “the controversy about SAA and its dependence on taxpayer funds seems to me to 
be a demonstrably obvious topic about which every citizen has a tangible interest to 
be informed. If the constitutional promise of transparency in public administration is 
to mean anything, then awareness of what public bodies do with the nation’s money 
is a low threshold to demand”.55  
 
It is against this background that this study raises the question whether it has not 
become necessary for South Africa to consider the implementation of state aid 
control rules which will form part of its competition law framework, to protect the 
competitive process when state aid is granted. The “dependence on taxpayer funds” 
of nearly every SOE which performs economic activities, has necessitated the quest 
to find a solution for the potential distortive effects which state funding of SOEs may 
have on free and fair competition and the potential negative impact which it may 
have on competitors of SOEs. The solution needs to give full recognition to the need 
for state financial aid to SOEs under certain circumstances and be mindful of the 
government’s prerogative to always act in the broader public interest. For this reason 
privatisation as an option to correct these failures with regard to SOEs is therefore 
eschewed. Privatisation may hamper the ability of the government to eradicate 
poverty and inequality. Instead this study proposes a state aid evaluation system 
which will promote competitive markets but will be sensitive to the public interest 
roles and mandates of SOEs. It is recognised though that the goals of South Africa’s 
competition laws56 are to control and eliminate anti-competitive practices by 
enterprises and to regulate mergers between enterprises and not to control state 
                                                          
55 South African Airways SOC v BDFM Publishers (Pty) Ltd [2016] 1 All SA 860 (GJ) 882. 




funding as there might be certain difficulties with such a position.57 State funding of 
SOEs is currently not regulated by South Africa’s competition laws. But Collins58 has 
correctly observed that the “necessity of state-aid regulation to effective competition 
law enforcement depends entirely on the goals of a nation's antitrust framework”.59 
 
Even if it is ambitious to believe that the South African government would subject 
itself to any controls in regard to its prerogative to provide state aid to SOEs, it has 
become imperative to determine how SOEs can become less dependent on 
government funding and more self-reliant. It is recognised that such an endeavour 
will not be without significant challenges, especially since the funding of SOEs in 
South Africa is a “politically sensitive” matter. However, an investigation into the 
possible application of state aid control rules in South Africa may assist to determine 
how South Africa can create more competition in sectors of the economy where 
there is currently no effective competition, either because of state-owned monopolies 
or because of the unwillingness of potential private competitors to enter a market 
due to the presence of an SOE which may always rely on government funding.  
 
EU state aid rules have been described as the most sophisticated and extensive 
state aid control rules in the world.60 For this reason the EU state aid control rules 
were chosen to serve as guidance for a possible South African equivalent. The 
reasons for the existence of the EU state aid control rules: why it was necessary to 
create a state aid control regime which regulates state aid by member states of the 
EU to any undertaking regardless of its ownership, will be scrutinised. Furthermore, 
the substance of the EU state aid control regime: its rules, its application61 and 
enforcement,62 exemptions63 to its application and procedural64 aspects have to be 
                                                          
57 All the difficulties which may be encounter with the implementation of EU-style state aid rules in a single 
country such as South Africa are discussed in para 2 of chapter 5. 
58 AR Collins “Is the regulation of state-aid a necessary component of an effective competition law framework” 
(2005) 16(2) European Business Law Review 379 379. 
59 AR Collins “Is the regulation of state-aid a necessary component of an effective competition law framework” 
(2005) 16(2) European Business Law Review 379 379. 
60 M Merola “Regional Aid: Recent Trends and some Historical Background- with special focus on large 
investment projects” 2010 3 European State Aid Law Quarterly 589 589. 
61 See para 4 of chapter 4. 
62 See para 8 of chapter 4. 
63 See para 5 of chapter 4.  




comprehensively discussed.65 For purposes of this chapter it suffices to provide a 
concise description of the rules and its application.  
 
2 Regulation of state aid as part of competition law: the European Union 
position  
 
2 1 A brief introduction to the EU state aid rules 
 
The EU is a supranational institution which consists at present of 28 member 
states.66 Graham has stated that: 
 
“…the fundamental underlying purpose of the European Union has been to create a 
single European market where the same conditions apply to economic 
transactions….”67  
 
The creation of an internal market68 was one of the core objectives of the EU.69 The 
internal market is “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”.70 This objective would not have 
been achieved if member states were allowed to act in ways which are not 
consistent with an internal market. The granting of state aid to undertakings 
operating within a member state’s borders (hereinafter connected undertakings) was 
considered to be one of those measures which could have affected the realisation of 
the internal market. Hence, rigorous supranational policies, of which the competition 
policy is one, were put in place to achieve the realisation of the internal market.  
 
If state aid by member states to undertakings were left unregulated, undertakings 
from other member states that are unaided would have been at a disadvantage 
                                                          
65 See chapter 4. 
66 Great Britain completed its exit as an EU member state on 31 January 2020 after the British population voted 
during a referendum on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU.  
67 C Graham EU and UK Competition Law (2010) 11. 
68 The founding treaties of the European Union and some older treaties use the phrase “common market”. 
However, in this study the phrase currently in use, which is the “internal market”, will be used.  
69 C Graham EU and UK Competition Law (2010) 301. 
70 Article 26(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Official Journal of the European Union 




when they compete with the supported undertakings. This might have distorted 
competition within the internal market. Consequently state aid to undertakings which 
perform economic activities within the EU had to be regulated. State aid control rules 
became part of the regulatory responses by the EU to avoid situations where 
member states would give preference to connected undertakings and therewith 
nullify the objective of the internal market. State aid rules, which have been a crucial 
part of the EU competition law framework since the establishment of the first 
European Communities,71 therefore apply equally to all EU member states and in the 
internal market72 as if it were one country, even though each member state has its 
own domestic economic policies. Through the regulation of state aid, both 
competition between undertakings and trade between member states are protected.  
 
2 1 1 Application of EU state aid rules73 
 
The legislative basis of the EU’s state aid rules is found in Articles 107-10974 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 107(1) of the TFEU 
provides that: 
 
 'Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever75 which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States be incompatible with the 
common market.' 
 
                                                          
71 The three founding European Communities which is the European Economic Community (EEC) established 
in 1957, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established in 1951 and the European Atomic 
Community (EURATOM) established in 1957 are all discussed in more detail in chapter four of this study. See 
para 3 of chapter 4. 
72 The internal market is described as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.” See J Fairhurst Law of the European Union 8 ed (2010) 770.  
73 See para 4 of chapter 4. 
74  See paras 3.4 and 4 of chapter 4 for a discussion of these articles. The numbering of these articles has 
changed as greater integration happened and as new treaties were signed and incorporated with the founding 
treaties. In the European Economic Community Treaty of 1957 it was numbered as Article 92-94, and then it 
was changed to Articles 87-89 in the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty). Throughout this 
study the current numbering will be used when reference is made to these treaty articles. 




Fairhurst states that these articles are not concerned with the way in which the state 
aid is granted but how the aid granted by the state or derived from the state may 
distort free and fair competition between undertakings.76 State aid as a notion is thus 
interpreted widely.77 This wide interpretation was confirmed in Banco de Credito 
Industrial SA (Banco Exterior de Espaqa SA) v Ayuntamiento de Valencia78 where 
the compatibility with EU law of a law providing tax exemption to certain 
undertakings in Spain and Greece was examined. The court said that: 
 
“In principle, the concept of aid must be interpreted broadly79 and refers to all forms 
of reduced burdens on undertakings. However, the concept of aid extends further 
than the concept of a subsidy……. Consequently, a fiscal advantage is capable of 
constituting aid….”80 
 
EU state aid rules apply to all undertakings which are engaged in economic activity81 
regardless of ownership. An undertaking is defined as “every kind of natural or legal 
person engaged in economic or commercial activity; it must be established in order 
to make a profit.”82 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provided its 
interpretation of the term “undertaking” in Hofner and Elser v Macrotron.83 The court 
defined an undertaking as follows: 
 
“in the context of competition law….. the concept of an undertaking encompasses 
every entity engaged in economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity 
and the way in which it is financed.” 
 
                                                          
76 J Fairhurst Law of the European Union 8 ed (2010) 648.   
77 J Fairhurst Law of the European Union 8 ed (2010) 648. 
78 [1994] ECR 1-877.  
79 My emphasis. 
80 Banco de Credito Industrial SA (Banco Exterior de Espaqa SA) v Ayuntamiento de Valencia [1994] ECR 1-
877 para 46. 
81 The concept of “economic activity” is extensively discussed in para 1.1.2 of chapter 5. 
82 J Fairhurst European Union 6 ed (2007) 640. See also the detailed discussion on the concept of an 
undertaking, including a public undertaking, in the EU in para 2.1 of chapter 2. 
83 Case C-41/90 [1991] ECR 1-1979 para 2.  




Therefore any member state which intends to provide state aid to an undertaking in 
the EU is subject to the stringent state aid rules and no aid may be allocated in an 
arbitrary way.  
 
2 1 2 Enforcement of EU state aid rules84 
 
Member states are required to notify the EU Commission, which is responsible for 
overseeing the application of Union law,85 of any possible aid to an undertaking, with 
certain state aid measures being exempted from the notification requirement. 
Exemptions may be granted in terms of the Block Exemption Regulation,86 the de 
minimis principle87 or the aid may be exempted in terms of article 107 (2) and (3) 
which provide a list of state aid which is per se regarded as being “compatible with 
the internal market” and aid that “may be compatible with the internal market”. In the 
event that aid is given by a member state to an undertaking without the approval of 
the EU Commission, the Commission has the responsibility to decide whether the 
aid was given in violation of the Treaty.88 The EU Commission therefore enforces a 
supranational competition legislative framework which incorporates the EU state aid 
rules. 
 
3 Recognising the differences between South Africa as a single state and the 
EU as a supranational institution  
 
State aid rules are unique to the EU because of its composition. This study 
recognises the vast differences between the EU and South Africa. A detailed 
                                                          
84 See para 8 of chapter 4 for a comprehensive discussion on the enforcement of EU state aid rules. 
85 See Article 17 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union Official Journal of the 
European Union No C 202/25 (2016). 
86 If state aid is part of a block exemption in the Block Exemption Regulation the granting of the aid has the 
automatic approval of the European Commission. See para 5.2 of chapter 4 for a detailed discussion on the 
Block Exemption Regulation. 
87 De minimis aid is aid which does not exceed €200,000 per undertaking over any period of 3 fiscal years. See 
the Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty and Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to de minimis aid. See para. 5.3 of chapter 4 for a detailed discussion the de minimis rule. 




analysis of these differences will be undertaken in chapter 5.89 It suffices to state 
here that South Africa is a rather small economy in comparison with that of the EU. 
Post-apartheid South Africa grapples with social and economic problems that do not 
arise in the EU. It is also acknowledged that there will be difficulties in transplanting 
supra-national EU state aid rules to a single country such as South Africa.90 Hence, 
the proposals for a potential state aid control regime for South Africa that are made 
in this study will recognise and be strongly influenced by these enormous differences 
between the EU and South Africa. 
 
Moreover, there is much to be learned about state aid to SOEs by single states,91 if 
one looks beyond the EU’s supranational status to some of its individual member 
states. Particularly important is what transpired within some eastern European 
countries92 before they joined the EU in 2004. Most of these countries do not have 
much bigger economies than South Africa93 and most of their economies were 
predominantly state-controlled via SOEs in the past as most had “centrally planned 
economies” with state aid as an “essential element.”94 The implementation of the EU 
state aid control rules was however one of the requirements for accession to the 
EU.95 The EU Commission managed to ensure that these countries complied with 
the state aid rules without significant transitional problems. This was mainly because 
they were required to have measures in place before accession, to ensure that there 
would be compliance with the state aid rules on accession.96 Hence, these countries 
                                                          
89 See para 2.2  of chapter 5 for a discussion of the supranational status of the EU as one potential impediment to 
the application of  state aid rules in South Africa as a single state.    
90 These difficulties are comprehensively discussed in para 2 of chapter 5.  
91 In this regard reference can also be made to the future UK state aid control regime which will be implemented 
in terms of the “State Aid (EU Exit) Regulations 2019” after the UK leaves the EU.  The position on state aid in 
the UK after it exit the EU is comprehensively discussed in para 4.3.7.3 (a)  
Ukraine is another single state where a state aid control regime applies. In terms of the Association Agreement 
between the EU and Ukraine which is in effect since September 2017 and replaced the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement of 1998 between the EU and Ukraine, Ukraine as a third country was required by the 
EU to implement a domestic state aid control system which replicates the position in the EU 
92 This includes for example countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 
93 See for example A Lester, E Nel & T Binns South Africa Past, Present and Future: Gold at the end of the 
Rainbow (2014) 283 where the authors found some “interesting similarities” between South Africa and Poland 
and place South Africa “well above” Romania when considering the per capita GNP.  
94 See J Hoelscher, N Nulsch & J Stephan “State Aid in the New EU Member States” (2017) 55(4) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 779 779.   
95 See P Schitterle “Implementing of the EC State Aid Control - an Accession Criterion” (2002) 1(1) European 
State Aid Law Quarterly 79 79–86. 
96 See J Hoelscher, N Nulsch & J Stephan “State Aid in the New EU Member States” 2017 55(4) Journal of 




adopted national state aid laws and their own authorities were monitoring the 
enforcement of their state aid laws.97 Schitterle98 states that in accordance with the 
European Agreements concluded between these eastern European countries and 
the EU at the time, the EU state aid rules were supposed to be implemented by 31 
December 1997. Even though they only implemented the rules in 2001,99 the 
important point is that these countries, all with former “centrally planned economies”, 
managed to do so successfully long before accession in 2004. This relatively smooth 
transition and compliance with the EU state aid rules by countries which had 
“centrally planned” economies and high levels of state intervention in their 
economies show: 
(i) that single state status is not necessarily an impediment to the implementation of 
state aid rules; 
(ii) that even in countries where SOEs were prevalent and assumingly regularly 
getting state aid due to their ownership, state aid rules could be implemented 
effectively; and  
(iii) that the implementation of state aid control rules does not necessarily take away 
the state’s ability to intervene in the economy but the state would do so in 
accordance with a set of rules which not only protects all economic competitors but 
also helps to grow the economy. It therefore does not take away the state’s ability to 
achieve governmental aims by using SOEs since state aid is still allowed for public 
interest reasons.100 The important aim it achieves though is to ensure that state aid 
is not distorting competition which is important for economic growth.  
 
As full member states of the EU, these eastern European countries have no choice 
but to comply with the state aid rules and it appears as if they continue to do so as 
there are no out of the ordinary complaints against them for providing unlawful state 
aid. They seem to act as they are required to do by the state aid rules and in the 
                                                          
97 See J Hoelscher, N Nulsch & J Stephan “State Aid in the New EU Member States” 2017 55(4) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 779 781-782. 
98 P Schitterle “Implementing of the EC State Aid Control - an Accession Criterion” (2002) 1(1) European State 
Aid Law Quarterly 79 80. 
99 See para 2.2 of chapter 5 for a discussion on the challenges which national monitoring authorities faced while 
having to enforce a national system of state aid control. These challenges could have played a role in the 
delayed implementations of the rules.  
100 See the discussion in para 7.2 of chapter 4 on Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) in the EU and 





exact same way as all other member states do. The analogy between South Africa 
and these eastern European countries should not be taken too far: despite the 
priority given placed on SOEs, the South African economy was never centrally 
planned, the fall of communism in eastern Europe meant that the ideological context 
within these countries were quite different from South Africa and although these 
states were still independent when they imposed state aid rules, they were 
influenced to do so by the dangling carrot of EU membership. However, this 
development still shows that the supranational nature of the EU state aid rules does 
not automatically disqualify it for consideration in a single state. 
 
4 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY  
 
This study was prompted by the uncontrolled state funding to SOEs which have or 
may have private competitors, even while these enterprises are governed and 
managed in ways which are below the minimum standard of good governance and 
management required by different legislation. Unlimited and perpetual state aid to 
poorly governed and financially mismanaged SOEs has significant consequences in 
South Africa.  
 
First, it reduces government funding which is available for other developmental 
purposes such as education and health care as funds need to be injected into these 
enterprises regularly. The National Treasury stated in its 2017 Budget Review101 that 
“operational inefficiencies, poor procurement practices, weak corporate governance 
and failures to abide by fiduciary obligations have plagued several companies that 
are now in serious financial difficulty.” The unabated spending of public money on a 
number of SOEs, notwithstanding poor governance102 and financial mismanagement 
should be of concern to all South Africans since poor governance and financial 
mismanagement keeps certain SOEs permanently dependent on government 
funding. This on its own requires an investigation into options to make SOEs less 
reliant on government funding. The growing discontent with this form of state aid 
                                                          
101 Chapter 8 of the 2017 Budget Review  
(accessible at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2017/review/Chapter%208.pdf). 
102 See A Thomas “Governance at South African state-owned enterprises: what do annual reports and the print 




illustrates the urgent need for an investigation into more effective regulation of this 
form of aid.103 National news headlines such as “Parastatals weigh on SA’s future”, 
“SAA104 and the R550-million bailout”, “Pension-fund bailout for Eskom”, “SOEs drag 
SA to the state of junk”105 and “Parastatals bailed out again-with promises of a fix” 
are a regular occurrence in the South African media.  
 
Second, state funding of SOEs have the potential to distort free and fair competition 
in South Africa because many SOEs have private competitors or potential 
competitors. This potential distortive effect of state funding of SOEs is the main focus 
of this study and it was undertaken as a result of the negative impact which state aid 
to SOEs may have on the competitive process. Hence, the intention is to find a way 
to address the possible distortive effects of the state funding of SOEs. This requires 
an investigation into possible measures which could protect private competitors of 
SOEs against measures that create an uneven playing field without taking away the 
government’s ability to grant financial aid to SOEs where appropriate. State aid 
control rules were identified as one potential measure that could achieve this. This 
study thus attempts to find a middle way that balances the protection of the 
competitive process against the distortive effects which state aid to SOEs may have 
and the state’s prerogative to provide state aid to SOEs in order for them to execute 
their governmental mandates. Although the focus of this study is to find a solution for 
the potential distortive effects which state funding of SOEs may have on the 
competitive process, such a solution would directly have a positive impact on the 
                                                          
103 See SM Muller  “South Africa needs to sober up to save itself from sickly state-owned enterprises” The 
Conversation.   Muller supports the fact that drastic steps need to be taken to address the issues in South 
Africa’s SOEs. 
(https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-to-sober-up-to-save-itself-from-sickly-state-owned-enterprises-




M Mutize &  S Gossel “Corrupt state owned enterprises lie at the heart of South Africa’s economic woes” The 
Conversation   
(https://theconversation.com/corrupt-state-owned-enterprises-lie-at-the-heart-of-south-africas-economic-woes-
79135). 
104 The courts have also noticed the public scrutiny which SAA as an SOE has been subjected to. Justice 
Sutherland in South African Airways SOC v BDFM Publishers (Pty) Ltd 2016 (2) SA 561 (GJ) 565 said “SAA is 
a public company and an organ of state whose financial affairs have been the subject of intense public interest 
and media scrutiny for several years, in which its viability as a going concern has been the main theme together 
with the financial support given to it by the state.” 




funds which are available for other developmental issues and would promote the 
efficient execution of government mandates as competition promotes the efficiency 
of enterprise. 
 
Third, SOEs such as SAA in the past frequently appeared before the South African 
competition authorities for violations of the existing competition laws.106 Currently the 
competition laws do not address the root cause of this impunity. Unrestricted state 
aid strengthens the market power of SOEs and isolates them from feeling the pinch 
of high fines and damages claims.107 Effective enforcement of conventional 
competition law may require consideration of state aid regulation.  
 
5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
 
The primary research question of this study is whether the regulation of state funding 
of SOEs which have or may have private competitors may prevent or significantly 
limit the potential distortion of competition by such state funding. In order to answer 
this question, it is necessary to know what the purpose and aims of South Africa’s 
competition legislation is and when it applies. It must then be established whether 
state aid to SOEs is of such a nature that, under certain circumstances, the 
application of South African competition laws should be extended to include it.  
 
A secondary question is whether and to what extent South Africa could benefit from 
a state aid control regime guided by the EU state aid control rules considering the 




The main hypothesis of this study is that unregulated state aid to SOEs which have 
or may have private competitors distorts competition in the absence of a proper 
regulatory framework. Free and fair competition amongst all enterprises, regardless 
of its ownership, is crucial for economic development which ultimately benefits all 
                                                          
106 See for example Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd [2005] 2 CPLR 303 (CT); and 
Competition Commission / Deutsche Lufthansa AG; South African Airways (Pty) Ltd [2006] 2 CPLR 528 (CT) 




South Africans. Unlimited state financial aid to SOEs is a significant threat to 
competitors and potential competitors, which in turn undermines the competitive 
process. State aid to SOEs without any clear criteria or legislative guidelines may 
lead to a diminished competitive drive of SOEs. SOEs will be able to produce 
products at competitive prices without being efficient because losses will be covered 
by state support. Other firms may be reluctant to enter markets dominated by SOEs 
that receive state grants even if they do not produce products at competitive prices. 
Inefficient behaviour of SOEs may be particularly harmful as it will hamper their 
ability to contribute to broader socio-economic goals. Ineffective state aid will mean 
that scarce state funds will not be applied effectively.  
 
The ordinary rules of competition law are not sufficient to ensure a level playing field 
between SOEs and their private competitors as these rules only apply to anti-
competitive behaviour by SOEs which perform economic activities, new measures 
need to be explored. It has become crucial for South Africa to address this problem 
in order to ensure economic growth for the benefit of all South Africans. 
 
7 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLGY 
 
7 1 Objectives 
 
This study highlights one of the significant threats to free and fair competition by 
identifying the potential distortive effects which unconstrained state aid to SOEs, 
may have on the competitive process in South Africa. Hence, the overall and main 
objective of this study is to have certain state aid108 to SOEs evaluated by the 
competition authorities of South Africa. It therefore seeks to identify important 
lessons from the EU’s state aid control rules which can be applied in the pursuance 
of a domestic state aid control regime.  
 
This study furthermore seeks to propose measures that balance the need for 
competitive markets and the crucial developmental and socio-economic role that is 
                                                          
108 The State aid which possibly should be subjected to evaluation by the competition authorities is discussed in 




envisaged for SOEs in South Africa. Without some state aid SOEs will not be able to 
compete effectively while at the same time fulfilling their public mandates. It is 
unlikely that the government will completely give up its sovereign powers to use state 
aided corporations to achieve policy goals. The proposals that are made here are 
sensitive to this reality. 
 
7 2 Methodology  
 
To achieve these objectives, this study considers a wide ranging number of topics: 
(i) the history and development of SOEs and the justifications for their continuous 
existence; 
(ii) the origin of statutory competition law, in the three chosen EU jurisdictions and 
South Africa and its application to SOEs; 
(iii) the EU state aid control rules; and  
(iv) the potential distortive effect which state aid to SOEs has within South Africa’s 
competitive environment and how it can be ameliorated. 
Scholarly work from the disciplines of political science, economics and law will be 
considered. The legal areas of competition law, state aid law, the law on corporate 
governance and state owned enterprises, domestic and international, as well as 
statutory material relating to these areas are at the centre of all these investigations.  
 
The part of the study which examines EU state aid rules and its relation to 
competition focuses on EU primary and secondary sources. These sources include 
the provisions of the various EU treaties which deal with state aid, directives, 
regulations and decisions on state aid issued by the EU Commission, case law on 
state aid and competition law by the CJEU and the input by the national competition 
authorities of the member states of the EU.  
 
The part of the study which examines SOEs in South Africa and the role of South 
African competition law in regard to these enterprises will encompass a variety of 
sources. These include wide ranging scholarly work, competition legislation and 
policies, the enabling legislation dealing with the operations of SOEs, other statutes 
which deal with SOEs and relevant decisions by the Competition Commission, the 




include the provincial divisions of the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
the Constitutional Court.  
 
The part of the study which examines competition regulation in three of Africa’s 
leading regional economic communities (ECOWAS, SADC and COMESA) to 
determine whether it is possible to pursue a state aid control regime for the regional 
economic community of which South Africa is a member state, draws on wide 
ranging scholarly work and primary sources such as their founding treaties, 
declarations, agreements and memoranda of understanding between member states 
of these institutions.  
 
8 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
8 1 Chapter two  
 
This chapter commences with an exploration of the origin of SOEs, their nature and 
the role and continuous use by governments of SOEs. The rise and fall of SOEs 
within selected EU member states are discussed. The purpose of this discussion is 
to show that SOEs were also crucial market players in those countries which are 
today known as developed countries before free and fair competition between 
private firms became the driving force for economic growth. For purposes of this 
discussion, the position on SOEs in Germany, France and Great Britain since the 
end of World War II is scrutinised. The reasons for selecting these countries for 
discussion are set out in chapter two but most important is that they are all currently 
members of the EU which has the world’s only state aid control regime as a crucial 
part of its competition law. This discussion reveals the differences in how these 
countries have used state-ownership, if at all, to rebuild their economies after World 
War II. The discussion on the use of SOEs as market players by states will also 
demonstrate how individual countries use SOEs for different purposes.  
 
Chapter two concludes with a discussion of the most significant South African SOEs 
before and after the dawn of democracy, their role within the South African economy 





8 2 Chapter three  
 
This chapter provides an exploration of the purpose and function of competition law 
and its relevance for SOEs. It discusses what competition law is and why it is 
important. The discussion starts with a historical overview of economic competition. 
It then proceeds with an analysis of competition law as a measure to protect 
competition. The birth of modern-day competition law in the United States of America 
and its applicability to SOEs are scrutinized. Chapter three continues with a 
discussion of the statutory competition law within the EU and its implementation 
within the three selected jurisdictions: France, Germany and Great Britain. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of statutory competition law in South Africa. 
 
8 3 Chapter four  
 
Chapter four scrutinises state aid regulation in the EU. It investigates how the 
regulation of state aid helps to promote competition among enterprises by 
scrutinising the inception of the state aid rules and why it was necessary for the 
newly established European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC) and the 
European Economic Community (the EEC) after World War II to have such rules in 
place. Both the substantive and the procedural rules of the EU state aid control 
regime are scrutinised. This discussion provides clarity on the need that is fulfilled in 
the EU by state aid control rules. The chapter also provides a discussion on the 
enforcement of EU state aid rules and the exemptions from these rules. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of state aid control outside of the EU with a focus on the 
United States of America and the World Trade Organization (the WTO). 
 
8 4 Chapter five  
 
Chapter five sets out the reasons why it is argued that state aid control rules in 
regard to certain state aid and certain SOEs are needed in South Africa, as a single 
state. The extent to which South African competition law is currently applicable to 
SOEs and the regulatory gaps in the current regime are discussed. The chapter sets 
out the benefits and difficulties with state aid rules for South Africa as a single state. 




Community (SADC), it necessitates a discussion of the competition rules within 
SADC, as this discussion stipulates the reasons why the proposals made within this 
study are made for South Africa as a single state and not as a member of SADC. For 
purposes of comparison, the competition rules within the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), two other African regional economic communities, are 
also scrutinised. The chapter concludes with a proposal regarding the entities and 
the forms of state funding to which state aid rules should be applied and the role 
which the South African competition authorities should play in evaluating state aid 
which may have a potential harmful effect on competition. 
 
8 5 Chapter six 
This chapter provides a summary of the outcomes of this study. It sets out why 
South African policymakers should give serious consideration to the implementation 
of a state aid control regime. It then sets out how such regulatory regime should 
look. Finally, the chapter concludes with a draft set of regulations that could be 
considered by the government as a possible legislative solution to the threat posed 
by state aid to free and fair competition, the wider economy and the developmental 
goals of the government. 
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1 Introduction 
SOEs1 play a pivotal role in the economies of many countries all over the world. 
During a data collection exercise by the Organization for Economic Development 
(OECD) in 2011 on the amount of SOEs within its member states, it was established 
from the information submitted by some member states2 that 2057 SOEs operate 
within those member states who have submitted data.3 It is therefore submitted that 
SOEs still play a role even in the economies of developed countries although state 
intervention in these countries has declined significantly during the 1980s and 
1990s.4 
South Africa also has many SOEs across many strategically important sectors of the 
economy which provide services and goods to the South African public.5 SOEs can 
be found in sectors such as transport, telecommunications, electricity supply and 
manufacturing.  
It is known that the presence of SOEs in markets may impact on competition within 
those markets. This is because SOEs are frequently dominant in their sectors and 
thus make the entry of a competitor into that sector difficult and/or there are 
competitors in the sector but SOEs, due to their state-ownership, enjoy the added 
advantage of possible government financial assistance or state aid which could have 
a distortive effect on competition. The granting of state aid to SOEs could mean that 
                                                          
1 Different synonyms are used to refer to state-owned enterprises. Terms such as “parastatal”, “state-owned 
corporations”, “public enterprises”, “state-owned companies”, “public entity” and “public company” are widely 
used in the literature on these institutions. In this study the term state-owned enterprises will be used throughout. 
2 The OECD has currently 34 member states of which 27 state submitted sufficient data in order to compile a 
report of the amount of operable state-owned enterprises within these countries. 
3 See H Christiansen The Size and Composition of the SOE Sector in OECD Countries OECD Corporate 
Governance Working Papers No 5 (2011) 1 6 (accessible at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg54cwps0s3-en). 
4 PA Toninelli (ed) The Rise and Fall of State-owned Enterprises in the Western World (2000) ix.  
5 The Department of Public Enterprises is the responsible ministry for state-owned enterprises in South Africa 
although there are some SOEs which are under the oversight of other ministries. These include the Department 
of Energy which has oversight over PetroSA, the Department of Communications which is responsible for the 
SABC and the Department of Transport, which has oversight over SOEs such as PRASA and the South African 
National Road Agency (SANRAL). Until recently the troubled SAA was also overseen by the Department of 
State-Owned Enterprises. This however changed when the national airline was transferred to the oversight of the 




the “competitive neutrality” principle is either not applied or its application is watered 
down. In terms of this principle SOEs and private enterprises should enjoy a “level 
playing field”.6 According to the OECD the “competitive neutrality principle” can be 
applied by having policies in place which ensure that the same rules apply to both 
private and state-owned enterprises. This would culminate in a limited role for the 
State and more competitive markets.7 To understand how state financial aid8 to 
SOEs may distort competition, it is necessary to know what SOEs are and the 
characteristics that are intrinsic to these enterprises. This discussion will recognise 
the importance of the role which SOEs played and still play in assisting states to 
develop certain industries to the benefit of all its citizens. Hence this chapter 
provides (i) an overview on the nature and characteristic of SOEs and their role 
within a market economy; (ii) the reasons for the continuous use of SOEs by 
governments; (iii) the origin of SOEs from their heydays in the 1960s; (iv) the modern 
decline of SOEs in Western economies and the reasons for the decline; and (v) the 
role of SOEs in South Africa.  
The Western economies chosen for study in this chapter are Britain, Germany and 
France. Firstly, Germany and France are and will remain members of the EU while 
Britain has decided to leave the EU but it will remain closely associated with the EU. 
As indicated in chapter one, the discussion in chapter five on how to control state aid 
to SOEs in South Africa uses the EU’s state aid control model as a benchmark 
because it is the only institution which applies a comprehensive state aid regulatory 
model as part of its competition law framework. Secondly, European integration 
started with France and Germany since they were the first two countries whose coal 
and steel industries were placed under the authority of one institution after World 
War II. This institution became known as the European Coal and Steel Community9 
and it was one of the first European communities which applied state aid control 
                                                          
6 For more on the competitive neutrality principle see OECD Competitive Neutrality: Maintaining a Level 
Playing Field between Public and Private Business (2012). This term is widely used in literature which deals 
with competition between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. See for example also A. Capobianco 
& H Christiansen Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy Options OECD 
Corporate Governance Working Papers No 1 (2011) (accessible at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg9xfgjdhg6-en). 
7 OECD State Owned Enterprises and the Principle of Competitive Neutrality (2009) 37.  
(accessible at https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/46734249.pdf). 
8 EU state aid control rules are discussed in chapter 4 and state aid to SOEs in South Africa and its impact on 
competitors of the SOEs are discussed in chapter 5. 




rules. The treaty establishing this community forms the start of European integration. 
Thirdly, Germany and France are also chosen since these two countries have the 
biggest economies in continental Europe. Fourthly, a discussion SOEs in Britain is 
justified as the divestiture of these SOEs during Margaret Thatcher’s time as Prime 
Minister was admired throughout the world and all literature today that deals with 
privatisation of SOEs includes Britain as part of the discussion. This is especially 
significant as Britain became one of the leading industrialised nations after World 
War II. In France the decline of SOEs started when Jacques Chirac became the 
Prime Minister in 1986. In Germany the decline commenced immediately after World 
War II during Konrad Adenauer’s administration. Adenauer was the first post-war 
Chancellor of Germany and he is considered to be the first Western leader after the 
war to start a divestment programme even though Margaret Thatcher’s privatisation 
programme is considered to be historically the most important one.10 A more detailed 
discussion on SOEs and their decline within the abovementioned three countries 
follows later in the chapter.  
 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the position in regard to SOEs in South 
Africa, since this study is done from a South African perspective. Also, South Africa 
is a leading economy on the African continent. It still has many SOEs which are 
granted state aid and there seems to be no reasonable indications that this position 
will change soon.  
 
1 1 Nature and characteristics 
 
Descriptions of SOEs can be found in a wide-ranging literature and case law as well 
as in several pieces of legislation worldwide.11 Gillis states that the “label” of state-
                                                          
10 WL Megginson & JM Netter “From State to Market: A survey of empirical studies on privatisation” (2001) 
39(2) Journal of Economic Literature 321 323. 
11 Coombes states that: “public corporations are like joint stock companies in that they are separate legal entities 
which can sue and be sued in courts, which keep commercial accounts, and which hire and fire their own staff. 
Public corporations are not directly accountable to Parliament (or thereby to the electorate), their staffare not 
members of the Civil Service, and they do not need parliamentary approval before spending money as does a 
government department. They are not headed by a minister but by a board of independent members appointed 
on the basis of their qualifications. However ministers (who are accountable to Parliament) may possess 
statutory powers over public corporations.” See D Coombes State Enterprise Business of Politic? (1971) 22. 
Nellis defines SOEs as:  “government owned or controlled entities which are supposed to earn the bulk of their 





owned enterprise means different things to different people.12 It is therefore 
important to identify those characteristics that distinctively make an enterprise an 
SOE. The OECD states that most countries may define SOEs as those enterprises 
in which the state holds the majority of voting shares.13 It identifies however also 
those instances in which the state is not the majority owner but still exercises a 
“similar degree of control” over the enterprise.14 In the light of this, it is submitted that 
the most important characteristic of SOEs is that they are either wholly or partially 
owned or controlled by a state. Their government ownership or control entitles SOEs 
to a number of advantages which clearly distinguish them from private enterprises. 
These advantages include that: 
 
“They are under less pressure to pay dividends. 
They have implicit government backing and can thus raise debt capital more readily. 
They have preferential access to state financing. 
They receive more or less distinguished subsidies or outright grants. 
They have a quasi-captive market at home. 
They enjoy preferential procurement conditions”15 
 
Beside their government ownership, many16 SOEs are considered to be “hybrid 
organization(s)”. This is because they also sell their output to the general public 
which makes them economic participants and bring them within the ambit of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sub-Saharan Africa World Bank Discussion Papers (1986) vii. SOEs are also described as those enterprises 
“effectively controlled by the government, those in which the state owns a majority of equity.” See R Mazzolini, 
“Are State-Owned Enterprises Unfair Competition?” (1980) 23(2) California Management Review 20 20. 
12 M Gillis “The Role of State Enterprises in Economic Development” (1980) 47(2) Social Research 248 251.  
13 OECD State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or an Opportunity?(2016) 18 
(accessible at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264262096-en).  
14 OECD State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or an Opportunity? (2016) 18 
(accessible at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264262096-en).  
15 See R Mazzolini “Are State-Owned Enterprises Unfair Competition?” (1980) 23(2) California Management 
Review 20 20.  
16 In a South African context only the commercialised SOEs and those operated in accordance with normal 
business principles are of a hybrid nature. All others public entities listed in the schedules to the PFMA are 




market.17 Hence scholars also pay particular attention to the competitive nature of 
SOEs. Sappington and Sidak18, for example, state that:  
 
“State-owned enterprises (SOEs), also known as public enterprises, are owned by 
governments rather than by private investors. SOEs compete directly with private, 
profit-maximizing enterprises in many important markets.” 
 
The authors’ observation regarding direct competition with private enterprises is 
important for purposes of this study since such direct competition by financially 
assisted SOEs causes many challenges19 to their private competitors. 
  
In the context of South Africa, SOEs are referred to in a variety of ways which 
include “parastatal”, “public entities”, “state-owned companies” and “public 
enterprises”. Reference to entities which are fully or partially owned or controlled by 
the state can be found in many statutes because South Africa does not have one 
particular statute dedicated to SOEs.20 The Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, the PFMA and the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the 
Companies Act) are a few of the more important examples. Because there is no 
dedicated Act, there is no general definition of SOEs. The most important 
                                                          
17 LP Jones Public enterprise in less developed countries (1982) 1. See also R Ramamurti “Controlling State-
owned Enterprises” in R Ramamurti &  R Vernon (eds) Privatization and Control of State-Owned Enterprises 
(1991) 206 207.  
18 DEM Sappington & GJ Sidak “Competition Law for State-owned enterprises” (2003) 71(2) Antitrust Law 
Journal 479 479. See also OECD State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or an 
Opportunity? (2016)  (accessible at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264262096-en).  
19 The advantages enjoyed by SOEs place these enterprises in a more beneficial position than their private 
competitors. It may also reduce any effort by SOEs to compete freely and fairly with their privately-owned 
counterparts. See for example R Mazzolini, “Are State-Owned Enterprises Unfair Competition” (1980) 23(2) 
California Management Review 20 20-28. 
20 Countries have adopted different legislative approaches when dealing with SOEs. While reviewing various 
legislative structures on SOEs it became apparent that countries either have one comprehensive statute which 
deals with all SOEs generally or a general statute dealing with SOEs plus individual statutes for each SOE or 
only individual statutes dealing with a particular SOE and its operations. New Zealand, Australia and Namibia 
are examples of countries which have one specific statute which deals with the governance of SOEs in general. 
Australia has the Public, Governance and Accountability Act 123 of 2013 which distinguishes between two 
types of Commonwealth entities, a corporate Commonwealth entity which is a body corporate and non-
corporate Commonwealth entity, which is a Commonwealth entity but not a body corporate. See section 11 of 
Public, Governance and Accountability Act 123 of 2013.  New Zealand has the State-Owned Enterprise Act 
1986 which lists all SOEs in Schedule 1. State-owned enterprises in the New Zealand statute includes, inter alia, 
enterprises such as Airways Corporation of New Zealand Limited, Asure Quality Limited, Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand Limited, New Zealand Post Limited, New Zealand Railways Corporation and 




categorization of public entities is found in the PFMA. Most importantly it refers to 
national21 government business enterprises which are described as a form of a 
“national public entity” together with: 
 
“(b) a board, commission, company, corporation, fund or other entity (other than a 
national government business enterprise) which is— 
(i) established in terms of national legislation; 
(ii) fully or substantially funded either from the National Revenue Fund, or by way of 
a tax, levy or other money imposed in terms of national legislation; and 
(iii) accountable to Parliament.”22 
 
A “national government business enterprise” in turn is described as an entity which: 
 
“(a) is a juristic person under the ownership control of the national executive; 
(b) has been assigned financial and operational authority to carry on a business 
activity; 
(c) as its principal business, provides goods or services in accordance with ordinary 
business principles; and  
(d) is financed fully or substantially from sources other than— 
(i) the National Revenue Fund; or  
(ii) by way of a tax, levy or other statutory money.”23 
 
The Companies Act defines a “state-owned company” as 
 
“an enterprise that is registered in terms of this Act as a company, and either— 
(a) is listed as a public entity in Schedule 2 or 3 of the Public Finance Management 
Act, 1999 (Act No. 1 of 1999); or 
 
                                                          
21 It also has a definition of a “provincial public entity”. See section 1 of the PFMA.  
22 Section 1 of the PFMA. 




(b) is owned by a municipality, as contemplated in the Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act, 2000 (Act No. 32 of 2000), and is otherwise similar to an enterprise 
referred to in paragraph (a)”24 
 
The recognition of SOEs in the Companies Act is a seminal development because 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (1973 Companies Act) did not deal specifically with 
SOEs. By specifically regulating SOEs, it is recognised that they sometimes require 
unique treatment, even though many general company law principles that apply to 
other companies will also apply to them. 
  
Since the EU’s state aid control rules serve as the yardstick to determine how state 
aid to certain SOEs in South Africa could be controlled, it is appropriate to look at 
those characteristics ascribed to SOEs in the EU. In the EU, the term “undertaking” 
is used to refer to enterprises which conduct business activities in business, whether 
public or private. Graham25 defines an undertaking in the context of competition law 
as: 
 
“The concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic 
activity regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is 
financed.” 
 
This is a rather wide definition which encompasses the activities of any economically 
active undertaking, private or public and therefore includes the economic activities of 
SOEs or public undertaking, as SOEs are called in the EU. Public undertakings are 
defined in the European Commission’s directive on the transparency of financial 
relations between member states and public undertakings26 as: 
 
                                                          
24 Section 1 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
25 C Graham EU and UK Competition Law (2010) 67.  
26 Commission’s Directive No. 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial relations between 




“any undertaking over which the public authorities may exercise directly or indirectly 
a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation 
therein, or the rules which govern it. 
A dominant influence on the part of the public authorities shall be presumed when 
these authorities, directly or indirectly in relation to an undertaking:  
(a) hold the major part of the undertaking’s subscribed capital ; or 
(b) control the majority of the votes attaching to shares issued by the undertakings; 
or 
(c) can appoint more than half of the members of the undertaking’s administrative, 
managerial or supervisory body.”27 
  
This description of “public undertakings” was reaffirmed by the CJEU in France, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom v Commission28 when it addressed the meaning of the term 
“public undertaking”.29 Public undertakings were described as enterprises over which 
a public authority30 may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence.31 It is 
stated that influence is presumed “when the public authority directly or indirectly 
holds the major part of the undertaking’s subscribed capital, control the majority of 
votes, or can appoint more than half of the members of its administrative, managerial 
or supervisory body”.32 A public undertaking in the EU is thus comparable to an SOE 
in South Africa.  
 
                                                          
27 See Article 2 of the Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of 
financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within 
certain undertakings Official Journal of the European Union No L 318/17 [2006]. The description was initially 
introduced by Commission’s Directive No. 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial 
relations between Member States and public undertakings Official Journal of the European Communities No L 
195/35 [1980].  
28 French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Commission 
of the European Communities [1982] ECR 2545. 
29 French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Commission 
of the European Communities [1982] ECR 2545. See also P Graig & G De Burca EU LAW Text, Cases and 
Material 3rd ed (2003) 1124.  
30 A public authority is described as the State, regional, local and all other territorial authorities. See Article 2 of 
the Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations 
between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain 
undertakings Official Journal of the European Union No L 318/17 [2006]. 
31 French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Commission 
of the European Communities [1982] ECR 2545. See also P Graig & G De Burca EU Law Text, Cases and 
Material 3rd ed (2003) 1124.  




1 2 Introduction to the reasons why governments utilise SOEs 
The rationales for using SOEs differ from country to country. Clark states that “state 
enterprises have been employed by almost every imaginable type of government for 
a wide variety of reasons.”33 The continuous use of SOEs should thus be viewed 
from the country’s perspective. Aikins is of the opinion that both “the market system 
and government intervention have their strengths and weaknesses, but their mutual 
coexistence is necessary for society”.34 Hence a one-size- fits -all approach cannot 
be followed to argue for less or more state intervention in the economy of an 
individual country.  
SOEs are one of the instruments for government intervention in markets. It must 
therefore be asked why government would intervene in markets and more 
particularly why they would prefer to make use of SOEs over other forms of 
intervention35 such as taxes, regulation and informal administrative guidance. 
The literature provides a wide range of reasons for governments creating or retaining 
SOEs to intervene in the economy including: “developmental goals”, “potential 
market failures”, that the state has contracted with the private sector for the 
provisions of services and goods and the desired position is not achieved, 
“regulatory deficiencies” and “political economic issues”.36 Cuervo-Cazurra and 
others argue that there are two “traditional explanations” for the existence of SOEs 
and these are the “economic” reason and the “political” reason.37 In accordance with 
the economic reason, governments use state- ownership to correct market failures 
and hence choose to become the “provider of goods to society” by using SOEs.38 In 
accordance with the political reason, the “ideology and political strategy” of the 
government may result in the creation of SOEs if the government is not sufficiently 
                                                          
33 NL Clark State Corporations in South Africa: Manufacturing Apartheid (1994) 2.  
34 SK Aikins “Political Economy of Government Intervention in the Free Market System” (2009) 31(3) 
Administrative Theory & Praxis 403 403.  
35 LP Jones Public enterprise in less developed countries (1982) 3.  
36 OECD Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries (2005) 20-21.   
37 A Cuervo-Cazurra, A Inkpen, A Musacchio & K. Ramaswamy “Governments as owners: State-owned 
multinational companies” (2014) 45(8) Journal of International Business Studies 919 921.   
38 A Cuervo-Cazurra, A Inkpen, A Musacchio & K. Ramaswamy “Governments as owners: State-owned 




confident and satisfied with private ownership of certain “productive assets”.39 The 
authors identify a number of political ideologies and strategies which might result in 
the creation of SOEs and these include communism, nationalism and social and 
strategic reasons.40 It is submitted that a government’s ideology will influence 
whether it will be using SOEs, regulation, taxes or other intervention measures when 
the need for government intervention arises. Toninelli argues along similar lines that 
the motives for governments’ use of SOEs can be grouped into three main 
categories, namely “political and ideological reasons”, “social motives” and 
“economic reasons”.41 Jones and Mason42 are in agreement with these other authors 
when they state that SOEs exist or are created: 
1. for ideological reasons; 
2. to acquire or consolidate political or economic power; 
3. due to historical heritage and inertia; and  
4. as a pragmatic response to economic problems. 
The authors rightly point out that SOEs are one of the many options available to 
governments when responding to economic crises. Other options mentioned by them 
include, inter alia, the provision of subsidies and various kinds of direct controls by 
the government.43 This was seen during the 2008 financial crisis when governments 
had to respond to an imminent danger of collapse of the international financial 
system. A complete discussion of the 2008 financial crisis is beyond the scope of this 
study. It does however require mention as it is the one major recent event that 
required government intervention in developed countries including those that are 
generally suspicious of government intervention in markets. Kaufman states that 
irresponsible mortgage practices by financial institutions were a significant cause of 
                                                          
39 A Cuervo-Cazurra, A Inkpen, A Musacchio & K. Ramaswamy “Governments as owners: State-owned 
multinational companies” (2014) 45(8) Journal of International Business Studies 919 921.   
40 A Cuervo-Cazurra, A Inkpen, A Musacchio & K. Ramaswamy “Governments as owners: State-owned 
multinational companies” (2014) 45(8) Journal of International Business Studies 919 921.   
41 P Toninelli “From private to public to private again: a long-term perspective on nationalization” (2008) 189 
Análise Social   675 678-679. 
42 LP Jones & ES Mason “Role of economic factors in determining the size and structure of the public-
enterprise sector in less-developed countries with mixed economies” in LP Jones (ed) Public Enterprise in Less 
Developed Countries (2009) 17 17.  
43 LP Jones & ES Mason “Role of economic factors in determining the size and structure of the public-
enterprise sector in less-developed countries with mixed economies” in LP Jones (ed) Public Enterprise in Less 




the 2008 crisis and that the management of leading financial institutions failed to 
implement proper structure which could assist such institutions dealing with risk.44 
Consequently the crisis struck at the “heart of the global economy rather than 
damaging its limbs.”45 Governments all over the world had to save big banks and 
corporations from financial failure. Some responded by nationalising private 
enterprises.  
In 2015 the OECD also did “stocktaking of government rationales for enterprise 
ownership”.46 Twenty four countries47 took part in the OECD process. The OECD 
concluded that the overall objectives for state ownership of enterprises in those 
countries which took part in the process are (i) to support national economic and 
strategic interests; (ii) to ensure continued national ownership of enterprises; (iii) to 
supply specific public goods or services when the state deems that the market 
cannot supply the same goods or services; (iv) to perform business operations in a 
“natural” monopoly situation; and (v) to create a state-owned monopoly (or oligopoly) 
where market regulation is deemed infeasible or inefficient.  
Governments either create new SOEs or they nationalise private enterprises. 
Nationalisation refers to the process whereby certain industries are transferred to 
state or public ownership. The literature shows that nationalisation in some 
developed countries had been used as a tool for economic development to address 
shocks caused by major historical event.48 Events at the time of the establishment of 
the SOE or the nationalisation of a private enterprise may provide clarity on the 
government’s reasons for making use of SOEs at that time. Prokopenko and Pavlin 
state that after World War II governments all over the world used SOEs as an 
economic developmental tool to achieve certain social goals as these enterprises 
                                                          
44 H Kaufmann The Financial Crisis: Causes and Remedies (2008) 253.  
45 H Kaufmann The Financial Crisis: Causes and Remedies (2008) 253. For more reading on the 2008 global 
financial crisis see also J Carmassi, D Gros & S Micossi “The Global Financial Crisis: Causes and Cures” 
(2009) 47(5) Journal of Common Market Studies 977  977–996.  
46 See OECD State-Owned Enterprise Governance: A Stocktaking of Government Rationales for Enterprise 
Ownership (2015) (accessible at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264239944-en). 
47 They are Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. 
48 In the United States of America it was a key tool after the Great Depression while in Europe the devastation 
caused by the two World Wars saw countries using nationalisation to rebuild their economies. In Europe the 
governments of countries such as Britain and France were big proponents of nationalisation of key industries 




were expected to generate employment, assist in regional development, provide 
social service, sell output at lower than market prices and ensure a more equal 
distribution of income.49 SOEs played a central role in the industrialisation process of 
many countries.50 Today SOEs are still created to assist governments with the 
development of strategic industries and to ensure control by the government over 
these industries51 even though many countries have had some kind of experience 
with privatisation.52 Many services and goods are still being provided by 
governments through the use of SOEs53 which are either newly established or 
private enterprises that were nationalised. Toninelli54 states that it is sometimes not 
clear why governments make a particular choice between nationalising private 
enterprises and establishing new SOEs, but whatever choice is made is influenced 
by a number of factors which include political, ideological and economic reasons and 
social motives. 
In South Africa all the above reasons and South Africa’s own unique circumstances55 
influenced the government to create new SOEs and retain those SOEs which it 
inherited from the Apartheid government. Eskom,56 for example, which was created 
in the 1920s formed part of the Apartheid government’s economic assets and today 
it forms part of the African National Congress (ANC) government’s economic assets. 
Even though the SOE has been plagued by problems in recent times, from financial 
and governance problems to operational problems and allegations of severe 
corruption and fraud within the SOE,57 it would be ambitious to think that the 
government will ever consider private equity in the SOE. Beside its historical 
heritage, Eskom remains one of South Africa’s most important SOEs because of it is 
                                                          
49 J Prokopenko & I Pavlin Entrepreneurship Development in Public Enterprises (1991) 8. See also WL 
Megginson & JM Netter “From State to Market: A survey of empirical studies on privatisation” (2001) 39(2) 
Journal of Economic Literature 321 323. 
50 J Prokopenko & I Pavlin Entrepreneurship Development in Public Enterprises (1991) 8.  
51 R Vernon & Y Aharoni State-owned enterprises in the Western economies (1981) 9.  
52 See the comprehensive discussion on privatisation in the selected European countries below in this chapter.  
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“developmental role”.58 Eskom provides jobs to thousands of South Africans, it 
develops crucial infrastructure, it is used for black economic empowerment purposes 
and it ensures that socially immobilised South Africans have access to affordable 
electricity. All this could be impacted if the government ever has to let go of its 100 
percent shareholding in Eskom.  
 
In conclusion, from all those reasons mentioned above, one aspect is clear and that 
is that SOEs are created or retained because of the particular circumstances present 
within a country. Such circumstances will explain why a country has many, few or no 
SOEs that participate in its economy. Hence those countries which have reached 
substantial economic development since World War II, especially Western countries, 
seem to have less SOEs operating as part of their economies than less economically 
developed countries such as China, Brazil or South Africa. 
 
1 3 The Origin of SOEs   
 
Megginson and Netter state that the “Great Depression, World War II and the final 
breakup of colonial empires” were some of the most significant reasons for 
governments to become more involved in the economy.59 Western European 
countries after World War II unanimously accepted that the state should be involved 
in “strategic manufacturing industries”, such as telecommunications, gas and 
electricity utilities, transportation and postal services.60 
 
However, SOEs already existed long before these historical events. It is stated that 
they can already be found in the Roman Empire and even receive mention in the Old 
Testament.61 Clark is of the opinion that SOEs may have existed as long as states 
themselves and in this regard refers, inter alia, to the Roman imperial plantations as 
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an example.62 It is noted that state intervention in the economy can be divided into 
three phases.63 According to Toninelli64 the first phase started during the 
Renaissance and lasted until the end of the nineteenth century, the second phase 
commenced during the first forty years of the twentieth century and the third phase 
followed Wold War II and the nationalisation drive that lasted until the 1970s,65 with 
countries like France even seeing huge nationalisations in the 1980s.66 In some 
countries SOEs were operating in every sector of the economy, in others SOEs were 
only active in certain essential sectors,67 while some others still focused on state 
regulation of certain sectors of their economies instead of actively intervening 
through the use of SOEs. In order to understand the attitude of different countries 
towards SOEs this chapter will discuss the origin and development of SOEs within 
the economies of those developed countries selected for this study and the origin 
and development of SOEs within South Africa.  
 
2 SOEs within developed economies: selected EU member states 
 
Europe has a history of state ownership with a major expansion of state 
ownership of industry occurring in the inter-war years and more especially 
after 1945. Until the 1980s, state intervention was generally accepted in 
Europe…68 
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“Following the cessation of hostilities after World War II, several European 
countries undertook the nationalisation of movable and immovable, tangible 
and intangible property belonging to their nationals and foreigners alike.”69 
 
The above two statements are clear indications that state ownership of different 
industries could be found in all European economies after World War Two. SOEs 
were part of the economies of these countries like they are today in less developed 
countries. This part will discuss the rise and fall of SOEs as an important tool for 
government intervention in selective European jurisdictions. 
 
2 1 Britain 
 
2 1 1 The heydays of nationalisation post-World War II  
 
As with other European countries World War II also had a major impact on Britain’s 
economy. Britain, like the rest of Europe, continued to suffer economic problems 
long after the final unconditional surrender by the German Forces took place on 7 
May 1945.70 The period between 1945 and 1951 has been coined the “Age of 
Austerity”.71 During this time SOEs started playing an important role in the British 
economy. The Labour leader Clement Attlee became the Prime Minister following a 
landslide victory over Winston Churchill’s Conservative Party.72 It was during this 
time that nationalisation became a prominent part of the Labour government’s 
policy.73 O’Hara argues that the public sector employment raised and that the output 
of the nationalised industries amounted to a fifth of the economy.74 The Bank of 
                                                          
69 NR Doman “Compensation for Nationalised Property in Post-War Europe” (1950) 3(3) International Law 
Quarterly 323 323.  
70 B Price Winston Churchill: War Leader (2009) 137.  
71 RA Dargie History of Britain: The Key Events That Have Shaped Britain from Neolithic Times To The 21st 
Century (2007) 190.  
72 RA Dargie History of Britain: The Key Events That Have Shaped Britain from Neolithic Times To The 21st 
Century (2007) 190.  
73 See C Ellis “Letting it Slip: The Labour Party and the ‘Mystical Halo’ of Nationalization, 1951–1964” (2012) 
26(1) Contemporary British History 47 48 where it is indicated that nationalisation and “common ownership” 
was already part of the Labour Party’s 1918 Constitution.  
74 G O’Hara “What the electorate can be expected to swallow’: Nationalisation, transnationalism and the 
shifting boundaries of the state in post-war Britain” (2009) 51(4) Business History 501 504. O’Hara provides 





England, industries such as iron and steel, and railways became government’s 
assets.75  
 
The Bank of England Bill was one of the first pieces of legislation to kick start the 
Labour Party’s nationalisation programme. At a meeting of the Cabinet on 13 
September 1945 a memorandum served before Cabinet which suggested 
government ownership of the Bank of England.76 The Cabinet expressed its approval 
to have the Bank of England under government ownership and this culminated in the 
enactment of the Bank of England Act 1946. The purpose of the Act was to “bring 
the capital stock of the Bank of England into public ownership and bring the Bank 
under public control.”77  
 
The next sector to follow was the coal and mining industry. The Bill for the 
Nationalisation of the Coal and Mining Industry served before the Cabinet in 
December 1945.78 Ultimately the coal and mining industry was nationalised by the 
Coal Industry Nationalization Act of 1946. Its purpose was to “establish public 
ownership and control of the coal-mining industry and certain allied activities.”79 The 
nationalisation of other industries including civil aviation, cable and wireless, 
transport, electricity and gas and iron and steel followed.80  
 
The Labour Party’s nationalisation programme came to a halt when it lost the 
national elections in 1951. Winston Churchill, who was the Prime Minister during the 
war, returned to Office as Prime Minister.81 It was only in 1964 that another Labour 
Party leader became the Prime Minister again, but subsequent Conservative Prime 
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Ministers continued with the nationalised industries.82 Dramatic changes to the 
state’s role in the economy were only made when Margaret Thatcher became the 
Prime Minister. Millward states that it was not only the Conservative Party which was 
opposing nationalisation but that it came from other spheres as well, such as 
academia.83 Nationalisation in Britain was soon to be considered a “historical 
episode”.84 
 
2 1 2 Divestiture of state assets: Margaret Thatcher’s legacy 
 
In 1979 Margaret Thatcher became the British Prime Minister. One of her biggest 
legacies is the privatisation of many of Britain’s state assets.85 Thatcher showed her 
disdain for state-ownership when she said: 
  
“The state should not be in business. State-ownership effectively removes- or at 
least radically reduces- the threat of bankruptcy which is a discipline on privately 
owned firms. Investment in state-owned industries is regarded as just another call on 
the Exchequer, competing for money with schools and roads. Targets can be set; 
warnings can be given; performance monitored, new chairmen appointed. These 
things help. But state-owned business can never function as a proper business.”86  
 
She continued that: 
 
“the evidence of the lamentable performance of government in running any 
business- or indeed administering service-is so overwhelming that the onus should 
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always be on the statists to demonstrate why government should perform a 
particular function rather than why the private sector should not.”87  
 
 
Through the above statements Thatcher made it clear that she had no desire to 
continue with the status quo, namely the continued operation of SOEs in crucial 
industries. And so Thatcher’s privatisation of British SOEs started. Megginson and 
Netter argue that although it was not Thatcher that introduced privatisation to the 
world,88 her privatisation programme is “historically the most important”. It was not 
always easy for the Thatcher government to ensure smooth transition of an industry 
from state ownership to private ownership. Sometimes there was resistance from 
unions, as the example of the privatisation of the British telecommunication industry 
showed, when a “Campaign against Privatisation” was started. When the British 
Telecommunications Act 1981 transferred the operation of the telecommunications 
system within the United Kingdom to a public corporation, British Telecom (BT), and 
also empowered the Secretary of State to license the operation of private 
telecommunications systems which could compete with BT, there was strong 
opposition. In February 1982 when the Secretary of State granted a licence to a 
company, Mercury Communications Ltd, to compete with BT, the union to which 
many of BT’s employees belonged, opposed both the licensing of competing private 
systems such as that operated by Mercury Communications Ltd and a proposal by 
the government, which was contained in a Bill which was before Parliament, to 
convert BT into a public company and to sell shares in the company to the public.89 
 
 Megginson and Netter commented that the goals of Thatcher’s privatisation 
programme were to: 
 
 “(1) raise revenue for the state;  
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(2) promote economic efficiency;  
(3) reduce government interference in the economy;  
(4) provide wider share ownership;  
(5) provide the opportunity to introduced competition; and  
(6) subject SOEs to market discipline.” 90 
 
Thatcher stated that the Conservative Party’s manifesto in 1979 did not mention 
privatisation as one of their key policies.91 The privatisation of only a few SOEs was 
mentioned in the manifesto: those of British Aerospace, shipbuilding enterprises and 
the National Freight Consortium. Shares in these concerns were sold to the public 
and employees were given the opportunity to acquire shares.92 During Thatcher’s 
first term in office, privatisation of state assets took place on a small scale.93 
Thatcher provided various reasons for this, which inter alia included, “low market 
confidence” and “large nationalised industries losses.”94 An intensified privatisation 
programme took off during Thatcher’s second term in office95 when she felt that the 
“economic conditions improved and the prospects for privatisation improved with 
them.”96 In its 1983 manifesto, the Conservative Party listed a number of SOEs 
which would eventually be privatised during Thatcher’s second term in office. These 
included British Airways, British Telecom, Rolls-Royce, British Steel, British Leyland 
and Britain’s airports.97  
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The privatisation programme quickly turned towards the public utilities such as 
telecommunications, gas, electricity, railways and water. When privatisation reached 
the water supply industry, emotions were running high. Thatcher states that it was 
said that “she’s even privatising the rain which falls from the heavens” to which she 
responded: 
 
“the rain may come from the Almighty but he did not send the pipes, plumbing and 
engineering to go with it.”98 
 
Certain measures to liberalize markets were taken to ensure that a state-owned 
monopoly did not merely turn out to be a private-owned monopoly after 
privatisation.99 If this were the case, competition among British enterprises, which 
was one of Thatcher’s main priorities, would not have been achieved. Dobek argues 
that “enhanced economic efficiency of the targeted enterprises” through competition 
between British enterprises, was probably the most important aim of Thatcher’s 
privatisation programme.100 Therefore public utilities were either restructured or 
broken up into various businesses before privatisation, to eliminate any monopoly. 
Where such restructuring or break up was difficult or not possible at the time of 
privatisation, as was the case with British Gas, the whole utility was privatised but 
some regulation was put in place to ensure that market power would not be abused. 
When it was time for Thatcher to leave office, she said the following of the 
privatisation which took place during her time in office: 
 
“There was still much I would have liked to do. But Britain under my premiership was 
the first county to reverse the onward march of socialism. By the time I left office, 
the state-owned sector of industry had been reduced by some 60 per cent. Around 
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one in four of the population owned shares. Over six hundred thousand jobs had 
been passed from the public to the private sector. It constituted the greatest shift of 
ownership and power away from the state to individuals and their families in any 
country outside the former communist bloc. Indeed Britain set a worldwide trend in 
privatization… And privatisation is not only one of Britain’s most successful exports: 
it has re-established our reputation as a nation of innovators and entrepreneurs. Not 
a bad record for something we were constantly told was ‘just not on’.”101 
 
Thatcher seemed to have been satisfied with and even proud of the privatisation of 
state assets during her administrations. Privatisation however did not stop when 
Thatcher left office. It was continued by her successors.  
 
2 1 3 SOEs after Thatcher and in present-day Britain 
 
John Major came to power in 1990. He continued the privatisation of state assets 
which Margaret Thatcher started. An example of privatisation which took place 
during Major’s time as Prime Minister includes the railways.102 When the Labour 
Party returned to power in 1997, it did not pursue its aims of nationalisation.103 Even 
its threat to renationalise those industries which the Conservative governments 
privatised was abandoned.104 It is noted that the Labour Party even completed the 
privatisation process in those instances where the planned privatisation of an 
industry under the Conservative governments had initially been postponed.105 The 
Labour government though did not use the term privatisation but preferred to refer to 
the process as “public private partnerships”106 or “public ownership”.107 
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Today the British government makes use of another type of public-private 
partnership besides privatisation. It was introduced in Britain in 1992 by the 
Conservative governments and is called the “private finance initiative”.108 It is said 
that the United Kingdom is at the forefront when it comes to the development of new 
ways of getting the private sector more involved in public service delivery and the 
private finance initiative (PFI) is one such developments.109 PFI has been described 
as follows: 
 
 “The Private Finance Initiative is a form of public-private partnership that combines 
procurement, where the public sector purchases capital items from the private 
sector, with an extension of contracting-out, where public services are contracted 
from the private sector. It differs from privatisation in that the public sector retains a 
substantial role as the main purchaser of services or as the enabler of the project. It 
also differs from contracting out since the private sector provides the capital asset as 
well as the services. A Private Finance Initiative contract is intended to provide a 
continuing commercial incentive for synergy, flexibility and efficiency right through 
from initial design, build and operation.”110 
 
The PFI has already been heavily criticized for bringing about an increase in 
government debt which the taxpayer has to cover.111 Criticism of the PFI has been 
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given further momentum by the collapse of Carillion, the UK’s second largest 
construction business.112 Its future use will be judged by its current success rate and 
how it improves, if at all, public service delivery.  
 
After Margaret Thatcher started her privatisation programme, many followed suit 
without hesitation.113 Her privatisation programme was the cause for “a wave of 
imitative privatisation policies around the world.”114 Whether the PFI will have the 
same impact remains to be seen.115 
 
2 2 Germany 
 
2 2 1 SOEs in the Federal Republic of Germany post-World War II: 1949 
onwards until reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany)  
 
SOEs could be found in Germany during the German empire, the Weimar Republic, 
the Third Reich (also referred to as “Nazi Germany”) and in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (also referred to as West Germany). In 1945, after World War II Germany 
was divided into four zones. Each zone was governed by one of the major Allied 
Forces.116 In 1949 the zones governed by France, Britain and the United States 
together became the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the zone 
governed by Russia became East Germany (the German Democratic Republic). 
Most enterprises in East Germany were nationalised and it had a “centrally planned 
economy”.117 A study of SOEs in East Germany is beyond the scope of this study.118 
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West Germany, on the other hand, operated a free market economy based on 
supply and demand and it inherited some SOEs from the Third Reich.119  
 
Article 15 of the Basic Law of Germany,120 which deals with “socialisation”, makes 
provision for nationalisation when required. The Article states that: 
 
“Land, natural resources and means of production may for the purpose of 
socialisation be transferred to public ownership or other forms of public enterprise 
by a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation.” 
 
Wengenroth states that the history of SOEs in present-day Germany should be 
considered on three levels, namely national, state and municipal as Germany is a 
decentralised federal state. Consequently state ownership existed on all three 
levels.121 The Federal Republic of Germany consists of sixteen states 
(Bundesländer).This study will focus on national SOEs but where the context of the 
discussion requires it, reference will be made to those SOEs which exist on state 
and municipal level.  
 
At the Potsdam Conference (July and August of 1945), which was a meeting 
between the leaders of the United States, United Kingdom and the then-USSR on 
post-war Germany, many matters regarding Germany were decided. These matters, 
inter alia, included “political principles” and “economic principles”.122 An Allied 
Control Council created policy for the whole of Germany.123 This included the 
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economic policy to rebuild the country after the war, which included the “desire to 
keep industry from expanding to threatening levels”.124 One of the economic 
principles of the Potsdam Conference determined that Germany was to be treated as 
a single economic unit during the occupation and common policies were made in 
regard to certain industries, which inter alia included mining, industrial production 
and allocation as well as transportations and communications.125  
 
SOEs of the former state of Prussia,126 SOEs which had their origins in the Weimar 
Republic and those established during the Nazi period all formed part of the German 
state after World War II.127 Among these SOEs were: 
(i) Salzgitter AG, which was formerly called the Hermann Goering Works and was 
established during the Nazi period for the production of steel; 
(ii) the Vereinigte Industrieunternehmungen AG (VIAG), which was a state holding 
company created for firms established during the empire in a number of industries 
including the aluminium industry and electricity supply;128  
(iii) the former Prussian Vereinigte Elektrizitäts- und Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft 
(VEBA), which had a stronghold in coal mining;  
(iv) Volkswagenwerke, which was established by Hitler’s government, it 
manufactured cars and during the war its main focus was the manufacturing of war 
armaments such as tanks, aircraft engines and missiles; and  
(v) the Saarbergwerke, which also belonged to Prussia during its existence and was 
conducting coal mining.129   
 
Besides those inherited SOEs, a few new SOEs were created such as Lufthansa in 
1954 and some banks which were important for reconstruction of the economy.130 
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The inherited SOEs were mostly kept to limit unemployment.131 No economic policy 
was put in place which would pave the way for bigger state intervention in the 
economy and the expansion of state assets as in Britain and France. Germany’s 
nationalisations were therefore dwarfed by those of France and Britain.132 The fact 
that Germany rejected big scale nationalisations of industries, unlike Britain and 
France, is certainly contrary to what could have been expected considering the 
economic devastation caused by the war. It is therefore in a sense surprising that 
state intervention in the economy was so limited especially as it was considered 
normal for European governments to step in when their economies needed to be 
reconstructed or rebuilt after a destructive event such as the war and also since state 
economic intervention took place all over Europe after the war.  
 
The decision by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany to concentrate 
more on “entrepreneurial activities” to rebuild, reconstruct and strengthen its war-torn 
economy instead of using nationalisation is certainly an interesting matter. What 
made the German leaders at the time decide against intensified nationalisations to 
rebuild their war-torn economy? Germany’s early attitude towards state intervention 
could have played a role in her “economic miracle”.133 Stolper and Roskamp observe 
that Germany at an early stage decided to integrate with the rest of the western 
world and to create a productive and internationally competitive economy.134 Even 
though most European countries and countries around the world were nationalising 
industries during this time, it is stated that public enterprises were seen as “strange 
bodies” as they did not converge with the economic policies of Konrad Adenauer’s 
first conservative government in 1949.135  
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Could the decision of no or limited state intervention in the post-war economy be 
attributed to the influence of Germany’s first post-war elected Chancellor, Konrad 
Adenauer? He was a law and economics graduate and one of the founders of the 
Christian Democratic Union political party. Adenauer was described as a “master 
tactician, constantly employing [threats to Germany] and offering bold solutions in 
order to reinforce his indispensability.”136 When Adenauer was elected as Chancellor 
it was expected that he would continue with free enterprise in Germany137 after the 
expansion of state-ownership138 during the Third Reich in industries such as aviation 
and iron and steel.139 During an address at Chatham House140 in London on 6 
December 1951 Konrad Adenauer said the following regarding the destruction of the 
German economy by the war: 
 
“We can bear the financial burden imposed by our social tasks only if the capacity of 
our economy is fully utilized. We have decided in favour of a social competitive and 
free economy in Germany because we believe that we can thus attain speedy and 
favourable results. Only an effective increase of our national product can enable the 
German people to improve their standard of living.” 
 
Adenauer had no appetite for high level of state intervention in the economy. Instead 
of following the route of nationalisation which Britain and France followed to address 
economic and social issues, Adenauer chose a free market economy which allowed 
for a limited level of state intervention. His economic policy, the "Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft" or Social Market Economy, “combined free enterprise with a social 
programme”141 and required the state to provide a “stable legal and social order”.142 
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Adenauer’s economic policy “emphasised the state’s responsibility actively to 
improve the market condition and simultaneously to pursue a social balance.”143 The 
"Soziale Marktwirtschaft" is attributed to Ludwig Erhard, who was Adenauer’s Vice-
Chancellor and the German Federal Republic’s first Minister for Economic Affairs.144 
Erhard believed that “Prosperity for all” and “Prosperity through Competition” are 
inseparable. He was a staunch proponent of a free market economy with a social 
character which would not be “hindered or eliminated through artificial or legal 
manipulations.”145 As a result of the "Soziale Marktwirtschaft", nationalisation of 
industries in Germany was moderate146 in comparison, for example, with the 
nationalisation programme which commenced in Britain under Atlee after the war. 
The emphasis was instead on private enterprises and everything associated with a 
market economy,147 although laws were enacted which protected not only private 
enterprises but also the social aspect of the economy.148  
 
Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, is not the “big inventor” of privatisation 
as it is known today, even though her government might have had historically the 
most ambitious and influential privatisation programme.149 It was Konrad Adenauer 
who, twenty years before Thatcher’s privatisation programme, started the first “large-
scale, ideologically motivated denationalization program”.150 In 1961 the Adenauer 
government sold a majority share in Volkswagen through a public share offering and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Economy see JC Van Hook Rebuilding Germany: The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945-1957 
(2004).    
142 C Allen “Between Social Market Economy and Corporatist Crisis Management: The West German Economy 
at Forty” (1989) 16 German Politics & Society 41 48.  
143 CL Glossner & D Gregosz The Formation and Implementation of the Social Market Economy by Alfred 
Mueller and Ludwig Erhard: Incipiency and Actuality (2011) 12.  
144 G Thiemeyer “The "Social Market Economy" and its Impact on German European Policy in the Adenauer 
Era, 1949-1963” (1983) 25(2) German Politics & Society 68 68-85.  
145 L Erhard Prosperity through Competition: The Economics of the German Miracle (1958) 2.  
146 E Schroter “Reforming the Machinery of Government: The Case of the German Federal Bureaucracy” in R 
Koch & J Dixon (ed) Public Governance and Leadership: Political and Managerial Problems in Making Public 
Governance Changes the Driver for Re-Constituting Leadership (2007) 251 254.   
147 WF Stolper & KW Roskamp “Planning a Free Economy: Germany 1945-1960” (1979) 135(3) Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Staatswissenschaft / Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 374 379.  
148 L Erhard Prosperity through Competition: The Economics of the German Miracle (1958) 2.  
149 WL Megginson & JM Netter “From State to Market: A survey of empirical studies on privatisation” (2001) 
39(2) Journal of Economic Literature 321 323.  
150 WL Megginson, RC Nash & M van Randenborgh “The Financial and Operating Performance of New 
Privatized Firms: An Empirical Analysis in TL Anderson & PJ Hill The Privatization Process: A Worldwide 




four years after that first divestiture it sold a major stake in VEBA.151 In regard to 
Volkswagen though, certain provisions within the Law on the Privatisation of Equity 
in the Volkswagenwerk Limited Company of 21 July 1960 (the VWLaw),152 allowed 
the government to impose certain restrictions after privatisation. These measures 
included the following:  
(i) a limitation of voting rights to “20 % of the share capital” even if a shareholder hold 
an excess of that amount153 and at the general meeting of the company, no person 
could exercise a voting right which corresponds to more than one fifth of the share 
capital;154  
(ii) the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Lower Saxony 
(Niedersachsen) were allowed to appoint representatives to the supervisory board of 
Volkswagen if they held shares in the company regardless of the amount;155 and  
(iii) resolutions of the general meeting, which would normally in terms of the German 
Aktiengesetz (the German Stock Corporation Act) require a “favourable vote” of at 
least 75%, required in terms of the VW Act a favourable vote of 80%.156 
Through this legislation the government maintained a certain level of control over 
Volkswagen. Certain provisions of the VW Law have been challenged on a number 
of occasions but Germany has enacted legislation to repeal those provisions of the 
VW Law and to align it with EU law without giving up much of the influence of Lower 
Saxony.157  
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The post-war successes of German industries could also have played a role in the 
government’s decision to maintain limited state economic intervention. Industries, 
after some time, started to reach their pre-war production levels and while in 1948 
only three industries surpassed their 1936 output, this number rose to thirteen in 
1950 and some industries more than doubled production between 1948 and 1950.158 
The only industries that were lagging behind were coal and mining as well as iron 
and steel.159 It is submitted that such statistics may have satisfied those in charge of 
the German economy that sufficient progress to overcome the economical 
destruction caused by the war could be made without intensifying nationalisation.  
 
There was some state interference in the early 1950s when financially-sound 
businesses were requested to subsidise certain “bottleneck industries”, which 
included industries such as iron and steel and coal mining which were slow to reach 
their pre-war production.160 This state intervention, however, did not endure for long. 
The moment the “bottleneck industries” were stabilised, the intervention ended and 
there was a return to free enterprise.161 The attitude towards state economic 
intervention which existed during the Adenauer era prevailed in Germany. Even in 
the late 1980s it was acknowledge that the Federal Republic of Germany did not 
have a “massive wave of nationalisations” but instead, it opted for “solutions rather 
closer to the market”, when it had to assist certain industries.162 The different federal 
governments of the Federal Republic of Germany that followed the Adenauer 
administration were never enthusiastic about nationalisation.163 The five chancellors 
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that succeeded Adenauer,164 all with different economic policies and political 
ideologies, continued to support limited state intervention in the economy.  
 
2 2 2 SOEs in a reunited Germany: post 1990 until the present-day Federal 
Republic of Germany  
 
In October 1990 the German Democratic Republic reunified with the Federal 
Republic of Germany to form the present-day Federal Republic of Germany. On 18 
May 1990 the two countries entered into a treaty to establish a monetary, economic 
and social union.165 There were of course other legislative measures in regard to the 
reunification but for purposes of this study reference will only be made to the treaty 
that dealt with economic reunification. Article I of the treaty determines that: 
 
“(3) The basis of the economic union shall be the social market economy as the 
common economic system of the two Contracting Parties. It shall be determined 
particularly by private ownership, competition, free pricing and, as a basic principle, 
complete freedom of movement of labour, capital, goods and services; this shall not 
preclude the legal admission of special forms of ownership providing for the 
participation of public authorities or other legal entities in trade and commerce as 
long as private legal entities are not subject to discrimination.” 
 
Importance was attached to, inter alia, a “social market economy”, “private 
ownership” and “competition”. This ultimately had an effect on SOEs in the German 
Democratic Republic. As already noted above, the German Democratic Republic 
operated a “centrally planned economy”, with most enterprises being state-owned.166 
The treaty introduced a social market economy to the parts of Germany that 
constituted the German Democratic Republic. This served as a basis for the 
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economic development of the erstwhile German Democratic Republic.167 Article 14 
of the treaty dealt with the structural adjustment of enterprises and the government 
of the German Democratic Republic was required to ensure “swift structural 
adjustment of enterprises to the new market conditions” with the object of achieving 
competitiveness.168 As most enterprises in the German Democratic Republic were 
part of the “centrally planned economy”, they were subject to this arrangement.  
 
Helmut Kohl, the first Chancellor of a reunified Germany transformed the SOEs of 
the former German Democratic Republic. His administration created an agency, the 
Treuhandanstalt (Trust Agency), to privatise SOEs in the German Democratic 
Republic.169 It had to achieve privatisation over a period of five year.170 The agency 
only kept those SOEs which were economically sound alive.171 As a consequence of 
this privatisation programme many former employees of these SOEs became 
redundant.172 However, this did not seem to have any impact on the decision to 
privatise, as it was one of the economic principles which were included in the treaty 
for an economic union.  
 
Since the first privatisations in the late 1950s when SOEs in the Federal Republic of 
Germany were sold to the public through people shares, a free market economy has 
been preferred by the different federal administration.173 According to an OECD 
report174, compiled in 2011, on the size and composition of SOEs in OECD 
countries, the federal government of Germany had no majority-owned listed entities; 
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it had 57 majority-owned non-listed entities and two statutory corporations which 
were majority-owned by the federal government.175 The federal government further 
had a minority share in Deutsche Telekom (31.7%), Deutsche Post (30.5%) and 
Commerzbank (25%).176 Angela Merkel, the current German Chancellor, is not a 
proponent of big state intervention in the economy either. It is stated that “Angela 
Merkel[‘s] vision is of a Europe of shrivelled public ownership and a minimal welfare 
state.”177 Just like her two immediate predecessors, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard 
Schroeder, Angela Merkel remains committed to a privately run economy in 
Germany.178  
 
2 3 France 
  
2 3 1 Post-World War II SOEs 
 
“The major thrust of the program presented to the Assembly by Prime 
Minister Pierre Mauroy was the broadest set of nationalization projects ever 
undertaken at one stroke in a free market economy.”179 
 
France had three periods of nationalisation under left-wing governments, from 1936 
until 1937, from 1945 until 1946 and in 1982. SOEs though were not an unknown 
concept before these periods,180 because nationalisation already existed in France 
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during the French Revolution.181 France’s biggest post-World War II nationalisation 
programme started decades after the end of the war, although the provisional 
government which came to power immediately after the war under General Charles 
de Gaulle also implemented nationalisation as a policy.182 A number of industries 
were nationalised soon after the war. Pinkney states that the first post-war national 
assembly already voted during its first five months in power for the nationalisation of 
the Bank of France,183 four large deposit banks,184 public utilities,185 coal mines and 
two thirds of the leading insurance companies.186 A major part of the banking 
industry became nationalised in December 1945,187 while in July of the same year 
the state became the owner of Air France.188 President Felix Gouin replaced General 
De Gaulle in January 1946 and he proposed the nationalisation of more industries, 
which included, inter alia, gas and electricity, all coal mines, the largest insurance 
companies and investment banks and mining.189 In April of 1946 France’s National 
Assembly adopted laws which implemented many190 of President Gouin’s proposals. 
Cohen states that as a consequence of the intensified nationalisation programme, 
the state’s role in the economy was extensive and in 1946 “it directly controlled 98 
percent of coal production, 95 percent of electricity, 58 percent of the banking sector, 
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38 percent of automobile production, and 15 percent of total GDP.”191 Nationalisation 
during this period apparently benefited the French economy as it grew more rapidly 
than the United States economy, people had a high standard of living and 
unemployment was low.192  
 
President Charles de Gaulle, the first president of the Fifth French Republic from 
1958, continued the post-war nationalisation drive and another round of intensive 
nationalisations followed from 1981 until 1986 under the Socialist President, 
François Mitterrand.193 Mitterrand was elected as the president of France in May 
1981. He embarked on significant economic changes and the “centrepiece” of 
changes under Mitterrand was the “$7.4 billion nationalisation program”.194 The 
nationalisation plans under President Mitterrand are considered to be “the most 
ambitious plan ever carried out by a Western democracy.”195 Molnar states that 
Mitterrand’s Socialist government believed that nationalisation would “expand the 
economy, since it was an article of faith with them that these institutions theretofore 
had served only the rich, but that under state ownership they would prosper because 
of the confidence of the masses in the Socialist program.”196 It is also stated that 
nationalisation was pursued in order to reorganise dysfunctional industries “central to 
economic development” in order for them to become more efficient, effective and 
productive.197 Berne and Pogorel state that some of the reasons for the 
nationalisation of private enterprises included that some private enterprises 
performed poorly financially and provided “substandard services”, some private 
enterprises were considered to be “too powerful or strategic” and therefore could not 
remain under private ownership and that the nationalisation of Renault, the French 
vehicle manufacturing company, was a “special case” as its head was considered to 
have been working with the Germans during World War II and therefore his property 
                                                          
191 P Cohen “Lessons from the Nationalization Nation: State-Owned Enterprises in France” (2010) 57(1) 
Dissent 15 16.  
192 P Cohen “Lessons from the Nationalization Nation: State-Owned Enterprises in France” (2010) 57(1) 
Dissent 15 16.  
193 P Cohen “Lessons from the Nationalization Nation: State-Owned Enterprises in France” (2010) 57(1) 
Dissent 15 16.  
194 D Borde & WW Egglestone “The French Nationalizations” (1982) 68 American Bar Association Journal 422 
422.   
195 RJ Nelson “Mitterand’s Nationalization Plans” (1981) 24(5) Challenge 54 54.  
196 T Molnar “Utopia Collapses” (1985) 37 National Review 30 30.  
197 RF Durant & JS Legge Jr. “Politics, Public Opinion, and Privatization in France: Assessing the Calculus of 




had to be nationalised.198 Another important factor was that most French people 
were in favour of nationalisation.199 Prosser mentioned that “the French penchant for 
the drawing up of national plans has also contributed to the image of a nation in 
which the state takes a far more central role in the purposive process of economic 
management.”200 
 
Mitterrand’s nationalisation programme commenced with the enactment of the 
“Nationalization Law”, which initially went through some constitutional challenges but 
eventually was promulgated in 1982.201 From the outset the intensity of Mitterrand’s 
nationalisation drive appeared to be aimed at eliminating private capital in SOEs.202 
Some of the industries which were included in this round of nationalisations were 
banks,203 companies in the steel, electricity, insurance and manufacturing 
industries.204 In terms of Title I of the “Nationalization Law” five industrial companies 
were nationalised: Compagnie generale d'electricite; Compagnie de Saint-Gobain; 
Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann; Rhone-Poulenc; and Thomson-Brandt. The state took 
transfer of all right, title and interest in the shares representing the companies’ 
capital.205 In exchange all holders of the shares which were transferred to the State 
received within three months after the publication of the “Nationalization Law, bonds 
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which were issued by the National Industrial Fund, a fund which was also 
established by the “Nationalization Law”.206 Title II of the “Nationalization Law” dealt 
with the nationalisation of banks. Banks that were included in the programme 
included those that were registered with the National Credit Council in terms of the 
laws of France and had on 2 January 1981 either one billion francs or more in 
demand deposits or in liquid or short-term investments.207 At least 40 banks were 
nationalised in terms of this law.208 However, certain banks were excluded from the 
programme. Examples included banks in which the majority of voting shares were 
owned by a natural person who was not residing in France or a juristic person whose 
“home office” was not in France.209 The nationalisation process took the same form 
as with other companies. The nationalisation of the banks heavily increased the 
state’s involvement as a deposit holder. Borde and Egglestone state that before the 
bank nationalisations, the already state-controlled banks accounted for 58.6 percent 
of deposits, while after the nationalisations this number increased to 98 percent. Title 
III of the “Nationalization Law” dealt with the nationalisation of two financial 
companies namely Compagnie financiere de Paris et des Pays-Bas; and Compagnie 
financiere de Suez.210  
 
Mitterrand’s nationalisation programme did not only focus on the enterprises listed in 
the “Nationalization Law”. Some enterprises which were not listed in the statute were 
also nationalised.211 During the early years of the nationalisation programme, the 
French public sector accounted for “24% of employees, 32% of sales, 30% of 
exports and 60% of annual investment in the industrial and energy sectors”.212 
Nationalisation in France continued unabated for a number of years under 
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Mitterrand’s administration. This position was somewhat reversed in the late 1980s 
when it became clear that instead of assisting the French economy, Mitterrand’s 
nationalisations were doing the opposite. Unlike the positive growth which was 
observed after the 1945-1946 nationalisations, the Mitterrand administration’s 
nationalisation increased the woes of the French economy. During the first years of 
nationalisation, unemployment was high and private investment in France fell 
sharply, which impacted on competitiveness.213  
 
 2 3 2 Divestiture of state assets in France 
 
It was time to end France’s reputation as an “interventionist” state. When Jacques 
Chirac became the French Prime Minister in 1986, nationalisation soon became part 
of France’s economic history. Privatisation of SOEs replaced it as a policy objective 
during the governments of Laurent Fabius,214 Jacques Chirac, Edouard Balladur215 
and Alain Juppe.216 The high-water mark of state divestiture was reached during the 
tenure of Jacques Chirac. Laux states that the privatisation of SOEs was a priority of 
the Chirac government and that the aim was to establish a free and competitive 
economy.217 It is stated that the policies of the French conservatives, of which Chirac 
was one, was to “restrict the role of the state to shift the interests and attention of 
business from the Ministry of Finance to the stock market and to transform France 
into a country of shareholders.”218 
 
The intention of the conservative government was clearly expressed when it 
established a Ministry of Industry, Trade and Privatization.219 On 11 February 1986 a 
privatisation programme was adopted.220 It aimed at reducing government 
involvement in most industrial and financial enterprises while those enterprises with 
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a “public service” were not initially included.221 Earmarked for privatisation in the 
government policies were banks, financial institutions and industrial companies.222 
Initially 66 SOEs were to be privatised during the first five years of the privatisation 
programme.223 It is argued that the reduction in state intervention that was about to 
take place in France was in line with Margaret Thatcher’s privatisation programme in 
Great Britain and Ronald Reagan’s deregulation of business in the United States.224 
 
The aim with this privatisation programme was to reverse some of the 
nationalisations of the early presidency of Mitterrand but the laws adopted in order to 
embark on this privatisation programme, did not only include enterprises which were 
nationalised during this period, but also those which were nationalised by the De 
Gaulle administration after World War II.225 Some of the first SOEs that were 
privatised included the “industrial companies” Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, 
Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann; Rhone-Poulenc as well as the nationalised banks 
Banque Odier, Bungener, Courvoisier and Banque Paribas.226 In almost all cases the 
government used “public share offerings” to sell its assets.227 Privatising SOEs 
meant that the enterprise would enter the free market for investments and anyone 
who could afford it, could buy shares in them. Initially the government wanted 
desirable shareholders to take up the public share offerings and measures were put 
in place to achieve this. These measures included for example that foreigners could 
obtain only 20 percent of issued shares and that the government could issue itself a 
“special share”, which would allow it a veto right in regard to any shareholder.228  
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Even though the privatisation programme slowed down when the French “father of 
nationalisation”, Mitterrand, was re-elected as President in 1988, it did not 
completely disappear. During his second term in office Mitterrand followed a “neither 
privatizations nor nationalizations” approach.229 The privatisation programme picked 
up speed again when Balladur became the Prime Minister in 1993. Even foreign 
investors from outside the EU could obtain 20 percent shareholding in the privatised 
enterprises.230  
 
When Alain Juppe became the Prime Minister and Mitterrand was replaced by 
Jacques Chirac as President in 1995, privatisation in France reached new heights 
even though it did not always go smoothly. In order to comply with newly 
implemented European integration requirements which were set out at the time in 
the Treaty on European Union of 1992 (also referred to as the Maastricht treaty and 
hereinafter the TEU), Chirac and Juppe had to take certain measures in France. In 
terms of the new EU requirements member states were required to avoid excessive 
government deficits and the planned or actual annual government deficit was not 
allowed to exceed 3 % of a member state’s GDP for that year.231 The government 
debt in relation to the GDP of member states was also not allowed to exceed 60% in 
any year.232 These new EU requirements were meant to ensure closer coordination 
of economic policies and sustained convergence of the economic performances of 
the member states.233 They were implemented with the intention to adopt in the 
future an EU-wide economic and monetary policy234 based on close coordination of 
member states’ economic policies, the internal market, common objectives and the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition.235 It was also to ensure 
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that there would be compliance with the principles of stable prices, sound public 
finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.236 
 
One measure taken by Chirac and Juppe was to cut jobs within SOEs and the civil 
service. Durant and Legge, Jr state that “one out of five French citizens in the 
workforce was paid directly by the state before the Gaullist privatization initiatives 
began under Chirac and Juppe.”237 Consequently this led to public-sector strikes by 
the French union movement.238 Such actions by employees in the public sector did 
however, not stop the privatisations of SOEs. By 1997, when another socialist Prime 
Minister, Lionel Jospin, came to power; “public assets exceeding $40 billion in value” 
had been sold through privatisation.239 Any fears that the new socialist-led 
government would reverse the privatisations did not materialise. However, Jacques 
Chirac, unsure of what would become of the privatisation programme started by him, 
still issued a stern warning to the socialists by saying: 
 
 "The state today no longer has any place in the management of competitive 
industry." That was a debate from another age." 240  
 
Jospin initially hesitated to sell state assets.241 However, the Jospin government 
accepted the position it found regarding privatisation and it continued with the selling 
of state assets. The Jospin administration, however, did not refer to it as 
“privatisation” but as “capital opening”.242  
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2 3 3 SOEs in present-day France: the position from 1997 onwards 
 
Privatisation used to be a policy mostly accepted and executed by “right-wing 
governments” but it has become the “conventional wisdom”, even of the left.243 
France illustrates this point, with Mitterrand, a socialist executing most of the 
nationalisations while Lionel Jospin, also a socialist, continued with the 
privatisations. Jospin went on to privatise more state assets than his five immediate 
predecessors combined and while his immediate predecessors privatised “easy 
targets”, he even disposed of strategic industries and public services.244 Part of 
France Telecom,245 which was considered to be the fourth biggest telecom operator 
in the world, was privatised in 1997 and after restructuring, Air France was sold in 
1999.246 Privatisation in the financial sector followed in 1998 with a partial selling of 
assets in the insurance enterprise, CNP Assurances and the selling of shares in 
Credit Lyonnais, a French bank.247 The privatisation of Credit Lyonnais was in part 
expedited due to the EU Competition Commissioner’s plans to accept a state aid 
package allocated to the bank if privatised.248 Plans to privatise enterprises in the 
defence sector such as Thomson-CSF, a defence electronic group and Aerospatiale, 
an aerospace company were also put in place.249 European integration was a big 
driving force behind France’s privatisation programme. Another factor which is 
indicated as important in regard to French privatisations is the EU prohibition of state 
aid to public undertakings, without consent from the European Commission.250 It is 
observed that due to this ban, public enterprises needed to find private enterprises 
within the EU or outside of the EU to work with and consequently privatisation and 
globalisation took place simultaneously.251 The ban on public support for public 
enterprises will be discussed in chapter four. It suffices to state at this point that state 
aid to public enterprises within the EU is regulated by the EU’s detailed State Aid 
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policy, which has its legislative origin in Article 107252 and 108253 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.  
 
The OECD states that the “large economies” in Europe, which includes France, has 
seen the most privatisations from 2000 onwards.254 From 2000 until 2007 France 
has sold state assets worth US$98.2billion, which places it at the top of the OECD’s 
list of “Top-10” countries in regard to privatisation activities.255 France’s privatisation 
drive is continuing into the 21st century. In 2004 it started with the privatisation of 
France Telecom when 10.9 percent of the company’s shares were transferred; 2005 
saw also privatisation activities in regard to Electricite de France, an electric utility, 
and motorway operators Autoroutes du Sus de la France and Autoroutes Paris-Rhin-
Rhone.256 Since the first privatisations during Jacques Chirac’s time as Prime 
Minister, France has come a long way with privatisation. Whether it was a 
conservative or socialist leading France, privatisation remained part of French 
economic policy; the opposite of post-World War II France, when nationalisation was 
an integral part of economic policy in order to rebuild the country after the 
devastating war.  
 
Nicholas Sarkozy, who succeeded Jacques Chirac as president of France in May 
2007, readjusted his “free market leanings” during the 2008 financial crisis which hit 
the French economy hard by sending it into a prolonged and “severe recession”, the 
first since 1993.257 It caused mass unemployment in France, the public deficit 
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worsened and many businesses went into bankruptcy.258 Sarkozy became critical of 
the “dictatorship of the market” and noted that “Laissez-faire capitalism is over”.259 
Sarkozy had to take measures (i) to reduce the public deficit; (ii) to limit job losses; 
and (iii) to prevent business closures.260 It would however be unfair towards Sarkozy 
to argue that measures taken during the financial crisis made him a proponent of 
state intervention in the economy.261 Many other developed countries such as the 
USA, Britain and Germany also had to take measures to protect their economies 
during the financial crisis and this did not necessarily signal a broad policy change 
towards greater state intervention.  
 
François Holland, who succeeded Sarkozy as the President of France and who is 
also known as the “most unpopular President of the Republic’s seven Presidents”,262 
did not take an interventionist approach during his time in office even while the 
French economy suffered severely because of the 2008 financial crisis and the “euro 
zone” economic crisis. Kuhn states that while “French voters may not have 
appreciated the hyperactive interventionism of President Sarkozy, this did not mean 
that they wanted their president to stand back from taking responsibility at a time of 
severe economic problems.”263 In May 2017 France elected Emmanuel Macron, a 
former Minister of Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs in President Francois 
Hollande’s administration, as its President.264 At the time France had faced years of 
“economic stagnation and political failure”: France’s GDP growth was behind most of 
other larger economies in Europe, unemployment was high and poverty rates 
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rose.265 When President Macron took office, the economic conditions in France 
started to improve slowly.266 Some of his policies for a renewed economy and 
prosperity for the French people include the cutting of taxes and spending, less red 
tape in regard to French labour laws and to reduced unemployment.267 Most 
importantly for this study, is that privatisation of SOEs became firmly part of 
President Macron’s economic policy to further boost the French economy.268 In 2017 
the government sold a “block of shares” in Engie, the power and gas company and in 
October 2018 it sold a €1.24 billion stake in Safran, the French aerospace and 
defence company.269 However, not all of President Macron’s economic policies are 
without controversy. Recent events in France, shows significant unhappiness with 
some of his economic policies. Eighteen months into his administration President 
Macron faced the first challenge to some of his economic policies when large 
protests erupted in November 2018 throughout the country and still continues to this 
day, although with rather small numbers than when it initially started. The protesters, 
who became known as the “Yellow Vests”, protested against ever increasing fuel 
prices and taxes which President Macron announced as measures to “protect the 
environment” and “combat climate change”. Furthermore, opposition groups are up 
in arms against privatisation plans of big SOEs.270 It is submitted that the willingness 
of President Macron’s government to sell stakes in big state-owned giants such as 
Groupe ADP, the national airport operator and the energy firm Engie, shows that he 
might have a stance towards state ownership much like that of Jacques Chirac.  
 
3 SOEs in a developing country: The case of South Africa 
3 1 Introduction 
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 SOEs were created in South African long before the dawn of Apartheid. Southall is 
of the opinion that the rise of SOEs in South Africa started during the reign of the 
“Pact Government”,271 which ruled South Africa from 1924 to 1929.272 The Electricity 
Supply Commission (ESCOM), which was created in 1922 by the Electricity Act of 
1922,273 and the Iron and Steel Corporation (Iscor), which was created in 1928,274 
were two of South Africa’s first SOEs.275 More SOEs were created when the 
Reunited National Party (which two years later became the National Party) became 
the ruling party in 1948.276 The sectors in which state ownership became more 
prominent were oil, gas, coal and arms.277 Privatisation only became a policy during 
P. W. Botha’s reign as head of state. He wanted certain SOEs to become profit-
making entities.278 Other reasons given for the apartheid government’s decision to 
take the route of privatisation is said to be that privatisation was an attempt by the 
National Party to manage South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to democracy by 
limiting the ANC’s power.279 Privatisation also ensured a growing free market 
economy but it only promoted the interest of the same people that accumulated all 
the advantages during Apartheid.280  
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When South Africa became a democracy, nationalisation was firmly on the agenda 
of the governing ANC.281 Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s first democratically elected 
president, also started out as a stern believer in nationalisation, but he came to 
accept that the free market is the best option to grow South Africa’s economy. This 
became clear when he said the following on 12 November 2003 during a symposium 
in the United States: 
“When I was released from prison, I announced my belief in nationalisation as a 
cornerstone of our economic policy. As I moved around the world and heard the 
opinions of leading businesspeople and economists about how to grow an economy, 
I was persuaded and convinced about the free market. The question is how we 
match those demands of the free market with the burning social issues of the 
world.”282 
In essence Mandela’s words, when applied to SOEs, reflect the major concern of this 
thesis. SOEs that receive public funds become a burden on taxpayers, often are 
corrupt and inefficient and undermine effective competition with private enterprises. 
Nevertheless, these enterprises can be important instruments to address the almost 
insurmountable social problems facing South Africa. It will be difficult to set out rules 
that will promote the benefits of these enterprises while limiting the harm that they 
may do. Hence, the role of SOEs in South Africa and some of South Africa’s most 
significant SOEs will now be discussed in order to provide background to the 
evaluation of these issues.  
 
3 2 The role of SOEs in South Africa 
 
According to Levy the development of SOEs in South Africa can be divided into four 
“broad phases”.283 The first phase stretches from the time when the State took 
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control of the railways after the Anglo-Boer War until the 1960s.284 During this time 
Iscor, ESCOM, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the South African 
Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (Sasol)285 were established.286 The second phase 
refers to the time during the 1980s,287 which is also the time when Iscor was 
privatised. During that time PW Botha, the State President at the time, announced 
his intentions of implementing privatisation as a government policy.288 Levy 
considers the third phase to be the first few years after the transition from Apartheid 
to democracy during which the ANC-led government was willing to keep up with 
world developments to embrace commercialisation289 and restructuring of SOEs.290 
Levy’s last phase regarding the role of SOEs in the South Africa economy refers to 
the time from 2007 until the present day, which takes into account the powerful rise 
of China as a world economy and the 2008 financial crisis which impacted on the 
“superiority of market capitalism.291 Perhaps a further epoch namely the era of “state 
capture” and the damage that this has done to the sustainability and credibility of 
SOEs can be added to those distinguished by Levy. 
 
As in the case of the European countries discussed above, the existence of SOEs in 
South Africa also needs to be viewed and discussed within the context of South 
Africa’s recent political and economic past. Due to Apartheid policies, the greater 
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part of the South African population had been excluded from socio-economic 
advancement. These policies also led to South Africa being isolated by the rest of 
the world. The impact of isolation on South Africa’s economy was marked. It had 
become more or less self-reliant. South Africa’s self-reliance at the time can be seen 
either as an advantage if that was the reason for the South African government to 
develop its own industry or it can be considered a disadvantage considering the 
massive funding the government had to find to finance its self-reliance and industrial 
development. In its determination to become self-reliant and to ensure that the 
economy did not falter, the Apartheid government became heavily involved in the 
economy. SOEs were established and used to ensure self-reliance while these 
SOEs also assisted the apartheid government in enforcing some of their other 
policies. An SOE like Armscor, for example, assisted the apartheid government with 
keeping political unrest in Soweto under control in 1976 through the use of locally 
manufactured weapons292 while a SOE like Sasol ensured that South Africa had 
sufficient oil supplies after Iranian oil supplies to South Africa were discontinued 
following the fall of the Shah during the Islamic Revolution.293 SOEs were used to 
develop infrastructure and to keep people content through job creation. Southall 
states that the extension of the state sector after 1948 led to (i) the appointment of 
“Afrikaner businessmen in key positions” in SOEs, (ii) “Afrikaners [being] favoured for 
the public service and senior and middle-management position within the 
parastatals”,294 and (iii) SOEs being used by the National Party “to develop Afrikaner 
capital”. SOEs were also used to provide services and goods to the public. Most of 
the services and goods delivered by SOEs were aimed at the minority white 
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population as the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) observed in Telkom SA Ltd 
/Business Connexion Group Ltd.295  
 
 “Under the old apartheid regime, it [Telkom] provided services to the residential 
and corporate market on the basis of the policies of that regime. Hence it was rare 
indeed to find residential telephone services in black townships.”296  
 
The same applied to many other enterprises with large infrastructure. Levin and 
Weiner state that Eskom “[built] the pylons that march past African villages to white 
farms” while the Land Bank provided subsidised credit to large farms owned by white 
South Africans.297 South Africa thus had many SOEs as a result of the government’s 
involvement in the Apartheid economy.  
 
South Africa became an inclusive democracy when it had its first general election in 
1994, but Apartheid has left South Africa with a deep divide between the rich and the 
poor. Although the ANC obtained political power in South Africa, economic power 
and the wealth of the country was still concentrated within the hands of a small white 
minority. The ANC-led government was and is still faced with high and often 
worsening levels of inequality, unemployment and poverty.  
 
Through its policies, the ANC has attempted to address inequality, unemployment 
and poverty while extending the provision of public services to more South 
Africans.298 It has tried to achieve a more equal distribution of wealth in South Africa. 
The provision of essential services and goods to all the people of South Africa was 
and remains a priority for the ANC.  
 
The government felt that this could not be done without considerable government 
intervention in the economy. As stated by the Constitutional Court in Competition 
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Commission v Senwes Limited Case CCT,299 the majority of black people were 
excluded from participation in the economy by Apartheid laws. This needs to be 
corrected. The court also stated that the Preamble of the Competition Act “calls for 
the opening up of the economy to enable all South Africans to have access to the 
control and ownership of the national economy.” In order to achieve this, the State 
has to intervene in the economy.  
 
SOEs have become an important form of intervention in the economy for the post-
Apartheid government. The ANC inherited a significant number of SOEs from the 
apartheid state. Through the continued use of these SOEs, and also by creating new 
ones, the government attempts to provide essential services and goods to all South 
Africans regardless of their race or social status.300 SOEs in South African are 
therefore supposed to be “agents of development”.301 
 
Southall states that the enterprises inherited by the ANC government were of all 
kinds and included financial bodies, industrial undertakings and utility companies.302 
These SOEs are now used, inter alia, as instruments to correct the divide between 
rich and poor, to create employment and to ensure equal provision of essential 
goods and services at affordable rates to the people of South Africa. SOEs also 
provide the government with the opportunity to place previously disadvantage people 
in managerial positions, create employment equity for black people, woman and 
people with disabilities and create a first job opportunity for black university 
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graduates.303 The government also uses SOEs to promote the equal distribution of 
resources especially since economic power is still to a large degree concentrated in 
the hands of a small white minority. Through SOEs such as Eskom, the government 
ensures strategically important sectors are developed for the benefit of all South 
Africans. A former Minister of Public Enterprises, Malusi Gigaba, stated that “the 
fundamental issue in determining whether the State needs to make a direct 
investment in a commercial enterprise is whether the private sector can be trusted to 
behave responsibly in developing a sector, particular if government regulatory 
capacity is weak.”304 In the absence of regulation in a sector, maintaining an 
enterprise within a sector might be the State’s way of ensuring that the sector is not 
exploited for the benefit of a few privileged South Africans. Gigaba also stated that 
“SOEs had an important role to play in developing vital economic infrastructure, 
managing state assets, and driving the transformation of customers and 
suppliers.”305 The role attributed to SOEs by Gigaba is clearly visible in the 
infrastructure development of SOEs such as Eskom and Transnet.306 
 
Decisions on whether to retain or divest the SOEs inherited from the Apartheid 
government, or whether to establish new SOEs or to nationalise private enterprises 
are informed by these policies. These governmental policies, which are the driving 
force behind the government’s developmental agenda, together with the ANC’s 
political ideology, are the reason for the continued use of and support of SOEs 
during the administrations of Presidents Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma 
and now Cyril Ramaphosa. These different administrations started or continued to 
operate SOEs in key sectors of the economy.307 SOEs were used as important 
vehicles for achieving policy goals and complying with social responsibilities of 
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government towards South Africans.308 Any changes to SOEs such as restructuring, 
which could include corporatisation or commercialisation and full or partial 
privatisation of SOEs are therefore highly politicised and controversial. Since it was 
necessary for the government to adopt an intensified developmental response to the 
Apartheid legacy, it might be more sceptical of the private sector and its ability to do 
the “right things” when supplying those products and services which SOEs are 
currently providing to South Africans even if the private sector is doing “things right” 
in regard to maximization of profits and producing products efficiently.309 Labour 
unions, employees of SOEs and South Africans generally have a deep interest in 
any planned changes to SOEs and many even object to any changes.310  
 
The socio-economic challenges faced by the majority of South Africans make it 
rather difficult for the government to sit back and to consider minimising its 
involvement in the economy. When all these challenges in South Africa are 
considered it becomes clear that the government will not easily part with its 
ownership or shared ownership of SOEs. This is particularly so for SOEs that 
operate within sectors which are of strategic importance to all the people of South 
Africa and its economy. The co-existence of SOEs and their private counterparts in 
the South African economy will therefore continue for some time to come.  
 
Nevertheless the wide-ranging use of SOEs has also been subjected to trenchant 
criticism.311 It has been observed that SOEs place unnecessary burdens on South 
Africa’s public purse and that it puts off foreign direct investment from investors who 
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may be wary of investing in firms if they have to compete with government-funded 
SOEs.312  
 
It would therefore be foolish to ignore the reality that SOEs in South Africa have not 
always done the “right things”. This is clearly illustrated by the role which SOEs 
played during the nearly ten years of the Zuma administration. SOEs together with 
other state institutions such as the South African Revenue Services became 
synonymous with corruption, patronage, cronyism, nepotism, fraud and allegations of 
unimaginable amounts of public money being stolen.  
The Zuma-era has become synonymous with the concept of “state capture”. “State 
capture” is not a uniquely South African concept. A research project by scholars 
associated with the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development showed that “state capture” occurs in many countries, especially those 
in transition.313 These scholars state that “state capture” refers to the “extent to which 
firms make illicit and non-transparent private payments to public officials in order to 
influence the formation of laws, rules, regulations or decrees by state institutions.”314  
In South Africa the term is used to refer to the corrupt relationships which allegedly 
existed between the former president, some members of his cabinet, other state and 
provincial officials and the Gupta family. Helen Zille, a South African politician and 
former leader of the main opposition party, describes “state Capture” as “the practice 
of powerful politicians turning supposedly independent institutions into political 
instruments to pursue their own agendas, protecting their allies, prosecuting their 
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enemies and enriching themselves.”315 She goes on to say that “State capture is the 
root cause of failure of democratic transitions across our continent and in many parts 
of the world.”316  
The now infamous Gupta family arrived in South Africa in the early 1990s. They 
started some business ventures and eventually established their well-known 
company, Sahara Computers, in 1997.317 South Africans probably will never know 
for sure how long the former president and the Gupta family knew each other and 
when the alleged corrupt relationship started. There seems to be proof that the 
relation between the Gupta family and Zuma might have existed318 long before the 
South African public became aware of it. Their relationship with the President 
became headline news when “Waterkloofgate”319 happened. This refers to the 
incident in 2013 when the Gupta family was allowed to land a private aeroplane with 
wedding guests at the Waterkloof Airforce Base in Pretoria, which is described as 
the South African Airforce’s “busiest airbase”.320  
The full extent of the alleged “state Capture” in South Africa was catalogued when 
Thuli Madonsela, the Public Protector321 from 2009 until 2016, issued a damning 
report322 in October 2016. The report was published after the Public Protector 
investigated a complaint about alleged improper and unethical conduct by the former 
president and other state functionaries and their improper relations with members of 
the Gupta family, who were allegedly involved in the removal and appointment of 
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ministers and directors of SOEs which resulted in improper and possibly corrupt 
award of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family’s businesses.323 Two other 
reports which contained similar worrying information on the alleged “state capture” 
followed that of the Public Protector: one by the South African Council of Churches 
called the “Unburdening Panel Process” and one by an inter-university research 
group called the “Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa is being Stolen”324  
For purpose of this thesis it is particularly important to look at the capture of SOEs in 
greater detail. These reports implicated South Africa’s most significant SOEs. The 
Public Protector’s report in particular scrutinised certain Gupta-links to Transnet, 
Eskom, Denel, the SABC and SAA.325 The Public Protector investigated alleged 
irregularities in the awarding of contracts by all these SOEs to a number of Gupta-
owned companies. In regard to Eskom, alleged irregularities in the awarding of 
contracts by Eskom to Tegeta Exploration and Resources and Optimum Coal Mine, 
two Gupta-owned companies and the sale of all shares held by Optimum Coal 
Holdings and mining rights to Tegeta Exploration and Resources were 
investigated.326 In regard to the Transnet, contracts awarded by Transnet to 
Regiments Capital and Trillian, two companies with a Gupta connection were 
considered.327 In regard to Denel, contracts concluded between Denel and VR Laser 
Services, a company owned by the Gupta family were exposed.328 In regard to SAA 
a contract awarded by SAA to the New Age newspaper for circulation to its 
customers was placed under the microscope.329 In regard to the SABC, contracts 
awarded to the New Age newspaper and/or TNA Media by the SABC, which are also 
companies with Gupta-links, were investigated.  
Some disturbing facts came to light in regard to those SOEs implicated in the alleged 
“state capture”. These included, inter alia, that in awarding certain contracts to 
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Tegeta, the Eskom board was solely acting for the benefit of Tegeta;330 that certain 
payments by Eskom to Tegeta may not have been in line with the PFMA;331 that the 
Eskom Board did not appear to have complied with their duty of care when dealing 
with these Gupta-linked companies and this may have constituted a violation of 
section 50 of the PFMA.332 These are only a few examples of the many 
transgressions that formed part of “state capture”. Generally it became apparent 
from the report that for the last decade, instead of delivering on their mandates to 
South Africans, these SOEs became burdens to the South African people and 
benefited only the corrupt capturers of the state and their accomplices. It is 
submitted that by being such a significant part of the alleged “state Capture”, SOEs 
prolonged and amplified the intolerable socio-economic challenges faced by the 
majority of South Africans. 
In light of all her disturbing findings, the Public Protector recommended that Jacob 
Zuma appoint a commission of inquiry, headed by a judge who had to be solely 
selected by the Chief Justice of South Africa.333 She further recommended that the 
records of her investigations and her report be used as the starting point for the 
commission of inquiry.334 As a result of the Public Protectors’ remedial action and 
Zuma’s opposition thereto, numerous court cases by opposition parties,335 civil 
society organisations and the former president and some of his associates336 
followed. Zuma attempted to have the Public Protector’s report judicially reviewed.337 
However, finally in January 2018, long after the release of the Public Protector’s 
report in October 2016 and following numerous attempts to frustrate the process with 
spurious tactical litigation, Zuma decided to establish a commission of inquiry338 to 
investigate the alleged “State Capture”. The commission started its hearings in 
August 2018. At the time of completing this thesis the Commission had not yet 
                                                          
330 Para 6.2 of the Public Protector State Capture Report.  
331 Para 7.9 (a) of the Public Protector State Capture Report.  
332 Para 7.9 (b) of the Public Protector State Capture Report.  
333 Para 8.4 of the Public Protector State Capture Report.  
334 Para 8.6 of the Public Protector State Capture Report.  
335 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of SA; In re Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic 
of SA [2017] 3 All SA 124 (GP); Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2018 (2) SA 
571 (CC).  
336 Molefe v Eskom Holdings Soc Limited 2017 JDR 1191 (LC).  
337 President of the Republic of South Africa v Office of the Public Protector 2018 (5) BCLR 609 (GP).   
338 See Government Gazette No. 41403 Vol. 631 (25 January 2018) for the terms of reference of the 




completed its work but the hearings have already illustrated how SOEs participated 
in “state capture” disregarded the broad interests of especially vulnerable and poor 
South Africans.  
Although SOEs will remain a part of economic regulation there may be a need to 
regulate them adequately to mitigate harm they may cause. However, this should be 
done after a more detailed analysis of creation and main purpose of certain SOEs 
before and after the dawn of democracy as well as an evaluation of the role which 
specific SOEs play today in the South African economy and society. 
 
3 3 An overview of the most significant pre-democracy SOEs339 
 
3 3 1 Iscor340 
 
Iscor was established in 1928 by the Iron and Steel Industry Act 11 of 1928.341 It was 
the largest iron and steel producer in South Africa. Jan Smuts, the Prime Minister at 
the time, envisaged that state intervention in the iron and steel industry would meet 
the domestic demand for iron and steel and would create jobs.342 Consequently Iscor 
needed some protection against the importation of foreign iron and steel. This was 
provided through the implementation of dumping duties343 on foreign steel.344 The 
outbreak of World War II was favourable for Iscor.345 The countries which previously 
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exported iron and steel to South Africa, such as Britain, Germany and the United 
States, relied on the output of their industries to see them through the war. Those in 
South Africa who relied on imported iron and steel, could now only get it from Iscor. 
Iscor was credited with setting the pace for industrialisation in South Africa.346 Martin 
states that Iscor allowed South Africa to join the “privileged ranks” of countries which 
had steelworks347 and that: 
 
“The ISCOR case stands as the crowning achievement of state intervention in the 
interwar period, a bold new entry by the state into the realm of what had hitherto 
been the privileged realm of private capital accumulation.”348 
 
In 1989 the South African government promulgated the Conversion of Iscor Limited 
Act 57 of 1989 (the Conversion Act). The Conversion Act, inter alia, provides for the 
conversion of Iscor into a company in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and for 
the disposal by the State of shares held in the company.349 Section 6 of the 
Conversion Act deals with the shareholding of the State and the disposal of its 
shares in the converted enterprise. The section authorised the Minister of 
Administration and Privatisation in conjunction with the Minister of Finance to 
dispose of shares held by the state to any person and in any manner they deemed 
fit. After various investigations on the viability of selling Iscor, the government sold 
Iscor in 1989 for R3.7 billion.350 The Competition Tribunal of South Africa said in 
2007 that: 
 
“Iscor was selected to lead the then South African government’s privatisation 
programme, ushering in a new era in the company’s history with its listing on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (“JSE”) on 8 November 1989.”351 
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In March 2001 Iscor announced its restructuring and this process was completed in 
November 2001, with the listing of Kumba on the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange.352 Kumba is the company which obtained Iscor’s mining assets while 
Iscor remained a pure steel company.353 At the end of 2003, another world leading 
steel producer, LNM Holdings B.V. gained control over Iscor.354 This was achieved 
through the acquisition of a 50 percent shareholding in Iscor, after it started off with 
an initial 34, 8 percent shareholding.355 Hereafter Iscor changed its name to Ispat 
Iscor and then to Mittal Steel SA.356 When Mittal Steel, a multinational corporation, 
and Arcelor, the world’s second largest steel producer at the time, merged in 
2006,357 the merged company became known as Arcelor Mittal and Mittal Steel SA 
came under the control of Arcelor Mittal.358 Today, the now renamed Iscor forms part 
of the ArcelorMittal group, the world leading steel producer, with ArcelorMittal South 
Africa Limited being the largest steel producer in South Africa that manufactures half 
of Africa’s steel.359  
 
3 3 2 ESCOM/Eskom  
 
ESCOM was established by the Electricity Act of 1922. Christie argues that the 
difficulty which the South African Railways (SAR) experienced in transporting coal 
from Natal played an important role in the establishment of ESCOM. This was 
because the electrification of SAR locomotives would have been more beneficial for 
it as they would be more powerful and less labour would be required.360 The SAR 
explored options such as its own power stations, supply of electricity by 
municipalities and buying electricity from a private enterprise but all these options 
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were unattractive.361 Therefore the SAR was in favour of the establishment of a 
state-owned enterprise for the supply of electricity.362 William Hoy, the general 
manager of the SAR wanted the state to have a significant role in the production of 
electricity.363 Jan Smuts, the Prime Minister of South Africa at the time, showed his 
willingness for state intervention with regard to electricity supply if this would assist 
South Africa in its ambition to industrialise.364 Those tasked365 by Smuts to 
investigate such state intervention in the electricity supply industry indicated that it 
would be beneficial for any industrialisation ideals.366 This was the start of a process 
that would end in the establishment of ESCOM.367 Hendrik van der Bijl became 
ESCOM’s first chairman. As he was also the chairman of Iscor, he “led the creation 
of South Africa as a modern industrial state.”368 
 
In 1987 ESCOM (Afrikaans Evkom) was renamed as Eskom by the Eskom Act No. 
40 of 1987 (Eskom Act). Section 2 (1) of the Eskom Act provided as follows: 
 
“The juristic person established under section 1 read with section 2 of the Electricity 
Act, 1922 (Act No. 42 of 1922), and known as the Electricity Supply Commission, 
which continued to exist as a juristic person known as Escom under section 2 of the 
Electricity Act, 1958 (Act No. 40 of 1958), shall continue to exist as a juristic person 
known as Eskom notwithstanding the repeal of the latter Act by section 31 of the 
Electricity Act, 1987.” 
 
The Eskom Act was repealed by the Eskom Conversion Act No. 13 of 2001, which 
converted Eskom into a public company having a share capital, with its entire share 
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capital held by the South African government.369 Today Eskom is the world’s 
eleventh largest electricity producer. It produces, transports and distributes about 
ninety five percent of South Africa’s and about forty five percent of Africa’s 
electricity.370 However, in recent years Eskom has been plagued by various 
difficulties. It has been party to many legal matters which involved various disciplines 
of the law such as administrative law, delict, competition law, constitutional law, 
company law and labour law.  
 
More recent troubles faced by Eskom were poor corporate governance, severe 
corruption within the SOE371 and its inability to supply South Africa with electricity. As 
the demand for electricity in South Africa rose, Eskom’s capacity failed to keep up. 
South Africans faced regular loadshedding372 for prolonged periods. The most 
vulnerable people in South Africa, those who the government wants to protect by 
providing affordable electricity through Eskom and those who are supposed to enjoy 
the benefits of the government’s developmental goals, were the ones that suffered 
most, due to Eskom’s incapacity to supply electricity on demand. They are the ones 
who rely fully on Eskom for electricity supply and are also unable to afford alternative 
electricity generators. Major loadshedding at present and the consequences of 
prolonged corruption, poor corporate governance and financial maladministration in 
Eskom during the Zuma era undoubtedly impact on the government’s ability to 
achieve its goal of supplying affordable electricity to all South Africans. Therefore 
drastic steps had to be taken when Cyril Ramaphosa became the president of South 
Africa. In his first State of the Nation Address in February 2019, President 
Ramaphosa announced that Eskom will be restructured in three separate entities: 
generation, transmission and distribution. He said: “It is imperative that we undertake 
these measures without delay to stabilise Eskom’s finances, ensure security of 
electricity supply, and establish the basis for long-term sustainability.” It remains to 
be seen whether this intervention by the government will lead to improvements in 
regard to Eskom’s operations, management and delivering of its governmental 
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mandate. The Goldman Sachs Group describes Eskom as South Africa’s “biggest 
financial risk”.373 Hence, the success of Eskom during the unbundling and thereafter 
is crucial in light of the severe risk which Eskom’s potential failure poses to the South 
African economy. The economic prospects of South Africa as a country are thus 
dependent on Eskom’s success and for the sake of all South Africans, Eskom’s 
operations, finances, management and corporate governance need to be sorted out 
urgently.  
 
3 3 3 The IDC  
 
The IDC was established in 1940 by the Industrial Development Corporation Act 22 
of 1940 “to promote the development of local industries”.374 The purpose of the Act 
was to “constitute a corporation the object of which shall be to promote the 
establishment of new industries and industrial undertakings and the development of 
existing industries and industrial undertakings.”375 Clark notes that when there was 
no interest from private investors in an industry, the IDC could establish an 
undertaking on its own as was the case in the wool industry.376 According to its 
founding legislation, the IDC aims, inter alia, to establish and conduct industrial 
undertakings, to facilitate, promote, guide and assist in the financing of new 
industries and industrial, schemes for the expansion, better organization and 
modernization of and the more efficient carrying out of operations in existing 
industries and industrial, or ancillary or related economic, undertakings and to 
promote the economic empowerment of the historically disadvantaged communities 
and persons.377 Feinstein argues that the IDC was operated like an industrial bank 
and that state intervention in the economy was maintained through the IDC.378 
Feinstein is further of the opinion that the IDC was used by the government in the 
Apartheid years to “strengthen the economic position of Afrikaner firms”.379 
Furthermore, industries established by the IDC “were to have a monopoly of 
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production and supply within South Africa, with their sole competition coming from 
imports”.380  
 
During the state sector expansion from 1948 many new SOEs were established 
under the auspices of the IDC while others were expanded.381 These included, inter 
alia, the Phosphate Development Corporation in 1952 to produce phosphate for the 
agricultural sector in South Africa,382 Sasol in 1950 to produce oil from coal383 and 
the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) in 1968, which manufactured 
armaments for the government after an embargo imposed by the United Nations on 
South Africa in regard to the sale of arms.384 The South African Railways and 
Harbours and Escom are some examples of SOEs which were expanded.385 
 
Today the IDC is still maintaining the mandate for which it was established and this 
mandate was expanded to include industrial development in the rest of Africa.386 
 
3 3 4 Sasol  
 
Sasol was established in 1950 by the IDC,387 when the government started to 
explore the possibility of establishing a coal-to-oil producer after private ventures 
failed due to a lack of funding.388 Clark argues that the establishment of Sasol by the 
government was a direct result of the “failure of private capital to do so”.389 The 
creation of Sasol was celebrated as “the birth of a strategically important enterprise 
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‘not controlled from abroad or by international monopolies and cartels but by the 
South African state’”.390 Hence, Sasol is described as South Africa’s “coal-to-oil 
project” which was “central to apartheid South Africa’s response to oil sanctions”391 
 
Although there were initial regrets about the establishment of Sasol due to the rise in 
“capital requirements”,392 various plants were established which were operated by 
Sasol and these plants provided some of South Africa’s much needed oil.393 Further 
investment in and expansion of Sasol was driven by the urgent need to ensure 
supplies despite: (i) the international oil crisis of 1973; (ii) a United Nations imposed 
oil embargo in 1977, which was implemented by many oil-exporting countries,394 and 
(iii) the Revolution in 1979 in Iran which at that point was one of the major oil 
suppliers to the country.395 Sparks396 argues that it was the state’s intervention to: (i) 
regulate the fuel market, (ii) discipline the oil multinationals, and (iii) massively 
subsidise the oil-from-coal project that was decisive to Sasol’s viability.397 Added to 
that, was the diversification of Sasol’s operations. When oil prices were low during 
the 1960s, Sasol expanded its operations by venturing into the chemical industry 
with state support.398 
  
In 1979 Sasol was privatised and became Sasol Limited. Sparks states that the first 
step to privatisation came about when two new oil-from-coal plants, Sasol 2 and 3 
which started operations in 1982, had to be funded during difficult economic 
conditions following the oil shock of 1973.399 Sparks further notes that the public 
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purse could not carry the cost of the two new plants and therefore private investment 
was needed to supplement the fuel levy and the loans from the IDC.400 Even after 
being listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Sasol continued to enjoy “special 
strategic status” since the state continued to subsidise it via fuel levies.401 Most of 
the state support was only completely removed after the end of Apartheid.402 
 
Today Sasol is a successful multinational corporation with operations in various 
countries. It is listed on both the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and the New 
York Stock Exchange. Sasol is a leading producer of chemicals, liquid fuel from coal 
and natural gas and it is involved in large “gas-to-liquid schemes” in various 
countries such as China and the United States.403    
 
3 3 5 Armscor  
 
In 1963 the United Nations (UN) imposed an embargo on the sales of arms to South 
Africa.404 The embargo called upon all states “to cease forthwith the sale and 
shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa”405 
Previously South Africa imported most of its armament from the United Kingdom.406 
Armscor was established by the Armament Development and Production Act 57 of 
1968407 as a direct result of the UN arms embargo. It had to ensure that the 
government had sufficient armaments408 and provided both the military and police 
                                                          
400 S Sparks “Between ‘Artificial Economics’ and the ‘Discipline of the Market’: Sasol from Parastatal to 
Privatisation” (2016) 42(4) Journal of Southern African Studies 711 721. 
401 S Sparks “Between ‘Artificial Economics’ and the ‘Discipline of the Market’: Sasol from Parastatal to 
Privatisation” (2016) 42(4) Journal of Southern African Studies 711 723. 
402 S Sparks “Between ‘Artificial Economics’ and the ‘Discipline of the Market’: Sasol from Parastatal to 
Privatisation” 42(4) 2016 Journal of Southern African Studies 711 723. 
403 J Daniel, J Lutchman & A Comninos “South Africa in Africa: trends and forecasts in a changing African 
political economy” in S Buhlungu, J Daniel, R Southall & J Lutchmann (eds) State of the Nation: South Africa 
2007 (2007) 508 523.   
404 See the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Arms Embargo Against South Africa Resolution 282 
(1970) which was adopted by the Security Council at its 1549th meeting on 23 July 1970 in (1970) 9(5) 
International Legal Materials 1091 1091-1092. The embargo was only terminated in May 1994. See the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 919 (1994) Concerning the Termination of the Arms Embargo against 
South Africa of 25 May 1994 in (1994) 33(4) International Legal Materials 1060 1060-1061.  
405 Para 3 of Resolution 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963  
(available at http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/80893/S_RES_181%281963%29 EN.pdf). 
406 CM Rogerson “Defending Apartheid: Armscor and the Geography of Military Production in South Africa” 
(1990) 22(3) GeoJournal 241 242.  
407 This Act has now been repealed by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited Act 51 of 2003. 




with a modern arsenal.409 Armscor was therefore created to reduce South Africa’s 
dependence on foreign military supplies410 and transformed South Africa from an 
importing country in regard to armaments to an arms producing country.411 Armscor 
did not constitute the first attempt to manufacture arms in South Africa. Rogersons 
argues, that South Africa’s “military industrialization” was already well on its way at 
the time of the embargo.412 But Armscor escalated the manufacture of arms against 
the backdrop of the embargo. Armscor played an important role in “protecting the 
apartheid government” and helped the government in 1976 to control uprisings in 
Soweto with locally manufactured weapons.413  
 
Today Armscor remains a state-owned enterprise and the Armaments Corporation of 
South Africa Limited Act 51 of 2003 provides for its continued existence. The state 




(a) the defence matériel requirements of the Department effectively, efficiently and 
economically; and 
(b) the defence technology, research, development, analysis, test and evaluation 
requirements of the Department effectively, efficiently and economically.”415 
 
After 1994 the government decided to reduce the defence budget since it had to 
focus on other pressing issues such as the eradication of poverty. As a result 
Armscor started to produce civilian products alongside its military armaments 
products.416 Since the production of civilian products was prohibited by the Act which 
established Armscor, it was split into two enterprises, one of which is today known as 
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Denel (Pty) Limited,417 the “largest manufacturer of defence equipment in South 
Africa” with the South African government as its sole shareholder.418 
 
3 3 6 Concluding Remarks 
 
The above mentioned SOEs are only a selected sample of the SOEs that contributed 
to South Africa’s industrialization before and after World War II. Feinstein observes 
that economic difficulties and the “economic cost of apartheid ideology and practice” 
made a continuation of such policies ever more difficult for the government.419 
Economic hardship led the government to consider reforms. Hill argues that the 
appointment of the Wiehann and Rieckert Commissions represented “the most 
important outward and visible signs of the new climate of thinking among the 
Afrikaner elite”.420 The Wiehann Commission was tasked to review the labour 
legislation and to make recommendations on how to reform it.421 The Rieckert 
Commission under the stewardship of PJ Rieckert, the Economic Advisor to the 
Prime Minister at the time and the Chairman of the Prime Minister’s Economic 
Advisory Council, was task to review a wide range of legislation.422 The various 
reforms recommended by these two commissions in their reports were hailed as 
“major developments that would bring fundamental changes in South Africa for the 
Black population”.423 Recommendations in these two reports led to the start of the 
gradual dismantling of the policies in place at the time, with their final elimination in 
1994 when South Africa had its first democratic elections. This was when the new 
ANC government inherited more than 300 SOEs in various sectors, from the 
Apartheid government, with the significant ones being Transnet, Telkom and 
Eskom.424  
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3 4 SOEs in the democratic dispensation425  
 
Today the number of SOEs which operate as part of South Africa’s economy 
remains large. The influence of SOEs remains significant in many key sectors of the 
economy. South Africa thus continues to have a mixed economy with both private 
enterprises and SOEs. Schedule two and three of the PFMA list both national and 
provincial SOEs as well as municipal SOEs. Examples include enterprises such as 
the Airports Company, Denel, Eskom, the SABC, SA Express, SA Forestry Company 
Limited, SAA and Telkom SA Limited.426 The number of SOEs listed in the schedules 
to the PFMA provides a clear picture on the active role which the state still plays in 
the economy. State intervention in the economy has thus not been down-scaled in 
the democratic era. This was to be expected considering the enormous socio-
economic challenges which the post-Apartheid governments have to address and 
the ideological impetus that is provided by the Freedom Charter.427 The Freedom 
Charter states that: 
“The People Shall Share in the Country`s Wealth! 
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored 
to the people; 
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be 
transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; 
All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people;” 
From these words it is clear that nationalization or at least strong resistance to 
privatization would be firmly embedded within the future policies of the ANC. It also 
made clear that certain sectors of the economy were inevitably going to be 
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nationalized or kept nationalized if inherited from the Apartheid government. Nelson 
Mandela confirmed this in February 1990, four years before he became president, 
when he said:  
“Where do we get the capital for the improvement of the living conditions of people 
if we do not nationalize?”428 
 “The only way we can raise the resources for development is to nationalise certain 
sectors of the economy.” 429 
Mandela’s mind regarding nationalization was however changed by the business 
community and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). He later concluded that nationalization is not the best option to achieve the 
goals of the government,430 but the ANC-led government wanted to ensure that, 
through its involvement in the economy, it could address the socio-economic 
challenges.   
After Mandela became convinced that privatization is the better option to ensure a 
growing South African economy which will be attractive to foreign investors, he and 
Thabo Mbeki, the deputy-president at the time, worked towards an ANC policy which 
would be more in line with privatization.431 In 1996 the ANC formulated its “guiding 
economic policy” for South Africa, which became known as the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution Policy (GEAR).432 Privatisation as a measure to achieve the 
government’s goals of economic development for all, formed part of the 
government’s GEAR policies.433 It was referred to though as the “restructuring” of 
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state assets and not privatization. This was done to appease the unions434 since the 
unions feared that privatization would lead to job losses and would compromise the 
delivery of high-quality and affordable delivery of service to all.435 They referred to 
privatization as a “war on the poor”.436 Nonetheless, in 1997 the government started 
to divest some state assets by selling six radio stations437 previously owned by the 
SABC while Telkom and SAA were partially privatized (SAA was later renationalized 
when the 20% that was sold off was reacquired).438 All those SOEs which were 
considered not to be part of a strategically important sector and those which were 
not necessarily required for assisting in the government’s developmental plans were 
considered for partial or full privatization.439 By 2003 the government had sold about 
nine percent of SOEs.440  
3 5 The Big U-turn on privatization  
Thabo Mbeki became the second democratically elected president of South Africa 
and he continued to be supportive of privatization as part of the economic policy. The 
government’s policy regarding SOEs and privatization under Mbeki has been 
referred to as a four-way approach.441 In accordance with this, “non-core” SOEs 
qualified for full privatization, SOEs that were “strategically important, such as 
Telkom and Transnet, were to be restructured and only partially sold in the interest of 
competition and efficiency, SOEs operating within the ports and railways sector were 
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to be run by “concessions” and there would be a formation of public-private 
partnership to deliver other essential service, especially on municipal level.442 Mbeki 
had the intention to privatize many SOEs such as the South African Forestry 
Company, SAA, Denel and parts of Eskom. Such privatizations however never 
materialized.443 National strikes by the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) against privatization contributed to the Mbeki administration’s change of 
heart.444 COSATU justified their strikes by referring to the high cost of basic services, 
rising unemployment and the outsourcing of services by partially privatized 
enterprises. Other reasons for the change were the conflicts between various 
governmental institutions over the restructuring of SOEs,445 employment creation 
and maintenance, the provision of public goods and black empowerment.446  
During Mbeki’s second administration it was admitted that the performance of SOEs 
was not satisfactory but that SOEs represented “hugely strategic resources” and with 
a good restructuring plan SOEs could lead the way on growth and development in 
South Africa.447 The focus in South Africa thus shifted from privatization to the 
restructuring of SOEs in order to make them more efficient and effective and less 
dependent on government funds.448 This shift may have been influenced by a study 
in the United States which found that making SOEs “less dependent on government 
funding, increasing their efficiency and compelling them to compete with private 
companies could improve their performance as much as selling them off to private 
investors”.449 This is in line with what Hentz called “the process of deregulating and 
commercialising public sector organisations”, rather than the selling and transfer of 
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state assets.450 It is said that the new strategy adopted in 2004 by the Mbeki 
administration included new appointments in key positions within SOEs as SOEs 
were meant to be “in the driving seat to uplift economic growth levels and deliver 
social and infrastructural services”.451  
However, in September 2008 Mbeki announced his resignation on national television 
as he had been recalled as President of South Africa by the ANC after he was 
defeated by the Jacob Zuma in December 2007 to become the President of the ANC 
at the ANC’s national conference in Polokwane in the Limpopo Province.452 Jacob 
Zuma became South Africa’s president in 2009. Soon thereafter the nationalization 
rhetoric within the ANC flared up again. The then ANC Youth League leader, Julius 
Malema announced that it was ANC policy for the South African mines to become 
nationalized.453 This was not denied or confirmed by the Zuma administration but 
was however dismissed by some members of his cabinet such as the Minister of 
Mines at the time, Susan Shabangu and the then Deputy-President, Kgalema 
Mothlante.454 However in September 2010 an investigative team was appointed by 
the ANC to determine the “desirability” of the nationalization of the mines, banks and 
manufacturing.455 The results of the “desirability” investigation were never made 
known to the South African public but Jacob Zuma did not nationalize private 
enterprises, as expected by the business community.456 However, political climate 
had turned against privatization.  
For its 53rd national conference in 2012 the ANC drafted a policy document on the 
position of SOEs and development finance institutions.457 This policy document 
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emphasised the role of SOEs “as instruments for significantly advancing the levels of 
economic transformation within South Africa.”458 In the policy document the ANC 
stated that SOEs are not created to maximize profits but to assist the state in 
reaching its developmental goals.459 It also became clear from the ANC’s Strategy 
and Tactics Policy of 2012460 that the ANC had no plans to abandon the role of 
SOEs in the economy and that it will keep South Africa a mixed economy for as long 
as necessity requires.461 
3 6 Measures taken to promote corporate governance of SOEs in especially 
the PFMA462  
“Parastatals' are deeply implicated in most fiscal problems of African governments 
because of their inefficiency, losses, budgetary burdens, and provision of poor 
products and services. Occasionally, they achieve some non-commercial objectives, 
which are used to justify their poor economic performance.”463 
With the above statement Mwaura reflects on the position in many African countries 
and this observation is particularly apposite for South Africa. It is known that proper 
corporate governance of enterprises leads to efficient and effective enterprises. It 
may also ensure that SOEs stay financially viable. Much has been written about the 
corporate governance of SOEs and how to make the management of SOEs more 
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“effective and efficient”.464 Sokol states that good corporate governance may provide 
firms with an edge over competitor firms and improve corporate performance.465 He 
further argues that good corporate governance could lead to efficient outcomes in 
regard to SOEs.466  
The OECD takes a leading role in researching and proposing measures for 
promoting corporate governance in SOEs. It attempts to promote effective 
governance of SOEs within its member states. It is submitted that successful 
corporate governance measures in the OECD should be considered in non-OECD 
countries. In 2011 the OECD published the results of interviews it conducted with the 
Chairs and other board members of SOEs in OECD member states.467 A key matter 
which was affirmed by the interviews was that most countries aim is to improve the 
performance of SOEs and that one way of doing so is to reform the boards of the 
SOEs.468 The OECD reports recognise certain factors which could lead to success 
when governments attempt to enhance the functioning of SOE board. These include, 
inter alia, that government must clearly communicate policies and objectives to the 
SOEs, abstain from ad-hoc interventions in the affairs of the SOE once its objectives 
have been clearly defined, provide training programmes for the boards and the 
government representatives and provide enhanced communication channels 
between the CEOs, the boards and the government representative.469 
The governance of SOEs in South Africa has been under the spotlight on various 
occasions.470 The debacles around the chief executive officers of ESKOM471 and 
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Transnet472 and the legal action taken for the recovery of money from former SAA473 
chief executive officer, Khaya Ngqula, contributed to the belief that the inefficient 
governance of SOEs in South Africa ultimately affects their ability to provide proper 
service to the broader South African public.474 Hence the government had to ensure 
that SOEs are complying with corporate governance principles in order to achieve 
less government dependence of SOEs and to root out mismanagement within SOEs.   
In South Africa the principles on corporate governance can be found in the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 and the King Reports and Codes on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa, the Constitution of South Africa and other statutory 
provisions which legislate the duties and responsibilities of the management of a 
corporation. The first version of the King Report was published in 1994, with a 
revision in 2002, the 2009 version which became necessary due to the enactment of 
the new Companies Act and the latest version in November 2016. Statutory 
provisions on the financial management of SOEs can be found in the PFMA. SOEs 
are clearly expected to comply with high standards of corporate governance. This 
has been confirmed by the court in South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v 
Mpofu475 where the court said that: 
“The conduct of public enterprises must be measured against the relevant principles 
of the Code and must adhere to best practices. The Code regulates directors and 
their conduct not only with a view to complying with the minimum statutory 
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standard but also to seek to adhere to the best available practice that may be 
relevant to the company in its particular circumstances.”476 
In a separate but concurring judgement Judge Jajbhay confirms the sentiments of 
Judge Victor regarding the governance of SOEs by saying that:  
“The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 recognises the importance of 
good governance: Section 195 deals with basic values and principles governing public 
administration. In terms of this section there must be a high standard of professional 
ethics. In fact this standard must be promoted and maintained. These principles 
apply to organs of state and public enterprises: Section 195(2).477 This is not 
surprising, given our history and the advent of our new democratic era. Our 
Constitution compels government in all of its forms, both through government 
departments and organs of state (including state-owned enterprises) to adhere to 
principles of good governance. It is for this reason that the provisions of the 
Constitution as well as the legislation enacted in terms thereof are applicable to 
state-owned enterprises. Our Constitution has enshrined certain rights that also have 
a direct bearing on the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises.”478 
Judge Jajbhay went further and said that: 
“In state-owned enterprises, like other organisations, good corporate governance is 
ultimately about effective leadership. An organisation depends on its board to 
provide it with direction, and the directors need to understand what that leadership 
role entails.”479 
The PFMA contains wide-ranging norms that are aimed to ensure that SOEs comply 
with high corporate governance standards as envisaged by the court. The PFMA 
was a big leap for South Africa in regard to the financial governance of SOEs. It 
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governs the financial management of all SOEs in South Africa and how they 
dispense with their money as SOEs are funded with public money480 and public 
resources must be managed efficiently and effectively.481 Madue states that the 
Constitution of South Africa and the King Code laid the foundation for the enactment 
of the PFMA.482 The PFMA gives effect to Chapter 13 of the Constitution.483 Chapter 
13 determines that “national, provincial and municipal budgets and budgetary 
processes must promote transparency, accountability and the effective financial 
management of the economy, debt and the public sector.”484 In Minister of Justice v 
FNB of SA485 the court also stated that the PFMA is the legislation which was 
envisaged by Section 216(1) of the Constitution. The section states that: 
"National legislation must establish a national treasury and prescribe measures to 
ensure both transparency and expenditure control in each sphere of government, by 
introducing– 
(a) generally recognised accounting practice; 
(b) uniform expenditure classifications; and 
(c) uniform treasury norms and standards." 
The Preamble of the PFMA provides as follows: 
“To regulate financial management in the national government and provincial governments; 
to ensure that all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of those governments are 
managed efficiently and effectively; to provide for the responsibilities of persons entrusted 
with financial management in those governments;” 
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Schedules two and three of the PFMA list those SOEs to which the Act applies. 
Included in schedule two are SOEs such as Denel, Eskom, SAA and Telkom SA 
Limited, mostly those SOEs which have been corporatized or commercialised, and 
included in schedule three are SOEs such as Electricity Distribution Industry 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd, the Amatola Water Board and the Public Investment Corporation 
Limited.  
Already in the 1990s when the ANC-led government adopted the Reconstruction and 
Development Plan (RDP),486 they wanted to ensure that government funding given to 
SOEs is managed properly. Article 5 of the RDP stated that: 
“parastatals which receive 20 per cent of their funding or R20 million (whichever is 
less) from government, should submit an annual director's report to the relevant 
ministry, showing how allocated funds were used given the objectives agreed to.” 
The enactment of the PFMA is not only intended to ensure that this requirement of 
the RDP was given effect to but also to ensure overall good financial governance of 
public funds. It is submitted that good financial management of SOEs will positively 
impact on the lives of all South Africans. If the finances of SOEs are properly 
managed and in compliance with what is regarded as best practice, the chances of 
SOEs requiring financial assistance becomes smaller, thus making SOEs less 
dependent on government funds. This again will reflect in the national budget. Funds 
that would otherwise have been allocated to SOEs, can be directed towards other 
essential services for the South African people. In Gama v Transnet Ltd487 the court 
said that: 
“it is clear that the purpose of the PFMA Act is similarly to hold accountable both the 
Board and officers (such as Executive Management) of State-owned corporations 
and other government controlled entities.” 
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Accountability for the financial management of SOEs in terms of the PFMA forms 
part of the overall good corporate governance of SOEs. This had been emphasised 
in Gama v Transnet Ltd when the court said: 
“The fact that the Board and its officers are subject to the express provisions of 
sections 50 and 51 of the PFMA in regard to their fiduciary duties and their 
accountability does not denigrate from their actions remaining subject to corporate 
laws. The PFMA amplifies these duties and obligations,488 which are of special 
application to all State-owned entitles, whatever form they take.”489 
With the enactment of the PFMA the South Africa government took an important step 
towards weaning SOEs off wasting government funds by ensuring effective and 
efficient financial management. However, it is also apparent that rules on corporate 
governance have not been sufficient to ensure the efficient operation of these 
undertakings.  
4 Concluding Remarks  
As this chapter has shown, for a very long time SOEs have formed part of the 
economies of developed countries just like they do at present in a developing 
country such as South Africa. Today though, there are fewer SOEs within developed 
countries than in the decades after World War II, despite the intervention that was 
required during the 2008 financial crisis. European integration has played a 
significant role in the divesting of state assets within those EU countries which were 
discussed in the chapter. The decline of SOEs in the selected EU countries was 
furthered by greater European integration490 and the implementation of the internal 
market in the EU. European integration led to the opening up of industries in which 
SOEs operated.491 Due to European integration, which gave rise to strict 
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supranational rules even in economic matters, the world might never see the level of 
state intervention that characterised the post-war era. Whether this is an overly 
optimistic outlook on possible future state intervention in EU member states has to 
be seen, considering that the world saw in 2008 “the biggest financial and economic 
crisis in 80 years”,492 which it was certainly not prepared for. The recent migrant 
crisis and the unfolding events in Eastern Europe, particularly the crisis in Ukraine 
seems to lead to a rebirth of a new conflict line reminiscent of the Cold War which 
may also affect the way western market economies think of state intervention and 
nationalisation of industries. Other factors which could swing the pendulum in the 
opposite direction again are the continuous financial problems within the euro zone 
countries and the rise of right-wing political parties all over Europe. It is submitted 
that beside European integration, the strict appliance of state aid measures493 within 
the EU could also have played a role in governments’ decision to privatise SOEs 
instead of intervening more in their economies.494  
In the context of South Africa, the role of SOEs continues to be significant. President 
Mandela might have accepted early during his administration as the first 
democratically elected President of South Africa that state intervention is not 
necessarily the best option to grow the economy. However, after that it has been 
generally accepted that a balance is needed between reaching the developmental 
goals of the government and growing the economy. The sheer number of enterprises 
listed in the PFMA, whether public utilities, commercialised enterprises or other non-
commercialises enterprises, is a clear indication of the level of state intervention 
which the government still considers necessary in South Africa. The government is 
clearly of the opinion that socio-economic conditions will not improve if it does not 
play an active role in the economy and it has to be recognised that for developmental 
reasons it is sometimes required that certain industries remain state-owned. The fact 
that the government owns SOEs in many strategic sectors does not mean though 
that the government delivers as it should. In the recent past the country has been 
plagued by service delivery protests. These protests are in often addressed at 
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government and local authorities but in some instances against the poor delivery of a 
service or goods provided by SOEs such as the provision of clean water, proper 
sanitation, transport and electricity. These are all sectors where the private sector 
could play a role and could have significant economic impact. However, again a 
question mark can be placed on whether private enterprises “will do the right thing” 
in these sectors even though they might “do things right” as private enterprises are 
focused on profit maximization and not the correction of socio-economic issues  
Since SOEs are representing “hugely strategic resources”, it is understandable that 
the South African government does not just want to follow a “simplistic process of 
privatization”. Various factors need to be taken into consideration when arguments 
are made for or against state intervention. Such factors include, inter alia, socio-
economic circumstances in South Africa, the level of economic development, 
availability of essential service and goods to all South Africans, infrastructure 
development and job creation. In the case of South Africa, with all its complex socio-
economic problems, many created as a result of past governmental policies, it is 
easy for the government to justify why certain strategic sectors of the economy are 
kept as state assets. This is particularly relevant in the context of service utility 
SOEs. The government and institutions such as the trade union movement, 
COSATU justifiably worry about the consequences of government divestment of 
strategic SOEs. Will all South Africans, especially the poor, still be able to access the 
services and goods which are provided by strategic SOEs at affordable rates? The 
water supply industry in South Africa can be used as example. One of the 
government’s developmental goals is to provide clean water to every resident of 
South Africa. Currently each province has its own water supply system in place. On 
the one hand there are justifiable fears that if the government, local, provincial or 
national, does not play an active role in water supply, that not everyone in South 
Africa might get access to water. On the other hand, there are also justifiable 
arguments that government might not reach the goal of supplying clean water to all 
South Africans in a quick and efficient way and that this could rather be achieved by 
private enterprises.495 Even while a sector of the economy is considered to be one of 
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the many strategic sectors in South Africa, consideration should be given to speedier 
and more efficient means for achieving the developmental goals of the government. 
It sometimes takes a bold move to improve the efficiency and speed with which a 
sector delivers services and goods to ensure that the developmental goals of 
government are met. 
END OF CHAPTER  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
industry. Thatcher describes the privatisation of the water industry as “politically sensitive” with “much emotive 
nonsense” and she continued with the process. A few decades after Thatcher’s privatisation of the water supply 
industry, competition in the industry is healthy and customers receive better prices and service due to such 
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The application of competition law to SOEs in certain circumstances became a 
necessary requirement since many SOEs are now operating beyond the national 
borders1 of the countries where they were established and they are also competing 
directly with “private, profit-maximizing enterprises” in many markets.2 Now that the 
characteristics of SOEs and the reasons for their existence3 are known and in order 
to determine the extent of the applicability of competition law to these enterprises 
within the selected jurisdictions, it is necessary to explore the purpose and function 
of competition law and its relevance for SOEs. This chapter will provide a general 
overview of competition law systems within the United States of America (US) since 
statutory competition law has its origin in the US, the three selected EU member 
states and South Africa. This discussion will shed light on how, if at all, the 
competition laws of these jurisdictions cover SOEs, their activities and their funding 
by the state. In the light of the recommendations that are made for South Africa in 
chapter 5, it is necessary to know whether state funding of economically active SOEs 
is at all covered by the different competition laws. This discussion is also 
necessitated by the fact that SOEs have become some of the biggest market 
players, particular in South Africa, while still enjoying those benefits which have the 
potential to distort competition. State aid to enterprises within the selected EU 
member states will be comprehensively discussed in chapter four, while chapter 5 
will give a comprehensive description of the positon in South Africa. Hence this 




                                                          
1 These enterprises are called “state-owned multinational enterprises”. See X He, L Eden & MA Hitt “The 
Renaissance of State-Owned Multinationals” (2016) 58(2) Thunderbird International Business Review 117-129. 
This is particular a phenomenon seen in regard to Chinese SOEs. 
2 DEM Sappington & JG Sidak “Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises” (2003) 71 Antitrust Law 
Journal 2. See also OECD “State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or an Opportunity?” 
OECD Publishing (2016) (accessible at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264262096-en). 





2 What is competition and why is it important? 
 
“Competition is central to the operation of markets, and fosters innovation, 
productivity and growth, all of which create wealth and reduce poverty.”4 
 
Many descriptions have been given of the concept of competition by economists, 
competition and antitrust scholars, courts and government agencies.5 It has been 
described as: 
 
“a process of rivalry between firms seeking to win customers’ business. This process 
of rivalry, where it is effective, impels firms to deliver benefits to customers in terms 
of prices, quality and choice.”6 
 
In a South African context one of the most quoted descriptions of competition still 
remains the one of Judge Van Dijkhorst in Lorimar Productions Inc. v Sterling 
Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd7 long before the dawn of South Africa’s current 
competition law regime: 
 
“In general terms competition involves the idea of a struggle between rivals 
endeavouring to obtain the same end. It may be said to exist whenever there is a 
potential diversion of trade from one to another. For competition to exist the articles 
or services of the competitors should be related to the same purpose or must satisfy 
the same need.” 
 
                                                          
4 N Godfrey “Why is Competition important for growth and poverty reduction” OECD Global Forum on 
International Investment 27-28 March 2008 3.  
5 For examples of such description see J M Clark “What is Competition?” (1925) 3 (3) University Journal of 
Business 217-240; L Abbott “What is Competition?” (1956) 4(7) Challenge 6 6-10; B Ross “What Is 
Competition For?” (1988) 31(2) Challenge 42 42-48.  
6 O Black Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust (2005) 7. 
7 Lorimar Production Inc.  v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd; Lorimar Productions Inc. v OK 




Competition is considered to be the “antithesis” to monopoly and has been credited 
with quicker “goal attainment” amongst people and businesses.8 Neethling observes 
that “[a] competitive relationship brings about a struggle for the favour of the client, a 
struggle which the one obtains, finds it correlate in the prejudice or potential 
prejudice that the other suffers”.9  
 
Competition takes place amongst businesses which operate within market 
economies.10 A free market economy is “founded upon the principles of free 
competition, free economic choice, and free development of the individual 
personality.”11 The notion of “markets” is thus important in regard to competition. 
What constitutes a market? The United States Court of Appeals12 stated that 
according to economists a market exists when buyers and sellers exchange goods 
or services and that the buyer’s desire to buy and the seller’s desire to sell are 
qualified by price. Both parties will only proceed within a certain price range and this 
makes the market a mechanism through which price is determined. The Competition 
Tribunal of South Africa stated that, for purposes of a competition law analysis, 
market definition relies on a number of aspects. These, inter alia, include demand 
side substitution, supply side substitution as well as functionality and nature of the 
product.13 Sissors notes that the traditional way of defining a market is through its 
“generic class of product”, the so-called product market, which refers to individuals 
who have bought the product in the past.14 The author observes that once the 
market has been identified through the product, the “most common classifications” 
used to describe purchasers in that market includes: (i) the size of the market, (ii) the 
geographical locations of purchasers, (iii) the demographic descriptions of 
purchasers, (iv) social-psychological characteristics, (v) reasons why products are 
purchased, (vi) who makes the actual purchases, and who influences the purchaser, 
(vii) when purchases are made and (viii) how purchasing is done.15 Other factors 
                                                          
8 A Kohn No Contest: The Case against Competition 2nd ed (2013) 1. 
9 J Neethling Unlawful Competition (2008) 3. 
10 Where a “centrally planned economy” exists, competition amongst enterprises is rare since all enterprises are 
owned by the state.  
11 LH Mai “Erhard's Social Market Economy” (1964) 44 (4) Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 329 329. 
12 Consolidated Gas Co. of Florida, Inc. v City Gas Co. of Florida 912 F.2d 1262 C.A.11 (Fla.) 1990 1277. 
13 Telkom SA Ltd / Business Connexion Group Ltd [2007] 2 CPLR 433 (CT) 453. 
14 JZ Sissors “What Is a Market?” (1966) 30(3) Journal of Marketing 17. 




stated by Sissors to define a market include age, consumers’ environment and 
geographical places.16 Competition, however, is not automatically present within a 
market only because there are a number of enterprises operating within such a 
market as competition may be restrained in different ways.17 Competition is thus an 
integral part of a free market economy. 
  
Five “forces” that shape competition amongst businesses have been identified.18 
These include (i) rivalry amongst existing competitors, (ii) the threat of new entrants, 
(iii) the threat of substitute products and service, (iv) the bargaining power of 
suppliers and (v) the bargaining powers of buyers.19 According to Porter the 
presence of these “forces” are not always the same in the different industries.20 It is 
argued that in some industries some of the “forces” have a stronger presence than 
others. As an illustration of this observation Porter uses the commercial airline 
industry. It is stated that in this industry the competition is between two existing 
competitors namely Boeing and Airbus and that the threat of a new entrant to this 
industry is relatively small but the “bargaining powers” of the buyers, which are the 
various airlines throughout the world, are great.21  
 
How the realization and existence of competition is viewed differs. Kolasky states 
that when a lay persons thinks of competition, two possibilities can be observed, 
firstly a sporting event between two opponents contesting to be the winner and 
secondly the number of firms competing for business and the more firms you find, 
the more competitive the behaviour will be.22 Then there is the traditional 
economist’s view of competition. The traditional economist’s concept of competition 
is not only about rivalry between competitors. A simplified way of referring to the 
economist’s view of competition is when “firms price their output at marginal cost and 
                                                          
16 JZ Sissors “What Is a Market?” (1966) 30 (3) Journal of Marketing17 17-18. 
17 One form of restraint, which is important for purposes of this study, may be through the actions of SOEs 
which operates within the market. 
18 ME Porter “The Five Force That Shape Strategy” (2008) 86(1) Harvard Business Review 78 80.  
19 ME Porter “The Five Force That Shape Strategy” (2008) 86 (1) Harvard Business Review 7880. 
20 ME Porter “The Five Force That Shape Strategy” (2008) 86 (1) Harvard Business Review 78 80. 
21 ME Porter “The Five Force That Shape Strategy” (2008) 86(1) Harvard Business Review 78 80. 
22 WJ Kolasky “What is Competition? A comparison of US and European Perspective” (2004) 49 (1-2) Antitrust 




costs are minimized by internal efficiencies”.23 This is thus a reason to note that the 
economist studies competition while the businessman practices it.24  
 
In regard to the benefits of competition, it is submitted that it offers various benefits 
to an economy in general and consumers in a market in particular. These benefits 
are recognised by institutions such as the OECD,25 the EU Commission26 and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).27 Firstly, 
competition ensures that producers produce goods and services at the lowest cost. 
This leads to low prices for all as prices are pushed down within a competitive 
market. Secondly, competition encourages businesses to improve the quality of their 
goods and services as consumers want to acquire quality goods and services for the 
best or lowest prices. Thirdly, competition leads to more choice for consumers. 
Competitors want their goods and service to be the preferred choice of consumers. 
Hence they will use various methods to ensure that consumers choose their goods 
and service above those of their competitors. These methods may, inter alia, include 
discounts, advertising methods to distinguish their products and services from those 
of competitors and to make them more attractive to consumers, the availability of 
more product or service options and incentive schemes such as providing free 
products when consumers spend a certain amount of money on their products and 
services. Fourthly, competition encourages innovation by businesses as they would 
like to be always one step ahead of their competitors. Neumann states that 
competition encourages innovative actions by competitors since no competitor 
knows what goods and services would be appealing to the consumer.28 Therefore 
products and services are tested on the market and if it appeals to the consumer, the 
competitor makes a beneficial discovery through competition.29 Cefrey observes that 
fair competition often leads to new invention in that businesses not only invent ways 
to make existing products better or to improve existing services but it also ensures 
                                                          
23 WJ Kolasky “What is Competition? A comparison of US and European Perspective” (2004) 49 (1-2) Antitrust 
Bulletin 29 31. 
24 J Dean “Competition –inside and out” (1954) Harvard Business Review 63 63. 
25 For all these benefits see OECD, “The Benefits of Competition Law and Policy for Developed and 
Developing Countries” (2004) 6 (1-2) OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy 40 40- 56.  
26 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html (accessed on 12 May 2016). 
27 See the UNCTAD’s Manual on the Formulation and Application of Competition Law (2004) 2. 
28 M Neumann Competition Policy History, Theory and Practice (2001) 14. 




that businesses invent new products and services.30 Lastly, competition ensures 
economic efficiency and development31 and it protects the consumer from restraint of 
trade and monopoly.32 
 
In order to understand the crucial role of competition between enterprises and how it 
can help to grow modern economies, it is important to refer to the history of 
competition and how economics as a science came to be used for competition law 
analyses.  
 
3 History of the Competition Concept in Economics  
3 1 Important epochs and economists 
Different economic epochs are important for the study since the different theories 
established and followed by economists during these epochs “shapes today’s 
actions of governments, enterprise [and] unions” towards economic competition.33 
No discussion on the history of competition is complete without reference to Adam 
Smith’s34 well known work, the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations35 
published in 1776 and it has been said that it is “common cause” to start any 
discussion on the economic history of competition with an exploration of Adam 
Smith’s work.36 Adam Smith’s37 book established the “roots of competition” and the 
belief that “uncontrolled, apparently chaotic, and completely self-interested behavior 
of businesspersons produces more welfare than government command and 
                                                          
30 H Cefrey The Sherman Antitrust Act: Getting Big Business Under Control (2004) 6. 
31 See the UNCTAD’s Manual on the Formulation and Application of Competition Law (2004) 2. 
32 AJ DeLuca “Requirements for competition” (1988) 57(2) Antitrust Law Journal 511 515. 
33 See RD Wolff and SA Resnick Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian 
(2012) 1. 
34 Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Nassua Senior and John Cairnes are all considered to be 
classical economist. See MN Rothbard “Competition and the Economists” (2012) 15 (4) Quarterly Journal of 
Austrian Economics 396 396-409. 
35 Described as a “formal treatise heralded by scholars as “equal to what has ever appeared on any subject of 
science whatever” and securing for its author “as near an approach to immortality as a fall to any economic 
writer”. See JH Hollander “The Work and Influence of Ricardo” in J C Wood (ed) David Ricardo: Critical 
Assessments (1985) 42 42.  See also J H Hollander “Adam Smith 1776-1926” (1927) 35(2) Journal of Political 
Economy 153 153-197.   
36 PJ McNulty “A Note on the History of Perfect Competition” (1967) 75 (4) Journal of Political Economy 395 
395. 
37 Adam Smith has been referred to as the “founding father of the profession [economics]” in particular classical 
economics and his contribution to economics has been compared to what Darwin did for science. See G Niels, H 
Jenkins & J Kavanagh Economics for Competition Lawyers (2011) 2; and K McCreadie Adam Smith's The 
Wealth of Nations: A Modern-day Interpretation of an Economic Classic (2009) 2. For further reading see also 




control”.38 Writings before Smith’s book though, indicate that the concept of 
competition already existed long before Smith’s famous work.39 McNulty thus rejects 
the notion that the entry of the concept of competition into economics can be 
attributed to Smith. The author notes that “neither the concept nor its analytical 
function” originated in Smith’s work.40 Smith’s pivotal role in establishing the concept 
of competition as a “principle of economic society” is however acknowledged.41  
What was the “Smithian concept of competition”? The literature which deals with 
Smith’s theory on competition is unanimous that Smith saw competition as a 
“behavioural process” through which individuals ensured that they defeat their 
rivals.42 It is noted that to Smith competition was essentially a rivalry process 
between those who buy and those who sell goods at marginal cost but it was also a 
“process by which commodities and services were discovered, produced efficiently, 
and allocated to their most highly valued uses in order to respond to the problem of 
scarcity.”43 Rothbard observes that Smith viewed competition in the “common-sense 
way” the same as businessmen view it, meaning it to be a rivalry between two or 
more independent persons or firms.44 Smith placed particular emphasis on the 
freedom to enter an industry and used this as a yardstick to determine the level of 
competition in an industry.45 While recounting Smith’s approach to competition, 
Stigler identified five conditions for competition to be present, attributed to Smith. 
These conditions are firstly, that competitors do not collude, secondly, that the 
number of potential and current competitors must be sufficient to eliminate any gain 
which is extraordinary, thirdly, knowledge of market opportunities by potential or 
                                                          
38 H Hovenkamp The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (2006) 15. 
39 R van den Bergh & PD Camesasca European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective 
(2001) 16. 
40 PJ McNulty “A Note on the History of Perfect Competition” (1967) 75 (4) Journal of Political Economy 395 
395. 
41 PJ McNulty “A Note on the History of Perfect Competition” (1967) 75 (4) Journal of Political Economy395 
395-396. McNultry states that “His [Smith’s] contribution with respect to the concept of competition was the 
systematization of earlier thinking on the subject and, more importantly, the elevation of competition to the level 
of a general organizing principle of economic society-an achievement far greater, surely, than that of any of his 
predecessors.” 
42  See D Geradin, A Layne-Farrar & N Petit EU Competition Law and Economics (2012) para 2.10. 
43 GM Anderson & R D Tollison “Adam Smith's Analysis of Joint-Stock Companies” (1982) 90(6) Journal of 
Political Economy1237 1238. 
44 MN Rothbard “Competition and the Economists” (2012) 15 (4) Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 396 
396. For further reading on the economic theories of David Ricardo see D Ricardo On the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation 3rd ed (1821). 
45 GM Anderson & RD Tollison “Adam Smith's Analysis of Joint-Stock Companies” (1982) 90 (6) Journal of 




current competitors, fourthly, the freedom to act on the knowledge of these market 
opportunities and lastly, that resources must flow in those directions and in those 
quantities as desired by their owners.46 
 
Other well-known classical economists and fierce followers of Smith’s theory on 
competition continued to apply and observe Smith’s theory with very little or no 
changes. It is stated that David Ricardo, the first major economist to follow Smith, did 
not add anything of significance to Smith’s view on competition and that Smith’s 
position was closely followed in instances where he made reference to monopolies 
as Ricardo also attacked British colonial monopolies which were already fiercely 
criticised by Smith.47 The classical economist, John Stuart Mill48 continued in the 
tradition of Smith and Ricardo.49 Only at a later stage was there a certain degree of 
diversion from the “Smithian tradition” in regard to competition.  
 
Nassua Senior and John Cairnes broadened Smith’s description of a monopoly. 
Senior believed that if the conditions for producing a commodity were not equal, 
monopolistic behaviour was present. Cairnes deviated from earlier economic theory 
on the meaning of free competition.50 Smith and those following his theory on the 
meaning of free competition viewed it as the process which attain prices which is 
equal or very close to the production cost, while Cairnes concentrated on the result 
which was reached, namely that the price and the production costs was equalised 
and not the process to reach such a result.51 Cairnes is considered to be one of the 
last classical economists before the neoclassical economist introduced changed 
theories regarding competition. 
 
                                                          
46 GJ Stigler “Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated” (1957) 65 (1) Journal of Political Economy 1 2. 
47 MN Rothbard “Competition and the Economists” (2012) 15(4) Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 396 
397. 
48 For more reading on the theories of John Stuart Mill see J S Mill Principles of Political Economy: with Some 
of their Applications to Social Philosophy 2nd ed (1848). See also P D Groenewegen “Was John Stuart Mill a 
Classical Economist?” (2005) 13 (3)   History of Economic Ideas 9 9-31. 
49 MN Rothbard “Competition and the Economists” (2012) 15(4) Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 396 
398. 
50 MN Rothbard “Competition and the Economists” (2012) 15 (4) Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 396 
399-400. 
51 MN Rothbard “Competition and the Economists” (2012) 15(4) Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 396 
399-400. See also GJ Stigler “Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated” (1957) 65 (1) Journal of 




Only in 1871 did competition receive “explicit and systemic attention in the 
mainstream of economics”.52 The view is that the shift in the late 1870s from 
macroeconomics, which focused on the economy and its growth as a whole, to 
microeconomics, which focused on an economy influenced by decisions made by 
individuals and firms, was the start of the neoclassical economic theories and 
between 1870 and 1930 the foundation of the neoclassical economic theory was 
established.53 Economists such as Cournot, Dupuit, Jevons, Edgeworth, Clark and 
Knight are credited with the broadening of Adam Smith’s theory on competition by 
adding a mathematical approach to the analysis of markets and by observing that 
market prices “depend on the subjective value of goods”.54 This established the 
“price theory”.55  
 
The neoclassic economists did not opposed or reject the classical theory in regard to 
the concept of competition but attempted to get a better understanding of 
competition. They did this by using “advanced apparatus”, which is the “equilibrium-
based model”.56 Neoclassical theories introduced the concept of “perfect 
competition”. “Perfect competition” was achieved by a market with multiple sellers 
and buyers and these market players ensured that they benefitted from the “law of 
demand and supply”.57 Competition is perfect when demand fully meets supply.58 
“Perfect competition” does not focus on the behaviour of a business but purely on 
the effect of the competitive process.59 Conditions which indicate “perfect 
competition” are believed to include: firstly, the presence of many buyers and sellers 
without any single buyer’s or seller’s action impacting on the market price of a 
product; secondly, the knowledge by producers and consumers of events within a 
                                                          
52 GJ Stigler “Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated” (1957) 65 (1) Journal of Political Economy 1 1. 
53 RD Wolff & S A Resnick Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian (2012) 15. 
54 AS Papadopoulos The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010) 269. 
55 AS Papadopoulos The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010) 269. 
56 O Andriychuk “The Concept of Perfect Competition as the Law of Economics: Addressing the Homonymy 
Problem” (2011) 62 (4) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 523 528. 
57 O Andriychuk “The Concept of Perfect Competition as the Law of Economics: Addressing the Homonymy 
Problem” (2011) 62 (4) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 523 528. 
58 O Andriychuk “The Concept of Perfect Competition as the Law of Economics: Addressing the Homonymy 
Problem” (2011) 62 (4) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 523 527. 
59 O Andriychuk “The Concept of Perfect Competition as the Law of Economics: Addressing the Homonymy 
Problem” (2011) 62 (4) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 523 527. See also P Sutherland & K Kemp 
Competition Law of South Africa (2014) 1-8 and A S Papadopoulos The International Dimension of EU 




market on which they can act; thirdly, homogenous products in markets which 
ensures that consumers do not go after the products of “alternative suppliers”; 
fourthly, both firms and consumers act in their own economic interest; and lastly, that 
there are no barriers to the movement of any products.60 
 
The above economic theories which promoted individual economic freedoms and 
limited state intervention in the markets came under threat during the Great 
Depression, when state intervention in markets, became a necessity.61 Neither the 
classical economic theory nor the neoclassical economic theory prepared anyone for 
an event such as the Great Depression.62 Governments had to act to ameliorate the 
impact on their economies and societies. The Great Depression “played havoc with 
laissez faire”63 since governments had to interfere with the individual economic 
freedoms required by the classical and neoclassical economic theories. The inability 
of classical and neoclassical theories to provide solutions for the economic problems 
which arose during the Great Depression, led to the rise of the Keynesian theory on 
competition.64 One of the fundamentals of the Keynesian theory is that the state 
should play a bigger role in markets than is attributed to it by the classical and 
neoclassical theories.65 Even though some state intervention was favoured by the 
Keynesian theory, it is argued that it was not an “attack on the virtues of the market 
economy”,66 but was necessary due to the economic conditions created in 1933, 
conditions for which there were no proper solutions in the existing economic 
theories. The American President at the time, Franklin Rooseveldt, started to accept 
the Keynesian theory to save America’s economy.67 As a result federal programmes 
were created to employ millions of unemployed Americans and laws were put in 
place to regulate free markets.68 The Keynesian approach of state involvement in the 
economy was an integral part of economies until the 1970s when the state’s 
                                                          
60 D Kallay The Law And Economics Of Antitrust And Intellectual Property An Austrian Approach (2004) 17. 
61 See RD Wolff & SA Resnick Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian (2012) 
15. 
62 See RD Wolff & SA Resnick Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian (2012) 
15. 
63  P Berton The Great Depression: 1929-1939 (2002) 14. 
64 See RD Wolff & SA Resnick Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian (2012) 
17. 
65 RD Wolff & SA Resnick Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian (2012) 17. 
66 R Marris Reconstructing Keynesian Economics with Imperfect Competition: A Desktop Simulation (1991) 5. 
67 RD Wolff & S A Resnick Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian (2012) 17. 




involvement in the economy was again questioned.69 It is said that the election of 
leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan was indicative of the belief 
that the state needed to play a reduced role in the economy and that there needed to 
be a return to “individual initiative and responsibility.”70 The application of Keynesian 
theories in capitalist economies thus started to fade with Margaret Thatcher’s 
historically important privatisation programme which commenced a worldwide trend. 
Many states were gradually withdrawing from regulating markets and being active as 
an economic player.  
 
However, the 2008 financial crisis71 saw a return to Keynesian economics. 
Governments all over the world had to intervene to save failing banks and other 
financial institutions.72 State intervention was necessary to correct the failures of the 
free market and to avoid an even bigger economic crisis. Any impact on competition 
between enterprises by such state intervention would have been dwarfed by the 
severe economic disaster that would have ensued had there been no intervention. In 
the EU, for example, provision was made through special regulations, for the 
assistance of banks and financial institution by the governments.73 Not only did 
specific rules limit the impact on competition but it also ensured that states stayed 
true to the state aid regime that applies within the EU. The state aid that was thus 
provided occurred within a regulatory framework. Hence state involvement in the 





                                                          
69 RD Wolff & S A Resnick Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian (2012) 21. 
70 RD Wolff & SA Resnick Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian (2012) 22. 
71 See chapter two for a short reference to this crisis. 
72 RD Wolff & SA Resnick Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian  (2012) 24 
73 See Communication from the Commission on the application of the State aid rules to support measures in 
favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’) Official Journal of the 
European Union No.216/1 [2013]; Temporary Community framework for State aid measures to support access 
to finance in the current financial and economic crisis Official Journal of the European Union No. C 16/01 
[2009]; The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of 
the current global financial crisis Official Journal of the European Union No. C 270/02 [2008]. See also P 
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4 Competition law (antitrust law) as protection measure for competition 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
Competition is safeguarded through the implementation of competition laws. 
Competition laws internationally have the same fundamental features namely the 
regulation of anticompetitive conduct by private parties and the regulation of mergers 
or combinations.  
 
Sweeney states that: 
 
“Competition law (or antitrust law) is generally taken to refer to the laws that 
regulate private anticompetitive conduct……there are certain core provisions that 
underpin nearly all competition law regimes. These include: prohibition of 
anticompetitive collusion (such as price fixing and market sharing by competitors), 
prohibitions on anticompetitive vertical arrangements (such as exclusive distribution 
agreements), prohibitions on anticompetitive conduct by dominant firms… and 
prohibitions on mergers that substantially reduce competition"74 
 
Further description includes those by Winslow and Neumann. Winslow describes 
competition law as follows:  
 
“In general, competition law prohibits or provide a means to address conduct that is 
‘anticompetitive’- that is conduct that does or is likely to restrict output and increase 
price, impede market expansion or new entry, reduce product or service quality, or 
stifle innovation. They also prohibit firms from obtaining market power by merger or 
by any means other than skill, foresight, and industry.”75 
 
Neumann notes that countries which apply their competition legislation in a strict way 
display “superior international competiveness.”76 
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Competition law is one element of competition policy.77 Jenny identifies other 
elements of competition policy including “deregulation”, “trade liberalization” and 
“privatization”.78 Competition law has also been described as “one of the means by 
which states regulate the behaviour of players in the free-market economies.”79 
Many countries, including South Africa, have free market economies. Competition in 
the sense that is relevant for competition law can occur only in these economies. 
Countries with a free market economy generally have competition policies in place to 
regulate competitive relations. Competition law has both economic and political 
goals.80 Buttigieg states that these goals may be linked to the economic 
circumstances within a country or its region and it may change with the passing of 
time and a change in “political and scholarly ideologies.”81 It is further stated that 
whatever the economic circumstances within different economies are, the 
consumer’s protection should be at the forefront of all goals of competition policy and 
law.82 Competition law thus sets the rules for competitive relations and it attempts to 
eliminate all activities by competitors which could be harmful to the economy. Its 
application is triggered by any uncompetitive or prohibited practices.  
 
4 2 The different “schools of thought” on competition law  
 
A number of “schools of thoughts” have developed over the decades, which 
established different theories in regard to: competition law, the reasons for its 
importance and the economic analysis of competition. These schools include the 
ordoliberals, the Harvard economists, the Chicago economists,83 the post-Chicago 
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economist and the Austrians economists.84 It is important to know how different 
schools of thought view competition and the law that governs it. 
 
Europe was in a dire economic position after World War II. Economies needed to be 
rebuilt. After the war it was expected that state control of economies would be seen 
as the norm all over Europe and that competition and individual freedoms in the 
market place would be limited.85 However by the 1960s the market economy and the 
“process of competition” became the important measures for a successful economy, 
particularly in Germany.86 These developments were a result of the economic 
theories of a certain group of scholars based at the University of Freiburg.87 The 
Freiburg “school of thought” also known as the ordoliberals influenced the German 
economic policy after World War II88 and it is widely believed that they were behind 
the German social market economy (the Soziale Marktwirtschaft) implemented by 
Ludwig Erhard, the Vice- Chancellor and Minister for Economic Affairs of the 
German Federal Republic.89 Their ideas had a huge impact on the social and 
economic policies in Europe.90 Gerber states that the Freiburg School was in 
agreement with former thinkers on the importance of a competitive economic system 
in order to ensure a “prosperous, free and equitable society”.91 They believed that 
the competition principles should form part of a “constitutional framework”.92 One of 
their objectives was to rid Germany of the “cartelization” of its industries, which 
started to take effect in 187393 and which continued during the Weimar Republic 
after World War I and under Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime, as they wanted “private 
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power in a free society”.94 The ordoliberals believed that economic goals could be 
achieved through the application of legal disciplines such as “cartel” (competition 
law), contract and corporate law.95 They further wanted the state to play a significant 
role in the promotion of competition and therefore a strong state was required to 
protect “economic liberty” since any weakness on the part of the state would not 
have led to “economic liberty”.96 Economists such as Walter Eucken, Franz Bohm, 
Alexander Rustow, Wilhelm Ropke and Alfred Muller-Armack are the “founding 
fathers” of this “school of thought”.97  
 
The theories of the Harvard “school of thought” (Harvard School) or the 
“structuralists” had a profound impact on antitrust law (competition law) in America 
during the 1950s and 1960s.98 The theories of the Harvard School were adopted by 
the courts and antitrust agencies during the 1960s and the 1970s.99 The Harvard 
School adopted a theory whereby they assumed that when a firm had market power, 
it will act in an anti-competitive manner.100 Hence they proposed that courts and 
competition authorities should presume the illegality of mergers, joint ventures of any 
agreements which would lead to market power even though it could benefit 
consumers.101 They followed a “structural approach” in condemning anti-competitive 
practices. The structural approach of the Harvard School was however relaxed in the 
works of Donald Turner.102 He no longer viewed structure as an automatic indication 
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of anti-competitive behaviour but rather as a factor that required closer 
investigation.103 This is mainly the approach that is followed today.104 
 
The Harvard School’s structuralist approach however came under fire from scholars 
at Chicago University. Unlike the Harvard School who focused on the market power 
of a firm, the Chicago “school of thought” (Chicago School) or the “behavioralists” 
adopted a theory which focused on the objective of antitrust (competition law). 
Scholars associated with the Chicago school found no evidence that “Congress's 
intent under the antitrust laws was to protect individual competitors against large 
firms' exercise of market power.”105 As a result their approach was that the antitrust 
laws were designed simply to increase the efficiency of the American economy and 
that only economic efficiency foster “conditions that maximized wealth” and 
consumer welfare.106 They focused on the “efficiency gains to society from large 
size” and did not consider concentrated markets to be bad for competition.107 Posner 
credits Aaron Director for establishing the basic ideas of the Chicago School.108 In 
the late 1970s,109 the courts and antitrust agencies started to follow this approach 
since they were no longer willing to prohibit competitive conduct on its face.110 
Instead, the effects of particular conduct on consumers had first to be investigated 
before any finding on its legality could be made.111  
 
The Chicago school’s approach has also been altered by the “post-Chicago school 
of thought” (the post-Chicago school). It developed out of the observation that the 
Chicago school’s approaches were “too simplistic to take real-world phenomena into 
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account”112 and that certain “market structures” and “collaborative activity” may have 
anti-competitive consequences.113 Hovenkamp states that those who found markets 
to be more complex and varied than what the Chicago school was willing to admit 
wanted an antitrust policy that was more sensitive to market imperfections.114 He 
further states that the post-Chicago theorists (i) had less confidence in markets; (ii) 
were more fearful of strategic anticompetitive behaviour by dominant firms; and (iii) 
had more faith in the efficacy of government intervention.115 Hence the post-Chicago 
theorists developed new game theories and empirical tools “to study complex market 
structures”.116 Baker states that the new empirical tools allowed better measurement 
of incentives, conduct and effects.117 By using these tools to analyse strategic 
behaviour by market participants, the post-Chicago school showed that it could be 
anti-competitive.118 The acknowledgment that strategic behaviour by market 
participants could be anti-competitive, led the number, variety and likelihood of anti-
competitive practices to become “open ended”.119 Baker states that these 
developments started to influence antitrust policy during the 1990s.120 It started to 
manifest during H.W. Bush’s administration when the new merger guidelines were 
adopted and also in the Supreme Court’s decision in Eastman Kodak Company v 
Image Technical Services Incorporated.121 In the Kodak case a number of 
independent services organizations who serviced photocopiers and micrographic 
equipment manufactured by Kodak, instituted action against Kodak after it adopted 
policies to limit the availability of parts. Kodak was a manufacturer and seller of 
photocopiers and micrographic equipment and it also sold service and replacement 
parts for its equipment. The independent services organizations alleged that Kodak’s 
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policies to limit the availability of parts to them made it difficult for them to compete 
with Kodak in servicing Kodak’s photocopiers and micrographic equipment in that it 
amounted to a tying arrangement between Kodak parts and service.122 The issue 
which the court had to determine was whether Kodak’s lack of market power in the 
primary equipment market precluded the possibility of market power in derivative 
aftermarkets. Tying arrangements where the seller has “appreciable economic 
power” in the “tied product market” is considered to be illegal in terms of a per se 
rule.123 Hence, a judicial inquiry into its “procompetitive benefits and its 
anticompetitive costs” is not necessary. In this case the court undertook a judicial 
inquiry after having found that there was sufficient evidence of a tying arrangement. 
The court used “appreciable economic power” in the “tied product market” as a 
measure to determine whether there could be any anticompetitive effects by the 
tying arrangement.124 It stated that in determining the existence of market power it 
has to closely examine the economic reality of the market at issue. It did not favour 
any existing economic theory but focused on the facts125 and decided from the 
evidence offered that it was reasonable to infer that Kodak had market power to 
raise prices and drive out competition in the aftermarkets.126 Baker states that the 
Supreme Court’s openness to accept economic theories outside of the Chicago 
school’s price theory showed its acceptance of new antitrust possibilities,127 while 
Klein states that the Kodak case can be correctly described as “emphasizing an 
examination of the facts of a situation before accepting an economic theory.”128  
 
The Austrian “school of thought” (the Austrian school) evolved around the ideas and 
theories of a group of Austrian scholars that included Carl Menger, Ludwig von 
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Mises, Joseph Schumpeter and Friederich Hayek.129 Even though different 
approaches to competition exist amongst these scholars, Kallay identifies those 
aspects on which the scholars have found common ground and these, included the 
emphasis on the role of the entrepreneur, the importance of product differentiation 
and the belief that competition is a dynamic process.130 The dynamic process 
advocated by the Austrian school became part of modern economic theory through 
the views of Joseph Schumpeter, the so-called “prophet of innovation”. Schumpeter, 
described as “a third generation member of the Austrian school”, is one of many 
prominent economists of the early twentieth century who was initially associated with 
the Austrian school and the most prominent theory on dynamic competition can be 
attributed to Schumpeter.131 The Austrian school’s approaches are considered to be 
the “roots of Schumpeter’s thoughts” and it is argued that certain elements of his 
theory derive from the Austrian school.132 Schumpeter’s “entrepreneurial innovation” 
theory was mostly based on Carl Menger’s work on the “entrepreneurial function” in 
economics.133 This, though, is not surprising since Schumpeter studied under some 
of the members of the Austria school.134 Schumpeter is thus associated with the 
“Austrian tradition in the everyday language of economics135 but in the course of time 
Schumpeter decided to move away from the views held by the Austrian school.136 
 
Schumpeter believed that consumer welfare can be achieved through competition 
which involves “new products, new technologies, new sources of supply, and new 
forms of business organization.”137 All these could be achieved through innovation 
and therefore “innovative competition”. Roberts summarises how greater competition 
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can lead to innovation or how innovation can lead to competition when he states 
that: 
 
“An innovative new product tends to face low competition at the point of 
introduction and therefore earns relatively high profits. These high profits attract 
imitators, which increase the level of competition faced by the product as time 
passes. Finally, this increased competition translates into reduced profits for the firm 
producing the new product.”138  
 
The goal of competition is reached, when the innovated product or service is 
available at affordable prices to all, not only to the few that could initially afford it 
when it was introduced. It is at this point when innovation starts benefiting more 
people and there is no doubt that innovation contributes to “human welfare”. Baker is 
thus correct when he states that “[f]rom one generation to the next, innovation is 
undoubtedly a central determinant of the welfare of humankind.”139  
 
Although innovation was not initially an obvious part of the general antitrust narrative, 
people such as Joseph Schumpeter and Kenneth Arrow140 ensured that it is now 
accepted141 that free and fair competition between enterprises encourages 
innovation142 of products and processes.143 Today the theory of dynamic competition 
is attributed to Schumpeter and his well-known work, Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy. Schumpeter believed that the introduction of new products and services 
drives capitalism.144 Schumpeter continues to be known as the “Prophet of 
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Innovation” and remains today one of the most influential thinkers about the concept 
of innovation.145 Schumpeter was thus not a follower of the theory of “perfect 
competition”, which forms part of neo-classical approach and which assumes the 
presence of many firms within a market which do not have the capabilities to control 
the market, and also of many buyers and seller within a market with knowledge of all 
products or service to be sold and bought.146 Schumpeter did not necessarily see 
monopolies as a threat to competition since his view was that the “perennial gale of 
creative destruction” would destroy monopolies if such firms did not remain 
innovative. He believed that monopolists or bigger firms rather than firms in 
competitive markets equal innovation.147 Schumpeter also believed that “monopoly 
power is needed to create the ‘new’ but also because it is the ‘new’ that ultimately 
destroys monopoly power”.148 Schumpeter argued that innovation leads to “gales of 
creative destruction”.149 Such “gales of creative destruction” lead to changes in 
markets, which challenge “equilibrium economics” in favour of “evolutionary 
economics”. Entrepreneurship, which contributes to economic development by 
introducing the “new”, is encouraged by such changes. Gavil and First believe that 
elements of “creative destruction” include (i) new consumers (ii) new products (iii) 
new markets (iv) new methods of production and transportation, and (v) new forms 
of organizations.150 It is submitted that these elements are today all guaranteed 
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4 3 Evolution of statutory competition law 
 
4 3 1 Introduction 
 
Since statutory competition law has its origin in the United States, it is most 
appropriate to start the discussion on this topic with a reference to an important 
dictum by the United States Supreme Court. 
 
“Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Charta 
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our 
fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every 
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete- to assert with vigour, 
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.”151 
 
This statement by the United States Supreme Court, even though it was made in the 
context of that country, stresses the importance of having competition law in every 
modern society. It signifies the most fundamental principles on which competition is 
based namely economic freedom, free enterprise, the freedom of enterprises to 
compete, efficient allocation of economic resources, low prices and high quality 
products and services. In order to apply competition policy to businesses, there 
needs to be competitive relations between businesses.  
 
The United States antitrust law, together with the EU competition law, undoubtedly 
are the two most influential competition law systems. These two regimes are 
influential because many countries have introduced competition laws based on either 
the United States’ or the EU’s competition law regimes or a combination of rules 
found in both regimes. These two competition law regimes have had an enormous 
impact on scholars, politicians, officials who envisage better competition policies for 
their own countries and practitioners who use the learning from these systems when 
they deal with cases in their own systems. Hence it is necessary to scrutinize the 
                                                          





evolution of these two competition law regimes. In a South African context it is 
important, firstly, because South Africa’s competition laws have also been greatly 
influenced by these two competition law regimes. Secondly, the EU has the only 
state aid control regime which forms part of its statutory competition laws and its 
state aid control regime serves as a benchmark for the recommendations in chapter 
5 regarding South African SOEs and state aid control. 
 
4 3 2 Statutory Competition law (antitrust law) in the United States 
 
American antitrust law, even though a creation of statute, has its roots in the 
(English) Common law restraint of trade doctrine152 and the common law tort of 
unfair competition.153 According to Fox American antitrust law is based on four 
“ancestral pillars” which were established by English case law and forms the basis 
for free market competition policy in America. These are that (i) state-granted 
monopoly is bad, (ii) cartels harm the public good, (iii) free entry into markets is 
good, and no incumbent competitor should be able to sue for the private loss that 
new entry entails since no one can sue for harm from competition itself and (iv) some 
private restraints are necessary to facilitate salutary transactions, and reasonable 
restraints are desirable and permissible.154 
 
Fox further states that these principles are the “basic guarantors” of economic 
freedom in America. Therefore, according to Fox, American antitrust law is all about 
economic freedom, with efficiency only being a “by-product” of such freedom.155 
Today these four principles are not only reflected in the antitrust laws of the United 
States but also in the competition laws of many of those countries which adopted 
their own competition law regimes.  
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Antitrust law in the United States is mostly addressed on a federal level156 even 
though many federal states have also passed their own antitrust laws which are 
enforced by the attorneys general of the states.157 The key antitrust laws in the 
United States are the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. Sections 1 - 11), the Clayton Act (15 
U.S.C. Sections 12-27) and the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. Sections 
41-58).158 Although many changes have been made to these statutes since their 
inception, the basic principles remain the same.159 Other statutes governing 
“marketplace competition” include the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
of 1976 (15 U.S.C. Section 18a, as amended)160, the International Antitrust 
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (15 U.S.C. Sections 46, 57b-1, 1311, 1312, 
6201, 6201 note, 6202-6212)161 and the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 (which 
amended the Clayton Act and which is codified in 15 U.S.C. Sections 13, 13a,13b 
and 21(a)162. The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission are the authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
the antitrust laws.163 
 
4 3 2 1 The Sherman Act of 1890 
 
 
“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty 
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the 
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rights if such acquisition is above a specified amount. See DF Broder U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement: A 
Practice Introduction (2012) 22. 
161 This Act provides for cooperation between the United States and foreign countries to improve international 
antitrust enforcement. It also makes provision for the United States to enter into mutual agreements with foreign 
countries for assistance in a wide variety of antitrust matters. The United State has entered into many such 
agreements with foreign countries. See DF Broder U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement: A Practice Introduction 
(2012) 23. 
162 This Act prohibits price discrimination and predatory pricing. See DF Broder U.S. Antitrust Law and 
Enforcement: A Practice Introduction (2012) 23. 
163 See the following agreement:  Federal Republic of Germany- United States: Agreement Relating, to Mutual 




premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best 
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the 
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conductive 
to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.”164 
 
The Sherman Act forms the foundation of antitrust law in America. The last three 
decades of the nineteen century saw a thriving American economy. Not only was this 
positive outlook of the American economy good for firms, but firms also became the 
most valuable “economic institutions” and this led to a dramatic expansion of the 
industrial sector.165 The American people were in favour of the expanded industrial 
sector and fully supported “corporate America” and its industrialization ambition.166 
Since so many firms existed and supported the American industrialization ambition 
before the enactment of the Sherman Act, the amount of firms was thus not 
considered to be problematic.167 What was indeed troublesome was the size of 
certain firms and the lack of competition among these firms.168 It is stated that 
“aggressive industrialists” were building their business empires without any regard 
for other market players such as farmers, buyers and other small players.169 
Individuals like JP Morgan and JD Rockefeller were considered to be the 
“personification of the consolidation of power”.170 Competition was not a priority 
among the business leaders in charge of the big corporations. Various negative 
meanings were attributed to competition. Some of these include reference to 
competition as “industrial war”, that “[i]gnorant, unrestricted competition, carried to its 
logical conclusion, means death to some of the combatants and injury to all” and that 
not even competitors who came out on top after such an “industrial war”, and did not 
cease to exist, were spared the harm of such competitive “combat”.171 Unrestricted 
                                                          
164 Northern Pacific Railway Company v United States of America 356 U.S. 1 4 78 S. Ct. 514 (1958) 517. 
165 T McNeese The Robber Barons and the Sherman Antitrust Act: Reshaping American Business (2009) 56. 
166 T  McNeese The Robber Barons and the Sherman Antitrust Act: Reshaping American Business (2009) 56. 
167 T McNeese The Robber Barons and the Sherman Antitrust Act: Reshaping American Business (2009) 56. 
168 T McNeese The Robber Barons and the Sherman Antitrust Act: Reshaping American Business (2009) 56. 
169 See EM Fox “When the State Harms Competition – the Role for Competition Law” (2014) 79 (3) Antitrust 
Law Journal 769 769-820. 
170 J Conlin The American Past: A Survey of American History Since 1865,Vol. II (2010) 451. 
171 These were the views held on competition among executive members of some of the biggest American 
corporations quoted in various sources.  See T McNeese The Robber Barons and the Sherman Antitrust Act: 
Reshaping American Business (2009) 57 and   D F Noble Beyond the Promised Land: The Movement and the 




competition was also seen as a “deceptive mirage” and the idea of rational 
cooperation was considered to be “natural” instead of “cutthroat competition”.172  
 
At first, pricing policies were being used to destroy rival businesses.173 However, 
businesses which used such pricing tactics did not necessarily become more 
profitable.174 Consequently, firms started to combine, first through “pools”175 and then 
“trusts”.176 By the 1880s “pool arrangements” between firms were common177 and 
the number of trusts grew as well.178 Such combinations led to the increase of big 
businesses which obtained market power179 to control whole industries and big 
business just became bigger.180 
 
However, even though common, such “pool arrangements” amongst railroads soon 
were outlawed by the Interstate Commerce Act due to governmental and customer 
disapproval.181 Trusts182 on the other hand, unlike other forms of business 
organization which were used in America during the later years of the nineteen 
century, were considered to be the one business form which created the most 
concern among members of the public.183 They were considered a “menace” to 
                                                          
172 DB Audretsch The Entrepreneurial Society (2007) 38.  
173 JR Williamson Federal Antitrust Policy during the Kennedy-Johnson Years (1995) 1. See also T McNeese 
The Robber Barons and the Sherman Antitrust Act: Reshaping American Business (2009) 58. 
174 T McNeese The Robber Barons and the Sherman Antitrust Act: Reshaping American Business (2009) 58. 
175 Also referred to as “loose agreements”. See JR Williamson Federal Antitrust Policy during the Kennedy-
Johnson Years (1995) 1. 
176 Also referred to as “tight agreements”. See JR Williamson Federal Antitrust Policy during the Kennedy-
Johnson Years (1995) 1. 
177 T McNeese The Robber Barons and the Sherman Antitrust Act: Reshaping American Business (2009) 58. 
178 J Conlin The American Past: A Survey of American History Since 1865, Vol. II (2010) 451. 
179 See WM Landes & RA Posner “Market Power in Antitrust Cases” (1981) 94 (5) Harvard Law Review 937. 
937 where the authors describes the term “market power”.  Market power  “refers to the ability of a firm (or a 
group of firms, acting jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly 
that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded.” The standard of proving market power in antitrust 
case, according to the authors, is by “first defining a relevant market in which to compute the defendant's market 
share, next computing that share, and then deciding whether it is large enough to support an inference of the 
required degree of market power.” 
180 J Conlin The American Past: A Survey of American History Since 1865, Vol. II (2010) 451. 
181 T McNeese The Robber Barons and the Sherman Antitrust Act: Reshaping American Business (2009) 58. 
182 Trusts were at one point described as “conspiracies that restrained interstate and foreign trade”. See A. 
Axelrod & C Phillips What Every American Should Know About American History: 225 Events that Shaped the 
Nation (2008) 183. 
183 JL Baumgardner “Sherman Antitrust Act” in L C Schlup & JG Ryan (eds) Historical Dictionary of the 




consumer welfare that was “designed to curtail competition”.184 During the 1880s the 
American public realised that “combination” of businesses reduced the number of 
competitors and in some instances led to monopolies.185 “Combinations” at times 
tended to achieve exactly the opposite of fair competition and with each 
“combination” the level of competition was reduced.186 Since there was little 
competition for some trusts, they did not feel the need to price products competitively 
and consequently product prices were inflated, which led to huge profits for these 
trusts.187 
 
It seems though that not everything about “combinations” was bad. Letwin observes 
that just as competition was good, combinations also had good elements. According 
to the author combinations created efficient businesses and the efficiency of such 
businesses reduced the cost of goods which again reflected in “people’s income”, 
while competition kept down the prices of goods.188 This according to Letwin caused 
quite a dilemma for the American legislatures when the Sherman Act had to be 
drafted.189 Even though “combinations” in some cases had some positive results, 
such as efficiency, it also led to big businesses which sometimes abused their 
market power. It was therefore decided that when “combinations” would lead to 
monopolies, it should be prohibited.190 Trust and other “combinations” which had the 
potential to limit or eliminate competition thus had to be outlawed and the Sherman 
Act191 was the legislation which would ultimately do that. The big “evil” which the 
Sherman Act had to address was the big trusts, “which could swallow up or drive out 
smaller businesses and charge monopoly prices.”192 
  
On 2 July 1990 the United States celebrated the centenary of the Sherman Act. It 
became the first statute in America to control big business. The Sherman Act was 
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enacted in 1890 after it was submitted to the Senate in 1888 by Senator John 
Sherman,193 who is the “founding father of the Republican Party in Ohio”.194 The act 
gets described as the first statute to control big companies and to protect small 
businesses.195 It is stated that the act was a result of many years of public protest 
against the abuse of power by big businesses.196 It was intended to lead to fair 
competition, to provide all companies including the small ones the chance to 
succeed.197 It was also intended to prohibit practices which could eliminate 
competition.198  
 
In 1911 Justice White, the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, stated in 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v U.S.199 that Congressional debates at the 
passage of the Sherman Act conclusively show that the main reason for the 
legislation was the economic conditions at the time. The court observed that these 
economic conditions led to (i) a vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of 
corporations and individuals, (ii) an enormous development of corporate 
organization, (iii) the facility for combination which such organizations afforded, (iv) 
that the possibilities to combine was being used by the corporations and 
consequently combinations known as trusts multiplied and (v) the widespread 
impression that the power of these trusts had been and would be exerted to oppress 
individuals and injure the public generally. Even though Congressional debates 
cannot be used to interpret a statute, such debates are however important to 
ascertain “the environment” at the time the Act was enacted.200 Few prosecutions 
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200 Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v U.S. 221 U.S.1 (1911) 50.  This observation is shared in other cases 
by the United States Supreme Court and other federal court such as in U.S. v Trans-Missouri Freight 
Association 166 U.S. 290 (1897) 317-319 where the court stated that “it is impossible to determine with 
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were instituted by the government during the first ten years of the Sherman Act.201 
Not only was it an unknown field to Congress but both Democrat and Republican 
administrations at the time were considered to be “friendly to big business”.202 
Consequently, even with the Sherman Act in place business combinations continued 
unabated.203 This however changed in 1901 when Theodore Roosevelt became the 
American President. When Roosevelt realised how unpopular big business was 
among the American people, he decided to make “trust-busting” part of the focus of 
his administration.204 Roosevelt became known as the “trustbuster”.205 He took a 
strong stance against the power of business combinations206 and was determined to 
break-up the “onerous and flagrant monopolies and trusts.”207 The Roosevelt 
administration started to enforce the Sherman Act actively. Voters (consumer, 
workers and small business owners) were supportive of Roosevelt’s “antitrust 
initiatives”.208 Roosevelt broke up trusts throughout his presidency, which was from 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and this is to be ascertained from the language used. But courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur 
to the history of the times when it was passed; and this is frequently necessary, in order to ascertain the reason 
as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it.”  And Mitchell v Great Work Milling and Manufacturing 
Company 2 Story 648, 17 F.Cas. 496 (C.C.Me. 1843) 498-499 where the court said that: “What passes in 
congress upon the discussion of a bill can hardly become a matter of strict judicial inquiry; and if it were, it 
could scarcely be affirmed, that the opinions of a few members, expressed either way, are to be considered as 
the judgment of the whole house, or even of a majority. But, in truth, little reliance can or ought to be place 
upon such sources of interpretation of a statute. We are bound to interpret the act as we find it, and to make such 
an interpretation as its language and its apparent objects require. We must take it to be true, that the legislature 
intend precisely what they say, and to the extent which the provisions of the act require, for the purpose of 
securing their just operation and effect. Any other course would deliver over the court to interminable doubts 
and difficulties; and we should be compelled to guess what was the law, from the loose commentaries of 
different debates, instead of the precise enactments of the statute.” 
201 The first cases under the Sherman Act  include United States v Jellico Mountain Coal & Coke Co., 43 Fed. 
898 (1890), 46 Fed. 432 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1891). a case against various coal producers and dealers which 
alleged  a combination which was formed for the purpose of fixing wholesale and retail prices of coal; United 
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association 166 U.S. 290, 17 S.Ct. 540 U.S. (1897),  a  case against the Trans-
Missouri Freight Association, an association of railroads, which alleged  a combination formed for the purpose 
of fixing rates for  freight traffic; United States v Benjamin F. Nelson 52 F. 646 (D.C. Minn. 1892), a case 
against certain lumber dealers, who had an agreement to raise the retail price of lumber and United States v E. C. 
Knight Co. (1892)  a case against the E. C. Knight Company and other sugar producers, alleging that the 
American Sugar Refining Company had acquired control of a large majority of all the sugar refineries in the 
United States and, in order to obtain complete control of the price of sugar in the United States, had entered into 
an unlawful scheme to purchase the stock, machinery, and real estate of the other producers.  
202 J Conlin The American Past: A Survey of American History, Vol. II (2010) 451. 
203 J Conlin The American Past: A Survey of American History, Vol. II (2010) 451. 
204 H Brogan History of the United States of America (1985) 464. 
205 M Winerman “The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition” (2003) 71(1) 
Antitrust Law Journal 1 16. 
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Antitrust Law Journal 577 578.  
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1901 until 1909.209 He is credited with the creation of an antitrust unit within the 
Department of Justice even though the Antitrust Division as it is known today was 
created in 1933 by President Franklin D Roosevelt.210 After Theodore Roosevelt left 
office in 1909, his successor, William Taft, continued Roosevelt’s “trustbusting” 
policies.211 Taft initiated even more anti-trust proceedings than Roosevelt did during 
his administration and it was Taft’s administration which broke up the giant Standard 
Oil Company.212 
 
Roosevelt’s active stance against “bad” trusts213 led to more court cases.214 This 
again increased the number of authoritative judicial interpretations of the provisions 
of the Sherman Act by the courts.  
 
The important provisions of the Sherman Act provide as follows: 
 
Section 1: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, 
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a 
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administration’s active enforcement of the Sherman Act  against trusts was Northern Securities Co. v U.S. 
193 U.S. 197 (1904) , a case against the Northern Securities Company and other individuals, for a violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  It was alleged that in terms of an agreement in restraint of trade Northern 
Securities Company had acquired and held a large majority of the stock of the Great Northern Railway 
Company and Northern Pacific Railway Company, which were competitors. The combination was declared 
illegal and the Northern Securities Company was prohibited from acquiring any more stock in the two railway 




corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.”215 
 
Section 2: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.”216 
 
Voorhees states that the particular Congress at the time, which was responsible for 
enacting the Sherman Act, did not provide any statutory definitions for terms such as 
“restraint of trade” and “monopolization” and no other Congress has done it since 
then.217 As a result the interpretation of the wording of these two sections has been 
left largely to the federal courts. Although the courts initially found it difficult to apply 
the act,218 today however, various interpretations of the sections of the Sherman Act 
exist and Voorhees calls it “court-made antitrust jurisprudence”.219 Some cases of 
the United States Supreme Court on the Sherman Act provide guidance on the 
interpretation of the two important provisions of the Act.220  
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Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v U.S. 166 U.S. 290 (1897) 60-61 made observation in regarding the 
interpretation of both section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 
 In regard to section 1 of the statute the court said: “That in view of the many new forms of contracts and 
combinations which were being evolved from existing economic conditions, it was deemed essential by an all-
embracing enumeration to make sure that no form of contract or combination by which an undue restraint 
of interstate or foreign commerce was brought about could save such restraint from condemnation. The statute 
under this view evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts, whether resulting 





Different interpretations by the courts give rise to the question as to what Congress’s 
initial goals were with the enactment of the Sherman Act. According to Hofstadter 
antitrust traditionally had three classes of goals and these are economic, political as 
well as social and moral goals.221 However, the predominant view today in the 
antitrust community is that the antitrust laws were passed to ensure economic 
efficiency.222 Although the Sherman Act is more than hundred years old, debates are 
still raging as to its original goals.223  
 
The work of scholars such as Robert H. Lande and Richard Bork had a profound 
impact on how the courts interpreted the Sherman Act. Lande believed that the 
primary goal of the Sherman Act was to prohibit the “transfer of wealth away from 
consumers”,224 while Bork believed that economic efficiency was the primary goal of 
the Sherman Act.225 It is however argued that Bork’s initial observation was that the 
Sherman Act’s main goal was consumer welfare and that he only changed this later, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that commerce from being restrained by methods, whether old or new, which would constitute an 
interference,—that is, an undue restraint. 
In regard to section 2 of the statute the court said: “And a consideration of the text of the 2d section serves to 
establish that it was intended to supplement the 1st, and to make sure that by no possible guise could the public 
policy embodied in the 1st section be frustrated or evaded. The prohibition of the 2d embrace ‘every person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to 
monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations . . .’ By 
reference to the terms of § 8 it is certain that the word ‘person’ clearly implies a corporation as well as an 
individual” 
221 R Hofstadter The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (2008) 199-200. 
222 JB Kirkwood & RH Lande “The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing 
Efficiency” 84(1) Notre Dame Law Review 191 192. 
223 AN Kleit “Common Law, Statute Law, And the Theory of Legislative Choice: An Inquiry into the Goal of 
the Sherman Act” (1993) 31 (4) Economic Inquiry 647 647. 
224 Lande’s views found some support from Hovenkamp in H Hovenkamp “Antitrust Protected Classes” (1989) 
88(1)  Michigan Law Review 1 22 where the Hovenkamp states  that:  
“In 1966, Robert Bork attempted to show that Congress' dominant concern in passing the Sherman Act was 
allocative efficiency, neoclassically defined. According to Bork, wealth transfers from consumers to dominant 
firms were really not all that important as far as the Congress of 1890 was concerned. Neither was it concerned 
about injury to competitors. Congress' principal concern, Bork argued, was that monopoly would lower output 
and force consumers to make inefficient substitutions for the monopolized product. But Bork's analysis of the 
legislative history was strained, heavily governed by his own ideological agenda. He concluded all too quickly 
that because some members of Congress knew that demand curves slope downward (i.e., that output is reduced 
as prices rise), that they also had a modern conception of allocative efficiency and the social cost of monopoly. 
Not a single statement in the legislative history comes close to stating the conclusions that Bork drew.” 
Hovenkamp provides his own interpretation of the legislative history of the Sherman Act. The author is of the 
opinion that the 1890 Congress wanted to protect competition and since competition was not formally defined it 
was mostly seen by some members of the 1890 Congress as rivalry between sellers. Hovenkamp observes that 
competition was never about prices equalling marginal cost as such a theory did not form part of the economic 
literature at that time. See H Hovenkamp “Antitrust Protected Classes” (1989) 88(1) Michigan Law Review 1 
23. 
225 AN Kleit “Common Law, Statute Law, And the Theory of Legislative Choice: An Inquiry into the Goal of 




a theory questioned by observers of Bork’s work.226 Crane states that Bork’s most 
significant contribution to antitrust is that he identified economic efficiency as the sole 
objective of the United States’ antitrust laws.227  
 
Other scholars such as Pitofsky argues even while the “political forces” were 
different when the major antitrust laws were enacted, the laws were always meant to 
make economic considerations more important than non-economic considerations 
and that, at some time during the existence of antitrust laws, lawyers and economist 
have convinced courts to adopt a pure economic approach to antitrust law.228  
 
Clearly two opposing positions existed and may still exits as to Congress’ original 
goals when enacting the Sherman Act. On the one hand there are those who believe 
that the Sherman Act initially had both “non-economic” and “economic” goals and on 
the other hand those who believe that the Sherman Act had only “economic” goals 
when it was enacted. The question thus arises as to which one of these two views 
was favoured by the courts in particular the United States Supreme Court. Did the 
courts tend to interpret the Sherman Act in order to give effect to the consumer 
welfare principle or were the court more incline to interpret the Sherman Act to 
ensure economic efficiency is the trumping principle? It is apparent that the Supreme 
Court in every case which was before it after the passage of the Sherman Act 
considered the “legal situation” at the time of its passage in order to determine 
whether there was an infringement of the act or not. 
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The case of United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association229 was the first major 
case which represented the “first judicial debate” about the goals of the Sherman Act 
and how the act was to be interpreted.230 Justice Peckham231 stated that the goals of 
the Sherman Act cannot just be determined by looking at the debates which took 
place amongst Congress members at the time of the passing of the Act232 but that 
the court has the responsibility to determine the meaning of the Sherman Act just like 
with any other statute. The meaning of the provisions of the Sherman Act as stated 
today in literature is thus attributed to the federal courts and its interpretation of the 
act. 
 
Many cases233 which referred to the goals of the Sherman Act followed but economic 
analysis was not necessarily always the guiding principle in these cases. U.S. v 
Arnold Schwinn & Co.234 was one of those case in which the court “explicitly rejected 
economic reasoning.”235 Muris states that the Schwinn decision was heavily criticised 
and that the court seemed to have been “simply confused”.236 This so-called 
confusion by the courts as to the goals of the Sherman Act prompted Robert Bork, a 
prominent legal antitrust legal scholar, to look into the legislative intent of the 
Sherman Act since the courts “were freely choosing among multiple, 
incommensurable, and often conflicting values.”237 In one of his most famous 
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articles238 Bork draws the conclusion that the goal of the Sherman Act was to ensure 
efficiency and that this is clear from senator Sherman’s emphasise that this bill 
(which became the Sherman Act) would not interfere with efficiency.239 Bork states 
that “[not] once did Sherman suggest that courts should blunt or discourage efficient 
size or conduct in the interest of any social or political value.”240 In 1977 the US 
Supreme Court started to lean towards Bork’s theory,241 which is described as “one 
of his many enduring contributions to U.S. antitrust law.”242 It did so regardless of all 
the criticisms Bork’s theory received.243 It rejected the explicit rejection of economic 
reasoning in the Schwinn decision.244 In Continental T. V. Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc.245 
the court stated: 
 
Such restrictions [vertical restrictions], in varying forms, are widely used in our free 
market economy….there is substantial scholarly and judicial authority supporting 
their economic utility. There is relatively little authority to the contrary.28 Certainly, 
there has been no showing in this case, either generally or with respect to Sylvania's 
agreements, that vertical restrictions have or are likely to have a “pernicious effect 
on competition” or that they “lack . . . any redeeming virtue.” Accordingly, we 
conclude that the per se rule stated in Schwinn must be overruled.30 In so holding we 
do not foreclose the possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions 
might justify per se prohibition under Northern Pac. R. Co. But we do make clear that 
departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable 
economic effect rather than as in Schwinn upon formalistic line drawing.”246 
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Through this U-turn in Sylvania the court actually returned to the earlier Sherman Act 
jurisprudence in cases such as Northern Pacific Railway Company v US247 and 
Appalachian Coals v US.248 This change of heart by the court necessitates a 
discussion of the two approaches that have been followed by the courts in regard to 
the interpretation of the provisions of the Sherman Act. 
 
Two approaches regarding the interpretation of the provisions of the Sherman Act 
were developed, namely the “rule of reason” and the “per se illegal restraint of trade 
rule”. In State Oil Company v Khan249 the Supreme Court states that the provisions 
of the Sherman Act prohibits literally every restraint of trade250 but that the court has 
for a long time recognized that Congress only outlawed “unreasonable restraints”.251 
This led to the development of the “rule of reason”. The Supreme Court described 
the “rule of reason” as follows: 
 
“Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding 
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable 
restraint on competition”252 
 
The “rule of reason” was first recognised in 1911 by the Supreme Court in the case 
of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v United States253 It has ever since been 
                                                          
247 356 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 514 U.S. (1958) 517 the court said that: “The Sherman Act was designed to be a 
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of 
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248 288 U.S. 344 (1933) 359-360 the court stated that “The purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to prevent 
undue restraints of interstate commerce, to maintain its appropriate freedom in the public interest, to afford 
protection from the subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic endeavor.” 
249 522 U.S. 3 (1997) 10. 
250 In United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association 166 U.S. 290(1897) the court still strictly applied the 
provisions of the Sherman Act  however in United States v Joint-Traffic Association 171 U.S. 505(1898) the 
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the Act would be narrowly interpreted, many commercial contracts would be illegal. The court further stated 
that it was not Congress intention to prohibit all contracts and also not contract that might in the slightest way 
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interpretation of the Sherman Act.   




applied in regard to certain restraints of trade and has been considered as the “the 
prevailing standard of analysis”. In terms of the “rule of reason” the court evaluates 
specific information about the industry in which the alleged restraint exists, the 
conditions in the industry before and after the restraint was imposed and the history, 
nature and effect of the restraint.254 After all such considerations were taken into 
account and the conclusion is that the restraint is negatively affecting competition, 
only then will the court decide to declare it an infringement of the Sherman Act. The 
“rule of reason” thus removes the presumption of illegality of a restraint. The 
Supreme Court however has not been oblivious to the fact that using the “rule of 
reason” may prove to be quite a challenge. In Arizona v Maricopa County Medical 
Soc.255 the court observed that the application of the “rule of reason” is costly and 
litigation to determine whether an agreement or practice falls foul of the Sherman Act 
can be, firstly, “extensive and complex”, and secondly, that judges often lack the 
understanding of markets and behaviours within such markets to make confident 
decision on the effects of a practice on competition.256  
 
Dating back to 1897,257 the courts have therefore also applied a per se rule. The per 
se rule does not require courts to do extensive investigation into whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
253 See Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v United States 221 U.S. 1 (1911) 63-64 where the court said 
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the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because 
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.” 
254 See Hyland v Home Services of America, Inc. 771 F.3d 310 C.A.6 (Ky. 2014) 317. 
255 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
256 Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Soiety. 457 U.S. 332 (1982) 343-344. 
257 It is stated that the “per se rule” was first recognised by the US Supreme Court in the case of United States v 
Trans-Missouri Freight Association 166 U.S. 290 (1897). See M Flinn, WB Snell, JA Parsons, F Poul & VA 





behaviour complained of is contravening the antitrust laws. Certain agreements and 
practices are thus presumed to be illegal in terms of the antitrust legislation. In 
Northern Pacific Railway Company v US258 the Supreme Court stated that certain 
agreements and practices should be presumed to be illegal without the need for any 
elaborate inquiry as to the harm caused by such agreements or practices or the 
business excuse for such behaviour due to its “pernicious effect on competition and 
lack of any redeeming virtue”. It further stated that a complicated and prolonged 
economic investigation into the history of the industry involved and other related 
industries in order to determine whether a restraint is illegal, is often “fruitless”.259 
Restraints of trade which come within the ambit of the “per se rule” are those with 
such a “predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect”, or “such limited potential 
for procompetitive benefit”, and therefore the need to consider any economic 
considerations is discarded and such agreements and practices are considered to be 
automatically unlawful.260 These include agreements and practices such as price 
fixing,261 division of markets,262 group boycotts,263 and tying arrangements.264 An 
inquiry in terms of the per se rules should thus focus on whether the agreement or 
practice complained of, “facially appears to be one that would always or almost 
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output”.265 Even though certain 
agreements and practices are considered to be per se illegal, the Supreme Court 
has acknowledge that there is no “bright line” separating the “per se rule” from a “rule 
of reason” analysis and therefore an inquiry into market conditions may be required 
before the agreement or practice is presumed anticompetitive.266 A “per se rule” 
inquiry should however not lead to the same “burdensome analysis” which is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Well, Hardly Ever’: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality” (1987) 38 Hastings 
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261 See for example Albrecht v. Herald Co. 390 U.S. 145 (1968) and U.S. v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 310 U.S. 
150 (1940). 
262 See for example U.S. v Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 85 F. 271 C.A.6 1898 and Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v U. 
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required for a “rule of reason” analysis.267 Beschle states that in the 1970s there was 
a serious rethinking of the application of the “per se rule”.268 Expansion of its 
application started to contract when the “rule of reason” started to be applied to 
categories of behaviour which were once per se illegal.269 The per se rule’s 
application to practices such as horizontal price fixing, resale price maintenance, 
horizontal market division and tying arrangements became to a certain degree less 
strict since the courts were willing to consider arguments about the particular 
behaviour.270 And the courts were willing to only classify agreements and practices 
as per se illegal “after considerable experience with certain business 
relationships”.271  
 
In conclusion, even though the Congress of 1890 did not provide a clear statutory 
description of the important terms of the Sherman Antitrust Act, today there is no 
paucity of guidance from the federal court as to the meaning of the wording of the 
statute. Since its enactment more than hundred years ago, the court provided 
competent meanings to the provisions of the statute. And many other regulatory 
instruments have been introduced to compliment the Sherman Antitrust Act. It is thus 
necessary to examine how these other regulatory instruments supplements the 
Sherman Act in regulating competition. 
 
4 3 2 2 The Clayton Act  
 
“[T]he Clayton Act, which is a part of the scheme of laws against unlawful restraints 
and monopolies, does not wait for its operation until monopolies have been created 
and restraints of trade established, but seeks to reach them in their incipiency and 
stop their growth.”272 
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Trusts were still created even after the passing of the Sherman Act. Even with the 
provisions of the Sherman Act giving the courts great powers to prevent violations 
and restraints of the act, the “greatest merger activity” of that time occurred from 
1895-1904 after the Sherman Act came into effect in 1890.273 The Sherman Act’s 
method of dealing with monopolies after they were formed, was not used sufficiently 
and the rise of big business continued.274 “Populist concerns” continued as it was 
believed that financial crises in 1902 and 1907-1908 were a result of attempts by 
businessmen to create monopolies.275  
 
When Woodrow Wilson,276 came to power he decided to enact supplemental 
antitrust legislation, to compliment the Sherman Act.277 Wilson acknowledged that he 
was not against big business that had become big due to the skills and intelligence 
of businessmen.278 His problem was however with arrangements (trusts) which were 
intended to eliminate competition279 and at one point he drew the conclusion that 
“corporate consolidation” has gone too far.280 Wilson preferred “legal regulation” over 
“executive regulation”.281 Consequently Wilson’s intended legislation, the Clayton 
Act, which was enacted on 15 October 1914 prohibited specific type of conduct.282  
 
Together with the Sherman Act, it is considered the primary regulatory instruments to 
govern antitrust in the United States. The Clayton Act is enforced by the Antitrust 
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Division of the US Department of Justice283 and the Federal Trade Commission.284 It 
prohibits behaviour such as price discrimination,285 tying arrangements286 
“interlocking directorates and officers”287 and mergers or acquisitions by one 
corporation of stock of another if such acquisition may have the effect to substantially 
lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.288 Unlike the Sherman Act the 
Clayton Act does not impose criminal sanctions for the contraventions of these 
provisions. Other matters governed by the Clayton Act include imputation of personal 
liability of directors and agents of a corporation should the corporation violate any 
“penal provision” of the antitrust laws289 and the exemption of labour organizations 
                                                          
283 15 U.S.C. § 25. 
284 The Clayton Act is indirectly enforced by the FTC as contraventions of this Act will also be regarded as 
breaches of section 5 of the FTC Act but it is also directly enforced by the FTC in some respects. For example, 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the acquisition by one corporation of the stock of another, if “the effect of 
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” and in terms of 
Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to file suit in 
the federal district courts and seek a preliminary injunction to prevent a merger pending a Federal Trade 
Commission administrative adjudication “whenever the Commission has reason to believe that a corporation is 
violating, or is about to violate, Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 and Federal Trade 
Commission v Penn State Hershey Medical Centre, 838 F.3d 327, 337 3d Cir. (2016). 
For more on the Federal Trade Commission see the discussion below on the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
285 See 15 U.S.C. § 13 which determines that: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the 
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lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent 
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination.” 
286 See Title 15 U.S.C. § 14.  In Northern Pacific Railway Company v U.S. 356 U.S. 1 (1958) 5-6 the Supreme 
Court described a tying arrangement as an agreement by a party to sell a product to another party but only on the 
condition that the buyer also purchases another product, one which is tied to the purchase of the first product or 
the buyer at least has to agree that he will not purchase the additional product from any other supplier. The court 
stated that ‘tying agreements” serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.  In Jefferson 
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v Hyde 466 U.S. 2 (1984)10-18 the Supreme Court however stated  that every 
refusal to sell two products separately cannot be said to restrain competition and that cases by that court have 
concluded that the “essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement” lies, firstly,  in the seller's 
exploitation of its control over the tying product, secondly, to force the buyer into the purchase of the tied 
product that the buyer perhaps would not have bought or might have bought elsewhere, thirdly when such 
“forcing” is present, competition for the tied product is restrained. Thus an inquiry into the validity of a tying 
arrangement should focus on the market or markets in which the two products are sold as that is where the 
anticompetitive forcing has its impact. This last observation by the court is supported by DL Beschle, “What, 
Never? Well, Hardly Ever’: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality” (1987) 38 
Hastings Law Journal 471 482 when the author states that the application of the per se rule of illegality in 
respect to tying arrangements has been applied differently in one respect namely that the tying arrangement is a 
per se violation only if the defendant has some sort of market power. 
287 See Title 15 U.S.C. § 19 which determines that no person shall serve as a director or officer in any two 
corporations at the same time which are competitors and has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating 
more than $10,000,000 and that the elimination of competition through agreement between the two corporations 
would constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. 
288 See Title 15 U.S.C. § 18.  




from the application net of the antitrust laws.290 The Act also provides that any 
person who suffers any injury to business or property291 due to a violation of the 
antitrust laws may sue for threefold the damages sustained and the cost of the 
suit.292 The year 2014 marked the centenary of the Clayton Act. Even though the 
Clayton Act has been amended on several occasions,293 the basic provisions of the 








                                                          
290 See Title 15 U.S.C. § 17 where it is stated that nothing within the antitrust laws forbid the existence and 
operation of such organizations and they are not to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, 
under the antitrust laws. This exemption to labour organization is however only afforded if the labour 
organization upheld the following two requirements as stated by the Supreme Court namely, that the union acts 
in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups.  See U.S. v Hutcheson 312 U.S. 219 (1941) 232 
291 See Reiter v Sonotone Corporation 442 U.S. 344 (1979). The Supreme Court provides clarity on how the 
term “business of property” should be interpreted to establish any economic harm. 
292 Section 7 of the Sherman Act originally made provision for treble damages for any harm suffered due to an 
antitrust violation. This section was later incorporated in the Clayton Act.  
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 which states that. “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor [..], without respect to the amount in controversy, 
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee.” 
The Supreme Court described the possibility to claim for treble damages as a “chief tool” in the enforcement of 
the antitrust law and as a deterrence to potential antitrust violators. See Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 (1985) 634. 
 The goals of the treble damages provision, according to Cavanagh, include compensation of victims, deterrence 
of violators, forfeiture of ill-gotten gains and punishment for wrongdoing. See ED Cavanagh “Detrebling 
Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” (1987) 61 Tulane Law Review 777 783. See also Blue 
Shield of Virginia v. McCready 457 U.S. 465 (1982) 471 where the Supreme Court stated that Congress’ 
intention was to create a private enforcement mechanism which would deter antitrust violations and deprive any 
person who violates antitrust laws of the “fruits of their illegal actions” and for the victim to be compensated in 
a proper way. 
The usefulness of treble damages as an antitrust enforcement tool has been question on many occasions by 
economists and legal scholars to the extent that a “detrebling movement” came into existence. It however 
remains an antitrust enforcement tool on the statute books. See ED Cavanagh “Detrebling Antitrust Damages: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” (1987) 61 Tulane Law Review 777 777-848. 
293 The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 amended the price discrimination provisions of the Clayton Act,  the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, inter alia, introduced notification requirements for 
certain mergers and acquisitions and the 1950 amendment by the Celler-Kefauver Act  was intended to “ […] 
prevent economic concentration in the American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in 
business”  after large combinations continued to grow by using mergers since businessmen were circumventing 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act by purchasing their competitors' assets, as the section prohibited corporations 
under most circumstances from merging only by purchasing the stock of their competitors. See U. S. v Von's 




4 3 2 3 The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)  
 
The FTC Act came into force in 1914. The Federal Trade Commission (the 
Commission)294 enforces the FTC Act. The Commission was established as an 
independent institution.295 The duties of the Commission, inter alia, include the 
prevention of unfair methods of competition and “to compile and investigate the 
economic facts concerning corporations engaged in interstate commerce”296 even 
though it does not have “explicit statutory authority” to enforce the most important 
antitrust statute namely the Sherman Act.297 The Commission was created to deal 
with “monopoly problems298 and was the fulfilment of an election campaign promise 
of President Woodrow Wilson.299  
Section 5 of the FTC Act deals with unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in commerce, which may have an effect on commerce.300 
Dahdouh argues that the Congress in 1914 was worried that the Sherman Act has 
put the enforcement of antitrust purely in the hands of the courts and that Congress 
did not want the courts to be the only enforcers of the antitrust laws.301 Dahdouh 
further states that the antitrust laws at the time were too limited in scope.302 As a 
consequence the Commission was created with its own power and jurisdiction to 
challenge anticompetitive conduct.303 The Congress in 1914 intended section 5 to be 
an upgrade of the US antitrust system as the section was intended to have a wider 
reach over anti-competitive behaviour even beyond those which the Sherman and 
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Clayton Acts encompass.304 The scope of the section is thus wide enough to include 
conduct which may perhaps fall short of being anticompetitive under the Sherman or 
Clayton Acts,305 as it may reach types of “competition harm” that are different from 
those that qualify as violations in terms of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.306 
However, it has in reality not been enforced or applied in a manner that extends 
beyond the Sherman and Clayton Acts.307  
Kovacic and Winerman list five “principal motivations” that led to the enactment of 
section 5 by Congress:308 firstly, the possibility that the Sherman Act, as applied by 
the courts would not encompass all trusts; secondly, Congress wanted to establish 
an “administration mechanism” which would ensure that the conduct of business 
stays within certain boundaries while taking into account evolving business practices 
and development; thirdly, to establish a body which would, among other things, 
investigate business conduct; fourthly, to create a “policy instrument” that would be 
independent from the executive authority; and lastly, to bring about a penalty regime 
different from the one in terms of the Sherman Act.309 
Any unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
commerce or those which may affect commerce are unlawful in terms of the FTC 
Act.310 With regard to the meaning of “unfair”, the Supreme Court has stated that: 
 
 The standard of “unfairness” under the FTC Act is, by necessity, an elusive 
one, encompassing not only practices that violate the Sherman Act and the 
other antitrust laws, but also practices that the Commission determines are 
against public policy for other reasons.”311 
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309 WE Kovacic & M Winerman “Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act” (2010) 76(3) Antitrust Law Journal 929 931. 
310 See 15 U.S.C.A. Section 45. 




The FTC Act empowers the Commission to prevent persons, partnerships and 
corporations, with the exception of certain business organisations specifically 
described in the FTC Act,312 from using “unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”.313 
Any unfair method of competition which involves commerce with foreign nations, 
excluding import commerce, is not covered by the FTC Act outside of specifically 
circumscribed situations.314 
 
There are several other statutes in the United States that concern competition on a 
federal or state level. The scope of this study however only covers the basic antitrust 
laws which are of importance and relevance for the analysis and examination of the 
hypothesis of this study. 
 
4 3 3 Federal Antitrust laws and SOEs  
 
“For more than a hundred years corporations have been used as agencies for doing 
work of the government. Congress may create them ‘as appropriate means of 
executing the powers of government”315 
 
The “state acting as an owner” is not an unknown concept in the American economy. 
Field describes partial or full government ownership of a corporation as “an old 
American practice”.316 SOEs are known in America as “government corporations” or 
government-supported corporations which refers either to “mixed-ownership 
government corporations”317 and/or wholly owned government corporations”.318 
                                                          
312 See 15 U.S.C. Section 45 (a) (2) for these exceptions. 
313 15 U.S.C. Section 45 (a) (2) for these exceptions. 
314 See 15 U.S.C. Section 45 (3) for these scenarios. 
315 Keifer & Keifer v Reconstruction Finance Corporation 306 U.S. 381 (1939) 389.  
See also Luxton v North River Bridge Co. 153 U.S. 525 (1894) 529 where the court stated that Congress may 
create corporations as a means of executing the powers of government, like establishing a bank for the purpose 
of carrying on the fiscal operations of the United States or a railroad corporation for the purpose of promoting 
commerce among the states. 
316 OP Field “Government Corporations:  Proposal” (1935) 48 Harvard Law Review 775 775. 
317 The following are examples of such corporations: the Central Bank for Cooperatives, the Federal Deposit 





Geddes states that “government corporations” in the United States compete with 
private firms in many industries which include transport, electricity supply, water 
works and mail delivery.319  
 
Some of the best-known federal SOEs320 are the National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation,321 the United States Postal Service,322 the Tennessee Valley 
Authority,323 the Federal National Mortgage Association, also known as Fannie Mae 
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, also known as Freddie Mac.324  
 
The antitrust laws apply to every contract or combination in the form of a trust or 
otherwise in restraint of trade and commerce and every person who monopolizes or 
attempts to monopolize commerce or trade in the United States.325 There are 
however certain exemptions and exceptions from the application of the antitrust 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Banks, the National Credit Union Administration Central Liquidity Facility and the Regional Banks for 
Cooperatives. See Title 31 U.S.C. § 9101. 
318 See 31 U.S.C. § 9101 which deals with “Government Corporations”. The following are examples of wholly 
owned government corporations: the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Community Development Financial 
Institutions Fund, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, Federal 
Prison Industries, Incorporated, the Corporation for National and Community Service, the Government National 
Mortgage Association, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Pennsylvania Avenue Development 
Corporation, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development 
Corporation,  the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development when carrying out duties and powers related to 
the Federal Housing Administration Fund, the Tennessee Valley Authority. 
319 RR Geddes Competing with the Government: Anticompetitive Behaviour and Public Enterprises (2004) xi 
320 Refer to chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on SOEs. 
321 This corporation is described as a corporation established by the Congress in order to avert the threatened 
extinction of passenger trains in the United States. See Lebron v National R.R. Passenger Corp. 513 U.S. 374, 
(1995) 967. 
322  The US Postal Service started as an independent establishment of the executive branch of the Government of 
the United States. See 39 U.S.C. § 201. The functions of the US Post is stated as follows: “The Postal Service 
shall have as its basic function the obligation to provide postal services to bind the Nation together through the 
personal, educational, literary, and business correspondence of the people. It shall provide prompt, reliable, and 
efficient services to patrons in all areas and shall render postal services to all communities.” See 39 U.S.C. § 
101.  For more on the US Postal Service and its nature see also the case of U.S. Postal Service v Flamingo 
Industries (USA) Ltd. 540 U.S. 736 (2004) 748 where the Supreme Court stated that “The Postal Service, in both 
form and function, is not a separate antitrust person  from the United States. It is part of the Government of the 
United States and so is not controlled by the antitrust laws.”  
323 A government corporation which was established by the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as 
amended and which gets described by the Supreme Court as “a federally owned corporation that operates fossil-
fuel fired power plants in several States.” See American Electricity Power Company Inc. v Connecticut 131 
S.Ct. 2527 U.S. (2011) 2534. 
324 RR Geddes Competing with the Government: Anticompetitive Behaviour and Public Enterprises (2004) xi.  
See also Garcia v. Federal National Mortgage Association 782 F.3d 736 C.A.6 Mich. (2015) 737 where the 
United States Court of Appeals (sixth circuit) describes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as government-sponsored 
private enterprises that purchase and securitize residential mortgages. For further reading on these two 
government corporations see JR Hagerty The Fateful History of Fannie Mae: New Deal Birth to Mortgage 
Crisis Fall (2012). 




laws. These include certain industries on a federal level and certain activities by 
states which may impact on competition. 
 
4 3 4 SOEs on federal level: Possible exemption from the antitrust laws 
 
“…where the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance 
of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a 
majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the 
Government for purposes of the First Amendment.326 
 
In City of Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising Inc.327 the Supreme Court stated 
that the Sherman Act prohibits the regulation of prices and goods in the marketplace 
by private persons but that this prohibition does not apply to those industries which 
Congress has exempted from the application of the antitrust laws. Immunity from 
antitrust laws can be found in many industries such as agriculture and transport. 
Sappington and Sidak are of the opinion that if a “federal SOE” claims sovereignty 
and Congress have not via legislation consented to claims against such a “federal 
SOE”, the chances of any successful antitrust proceedings against such an 
enterprise are limited.328 Therefore, according to the authors, there is limited antitrust 
jurisprudence in the United States on SOEs violating competition in comparison to 
other business practices that may violate antitrust laws.329 It is also stated that the 
paucity of antitrust jurisprudence on SOEs, may be laid before the door of capitalism, 
as the United States never had a real appetite for nationalisation of industries even 
though there were some exceptions during times of war330 and economic difficulties. 
It is also believed that the United States Constitution immunizes, to a great extent, 
anticompetitive behaviour by “government corporations”.331  
                                                          
326 See Lebron v National Rail Road Passenger Corporation 513 U.S. 374 (1995) 400. 
327 499 U.S. 365 (1991) 388. 
328 DEM Sappington & JG Sidak “Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises” (2003) 71 (2) Antitrust Law 
Journal 479 481. 
329 DEM Sappington & JG Sidak “Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises” (2003) 71(2) Antitrust Law 
Journal 479 481.  
330 DEM Sappington & JG Sidak “Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises” (2003) 71 (2) Antitrust Law 
Journal 479 481. 
331 DEM Sappington & JG Sidak “Anticompetitive Behaviour by State-Owned Enterprises: Incentives and 
Capabilities” in RR Geddes Competing with the Government: Anticompetitive Behaviour and Public Enterprises 




The heyday of government controlled corporations in the United States was after the 
two world wars and during the Great Depression. The Supreme Court stated that the 
first “large-scale use” of SOEs happened during World War I.332 However, all 
government-controlled corporations were dissolved after the end of the war.333 The 
Great Depression was the next event in America’s history which led to the 
establishment of SOEs. Corporations established during this time were meant to 
stabilise the American economy.334 However due to the sheer number of SOEs that 
were created and “the lack of accountability”, Congress at the time enacted the 
Government Corporation Control Act, which introduced certain strict measures in 
regard to government corporations.335 These measures, inter alia, included the 
requirement to submit a “business-type budget” to the President, which the President 
then subsequently submitted to Congress,336 the submission of an annual 
management report to the Congress not later than 180 days after the end of the 
corporation's fiscal year,337 and the auditing of the corporation’s financial 
statements.338 Many of the government corporations were however dissolved after 
World War II but new ones were established in the 1960s, most of which were 
agencies situated within the federal government and thus exempted from the 
application of the antitrust laws.339 In later years though, instead of establishing 
government corporations, the government started to sponsor corporations and these 
corporations were not “agencies or establishments” of the federal government and 
neither were they subjected to the provisions of the Government-Controlled 
                                                          
332 Corporations such as the United States Grain Corporation, the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation, 
the United States Spruce Production Corporation, and the War Finance Corporation were created. See Lebron v 
National R.R. Passenger Corp. 513 U.S. 374 (1995) 388. 
333 Lebron v National Rail Road Passenger Corporation 513 U.S. 374 (1995) 388. 
334 Lebron v National Rail Road Passenger Corporation 513 U.S. 374 (1995) 388. These corporations included 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a corporation which was authorized by Congress to make loans to 
banks, insurance companies, railroads, land banks agricultural credit organizations. This corporation also got 
authorised by Congress to create SOEs without requiring congressional consent every time and it went on to 
create a number of other corporations during this time; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a corporation 
which was established to hold and liquidate the assets of failed banks and also to insure bank deposits; the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, a corporation established to help the Government to enter the commercial sale of 
goods and services. 
335 See Lebron v National Rail Road Passenger Corporation 513 U.S. 374 (1995) 388.  
336 See 31 U.S.C. § 9103. 
337 See 31 U.S.C. § 9106. 
338 See 31 U.S.C. § 9105. 




Corporations Act.340 Such “government-sponsored enterprises” could enter the 
market with “government –conferred advantages”.341 
At present the “appetite” to operate SOEs as part of the federal economy is still 
limited. However, a number of SOEs can be found operating as part of the economy 
though, within the individual states.  
 
4 3 5 SOEs on state-level: Antitrust enforcement and the state-immunity 
principle  
 
The Constitution of the United States of America states that:  
 
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”342 
 
The “Supremacy Clause” is clear that all state law is subjected to federal laws. 
Consequently any activities by the various states which may impact on free and fair 
competition when they act as market participants should thus be subject to the 
federal antitrust laws. However, various activities of the States which may impact on 
competition are exempted from the antitrust laws.343 In the case of North Carolina 
State Board of Dental Examiners v Federal Trade Commission344 the Supreme Court 
                                                          
340 Lebron v National R.R. Passenger Corp. 513 U.S. 374 (1995) 390. 
341 The Supreme Court used the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) as an example in Lebron v 
National Rail Road Passenger Corporation 513 U.S. 374 (1995) 390. 
342 See the Supremacy Clause, U.S.C. Const. Art. VI cl. 2.  
 See also R Squire “Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause” (2006) 59 Stanford Law Review 77 77-130 for a 
detailed discussion on the Supremacy Clause and antitrust. 
343 See Parker v Brown 317 U.S. 341 (1943) which established the state-immunity principle. 
See also JM Bona & LA Wake “The Market-Participant Exception to State-Action Immunity From Antitrust 
Liability” (2014) 23 (1) Journal of the Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law Section of the State Bar of 
California 156 156 where the authors states that: “a significant category of potentially-anticompetitive conduct 
often escapes antitrust scrutiny: state and local commercial activity. Governmental entities can, and do, enter the 
marketplace as competitors, and may have even stronger incentives than profit-maximizing firms to harm 
competition. Indeed, state and local entities have built-in advantages that may allow them to successfully 
monopolize, or otherwise injure competition.” 




stated that the federal antitrust laws are a “central safeguard” for free market 
structures within the United States but to require the various federal states to comply 
with the Sherman Act at the expense of other “values a State may deem 
fundamental” would place an “impermissible burden on the State’s power to regulate. 
The first antitrust case in which antitrust immunity of the federal states was 
recognised was Parker v Brown.345 In this case the United States Supreme Court 
stated that the Sherman Act does not mention a state as such and the statute further 
gives no indication that it was intended to restrain state action or any official action 
that was directed by a federal state. It was concluded that the Act is applicable to 
persons only, which includes companies.346 The court further stated that the 
Sherman Act’s legislative history provides no suggestion that a purpose of the Act 
was to restrain state action but that its founders only intended the Act to prevent 
‘business combinations' and that this purpose to prevent combinations that restrain 
competition and monopolies by individuals and corporations only, appears 
“abundantly” from the Act’s legislative history.347  
 
As a consequence the Parker principle or the state-action immunity principle348 was 
established. In terms of this principle the various federal states of America are 
exempted from the application of the antitrust laws as long as they act in a sovereign 
capacity.349 In Federal Trade Commission v Phoebe Putney Health System Inc.350 
the Supreme Court again emphasised the grounds on which any other body which is 
not a federal state may claim immunity from antitrust laws when a state has granted 
that body certain corporate powers to execute on its behalf. In this case the court 
had to decide whether a law of the State of Georgia that creates special-purpose 
public entities called hospital authorities and gives those entities general corporate 
                                                          
345 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
346 Parker v Brown 317 U.S. 341 (1943) 350. 
347 See Parker v Brown 317 U.S. 341 (1943) 351. 
348 Parker v Brown 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
349 Parker v Brown 317 U.S. 341 (1943) 313 where the Supreme Court stated that “The Sherman Act makes no 
mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action 
directed by a state." The principles of federalism were the basis for the court’s decision. On page 350 the court 
stated that:  “In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save 
only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's 
control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.” 
For further mention on the importance of federalism as a reason for the introduction of the state-action immunity 
see Federal Trade Commission v Ticor Title Ins. Co. 504 U.S. 621 (1992). 




powers, including the power to acquire hospitals, clearly articulates and affirmatively 
expresses a state policy to permit acquisitions that substantially lessen competition. 
The court had to clarify the position after such a hospital authority established in 
terms of the Georgia law wanted to acquire the only other hospital out of two which 
was not under its control within a county. The FTC complained that the acquisition 
would create a virtual monopoly and would substantially reduce competition in the 
market for acute-care hospital services in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. The court stated that in order to 
qualify for immunity from the antitrust laws the hospital authority had to show that the 
challenged restraint was one “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” as 
state policy.351 It further stated that State-law authority to act on behalf of the federal 
state is insufficient to establish state-action immunity but the “substate governmental 
entity” has to show that it has been delegated authority by the federal state to “act or 
regulate anti-competitively.”352 The court concluded that there is no need for a state 
legislature to “expressly state” that the legislature intends for the delegated action to 
have anticompetitive effects but the anticompetitive effect must have been the 
“foreseeable result” of what the State authorized.353 While the Georgia law in 
question does allow the hospital authority involved in the matter to acquire hospitals, 
it does not clearly articulate and affirmatively express a state policy empowering the 
hospital authority to make acquisitions of existing hospitals that will substantially 
lessen competition.354 It also said that there was no evidence that the State of 
Georgia “affirmatively contemplated that hospital authorities would displace 
competition by consolidating hospital ownership”.355  
 
State-action immunity can thus only be invoked by governmental entities if the 
“challenged anticompetitive conduct” is undertaken in accordance with a regulatory 
scheme “that is the State’s own” and when there is “clear articulation” of the State's 
                                                          
351 Federal Trade Commission v Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. 133 S.Ct. 1003 U.S. (2013) 1010. This 
requirement was first set by the Supreme Court in City of Lafayette v Louisiana Power & Light Company, 435 
U.S. 389, 410, 98 S. Ct. 1123, 1135, 55 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1978) 1135. 
352 Federal Trade Commission v Phoebe Putney Health System Inc. 133 S.Ct. 1003 U.S. (2013) 1012. 
353 Federal Trade Commission v Phoebe Putney Health System Inc. 133 S.Ct. 1003 U.S. (2013) 1011. 
354 Federal Trade Commission v Phoebe Putney Health System Inc. 133 S.Ct. 1003 U.S. (2013) 1010. 




intent to displace competition.356 If the State delegates its corporate powers to a 
private party to implement a state policy, an additional requirement applies in that the 
policy has to be actively supervised by the State.357 Governmental entities to which 
States delegate their powers to execute policy are however not subject to the active 
state supervision requirement because “they have less of an incentive to pursue their 
own self-interest under the guise of implementing state policies.”358 
The state-action immunity principle was originally aimed at protecting state 
legislatures acting in their legislative capacities359 as it ensured that any conflict 
between state sovereignty and America’s commitment to a policy of robust 
competition would be avoided.360 Now though, it may also be invoked by other 
governmental authorities, municipalities and private parties who are authorised by 
the federal states to implement policies on the states’ behalf,361 thus creating a 
“multi-tier immunity” from antitrust laws. This “multi-tier immunity” has been 
established by the three approaches which have been developed by the Supreme 
Court to analyse a state-action immunity defence.362 These three approaches are (i) 
an “ipso facto immunity”;363 (ii) the “Midcal scrutiny”;364 and (iii) the “Hallie 
                                                          
356 Federal Trade Commission v Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. 133 S.Ct. 1003 U.S. (2013) 1010. 
357 Federal Trade Commission v Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. 133 S.Ct. 1003 U.S. (2013) 1010. In North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v Federal Trade Commission, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117, U.S. (2015) 
1117 the Supreme Court stated: “If a State wants to rely on active market participants as regulators, it must 
provide active supervision if state-action immunity under Parker is to be invoked.” 
358 Federal Trade Community v Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. 133 S.Ct. 1003 U.S. (2013) 1011. 
359 Auraria Student House at the Regency LLC v Campus Village Apartments LLC 843 F.3d 1225 10th Cir. 
(2016) 1249. 
360 North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission 135 S.Ct. 1101 U.S. (2015) 
1110. 
361 Auraria Student House at the Regency LLC v Campus Village Apartments LLC 843 F.3d 1225 10th Cir. 
(2016) 1249. 
362 Edinboro College Park Apartments v Edinboro University Foundation, 850 F.3d 567, 572 3d Cir. (2017) 
572. 
363 In regard to this approach, the court in Edinboro College Park Apartments v Edinboro University 
Foundation, 850 F.3d 567, 572 3d Cir. (2017) 572 said: “Once it is determined that the relevant action is “an 
undoubted exercise of state sovereign authority” undertaken by an actor “whose conduct ... automatically 
qualif[ies] as that of the sovereign state itself,” that conduct is immune without the need for any further 
analysis.” This approach only applies to acts of federal state legislatures and the decisions of a federal state’s 
Supreme Court when it acts legislatively and not judicially. 
364 This approach is applied when a private party or state agencies “controlled by active market participants” 
seeks to invoke the state-action immunity principle. In this regard the private party has to comply with two 
requirements:  firstly, it must have acted in accordance with a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” 
state policy which permits anticompetitive conduct and secondly, the State must “actively supervise” the private 
party’s conduct. Edinboro College Park Apartments v Edinboro University Foundation, 850 F.3d 567, 572 3d 




scrutiny”.365 Which of the three approaches apply to a particular state-action 
immunity defence depends on whether the “relevant actor is comparable to a 
sovereign power, a private business, or something in between.”366 
 
But the scope of the state-action immunity principle has not gone unquestioned. 
Various agencies which include the Federal Trade Commission, the Antitrust Section 
of the American Bar Association and the Antitrust Modernization Commission367 
have commissioned reports on the anticompetitive effects of an “overly broad state 
action doctrine”.368 Various antitrust scholars have argued for a limited state action 
doctrine.369 Economists view regulation of markets as justified only in situations 
where competition fails and state regulation and intervention have often gone 
beyond this.370 With so many convincing arguments by antitrust scholars and 
economists, it could be realistic to expect that the Supreme Court would at one point 
review the scope of the state immunity doctrine as it has been applied since its 
inception in Parker v Brown. However, as recent as in February 2015 the Supreme 
Court said that federal states, when acting in their respective jurisdictions do not 
need to adhere “in all contexts to a model of unfettered competition.”371 The court 
further said that: 
 
                                                          
365 In terms of this approach municipalities are exempt from active supervision which is required by the “Midcal 
scrutiny” for private parties but it must still act in accordance with a “clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed” state policy which permits anticompetitive conduct. Edinboro College Park Apartments v Edinboro 
University Found, 850 F.3d 567, 572 3d Cir. (2017) 572. 
366 Edinboro College Park Apartments v Edinboro University Foundation 850 F.3d 567; 572 3d Cir. (2017) 572. 
367 This Commission was established to “examine whether the need exists to modernize the antitrust laws and to 
identify and study related issues.” See Sec. 11053 on the Duties of the Commission published in PL 107–273, 
2002 HR 2215. See also Antitrust Modernization Commission: Request for Public Comment (May 19, 2005) in 
70 FR 28902-02, 2005 WL 1170267 (F.R.). 
368 See D Platt Majoras “State Intervention: A State of Displaced Competition” (2006) 13 George Mason Law 
Review 1175 1179. See also the Antitrust Modernization Commission’s request for public comment on the 
exceptions and exemption to the antitrust laws. 
369 For various scholars’ works which criticises the scope of the state immunity doctrine see AC Stine  &  ED 
Gorman “Putting The Lid On State-Sanctioned Cartels: Why The State Action Doctrine In Its Current Form 
Should Become a Remnant Of The Past ” (2011) 66 University of Miami Law Review 123 123-139. S Weese 
“Eminent Need: Proposing A Market Participant Exception for Municipal Parker Immunity” (2011) 9 Cardozo 
Public Law, Policy and Ethics Journal 529 529-566. P  Hettich “Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine 
Will Not Work” (2005) 5 DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal 105 105-157. See also The State Action 
Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement under the Federal Trade Commission Act (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 
715 715-751. 
370 P Hettich “Mere Refinement Of The State Action Doctrine Will Not Work” (2005) 5 DePaul Business & 
Commercial Law Journal 105 106 





“If every duly enacted state law or policy were required to conform to the mandates 
of the Sherman Act, thus promoting competition at the expense of other values a 
State may deem fundamental, federal antitrust law would impose an impermissible 
burden on the States' power to regulate.” 372 
 
Through this statement the court has undoubtedly indicated that there is nothing 
questionable about the scope of the state- action immunity principle since the 
application of the principle is “appropriately limited” by the three approaches above. 
Even if federal states use SOEs or other governmental bodies for implementing and 
executing state policies and the activities of such SOEs or other governmental 
bodies impact on competition, it will continue to be exempted from the application of 
the antitrust laws as long as such bodies are executing a “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed” state policy and has the delegated authority by the federal 
state to “act or regulate anti-competitively.” Out of respect for the federalism 
principle, Congress will also not through the enactment of legislation interfere with 
the state-action immunity doctrine as it is currently applied.  
  
4 3 6 Concluding remarks on US antitrust law 
 
In conclusion it can be observed that the Sherman Act was the first statute to 
regulate restrictions on competition. Its significance is immense as it not only 
established antitrust law within the US but it also paved the way for competition law 
in many other countries. However, the US does not have a state aid control regime. 
The position on SOEs and state aid in the US is very well summarised by Collins373 
when he states that: 
 
“The United States was the first nation to develop a comprehensive body of antitrust 
law, yet unlike the European Union, it has failed to enact legislation designed to 
combat the anticompetitive effects that subsidies and other state-aid initiatives may 
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have upon unfettered business competition in national and multinational 
markets.”374 
 
SOEs are a “little-know business organization in the United States”375 and was never 
really popular. For this reason there was thus no need for an EU-style state aid 
control regime. The market integration in Europe also distinguishes it from the US. 
The control of state aid in the EU formed an integral part of the drive to achieve a 
single-market.376 If member States were allowed to provide unregulated state aid to 
any of its own undertakings, the idea of a single integrated European market would 
be undermined.377 This concern again does not exist in the US.  
 
It is claimed that antitrust enforcement in the US became reinvigorated under the 
Obama administration and after years in the “wilderness” antitrust enforcement 
became a hot topic again.378 During the Reagan and Bush (G.W.) administrations 
antitrust enforcement by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission 
slumped while a slight uplift occurred during the Clinton administration.379 However, 
Obama made vigorous antitrust enforcement part of his election campaign.380 Crane 
sets out five reasons for the revival of antitrust laws. Firstly, the laissez faire Chicago 
school perspective which dominated antitrust from the late 1980s ran its course and 
the time had arrived for a more “interventionist regime”, secondly, antitrust scholars 
had to a large extent started to call into question the Chicago school’s anti-
interventionist approach to antitrust enforcement, thirdly, President Obama had a 
sincere interest in the enforcement of antitrust laws and this interest was displayed 
with the calibre of people he appointed to head the Antitrust Division to make good 
on the promise he made during his presidential campaign that he would appoint "an 
antitrust division in the Justice Department that actually believes in antitrust law", 
fourthly, the laissez faire ideology had been undermined by the 2008 financial crisis 
                                                          
374 This view is shared by other scholars. Graham states that “US law assumes that certain activities can be 
removed from the scope of the anti-trust law if the federal state and state authorities think this is appropriate” 
See C Graham  EU and UK Competition Law (2010) 301. 
375 M Judd “Sources on State-owned enterprises” (1981) 59(3) Harvard Business Review 158 158.  
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and Materials 3rd ed (2003) 1122. 
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and the need for large scale government intervention precipitated by it and lastly, the 
growing rate with which other countries started to implement and enforce antitrust 
laws also played a role in its renaissance.381  
 
With more and more countries now adopting competition policies and laws that are 
mostly based on the United States’ antitrust laws and EU competition laws and with 
the many US multi-national firms operating business across the globe, it is 
reasonable to believe that the United States antitrust law will continue to serve as an 
influence.382 However when it comes to the position of SOEs, United States antitrust 
law is somewhat underdeveloped and hence it cannot serve as clear guidance. Even 
so, the wider United States learning on antitrust will remain important, also to the 
development of laws to address anti-competitive acts of SOEs.  
 
4 3 7 Statutory Competition law in the EU383  
 
4 3 7 1 Introduction 
 
“From a legal perspective, competition law has been at the centre of the EU law and 
European integration for the past fifty years.”384 
 
                                                          
381 DA Crane “Obama’s Antitrust Agenda” (2009) 32 Regulation 16 16-17. 
382 New developments in US antitrust law might also create interest amongst antitrust/ competition law policy 
makers and scholars around the world. A new movement known as the “Hipster Antitrust Movement/ New 
Brandeis School or New Progressive Antitrust Movement might again change the face of antitrust in the US as it 
is known at present. For a comprehensive read on this movement see JD Wright, E Dorsey, J Klick & JM 
Rybnicek “Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust” (2019) 51(1) 
Arizona State Law Journal 293 294-295. The authors state: “At its core, the Hipster Antitrust movement calls 
for a total rejection of the commitment to economic methodology and evidence-based policy that lies at the heart 
of modern antitrust enforcement. The Hipster Antitrust movement would reject Chicago School free marketers' 
approach to antitrust just as readily as it would Post-Chicago interventions.” They continue by saying that the 
“new revolution lays at antitrust law's feet a myriad of perceived socio-political problems, including, but not 
limited to, rising inequality, employee wage concerns, and the concentration of political power.” Its policies 
include specifically “a return to "big-is-bad" antitrust enforcement based upon firm size without regard for effect 
on consumers, making presumptively unlawful broad categories of mergers and acquisitions outright (e.g., all 
mergers beyond a certain size threshold even in the absence of potential horizontal or vertical issues), and 
abandoning the consumer welfare standard to take into account effects on income inequality and wages.” It 
remains to be seen to what extent this movement will bring significant changes to US antitrust law, considering 
its rising influence amongst scholars, think tanks and “prominent members of Congress. 
383 EU competition policies in regard to SOEs will be discussed and examined in greater detail in chapter four of 
this study. In this chapter though, the origin, development and application in member states of EU competition 
policies and law will be discussed. 




This was achieved through the various founding treaties of the EU, the 
implementation of more rules and policies regulating competition to strengthen the 
competition regime and of course greater European integration,385 during which the 
economic conditions in newly admitted member states were closely scrutinized to 
ensure that a coherent EU competition law regime would be maintained. Like the 
United States’ antitrust law, EU competition law also serves as a benchmark for 
many countries when implementing competition policy and law.  
 
The EU position on SOEs and competition is however substantially different from the 
American approach. This part on EU competition law will focus mainly on the origin 
and development of the EU competition law, its application within selected member 
states, namely Britain, Germany and France, and its relevance for the operations of 
SOEs. A more detailed discussion on the EU’s state aid policy relating to 
undertakings and in particular public undertakings (SOEs in South Africa), which are 
the focus of this study, will follow in chapter four. 
 
4 3 7 2 EU treaties, Competition law and their relevance for public 
undertakings  
 
After World War II, which ravaged nearly every state in Europe, it must have been 
difficult to foresee that, in the future there would be peace through supranational 
cooperation. The initial supranational cooperation was made possible by the sheer 
will and determination of six European countries which are Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. The devastation in these 
countries brought about by the war served as an incentive for these European 
leaders to unite Europe.386 The “founding fathers” of European integration, 
Germany’s Konrad Adenauer, France’s Robert Schuman, Italy’s Alcide de Casperi, 
Luxembourg’s Joseph Bech, the Netherlands’ Johan Willem Beyen, Belguim’s Paul 
                                                          
385 European integration has been described as “the historical process whereby European nation-states have been 
willing to transfer, or more usually pool, their sovereign powers in a collective enterprise” and the European 
Union and its institutional structures is the outcome of the process. See M Gilbert European Integration: A 
Concise History (2012) 1-5. 




Henri Spaak and Britain’s Winston Churchill knew that “civilized life” in Europe could 
only be achieve again through greater unity.387  
 
A “United States of Europe”388 was desired. And so the first integration efforts started 
with the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 by 
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany.389 This 
Community was established after Robert Schuman, the then French Foreign 
Minister, suggested that the coal and steel industries of Germany and France should 
be placed under one authority.390 The purpose was to create a single market in coal 
and steel,391 to prevent any “protectionist cartels” in the coal and steel industry and 
to spread the “social costs” of modernising these industries.392 The treaty 
establishing the ECSC was only meant to be in force for fifty years and thus expired 
in July 2002 and the ECSC ceased to exist.393 Nevertheless, this Community laid the 
foundation for more European integration and its institutional framework also set the 
example for the institutional framework of those European Communities that 
followed.  
 
In January 1958 the European Economic Community (EEC), followed when the 
Treaty of Rome (the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community or EEC 
Treaty) entered into force.394 Unlike the ECSC Treaty which focused mainly on one 
aspect of cooperation, namely on the coal and steel industry, this treaty concerned 
                                                          
387 M Gilbert European Integration: A Concise History (2012) 10. 
388 A term coined already in the mid-nineteen century but made popular again by Britain’s Winston Churchill 
when he called for a “United States of Europe” after the end of World War II. 
 See H Porsdam From Civil to Human Rights: Dialogues on Law and Humanities in the United States and 
Europe (2009) 114. 
389 The treaty establishing the ECSC, however, only entered into force in 1953. 
390 J Fairhurst Law of the European Union 8th ed (2010) 5. 
391 See J Steiner & L Woods EU Law 10th ed (2009) 4. 
392 M Gilbert European Integration: A Concise History (2012) 35. 
393 A Kaczorowska European Union Law 2nd ed (2011) 8. 
394 M Gilbert European Integration: A Concise History (2012) 5. 
The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was established at the same time than the EEC. 
Article 2 of the EEC Treaty determines that: “It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common 
Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an 
increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its Member 
States.” 
At the same time the treaty which established the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was 
signed.  This Community was meant to provide greater cooperation amongst the six signing nations in matters 
regarding the use of atomic energy.  




broader economic cooperation between member states. The implementation of 
competition policy within the EEC formed part of this treaty.395 The EEC Commission 
established the following objectives as the three fundamental principles of EEC 
competition policy (i) to create and maintain a single market for the benefit of 
consumers and business, (ii) to prevent large businesses from engaging in 
anticompetitive behaviour, and (iii) the support by the EEC of production, distribution 
and technological development.396 
Thus, besides establishing a “common market” between the founding member 
states, which covered all “economic fields” except the areas covered by the ECSC 
and the EURATOM,397 the EEC Treaty also became the first “supranational antitrust 
agreement” with the European Commission (the EU Commission) as its enforcer.398 
The important provisions of the EEC Treaty which dealt with competition are found in 
sections 85 to 94 of the treaty.399 Article 85 of the EEC Treaty dealt with agreements 
between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between the member states and which have as 
their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market. Article 86 of the EEC Treaty dealt with the abuse by a dominant 
enterprise of its position, while articles 92 to 94 dealt with aid granted by member 
states to favour certain enterprises or the production of certain goods. The founding 
treaty had no provisions on merger regulation. Article 3 of the treaty, however, gave 
the Commission the authority to establish a system which would ensure that 
competition within the EEC is not distorted.400 Even though it was found that articles 
85 and 86 were also applicable to concentrations within the EEC, it was considered 
not sufficient to ensure that competition is not distorted through concentration.401 
Consequently the EEC enacted its first “legal instrument” to control mergers in 
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397 J Fairhurst Law of the European Union 8th ed (2010) 7. 
398 M Gilbert European Integration: A Concise History (2012) 55. 
399 Of particular importance for this study are sections which deals with State aid granted to undertakings and 
which will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four of this study. 
400 Article 3(f) provides for the “the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted in 
the Common Market.” 
401 See the Preamble of the Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of 





December 1989 through the Council Regulation402 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings. This was the EEC’s first “community policy” on 
concentrations between undertakings 
 
After many amendments to the EEC Treaty by various other treaties since its 
inception in 1958,403 the numbering404 of the founding articles has been changed, the 
name of the EEC has been changed and also the name of the ruling treaty is 
different but the foundational principles have basically remained the same. These 
aspects are detailed in chapter four.405 Today provisions dealing with competition 
within the EU, as the EEC is known since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 
1993, are found in sections 101 to 109 of the TFEU.406 Council Regulation (EC) 
139/2004 (the “EC Merger Regulation”) is the existing legal instrument which 
governs mergers and has been described as “the most far-reaching reform of 
European merger control”407 since the first merger control system became effective 
on 21 September 1990. The EC Merger Regulation brought merger control in the EU 
in line with a more integrated market and possible further enlargement of the EU.408 
 
a) Applicability of EU competition law to undertakings including public 
undertakings 
 
                                                          
402 See Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings. 
403 Treaties which amended the founding treaty of the European Union as the EEC is known today include the 
Brussels Treaty of 1965, the Single European Act of 1986, the Maastricht Treaty of 1994, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam of 1997, the Treaty of Nice of 2001 and the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007.  
404 When reference is made in this chapter to the old numbering of the EEC Treaty, the new corresponding 
numbering in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union will be indicated. 
405 See para 3.1 of chapter four. 
406 Of importance to this study are those provisions found in sections 107 to 109 which deal with aids granted to 
undertakings by EU member states. The EU State Aid Model will thus be the exclusive focus in chapter four of 
this study. A comprehensive discussion of all the other provisions on competition matters namely those dealing 
with anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance and mergers, is beyond the scope of this study.  
407  P Verloop & V Landes Merger Control in Europe: EU, Member States and Accession States  (2003) xxiii 
408 See the Preamble of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)  in the Official Journal of the European 




The above EU competition rules apply to all undertakings equally, regardless of their 
ownership. In Hofner and Elser v Macrotron409 it was stated that: 
 
“…in the context of competition law the concept of an undertaking encompasses 
every entity engaged in economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity 
and the way in which it is financed.” 
 
Hence there is no special treatment for public undertakings.410 Within the EU SOEs 
are known as “public undertakings”. For as long as the public undertaking is a 
market participant that performs economic activity, the competition rules will apply to 
it. If a member state grants special or exclusive rights to public undertakings, the 
member state’s conduct will have to comply with special competition rules in the 
TFEU.411 The level of state involvement within the national economies in each EU 
member state differs considerably412 and the European Commission acknowledges 
that public undertakings play substantial roles in the national economies of member 
states.413 Nonetheless, there should be no “unjustified discrimination between public 
and private undertakings in the application on the rules on competition”.414  
 
European integration415 especially the creation of the internal market had a strong 
impact on the role of SOEs within economies of member states of the EU. The 
internal market was established by the Single European Act of 1986 (Single 
European Act). Gilbert states that the Single European Act was the most important 
                                                          
409 C-41/90 [1991] ECR 1-1979 para 2. This description can also be found C Graham EU and UK Competition 
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development for economic and political integration since the signature of the treaty 
which established the EEC.416 Article 13 of the Single European Act provides that: 
 
“The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the 
internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992… 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty.” 
 
The four key pillars of the internal market is the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital.417 Public undertakings, like their private counterparts, are 
providers of services and goods. Since competition rules are to be applied equally to 
public undertakings and private undertakings, public undertakings need to comply 
with treaty rules regarding competition. Consequently the Commission requires a 
transparent financial relationship between public undertakings and member states.418 
In order to ensure proper application of the rules of competition to public 
undertakings, the Commission requires that detailed accounts are kept and made 
available on request to the Commission. Such accounts should indicate “the 
distinction between different activities, the costs and revenues associated with each 
activity and the methods of cost and revenue assignment and allocation.419 This 
ensures that the relation between the State and SOEs does not at any point distort 
competition.  
 
b) Enforcement of the EU Competition rules 
 
All the above rules including the state aid rules420 are enforced by the Directorate 
General for Competition at the EU Commission.421 The EU Commission has been 
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described as a “market invigilator” and “a watchdog that barked whenever 
mercantilist tendencies tried to sneak into the market by the back door and a 
bloodhound employed to sniff them out”.422  
The centralised system of enforcing EU competition law which was established by 
Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962423 has now been replaced by a 
decentralised enforcement system.424 Lawmakers of the EU were mindful of the 
need to balance effective supervision of the enforcement of EU competition law and 
the need to simplify the administration burden of the Commission, when the 
decentralised system was considered.425 In terms of the current enforcement regime 
member states thus have the competence to designate those competition authorities 
which are responsible for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty 
(today Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU) in compliance with Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2003 and these authorities include courts.426 In terms of the current 
legislation the competition authorities and courts of all member states have thus now 
concurrent power with the Commission to apply Article 101(1) of the TFEU (formerly 
Article 81 (1) of the EC Treaty) and Article 101(3) of the TFEU (formerly Article 81 (3) 
of the EC Treaty) as well as Article 102 of the TFEU (formerly Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty).427 There is however a limitation on the concurrent jurisdiction of the national 
competition authorities. Any ruling by the competition authorities of the member state 
on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 101 and Article 102 of the TFEU 
which is also the subject of an EU Commission decision, cannot run counter to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
421 See B Buehler, G Koltay, X Boutin & M Motta “Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2013–2014” 
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422 M Gilbert European Integration: A Concise History (2012) 55. 
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Communities  L 1/1 (4.1.2003). 
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decision which the Commission adopted.428 The decentralised system not only 
lightens the Commission’s administrative burden, but another benefit might also be 
speedier decisions on possible anticompetitive practices. National competition 
authorities focus on anticompetitive behaviour within their respective jurisdictions, 
and may ensure speedy decisions.  
 
Nonetheless, those articles of the TFEU which deal with state aid to undertakings by 
member states and which form part of the EU competition rules, namely Articles 107 
to 109 are only enforceable by the Commission.429 It is the only institution which can 
decide on the legality or not of state aid to undertakings by member states. Member 
states may however, have institutions which advise undertakings affected by 
possible state aid on EU state aid regulations. Article 13 of the TEU states that: 
“The Union shall have an institutional framework which shall aim to promote its 
values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of 
the Member States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its 
policies and actions.” 
The treaty further states that:  
“In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely 
independent…the members of the Commission shall neither seek nor take 
instructions from any Government or other institution, body, office or entity. They 
shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties or the performance of 
their tasks.430 
It is submitted that in regard to the application of the EU state aid rules, consistency 
and independence of the Commission is of utmost importance. Firstly, the 
requirement in regard to consistency ensures that the state aid rules are applied to 
all member states in the exact same way without any deviation from the regulatory 
position. If this was not the case a situation may arise in which a member state 
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wants to grant aid to an undertaking operating within its border and its competition 
authorities might judge the aid not to contravene competition while if the EU 
Commission had to decide, the outcome could be otherwise. This might thus affect 
the uniform application of the state aid rules. Secondly, since the Commission is 
expected to be completely independent without taking instructions from any 
government, office or entity, any possibility of national authorities perhaps not 
standing up to their government if they were to apply state aid rules is excluded. The 
EU Commission is thus better placed to assess whether state aid by a member state 
to any undertaking might distort competition. 
 
4 3 7 3 Implementation of EU Competition law in selected member states: 
Britain, Germany and France  
 
a) Statutory Competition law in Britain 
 
“All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time 
created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures 
from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the 
Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United 
Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and 
followed accordingly.”431 
 
The above provision in Britain’s European Communities Act recognises the 
supremacy of EU law, including competition law. Britain has quite a story to tell about 
its initial ambitions to become a member of the EEC. At first Britain made two 
attempts to join the EEC but both failed.432 The first objection against British 
membership of the EEC was in 1963 by President De Gaulle backed by Germany’s 
Konrad Adenauer and the second refusal for membership was in 1967, again by 
President De Gaulle. De Gaulle used France’s veto right433 to block British 
membership since he felt that British membership to the EEC would weaken the 
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community. As a result of the two failed membership attempts the administration of 
Prime Minister Harold McMillan refrained from another admission application while 
De Gaulle was still in office.434 At the time Britain was still a colonial empire with 
close ties to the Commonwealth and a “special relationship” with the United States, 
which the six founding member states of the EEC especially France, felt could 
“disrupt the economic arrangements agreed by “The Six”.435 Britain only restarted its 
process to join the EEC after De Gaulle resigned from the French presidency in April 
1969.436 It became a member state of the EEC437 after the enactment of the 
European Communities Act 1972, in January 1973 under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Edward Heath and at a time when “a crisis-hit Britain was desperate to join 
on almost any terms”.438  
 
Gilbert states that there were three determining factors in regard to Britain’s desire to 
become a member state of the EEC: the first was driven by its poor economic 
performance in comparison with those countries which were member states of the 
EEC, the second was the realisation that greater European unity was essential in a 
world where “political and economic power [was] becoming more [concentrated] to 
such a great extent” and thirdly, the success of the EEC in its initial stages had 
convinced Britain that it wanted to be part of such a success story.439 With Britain’s 
admission the “Six” became the “Nine”440 and Britain became subject to all EEC 
rules covered in the EEC Treaty including those that deal with competition matters. 
Since its admission to the EEC in 1972, Britain enacted a variety of laws to govern 
competition. These include the Competition Act 1980,441 the Fair Trading Act of 
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1973,442 the Resale Prices Act of 1976443 and the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 
1976.444  
 
However, in the nineties Britain’s competition law underwent a substantial overhaul 
in order to align it further with EU Competition law.445 Today the two important 
statutes, namely the Competition Act 1998 (the Competition Act) and the Enterprise 
Act 2002 (the Enterprise Act), govern competition within Britain. Britain’s 
competition legislation represents now a “United Kingdom version of European 
Union competition policy”.446 Provisions of the TFEU on prohibited agreements, 
decisions by associations of undertakings or any practices which may prevent, 
restrict or distort competition are reflected in section 2 of the Competition Act, while 
the TFEU provisions on the abuse of dominance are reflected in section 18 of the 
Competition Act. The Enterprise Act provides, inter alia, for merger regulation, 
market investigations and the introduction of a cartel offence. The Competition and 
Market Authority447 is the principal body responsible for administering and enforcing 
the Competition Act. 
 
As stated above,448 sections 107 to 109 of the TFEU are directly enforce by the EU 
Commission. Hence, all state aid considered by a government organ in Britain has to 
be reported to the EU Commission in order for the Commission to determine whether 
such aid will have a harmful effect on competition. Any complaints of “unlawful” state 
aid provided by any branch of the British government to an undertaking which has 
the potential to distort competition, is lodged directly with the EU Commission. The 
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Commission will then investigate such complaints and if necessary will request 
information from the Member state concerned, in this case Britain.449   
 
A seismic change, however, came on 23 June 2016 when the British people voted to 
leave the EU during a referendum. Britain’s planned exist from the EU will have an 
impact on how EU rules and laws are applied and this includes the competition and 
state aid rules. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act of 2018, which received Royal 
Assent on 9 September 2019, provides some guidance in regard to this. The EU 
Withdrawal Act provides for the retention of existing EU laws.450 In terms of the Act, 
direct EU legislation, which refers to any EU regulation, EU decision or EU tertiary 
legislation which is in effect immediately before the day Britain will exit the EU, will 
form part of British law after it leaves the EU.451 Vickers states that although Britain’s 
current primary legislation on competition will continue to apply as they currently do 
because these are independent UK statutes and “will not fall over when Brexit 
happens”, there will be consequences and strains of various kinds.452 Some of these 
consequences and constrains have been touched upon by Michael Grenfell, 
Executive Director of the Competition and Markets Authority, during a speech at the 
Advanced EU Competition Law Conference.453 Those concerns listed include:  
“(i) the duplication involved in parallel investigations of mergers and anti-competitive 
practices;  
(ii) the risk of an ‘enforcement gap’ for UK consumers if there are no parallel 
investigations;  
(iii) the risks to business certainty if there is divergence from EU norms in 
competition enforcement;  
(iv) the loss of effectiveness from being outside the cooperation mechanisms of the 
European Competition Network (especially as regards authorities sharing 
confidential information on suspected anti-competitive practices);  
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(v) the loss of UK voices in the EU institutions to influence the development of EU 
competition law and policy; and  
(vi) at the CMA, a lack of adequate funding which might, for example, reduce the 
CMA’s ability to conduct the full range of their activities such as market investigations 
when staff have to be diverted to handle mergers that would previously have been 
examined exclusively by the EU Commission.” 
 
It is the above concerns and many others that prompted the House of Lords to 
publish a report on competition and state aid rules post-Brexit, after it received 
submissions from various experts and institutions.454 It has done the same in regard 
to other policy areas and Brexit. Some of the questions on competition rules which 
the experts wanted the UK government to address either in the EU Withdrawal Bill or 
during exit negotiations with the EU include: 
(i) The position in regard to block exemptions since businesses appreciate that the 
current EU block exemptions “ensure that certain types of agreements do not fall foul 
of either EU or UK antitrust prohibitions.” The experts feel that similar arrangements 
should continue to apply under UK law after Brexit “to provide certainty and minimise 
disruption for businesses”. They suggest that the government also need to clarify the 
extent to which the UK will continue to “take account of future EU block 
exemptions.”455 
(ii) The jurisdiction over competition cases during any transition period since the 
initial position papers regarding ongoing judicial and administrative proceedings at 
the point of Brexit shows two different approaches by the EU and the UK 
government. The EU’s suggestion is that withdrawal should not deprive the Court of 
Justice of its competence to adjudicate in proceedings which are pending on the 
withdrawal date, while the UK’s position is that Court of Justice should not remain 
competent to rule on cases which it has not decided on before withdrawal even if the 
facts arose before withdrawal. 456 
(iii) The type of cooperation that will exist between the UK and the EU as it will be in 
the mutual interest of both the EU and the UK to continue to cooperate on 
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competition matters post-Brexit. The view is that any such agreement should enable 
“reciprocal evidence-sharing”, including confidential information.457  
(iii) The position in regard to State Aid control after Brexit. Most of the expert 
submissions were favourable towards the EU state aid regime. They noted that 
despite frustrations with the application of the state aid rules, there was no clear 
evidence that the rules have curtailed successive UK governments’ ability to grant 
state aid. It was also admitted that although there are delays when the state aid rules 
are applied, the checks and balances entrenched in these rules are not necessarily a 
bad thing.458 
 
It is clear from the Lords’ Report that the UK government will have to address an 
extensive number of issues in regard to competition policy after Brexit. It is submitted 
that the position in regard to antitrust rules that were applied before exit, might not 
change significantly. This is also because antitrust rules all over the world focus on 
mostly the same aspects of competition. Where significant policy changes could be 
expected is in regard to the state aid rules. If the UK however envisages a close 
trade relationship with the EU, any departure from the EU position on state aid 
control, might become a sticky point during the exit negotiations with the EU and in 
establishment of trade relations. It was therefore encouraging when Andrew Griffiths, 
a former Minister for Small Business, Consumers and Corporate Responsibility, 
confirmed that the UK government is looking to establish its own state aid regulatory 
framework enforced by the Competition and Markets Authority. The Minister stated:  
 
“the Government has concluded that at the point an independent UK State aid 
authority is required, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) would be best 
placed to take on the role of State aid regulator. This reflects its experience and 
understanding of markets as the UK’s competition regulator and the independence 
of its decision-making from Government. By establishing a clear regulatory function, 
the Government believes we can provide assurance that the rules will be operated 
fairly throughout the UK internal market. We are continuing to engage with the 
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Devolved Administrations about the regulation of State aid, so that the new 
framework works for the whole of the UK.”459 
 
This vision by the government has now been formulated in the “State Aid (EU Exit) 
Regulations 2019”. As expected, it aligns closely with EU state rules and will come 
into force on the day Britain will exit the EU.  
 
b) Statutory Competition law in Germany  
 
Germany’s first post-World War II Minister for Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, 
believed in “prosperity through competition”. He believed that “Competition is the 
most promising means to achieve and to secure prosperity”.460 Erhard was thus the 
founding father of the “social market economy” (“die soziale Marktwirtschaft”) in 
Germany.461 Since Germany was one of the founding members of the EEC, it was 
one of the first countries to adhere to the supranational competition policy which 
includes the state aid rules of the EU. Germany’s first legislation on competition was 
enacted in 1958. The Act against Restraint of Competition (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen-GWB), however, had some predecessors in the form 
of “decartelization and deconcentration laws” which were enacted by the Allied 
nations462 after the end of World War II.463  
 
After the Bonn Conventions of 1955464 transferred authority from the occupied 
powers back to the German government, the Adenauer administration enacted the 
GWB.465 The GWB was crucial to the establishment of a free market economy in 
Germany, especially since the Nazi era saw an economy that was “fully planned, 
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controlled, and monopolized”.466 Section 1 of the GWB prohibits agreements that 
restrict competition, section 19 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by an 
undertaking, chapter 5 of the Act contains special provisions for certain sectors of 
the economy such as agriculture and the energy sector and chapter seven of the Act 
regulates concentrations.  
 
It is of particular significance to this study that the GWB explicitly applies to all 
undertakings which are either entirely or partly in public ownership or those which 
are managed or operated by public authorities467 although the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau are specifically exempted from 
some of the provisions of the Act.468 There is no special treatment for SOEs when 
they violate competition laws.  
 
The Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office),469 the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology, and the cartel authorities of the sixteen German States470 are 
responsible for enforcing the Act. Except for bid rigging, which became a criminal 
offence in 1997, committing any other restrictive practice remains an administrative 
offence only.471 Germany like all other EU member states is subjected to the EU 
state aid rules.  
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c) Statutory Competition Law in France  
 
Wise states that the foundation for French competition law was laid during the 
French Revolution when the Chaplier Law of 1791 barred members belonging to the 
same trade community from assembling to regulate their own common interest.472 
This ended medieval restrictions on access to professions and commercial activities. 
The French Penal Code of 1810 also prohibited certain activities by coalitions or 
combinations and any price manipulations. Article 419 of the Penal Code473 stated:  
 
 “Those who, by false or slanderous reports, purposely spread among the people; or 
by offering higher prices than those which were asked by the venders themselves; or 
by coalitions or combinations among the principal holders of the same kind of 
merchandize or provisions, tending to prevent such goods being sold at all, or being 
sold under a certain price; or by any fraudulent ways or means whatever, shall have 
effected the enhancement or reduction of the price of provisions or merchandize; or 
of the public securities and stocks, above or below the prices which would have been 
determined by the free and natural competition of trade; shall be punished with an 
imprisonment of not less than one month, nor more than one year, and a fine of 
from 500 to 10,000 francs. The offenders may, moreover, be placed, by sentence or 
judgment, under the superintendence of the high police, during not less than two 
years, nor more than five years.” 
 
The penalty was doubled if any of the prohibited activities were applied in regard to 
specific products. Article 430 of the Penal Code 1810 stated: 
 
“The penalty shall be an imprisonment of not less than two months, nor more than 
two years, and a fine of from 1,000 to 20,000 francs, if such contrivances have been 
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practiced upon corn, grain, flour, farinaceous substances, bread, wine, or any kind of 
liquor.” 
 
These restrictions were enforced by the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance 
and the ministry’s price directorate.474 The restrictions on coalitions and 
combinations in both the Chaplier Law of 1791 and the Penal Code were only 
relaxed by the courts during the 1880s when they started to distinguish between 
“good and bad cartels.”475 Amendments to the Chaplier Law and the Penal Code in 
1926 took into account the relaxation of the position in regard to combinations.476 
Combinations of manufactures, for example, could engage in certain activities such 
as division of markets and it was not necessarily condemned.477 By the 1930s cartels 
were not seen as necessarily bad.478 Riesenfeld states that “at some periods 
between the two world wars, concentration and cartelization were even fostered 
officially” and that the economic crisis during these times further strengthened “the 
status and role of the cartels.”479 Cartels were found in a number of industries which, 
inter alia, include the sugar industry, shoe manufacturing, high sea fisheries and the 
potassium industry.480  
 
After World War II and before France became one of the founding members of the 
EEC, France enacted price control legislation.481 A post-World War II Ordinance 
which was issued in 1945 made refusals to deal, price discrimination, resale price 
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maintenance and reselling at a loss unlawful.482 Since the Ordinance continued with 
price control measures such as those found in the Penal Code of 1810, it became 
known as the “Price Control Ordinance”.483  
 
An opportunity arose in 1953 to adopt a general competition law but the French 
Parliament failed to adopt the text.484 The government instead issued a decree on 
the maintenance or re-establishment of free industrial and commercial 
competition.485 It incorporated the Ordinance of 1945, added more concerted actions 
to those that were already unlawful486 and led to regulation of some activities of 
combinations.487 Riesenfeld states that besides adding new prohibitions, the 1953 
decree also amended some of the already existing prohibitions such as (i) the 
prohibition on refusal to deal which was rephrased and extended; and (ii) the 
prohibition on maintenance of minimum prices which was expanded and the 
exceptions clarified.488 The decree’s most important provisions were found in article 
59 bis, article 59 ter and article 59 quarter. Article 59 bis prohibited “[all] concerted 
actions, agreements, express or implied, understandings, or coalitions under 
whatever form or for whatever reason, which have as their object or may have as 
their effect the restriction of the full exercise of competition by placing an obstacle in 
the way of a lowering of production costs or sales prices or by favoring an artificial 
increase of the prices, are prohibited, except as provided in article 59 ter.”489 Article 
59 ter stated that the prohibition in Article 59 bis does “not refer to the concerted 
actions, agreements or understandings: (1) Which result from the application of the 
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text of a statute or regulation; (2) Which the originators are able to justify as having 
the effect of improving or extending the outlets of the production, or of assuring the 
development of economic progress by way of rationalization or specialization.”490 
Article 59 quarter established an administrative agency, the Commission Technique 
des Ententes (Technical Commission for Restrictive Accords) which became 
responsible for investigating violations of article 59 bis.491 Regardless of these new 
novel measures, the 1953 competition regime was mostly ineffective since firms 
continued to be involved in anticompetitive activities because the means to stop 
them were ineffective.492 The blame for the state of affairs of the competition 
legislation in France during the years after World War II can be placed before the 
door of the government. It has been stated that “the French State has always … had 
a most irritating penchant for interventionism and a tendency to consider legislation 
on competition as simply one instrument amongst many for controlling the 
economy”.493 
 
Other amendments494 followed in the years after the 1953 decree. In 1963 a law 
dealing with economic and financial stability which extended the application of 
competition law to the abuse of a dominant position and also extended the 
Commission Technique des Ententes’s’ powers to investigate any such abuse was 
adopted.495 The additional powers which were allocated to the Commission caused it 
to be renamed as the Commission Technique des Ententes et des Positions 
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Dominantes (“Concerted Practices and Dominant Practices Commission”).496 Even 
with this change, the Commission continued to be only an advisory body.497  
 
In 1977498 another round of changes to French competition law followed. These 
changes took into account the changes that occurred on European level in regard to 
competition law such as the development of merger regulation.499 At the time the 
EEC’s competition framework was twenty years old.500 In terms of the new changes, 
price controls were cut back, merger control was implemented, fines could be issued 
and injunctions granted for prohibited practices and the “Concerted Practices and 
Dominant Practices Commission was replaced with the Commission de la 
Concurrence (“Competition Commission”).501 Still, negative perceptions about the 
French competition system persisted.502 It was described as “outdated”, “full of 
contradictions”, “cumbersome” and “dangerous”.503 The factors stated to contribute 
to this failure were (i) government intervention in markets, which included 
subsidization of industries, (ii) “centrally planned” restructuring of firms and (iii) the 
lack of a competition spirit in those French firms that were dealing in international 
markets.504  
 
                                                          
496 Para 5 OECD Roundtable on Changes in Institutional Design of Competition Authorities- Contribution by 
the French Autorité de la Concurrence. 
497 Para 5 OECD Roundtable on Changes in Institutional Design of Competition Authorities- Contribution by 
the French Autorité de la Concurrence. 
498 For more on these 1977 changes see F Jenny “Evolution of Antitrust Policies in France” in G Mussati (ed) 
Mergers, Markets and Public Policy (1995) 163 166. 
499 F Jenny “French Competition Policy in Perspective” in GW Comanor, K Jacquemin, A Jenny, F 
Kantzenbach, E Ordover & L Waverman (eds) Competition Policy in Europe and North America: Economic 
Issues and Institutions  (1990)  146 151.  
500 For more in this regard see the discussions in para  4 4.3.7 of this chapter and par 3 of chapter 4 respectively 
501 M Wise “Competition Law and Policy in France” (2005)  7 (1) OECD Journal of Competition Law & Policy 
7 12 and F Jenny “Evolution of Antitrust Policies in France” in G Mussati (ed) Mergers, Markets and Public 
Policy (1995) 163 167-168. 
502 See F Jenny “French Competition Policy in Perspective” in GW Comanor, K Jacquemin, A Jenny, F 
Kantzenbach, E Ordover &  L Waverman, Competition Policy in Europe and North America: Economic Issues 
and Institutions (1990) 146 146. For further reading on the development of competition law in France after 
World War II see also SA Riesenfeld “The Legal Protection of Competition in France” (1960) 48(4) California 
Law Review 574 574-595. 
503 I Roudard “The New French Legislation on Competition” (1989) 10(2) European Competition Law Review 
205 205. 
504 F Jenny “French Competition Policy in Perspective” in GW Comanor, K Jacquemin, A Jenny, F 
Kantzenbach, E Ordover &  L Waverman Competition Policy in Europe and North America:  Economic Issues 




As a result another round of fundamental change505 to competition law were made in 
1986, when France transitioned completely to a market economy. The changes were 
hailed as a “liberal reform”.506 Jenny states that the French government became at 
the time eager to show its commitment to a free market economy.507 Hence, France 
adopted the 1986 Ordinance on price freedom and competition, which repealed the 
1945 Price Ordinance.508 The 1986 Ordinance was “hailed as a fundamental change 
in French economic policy.”509 Gerber states that this legislation was the “culmination 
of a process that had begun in 1977.”510 The new French competition law had “major 
symbolic importance for the role of competition law in Europe generally”.511 It led to 
the following changes to competition law in France: 
(i) It abolished the price control system established in 1945 and competition amongst 
enterprises became the determinant for prices, with only some exceptions;512  
(ii) It established the Conseil de la Concurrence (“Competition Council”), which unlike 
its predecessor, did not only have an advisory role513 but was a “quasi-judicial” and 
independent body with investigative and decision-making powers.514 The control of 
anticompetitive practices was transferred from the Minister Economics and Finances 
and the Competition Commission to the newly established agency and it became 
responsible for enforcing competition law. Companies could directly approach it, it 
could take legal action on its own initiative, impose injunctions and fines and make 
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recommendations to public authorities even in regard to draft legislative or regulatory 
texts;515 and 
(iii) The law on prohibited concerted practices and the abuse of a dominant position 
were not significantly changed.516 There were however a few changes which, inter 
alia, included that (i) it became illegal for firms to exercise their economic bargaining 
power over other firms in ways which may have harmed competition, (ii) refusal to 
deal and price discrimination which became unlawful in terms of the Ordinance of 
1945, were abandoned; and (iii) it decriminalized certain individual anticompetitive 
practices such as tie-in sales.517  
 
Some issues remained however after the enactment of the 1986 Ordinance. One 
was that the Competition Council was only responsible for enforcing competition 
laws in regard to anticompetitive practices and dominance by enterprises. The 
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs remained in charge of merger control with 
some involvement of the Council for Competition in cases where mergers could raise 
possible competition concerns.518  
 
In 2001519 the French competition law was “restated and codified.”520 The changes to 
competition law during this round, inter alia, included (i) a pre-merger notification 
                                                          
515 Para 8 OECD Roundtable on Changes in Institutional Design of Competition Authorities- Contribution by 
the French Autorité de la Concurrence.  
516 F Jenny “French Competition Policy in Perspective” in GW Comanor, K Jacquemin, A Jenny, F 
Kantzenbach, E Ordover &  L Waverman, Competition Policy in Europe and North America: Economic Issues 
and Institutions  (1990)  46 157.  
517 See RJA de Seife, “French and EEC Competition Law: GATT and U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Post-1992” 
(1992) 71 Nebraska Law Review 488 495-497. 
518 L Carswell-Parmentier “Reform of French competition law: adoption of a mandatory pre-merger control 
regime” (2002) 23 (2) European Competition Law Review 99 99-100. 
519 For more on all the 2001 changes to competition law see L Carswell- Parmentier “Recent developments in 
French competition law - commitments, leniency and settlement procedures - the French approach” (2006) 27 
(11) European Competition Law Review 616 616-630 and N Jalabert-Doury “European and international 
competition” (2001) 5  International Business Law Journal 589 589-595. 
520 M Wise “Competition Law and Policy in France” (2005) 7(1) OECD Journal of Competition Law & Policy 7 
12. For more on the 2001 law that brought the changes see S Lowe & M Perrier “The law on new economic 




requirement,521 (ii) stronger sanctions for anticompetitive practices, and (iii) a 
provision for leniency.522  
 
A further round of changes to the French competition law regime followed during 
President Sarkozy’s administration.523 In 2008 the Modernisation of the Economy Act 
2008-776 led to an overhaul in regard to the enforcement of competition law.524 It 
established the Autorité de la Concurrence (Competition Authority), the new agency 
responsible for enforcing competition legislation in France and it transferred merger 
control from the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs to the Competition 
Authority.525 Before this legislation was implemented, powers to enforce competition 
law were divided between the Conseil de la concurrence and the Ministry of 
Economy. Lassere states that the “transfer of merger control to the independent 
Authority [was] the flagship measure of the new regime.”526 The Ministry though 
retained some powers. These included: 
(i) the power to request (but not require) that the Competition Authority carry out a 
full phase-two investigation with respect to a merger transaction which the Authority 
has approved in the abbreviated phase one,  
(ii) the power to overrule, for general interest purposes, a decision by the 
Competition Authority if that would compensate for harm to competition, and  
(iii) the power to enforce settlements in response to anticompetitive practices 
affecting "a market of a local dimension" in France.527  
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Recently two more laws changed France’s competition law: the law on economic 
growth, activity and equal opportunities, also called the “Macron Law”, since it was 
drafted by Emmanuel Macron (the current French President) while he was the 
Economy Minister, came into effect in August 2015528 and Ordonnance 9 March 
2017 (no 2017-303). Manuel Valls, the Prime Minister in Francois Hollande’s 
administration, said of the changes brought by the “Macron Law”: “The series of 
reforms designed to remove obstacles, free up initiatives and boost the return to 
growth continues. These are reforms that the French people have asked for and that 
will have a positive impact on their day-to-day lives and our economic health.”529 The 
changes made by these two laws included: 
(i) for agreements between central purchasing bodies operating in the mass 
distribution sector to be notified to the Competition Authority two months prior to their 
entry into force when a certain threshold is reached 530 
(ii) simplification of leniency and settlement procedures.531 
(iii) to help victims who are seeking compensation for anticompetitive behaviour 
which affected them, various presumptions have been made part of French 
competition law. Any anti-competitive practice against which the Competition 
Authority had to act, “now constitute irrebuttable evidence of infringement, triggering 
liability of the author of such practices to third parties.”532 
 
Today France’s competition law is codified in the French Commercial Code.533 Its 
competition law, like the competition law regimes of other EU member states, are 
closely aligned with EU competition law. There are some aspects though which are 
only found in French competition law and not in EU competition law. These include 
for example the prohibition on “Restrictive Trade Practices” which falls within the 
                                                          
528 Law 2015-990. For Economic Growth and Activity and Equality of Economic Opportunities. 
529 See https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/law-on-economic-growth-and-activity. 
530 Article L. 462-10 as inserted the Macron Law article 37. Chapter 11:3 “An Overview of Competition Law in 
France” Corporate Counsel’s Guide to International Antitrust” November 2017 Update. 
531 Article L. 464-2 as amended by the Macron Law article 218. 
532 Chapter 11:3 “An Overview of Competition Law in France” Corporate Counsel’s Guide to International 
Antitrust” November 2017 Update. This new development in French competition law came as a result of the EU 
Directive 2014/10 on antitrust damages actions which was signed into law on 26 November 2014 and the 
deadline for implementing it in member states was 27 December 2016. The full Directive is accessible on  
(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.349.01.0001.01.ENG).  
533 Chapter 11:3 “An Overview of Competition Law in France” Corporate Counsel’s Guide to International 




jurisdiction of the normal courts and not the Competition Authority.534 The various 
pieces of legislation which were enacted over the years, firstly, to bring France’s 
competition law in “agreement with modern thinking”, secondly, to enable France to 
keep up with other European countries such as Germany, which also had to rebuilt 
their economies after the destruction of World War II and lastly, to keep up with 
greater European integration and convergence of national competition laws, thus 
ensured an effective and smooth transition from interventionist state to a free market 
economy. 
 
4 3 7 4 Concluding remarks on EU statutory Competition law  
 
Article 3 of the TFEU bestows exclusive competence on the EU in regard to the 
establishment of competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market. Since EU competition policy creates and maintains a fairer single market535 
which benefits consumers across all twenty eight member states, the EU 
Commission makes sure that competition policy is vigorously enforced. It wants to 
ensure that consumers do not pay more than they should for products or “have 
troubles finding the product they look for” and also that mergers do not harm the 
“competitive structure of the markets and thus consumers and the wider 
economy.”536  
To achieve this member states have to model their domestic competition laws on the 
primary legislation of the EU. This confirms the supremacy of EU competition law 
and avoid any possible conflict scenarios between EU competition law and domestic 
competition law, in which case EU law will trump domestic legislation because of the 
primacy principle which was establish by the Court of Justice in Flaminio Costa v 
E.N.E.L.537 The competition authorities of the member states also assist the EU 
Commission in its endeavour to achieve a “fairer single market” hence they have 
                                                          
534 Chapter 11:3 “An Overview of Competition Law in France” Corporate Counsel’s Guide to International 
Antitrust” November 2017 Update. 
535 See the annual EU Commission report on Competition Policy of 2016 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2016/part1_en.pdf). 
536 The annual EU Commission report on Competition Policy of 2016 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2016/part1_en.pdf). 




concurrent powers with the EU Commission to make decisions relating to Articles 
101 and 102 of the TFEU as well as enforcing their domestic competition legislation.  
 
Even though a “United States of Europe”, which Winston Churchill and other 
founding fathers of the EU had in mind after World War II, could not be achieved as 
each member state of the EU remains an individual nation-state, competition law 
within the EU is in broadly similar position to the federal antitrust laws of the United 
States within each EU member state, due to the supremacy of EU law. Also, 
because of the principles of “direct applicability” and “direct effects” any new 
developments in regard to EU competition law, becomes directly applicable in 
member states.538 EU statutory competition law might not be as old as the antitrust 
laws of the United States,539 but today these two competition law regimes have 
almost the same degree of influence throughout the world. 
 
4 3 8 Statutory Competition law in post-Apartheid South Africa540 
 
4 3 8 1 Introduction  
 
The Constitution541 of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 determines that: 
 
“Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. 
The practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law.” 
 
In Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Limited v Grundlingh542 the Constituional Court of 
South Africa stated that: 
 
                                                          
538 J Steiner & L Woods EU Law (2009) 105. 
539 See the discussion above in this chapter on the United States antitrust laws. 
540 This part will only discuss the applicability of South Africa’s competition law to the economic activities of 
SOEs. The issue of possible distortive state aid to SOEs in South Africa and how this may impact on 
competition will be discussed comprehensively in chapter 5. 
541 Section 22 of the Constitution. 




“The Bill of Rights does not expressly promote competition principles, but the right 
to freedom of trade, enshrined in section 22 of the Constitution is, in my view, 
consistent with a competitive regime in matters of trade and the recognition of the 
protection of competition as being in the public welfare” 
 
The constitutional provision above and the statement by the Constitutional Court, 
together with legislation such as the Competition Act, strengthen South Africa’s “free 
enterprise economic system”. As is the case with all market economies around the 
world, competition amongst enterprises with little or no state intervention, forms the 
cornerstone of the economy.543 Or as stated by Judge Van Zyl in Heyneman 
v Waterfront Marine CC:544  
 
“In any free enterprise economic system or, as it is usually called, “free market 
economy”, it is generally accepted that entrepreneurs and participants in the 
commercial sphere are free to compete with one another”; and  
 “…competition is, generally speaking, said to be of benefit to all interested parties, 
including the national interest.”  
 
Competition amongst enterprises in South Africa has no doubt played an important 
part, if not the most important part, in South Africa’s economic development, which is 
why competition has been described as the “life blood of commerce”.545 In post-
Apartheid South African competition is regulated by the Competition Act. 
 
4 3 8 2 The Competition Act  
 
“The Act prohibits practices that may eliminate competition in any market 
within South Africa’s economy. It also forbids abuse of dominance by business 
entities. The Act, through the enforcement of these prohibitions, encourages and 
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promotes competition in markets for the benefit of consumers of goods and 
services.”546 
 
Democracy in 1994 led to substantial changes of South Africa’s competition policies. 
The ANC547 noted that: 
 
“The concentration of economic power in the hands of a few conglomerates has 
been detrimental to balanced economic development in South Africa. The ANC is not 
opposed to large firms as such. However, the ANC will introduce anti-monopoly, 
anti-trust and mergers policies in accordance with international norms and practices, 
to curb monopolies, continued domination of the economy by a minority within the 
white minority and promote greater efficiency in the private sector.” 
 
Hence the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) prioritised the implementation of 
a new competition law as it felt there were a number of substantive reasons for 
adopting such a new law. Firstly, the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act 
96 of 1970548 which regulated competition in South Africa before the democratic 
dispensation, was deficient and lacked “adequate powers and proper political 
context”549 and the DTI wanted to “align competition law with trade and industrial 
policy and with the treatment of public enterprises”,550 secondly, the Act did not 
address the extent of concentration of ownership or market share, thirdly, there was 
no regulation of vertical or conglomerate mergers, fourthly, there was little effort to 
prevent mergers and acquisitions which intensify concentration and lastly, there were 
no strong prohibitions of anti-competitive activity.551 The DTI argued that the 
competition policy reforms, apart from its importance for economic and social reform, 
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(accessible at http://www.anc.org.za/docs/pol/1992/readyto.html). 
548 For detailed reading on this act and the competition policy enforcement during the time when this act was 
still active legislation see D Prins & P Koornhof “Assessing the nature of competition law enforcement in South 
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were also prudent for South Africa’s reintegration into the global economy, after 
years of isolation due to its Apartheid policies.  
 
Hence new and comprehensive competition legislation was implemented in South 
Africa in the form of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, which repealed the 
Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act as a whole. The Competition Act 
received presidential assent on 20 October and came into effect on 30 November 
1998 although many of its provisions only came into effect on 1 September 1999.552 
Lewis observes that during the negotiations for the new competition regime 
“secretiveness and a profound lack of accountability” was at the order of the day in 
the South African business sector.553 On the one hand there was the newly 
democratically elected ANC-led government which had its own plans for South 
Africa’s economy and on the other hand there was a business sector dominated by 
businesses which were the remains of the Apartheid era. These businesses had no 
choice but to start cooperating with the authorities. The first decade of the new 
competition law dispensation was, for the most part, successful.554 Regulated 
competition in South African now gives not only a minority group of South Africans 
the opportunity to choose between services and goods with competitive prices within 
markets but all South Africans are now afforded such privileges. 
 
With the implementation of the Competition Act South Africa followed developed 
countries that have progressive competition laws and policies. The Competition Act 
thus brought South Africa’s competition legislation into line with international trends. 
The implementation of the Competition Act was of such significance for South 
Africa’s economic development that it has prompted Lewis to state that “a 
competition culture has taken root in very infertile soil” and that the Competition Act 
and those institutions established by it has been a “highly successful enterprise”.555 
The Competition Act established the Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal 
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and the Competition Appeal Court, which are the institutions responsible for 
enforcing the competition laws of the country. The South African competition 
authorities, through their effective protection of competition have earned the respect 
of business people, government, organised labour and their international peers.556  
 
4 3 8 3 The purpose of the Competition Act  
 
Economic efficiency is at the centre of the new competition law regime. However, 
social development was not disregarded when the legislature drafted the new 
competition legislation. The Competition Act provides a comprehensive description 
of the purpose of the Act. Section 2 of the Competition Act states that the purpose of 
the Act is: 
“to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in order— 
(a) 
to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
(b) 
to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
(c) 
to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of 
South Africans; 
(d) 
to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic; 
(e) 
to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable 
opportunity to participate in the economy; and 
( f ) 
                                                          




to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the 
ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons.”557 
 
Not only does this purpose clause reflect the economic reasons for the new 
competition dispensation, it also includes a number of “public interest objectives” by 
giving expressly priority to goals that goes beyond the orthodox goals of competition 
law.558 Although promotion of employment and the other non-traditional goals which 
are part of South African competition law are not unique to South Africa’s 
competition legislation, they are not often found as objectives in competition 
legislation around the world. Such goals are in particular not in the competition 
legislation of those jurisdictions which have been discussed in this chapter. The 
South African legislature obviously had its reasons why objectives which are not 
“core competition objectives” had to be promoted by South African competition law.  
 
What was then the reason why South Africa has opted for this approach to 
competition law? This question is particularly important since the acceptance of 
wider goals has certain negative consequences for South African competition law. 
These goals broaden the mandate of the competition authorities and increase the 
complexity of their task. Not only do they have to determine whether actions will 
reduce efficiency or harm consumers but they have to determine the consequences 
in a much wider sense. It may be argued that many of these goals should be 
pursued through other policy instruments. From a social perspective, however, the 
South African approach can be justified. The Competition Act came into effect at the 
time of the transition from Apartheid to democracy. It is aimed at addressing the evils 
of the Apartheid economy which was designed to benefit the white minority only. The 
Apartheid economy created one of the most unequal societies in the world with very 
high levels of structural unemployment as well as high poverty levels. The 
unemployment rate in the first quarter of 2018 stood at a staggering 26.7 percent559 
and poverty levels continue to rise. Moreover, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
continue to face challenges as participants of the South African economy, even 
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though they contribute significantly to “job creation, poverty alleviation and assisting 
in the prosperity of the nation”560 and historically disadvantaged people still only own 
an insufficient part of productive assets in the economy. Although employment 
creation, assisting SME’s in their development and the correction of the economic 
imbalances of the past are not traditional competition goals, they can only be 
successfully addressed when there is an efficient economy which works for all and 
not a limited few. These gloomy realities justify the wider goals of post-Apartheid 
competition law even though the prominence of public interest goals of competition 
law in South Africa is not new.561 South Africa thus followed an approach to 
competition law which would meet its developmental demands even though 
competition law generally deals with the efficiency of an economy and not 
necessarily “development demands”.562 The Competition Act thus has to promote 
“core competition objectives”, those objectives that are typically part of any 
competition law all over the world and “social and industrial policy objectives”, those 
objectives which South Africa wanted as a specific part of its competition law.563  
 
The Constitutional Court has acknowledged that some of the Competition Act’s 
objectives are directed at addressing the inequalities and imbalances which were 
created by Apartheid.564 It stated that: 
 
“Section 2(e) and (f) of the Competition Act states that part of the purpose of the 
Competition Act is to ensure that small and medium sized businesses have equitable 
opportunities to participate in the economy and to promote a greater spread of 
ownership in the economy by those who were disadvantaged by Apartheid. These 
purposes implicate the right of equality contained in section 9 of the Constitution. 
Section 9(2) enjoins the State to take legislative and other measures to advance the 
                                                          
560 For more on the challenges faced by SMEs in South Africa see ST Leboea The Factors Influencing SME 
Failure in South Africa M.Com UCT (2017).  
561 Under the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act 1979 public interest played an imperative role 
when decisions had to be made by the Competition Board, which is the predecessor of the Competition 
Commission, on whether a restrictive practice or acquisition was justified of not. It was described as the “final 
criterion” for the justification or not of a restrictive practice or acquisition. See FCN Fourie “Issues and 
Problems in South African Competition Policy” (1987) 55(4) South African Journal of Economics 334 334. 
562 D Lewis Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (2013) 27. 
563 D Lewis Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (2013) 28. 




equality of previously disadvantaged people and section 2(e) and (f) of the 
Competition Act is a legislative measure of this kind”.565  
 
This approach of South Africa to the goals of competition law has not gone 
unchallenged. It is questioned whether competition law as set out in the Competition 
Act could reasonably meet all these goals.566 Reekie is of the opinion, firstly that the 
promotion of employment should not be a matter for competition policy but for 
macroeconomic policy. The author argues that if employment promotion is given the 
necessary importance by the competition authorities, the result could be possible 
reduced efficiency.567 This is the opposite of what competition law normally should 
achieve. Secondly, it is stated that competition law is not the “appropriate forum” for 
correcting past injustices by including the promotion of “a greater spread of 
ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically 
disadvantaged persons” as a purpose of competition law.568 Reekie justifies this 
observation by saying that redistribution should be either addressed through fiscal 
measures or “by restructuring state assets”.569 Thirdly, it is stated that if competition 
law is focused on matters such as the social welfare of all South Africans and the 
expanding of opportunities for South Africans to participate in world markets, it may 
have the opposite effect of promoting “the efficiency, adaptability and development of 
the economy” and “to provide consumers with competitive prices and product 
choices”.570 And lastly, it is stated that an already difficult task of the competition 
authorities is made even more difficult by including these “non-competition” goals as 
purposes of the Act.571  
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Practical implementation of the broad goals of the Competition Act was never going 
to be easy for the competition authorities of South Africa. The importance and 
perhaps difficulties of having the public interest goals as part of the Competition Act 
came under the spotlight when the Competition Tribunal approved the Massmart and 
Walmart merger by finding that the merger would not prevent or 
lessen competition in any of the markets in which Massmart operated. The Tribunal 
however imposed conditions because of public interest concerns, which the Tribunal 
described as “one of the unusual features” of the Competition Act. Although the non-
traditional goals in section 2 of the Competition Act was not the focus in this matter 
as section 12A (3) of the Act provides a separate list of specific public interest 
considerations which form part of merger analyses, employment considerations and 
the creation of opportunities for small and medium businesses in a competitive 
environment is also important just like in section 2. 
 
Despite an absence of competition concerns, a “pro-competitive” merger in South 
Africa may still be prohibited on public interest grounds. However, public interest is 
not open-ended and is limited to four factors. The competition authorities may only 
consider the effect of the merger on (i) a particular industrial sector or industry; (ii) 
employment; (iii) the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by 
historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and (iv) the ability of 
national industries to compete in international markets.572 The Competition Tribunal 
in the Massmart and Walmart merger imposed conditions to protect these interests. 
Firstly, the merged entity had to ensure that there were no retrenchments based on 
operational requirements in South Africa, resulting from the merger, for a period of 
two years from the effective date of the transaction. Secondly, the merged entity had 
to give preference to previous employees who were retrenched in 2010, should any 
employment opportunities become available within the entity. Thirdly, the merged 
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entity had to honour any existing labour agreements and could not challenge the 
position of the largest representative union, the South African Commercial Catering 
and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU), within the merged entity, for at least three 
years from the effective date of the transaction. Lastly, the merged entity had to 
establish a programme aimed exclusively at the development of local South African 
suppliers. 
 
The competition authorities in South Africa thus have to balance public interest with 
the standard competition considerations. The primary consideration is whether the 
merger harms competition and public interest is considered as a secondary aspect. 
Nevertheless, the competition authorities have not received much guidance from the 
Competition Act on how strict competition and public interest aspects have to 
balance.573 The competition authorities have thus considerable discretion when 
deciding the impact of public interest. The Competition Tribunal observed that public 
interest must be assessed with caution when dealing with a pro-competitive 
merger.574 It further stated that the public interest mandate should not be pursued in 
an “over-zealous” manner.575  
 
Scholars questioned whether it was appropriate for the competition authorities to 
impose conditions as was done in the Walmart case.576 The conditions regarding the 
continuation of employee contracts is not really open to question as merger 
approvals often require the merged entity to continue existing contracts for a certain 
time.577 What was however criticised was the condition which required that the 
merged entity continue to honour existing labour arrangements with Massmart’s (one 
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of the merging entities) largest representative trade unions for a three year period, 
since such a condition was not “merger-specific”.578 It is further argued that labour 
institutions and legislation should rather be used for labour issues that are not 
related to a specific merger and that competition authorities should not intrude on 
labour issues during their assessments of mergers unless such issues arise from the 
merger.579  
 
The matter came before the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) for an appeal against 
the Tribunal’s decision to allow the merger (and a review580 of the Tribunal’s 
proceedings). For purposes of this particular discussion, those issues raised in 
regard to the appeal are most significant. In the appeal it was contended that in 
adopting a consumer welfare standard exclusively, to the exclusion of other “societal 
welfare” factors, the Tribunal and the merging parties “ignored the express language 
of the [Competition] Act”.581 It was further contended that section 12A582 “enjoins the 
competition authorities to take account of factors which do not play a role in terms of 
the consumer welfare approach to competition policy” as the section established “a 
new paradigm”.583 The CAC stated that the Competition Act seems to require the 
Tribunal to initially examine the merger transaction within a traditional consumer 
welfare standard.584 Only thereafter the Tribunal will continue with its broader inquiry 
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in terms of sections 12A (2) and 12A (3).585 It accepted that a standard other than 
consumer welfare would “complicate the implementation of the Act, particularly 
owing to the complexity of the economic calculation of total welfare of a particular 
transaction”586 but also noted that “a narrow view of consumer welfare determined 
exclusively in terms of [effects] upon price and output” is not what the Competition 
Act mandates.587  
 
In regard to the question as to what weight should be given to those specific public 
interests listed in section 12A(3) of the Competition Act in order to determine 
whether it should trump a finding based on “traditional considerations of consumer 
welfare”, the CAC588 said the following: 
(i) As a result of the structure (and wording) of section 12A, the Tribunal or the CAC 
may be faced with arguments on consumer welfare and arguments that extend to 
employment and the interest of small business.589 
(ii) As such a proportionality exercise is required to determine how to balance the 
competing arguments. And even though this process might never be precise, it is 
what the Competition Act requires since the competition authorities have to proceed 
to engage with the factors which make up the public interest inquiry, even after they 
found that the merger is not likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition.590 
(iii) But a proportionality exercise “requires evidence which would enable the 
exercise, justify the calculation which flows therefrom and permit a balance to be 
struck between the competing issues of consumer welfare employment and small 
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business.” A lack of precise evidence591 however would make it difficult to do the 
proportionality exercise.592  
(iv) Therefore section 12A intends that when there is a finding that the merger will 
not substantially prevent or lessen competition, it should only be prohibited if there 
are “clearly identified, substantial public interest grounds” and if the effect on those 
specific public interests in section 12A (3) is not substantial, the court cannot use the 
public interest test to disallow the merger. 593  
(v) In accordance with all the evidence which was available to the Tribunal there was 
no reason to conclude that those public interest considerations594 raised in the 
appeal should trump the benefits which consumers got from the merger and as a 
result disallow the merger.595  
 
The CAC concluded by amending some of the conditions which the Tribunal 
imposed on the merging parties. The CAC required the merged entity to reinstate the 
retrenched workers while the Tribunal only wanted them to receive preference 
should employment opportunities arise within the merged entity. It also 
commissioned a study funded by the merging parties to establish the most 
appropriate means and mechanisms to empower local suppliers to respond to the 
                                                          
591 The lack of sufficient evidence in this case made it difficult to determine whether any job losses caused by an 
increased importation of goods outweigh the consumer benefits. 
592 Minister of Economic Developments/Competition Tribunal; South African Commercial, Catering and Allied 
Workers Union/ Walmart Stores Inc [2012] 1 CPLR 6 (CAC) 32-33. 
593 Minister of Economic Developments/Competition Tribunal; South African Commercial, Catering and Allied 
Workers Union/ Walmart Stores Inc [2012] 1 CPLR 6 (CAC) 36. 
594 In this case these interests included the rights of employees in the merged entity, the position in regard to 
those employees that were retrenched and the impact of the merger on the domestic supply chain including 
SMMEs. In regard to employee rights the CAC questioned whether it is “the role of competition law to provide 
the specific safeguards sought” by the trade union in regard to the employment rights of employees after the 
merger.  It said that if the merging parties would seek to erode union or employee rights guaranteed under 
existing law, these will be protected by the Labour Courts, which are set up to deal with disputes of rights. In 
regard to the retrenched employees the CAC said that “a retrenchment, which takes place shortly before the 
merger is consummated may raise questions as to whether this decision forms part of the broad merger decision-
making process.” This could require the merging parties to justify the retrenchment. In regard to the impact of 
the merger on the domestic supply chain and small and medium businesses, the CAC stated that “competition 
law cannot be a substitute for industrial or trade policy; hence this Court cannot construct a holistic policy to 
address the challenges which are posed by globalisation. But the public interest concerns set out in section 12A 
demands that this Court gives tangible effect to the legislative ambition.” The CAC felt that the Tribunal did not 
engaged meaningfully with the impact of those challenges posed by globalisation on small and medium 
businesses in South Africa. Hence the CAC instructed the merging parties to commission a study to investigate 
the implications of the merger for small and medium size businesses. Minister of Economic 
Developments/Competition Tribunal; South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union/ Walmart 
Stores Inc [2012] 1 CPLR 6 (CAC) 41-43. 
595 Minister of Economic Developments/Competition Tribunal; South African Commercial, Catering and Allied 




challenges that were posed by the merger. It is submitted that it is not often that the 
CAC makes a decision on the reinstatement of retrenched employees, something 
which is generally associated with labour courts and not competition courts, unless 
of course it is merger related, as was the case in this matter.  
 
The above discussion has shown that the non-traditional goals in section 2 of the 
Competition Act together with those specific public interest considerations in section 
12A (3) require the South African competition authorities to go much further than 
many of their counterparts around the world when adjudicating competition matters. 
South Africa should however guard against over-use of competition law as a tool to 
achieve wider goals. Other measures should be put in place to do so. Competition 
policy should continue to focus on what competition should ultimately achieve, which 
is a free and fair economy within which enterprises of all sizes may flourish and from 
which all South Africans benefits by having choices between quality products and 
services. 
 
4 3 8 4 Applicability and types of behaviour regulated by the Competition Act  
 
The Competition Act applies “to all economic activity within, or having an effect 
within, the Republic”, with certain exceptions.596 It prohibits restrictive horizontal 
practices,597 restrictive vertical practices,598 abuses of dominance599 and price 
                                                          
596 Such exceptions include (i) collective bargaining within the meaning of section 23 of the Constitution, and 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995), (ii) a collective agreement, as defined in section 213 of 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995 and concerted conduct designed to achieve a non-commercial socio-economic 
objective or similar purpose. See Section 3 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
597 See section 4 of the Competition Act .These are practices between enterprises which operate on the same 
level in the market and are thus competitors. The following practices are prohibited: agreements, concerted 
practice or decisions between firms or an association of firms in a horizontal relationship which may 
substantially prevent of lessen competition in a market unless any advantages such as technological, efficiency 
or other pro-competitive gain resulting from such behaviour outweighs the effect. Such agreements, concerted 
practices or decisions between enterprises may end in price fixing, market division and collusive tendering. The 
Act, in certain circumstance, also makes provision for a rebuttable presumption in regard to the existence of a 
restrictive horizontal practice.  
598 See section 5 of the Competition Act. This provision concerns enterprises operating their business on 
different levels of a supply chain such as a firm and its suppliers. An example of behaviour prohibited in this 
regard is the practice of minimum resale price maintenance even though a resale price may be recommended by 
a supplier or producer to a reseller but subject to certain restrictions. 
599 See sections 6 to 9 of the Competition Act. A firm is presumed to be dominant if certain conditions are 
present. These are if a firm has at least 45% of a market or if it has at least 35% of a market but less than 45% 





discrimination by a dominant firm.600 The Act also establishes a comprehensive 
merger control system601 which is enforced by the competition authorities. A merger 
occurs when one or more firms directly or indirectly acquire or establish direct or 
indirect control over the whole or part of the business of another firm.602 Parties to an 
intermediate or large merger are required to notify the Competition Commission of 
the merger within the prescribed period,603 while a party to a small merger is not 
required to notify the Competition Commission of that merger unless the 
Commission requires it to do so.604 The Act and regulations enacted in terms of it 
determine the thresholds for small, intermediate or large mergers.605 
 
4 3 8 5 Competition law and SOEs in South Africa  
 
As with its citizens, the South African government performs economic activities. This 
is not something novel since States all around the world take part in economic 
activities. State organs are parties to contracts and States establish corporate 
entities that participate in the economy in the form of SOEs. 
 
There are many reasons why the state would participate in the economy which 
include: socio-economic development, market failure in a sector and accessibility to 
goods and services for all. Many activities which the State undertakes are important 
for socio-economic reasons.606 A state will have a strong incentive to participate in 
sectors of the economy which are crucial for the development and maintaining of an 
efficient economy and the fair distribution of resources but are perceived not to be 
properly served by private firms. A government can act as a “market maker” by 
deciding to open up competition within markets where goods and services were 
previously only supplied by the public sector or it can act as a market participant 
through, for example, an SOE to supply services and goods that “free markets are 
                                                          
600 See section 9 of the Competition Act. 
601 See sections 11- 18 of the Competition Act. 
602 Section 12 of the Competition Act.  
603 See chapter 3 of the Competition Act. See also Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Bulmer (SA) (Pty) Ltd 
[2001–2002] CPLR 36 (CAC) which highlights the approach to sections 12 and 13.  
604 Section 13 of the Competition Act. 
605 Section 11 of the Competition Act.  




unlikely to supply at an adequate level.”607 There accordingly are good reasons why 
the South African state participates in the developing and transitional South African 
economy that was ravaged by the discriminatory policy of apartheid.  
 
SOEs and private enterprises in South Africa conduct their activities in the same 
economic sphere.608 Competition policy pursues a level playing field for all firms, 
irrespective of their ownership. Nevertheless, this may be difficult in markets where 
SOE’s participate. SOEs are hybrid institutions that are used to achieve socio-
economic development but are also commercial enterprises. Although they perform 
economic activities they have the regulatory and financial might of the state behind 
them. Page states that “state regulation and antitrust really have the same goal of 
promoting the public interest; antitrust establishing the general competitive rules and 
the states intervening to displace competition in cases of clear-cut market failure."609 
But intervention by the state will distort markets and it may in reality be difficult to 
decide when public interest would be best served by market forces or by government 
interventions that distort markets. There will have to be limits on the extent to which 
the state should be allowed to intervene in markets. 
  
In order to prevent distortions of the competitive process, the state as a market 
participant should, as a point of departure, be subject to competition law. Section 81 
of the Competition Act is an expression of this general principle. Section 81 of the 
Competition Act states that the “Act binds the State” and consequently the 
Competition Act is also applicable to economic activity by the State. Since SOEs are 
engaging in “economic activity” the Competition Act is applicable to them.610 
Nevertheless, there are important limitations when it comes to the reach of 
competition law in the context of the state. First, the Competition Act is an ordinary 
Parliamentary statute. Later legislation may override it.611 Even though certain 
                                                          
607 See TK Cheng, I Lianos & DD Sokol, Competition and the State (2014) 3. 
608 See the Proposed Guidelines for Competition Policy: A framework for Competition, Competitiveness and 
Development by the Department of Trade and Industry (27 November 1997). 
609 WH Page “State action and "active supervision": an antitrust anomaly” (1990) 35 (3) Antitrust Bulletin 745 
747. 
610 See the discussion in para 3.2 of chapter 2 on the role of SOEs in South Africa. 
611 See for example section 22(G) of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 which 





activities may possibly impact on competition, for reasons mentioned above those 
activities may be exempted from competition law and will thus not fall within its 
ambit. Secondly, many practices by which the state can distort competitive 
processes will not be covered by the ordinary provisions of competition. Most 
importantly, the granting of state aid will fall into this category. The need for 
regulating state aid in South Africa will be fully canvassed in chapter 5. In order to 
avoid the distortion of competition by the granting of state aid, chapter 5 provides 
proposals for regulation of the granting of state aid to economically engaged SOEs. 
That chapter will propose that certain state aid should be subjected to scrutiny in 
order to ensure a fair playing field for all those entities which are economically active 
in South Africa. The regulation of state aid, as recommended in chapter 5, may also 
promote goals that are at best indirectly related to competition such as addressing 
the failures of governance612 and financial management in SOEs and ensuring the 
application of government funding for the welfare purposes for which they are 
allocated to SOEs. It is however not the intention to propose in that chapter that state 
aid to SOEs should be prohibited under all circumstances. Such a suggestion will 
deny many exceptionally important mandates and developmental goals of SOEs in a 
society like South Africa, which still suffers the consequences of previous 
discriminatory laws. The mandate and socio-economic need for the existence of a 
particular SOE and the broad aims of the Competition Act should be balanced in 
order to determine the appropriateness of any state aid.  
 
4 3 8 6 Concluding remarks on South African statutory competition law 
 
The Competition Act is an important piece of legislation since it was part of the 
economic policies that brought South Africa out of its “isolationist past”.613 It is a 
post-Apartheid policy tool which was meant to ensure that the South African 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pharmacist, wholesale or distributor of such medicine and substances is allowed to sell it at a higher price than 
the price that was set by the pricing committee.  
612 Governance failures and absence of good financial management in SOEs are comprehensively discussed in 
para 1.2 of chapter 5.  
613 See for example G Makhaya, W Mkwananzi & S Roberts “How should young institutions approach 
competition enforcement? Reflections on South Africa’s experience” (2012) 19 (1) South African Journal of 




economy benefits all South Africans and not only a few.614 Since its inception in 
1999, the Competition Act did well in protecting competitive processes for the benefit 
of consumers but also in order to promote other objectives. It has been successful 
because it has been vigorously enforced. The Competition Act also applies to the 
economic activities of SOEs and it has been vigorously applied to these institutions. 
By including these economic activities in the scope of the Competition Act, South 
Africa has kept abreast with advanced competition law jurisdiction, in particular 
developed countries.615 However, it is argued that the current scheme for regulating 
the activities of SOEs is incomplete. It is not sufficiently recognised that competition 
can be harmed by state activities in regard to these SOEs which are not necessarily 
economic activities. In this respect, South African competition law accords with most 
other regimes outside of the EU. However, it is proposed that the major role which 
these entities play in the South African economy justifies a rethink. It is submitted 
that if the recommendations about the regulation of state aid that are made in 
chapter 5 are accepted, South Africa’s competition law regime will be able to realise 
the objectives set out in the Competition Act.  
 
END OF CHAPTER  
                                                          
614 See D Lewis Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 1- 281 for a 
comprehensive discussion of the Competition Act. 
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 “The elimination of internal frontiers between Member States enables undertakings 
in the Community to expand their activities throughout the internal market and 
consumers to benefit from increased competition. These advantages must not be 
jeopardized by distortions of competition caused by aid granted unjustifiably to 
undertakings.” 2 
 
“Any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in so far as it affects trade 
between Member States, incompatible with the common market.”3 
These statements in the Notice on cooperation between national courts and the 
Commission in the State aid field and by the CJEU respectively, provide a helpful 
introductory summary of the strict state aid control regime of the the EU. The EU has 
without doubt the most sophisticated and recognised state aid control regime in the 
world, since state aid by a member state may “interfere with conditions of 
competition” and may affect trade between member states. The state aid rules have 
a long history as they are an expression of the original integration ideals of what is 
today the EU.4  
This chapter will examine the EU’s state aid control rules. Questions such as (i) what 
is state aid regulation, (ii) why does it exist within the EU, (iii) who is it applicable to, 
and (iv) when does it apply will be asked and discussed. 
The EU state aid control model serves as the foundation for the recommendations 
which will be made for South Africa in chapter 5. Firstly, such an examination will 
help to determine whether the regulation of state aid could play a role to improve 
                                                          
2 Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in the State aid field Official Journal of 
the European Communities No C 312/07 [1995]. 
3 Case 290/ 83 Commission v France (1985) ECR 48. 
4 For a concise introduction to the European Union and European integration see J McCormick Understanding 




“financial and operational performance” of SOEs in South Africa. From a South 
African perspective such an inquiry is pivotal, especially in the light of the many 
failing SOEs which are part of the South African economy and which on so many 
occasions have required governmental assistance in order to stay afloat. Secondly, 
such an examination will also help to determine whether the EU model, which is a 
supranational model, could apply with modifications to a single state such as South 
Africa.  
In preparation of the proposed recommendations for South Africa in chapter 5, this 
chapter will examine and discuss the evolution of the EU state aid control regime 
from when the first European treaty, which contained provisions of state aid control, 
was enacted, until the present. It will discuss the central role which European 
integration played in the evolution of the state aid control regime. It also discusses 
the five different elements of the EU state aid prohibition and the procedural rules 
relating to the EU state aid prohibition. The institutional structures which are 
responsible for enforcing the state aid control regime will also be discussed. Lastly, 
the application of the state aid rules to public undertakings and services of general 
economic interest in the EU, as well as those systems outside of the EU which 
ultimately achieve the same outcomes as the EU state aid rules, will be discussed. 
2 Reasons for the limitation of state aid in the EU 
Governments all over the world subsidize activities performed in their economies and 
such subsidization is nothing new. Jaeger states that Adam Smith in his famous 
work, Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, already made mention of certain 
measures of subsidization.5 It is further stated that state aid may be used as a 
measure by governments to steer their economies.6 It is also part of sovereign policy 
for governments to decide to whom, when and in what form to allocate state aid.7  
State aid to enterprises therefore forms an accepted part of economic policy of 
countries all over the world. It provides governments with opportunities to correct 
                                                          
5 See T Jaeger “Distinguishing state and private subsidies: a closer look at the state character test” in J Drexl & 
V Bagnoli (eds) State-initiated Restraints of Competition (2015) 296 296.  
6 See T Jaeger “Distinguishing state and private subsidies: a closer look at the state character test” in J Drexl & 
V Bagnoli (eds) State-initiated Restraints of Competition (2015) 296 296.  
7 See T Jaeger “Distinguishing state and private subsidies: a closer look at the state character test” in J Drexl & 




market failures and to achieve other objectives which could benefit the broader 
society.8 As noted by Hancher, Ottervanger and Slot, the reasons for state aid varies 
from economic, social, political and strategic reasons.9 So why does a supranational 
entity like the EU needs rules on state aid control?  
The internal market (formerly known as the common market), which was first 
established by the ECSC Treaty10 and then the EEC Treaty,11 is the reason for the 
existence of the EU state aid rules. The common market was a fundamental element 
of the EEC Treaty. It was regarded as critical to the achievement of the aims set out 
in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty, which included a harmonious development of 
economic activities and higher standards of living for the peoples of the Community. 
The common market established by the EEC Treaty was replaced by an internal 
market after the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 came into effect.12 The internal market 
comprises of an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the 
TFEU and the TEU.13 It covers almost all economic activities: there are only a few 
limited exceptions.14 Market conditions15 in the EU are thus “similar to those in the 
market of a single state.”16 Hence, state aid control became an integral part of the 
EU competition policy,17 which forms part of the national legal systems of member 
states. The CJEU in Flamino Costa v ENEL remarked: 
“By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own 
legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of 
                                                          
8 See for example in this regard the discussion on the role of SOEs in the South African society in para3 2 of 
chapter two. 
9 L Hancher, T Ottervanger & PJ Slot EC State Aids (2012) para 2-004. 
10 Article 1 of the ECSC Treaty. 
11 Article 2 of the EEC Treaty. 
12 Article 1 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
13 Article 26 of the TFEU Official Journal of the European Union No C326/92 [2012]. 
14 For the exceptions see J Fairhurst Law of the European Union 8 ed (2010) 7. 
15 These include the elimination of custom duties between member states, elimination of quantitative restrictions 
on the import and export of goods between member states, a common customs tariff and commercial policy 
towards third parties, removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital, common 
agricultural policy, common transport policy, community competition policy. See J Fairhurst Law of the 
European Union 8 ed (2010) 7. 
16 J Fairhurst Law of the European Union 8 ed (2010) 7. 




the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to 
apply.”18 
The drafters of both the ECSC Treaty and EEC Treaty envisaged that intervention in 
the economy by a member state could have a devastating effect on competition and 
trade within the common market. When the state provides state aid to an 
undertaking which gives it an advantage over other undertakings, its intervention 
may cause distortions of competition within the internal market. This may be the 
case as its intervention may afford the benefiting enterprise benefits which it might 
have been unable to obtain through normal economic activity in the market. Hence 
state aid in any form runs counter to competition on the merit.19 It alters incentives of 
market players, creates moral hazard, encourages excessive risk-taking by the 
management of undertakings and creates inefficiencies.20 State aid rules ensure (i) 
that those undertakings which are most efficient receive the rewards to which a level 
playing field entitles them,21 and (ii) ensure that dominance in a market is not created 
for certain undertakings.22 A restrictive policy on state aid is thus essential for both 
the creation and maintenance of effective competition within EU markets. It aims to 
eliminate any economic advantage to an undertaking which it would not have 
obtained under normal market conditions. The establishment of a system which 
would ensure that competition within the common/internal market shall not be 
distorted and trade between member states shall not be affected due to state 
intervention was regarded as important to the attainment of the goals in the EEC 
Treaty (today the TFEU) quicker.23  
Restrictions on subsidies may also promote efficiency even beyond the direct harm 
that it is does to market rivalry. It will “prevent tit-for-tat reactions of the type: “Since 
                                                          
18 Case 6-64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL (Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (National Electricity Board) [1964] 
ECR 585 593. 
19  See T Jaeger “Distinguishing state and private subsidies: a closer look at the state character test” in J Drexl & 
V Bagnoli (eds) State-initiated Restraints of Competition (2015) 296 296. 
20 U Soltesz & C Von Kockkritz “The Temporary Framework- the Commission’s Response to the crisis in the 
real economy” (2010) 31(3) European Competition Law Review 106 106. 
21 See the State Aid Action Plan: Less and better targeted State aid: a roadmap for State aid reform 2005-2009 
COM (2005). 
22 L Hancher, T Ottervanger & PJ Slot EC State Aids (2012) para 2-008. 




you give aid to your industry, I help my industry too””24 and avoid a “wasteful subsidy 
race” and the “protection of national champions”.25 
This is closely related to the central aim of the European project which is market 
integration. While each of the member states has its own domestic economic 
policies, the internal market must not be undermined and needs to be protected by 
each EU member state. This requires common limitations on individual economic 
policies. While the EU does not intend to harmonize the economic policies of 
member states, it wants to ensure that the treaty goals of a well-functioning internal 
market is realised.26 Therefore a member state cannot be allowed to protect firms 
within its borders from external competition. Member states do not have the luxury to 
adopt a “do not care much” attitude in regard to competition in external trade 
especially when trading with other member states, since they are required by treaty 
law to comply with EU competition policy. The state aid control rules thus “limit the 
possible negative repercussions of national state aids on European market 
integration.”27  
It is vital to refer to the EU Commission’s explanation of the importance of having a 
supranational state aid control regime. In the State Aid Action Plan of 2005-2009 (the 
SAAP) the Commission states that:  
“State aid policy safeguards competition in the Single Market and it is closely linked 
to many objectives of common interest, like services of general economic interest, 
regional and social cohesion, employment, research and development, 
environmental protection and the protection and promotion of cultural diversity. It 
must contribute by itself and by reinforcing other policies to making Europe a more 
                                                          
24 L Hancher, T Ottervanger & PJ SlotEC State Aids (2012) para 2-013. 
25 L Coppi “The Role of Economics in State Aid analysis and the balancing test” in  E Szyszczak (ed) Research 
Handbook on European State aid Law (2011) 64  75.  
26 The EU consists currently of twenty eight member states, with Croatia as the last member state to join in 
2013. Unlike the position within a single state, which can provide subsidies as it feels necessary for the smooth 
functioning of its economy, there are twenty seven other member states which economies may be impacted on if 
one provides state aid to its undertakings.  
27 I Ganoulis & R Martin “State Aid Control in the European Union: Rationale, Stylised Facts and Determining 




attractive place to invest and work, building up knowledge and innovation for 
growth and creating more and better jobs.” 28 
The Commission further states: 
“The objective of State aid control is, as laid down in the founding Treaties of the 
European Communities, to ensure that government interventions do not distort 
competition and trade inside the EU.”29 
The CJEU has also provided its explanation why state aid control within the EU is so 
important. In Spain v the Commission30 the court stated that when financial aid is 
provided to an undertaking by a member state, such aid strengthens the position of 
the undertaking compared with the competitor of that undertaking within the intra-
Community trade. This affects the position of the competitor, since it firstly, 
strengthens the beneficiary undertaking domestically in that it is not required to 
export its products. Secondly, the beneficiary undertaking may maintain or even 
increase its domestic production since it might be too difficult for another competitor 
to enter the market of the beneficiary undertaking, thus lessening the possibility of 
competitors exporting their products to that market. Economists’ reasons for the 
control of state aid within the EU include economic efficiency, efficient allocation of 
resources, and optimization of allocated resources.31 Coppi observes that economic 
analysis started to be part of European competition law from the late nineties, with 
the CJEU already recognising it in the 1960s.32 However, economic analysis did not 
gain traction in state aid decisions, even though it had been applied for quite some in 
other areas of competition law. In the first instance the application of economics is 
                                                          
28 Para 15 of the State Aid Action Plan: Less and better targeted State aid: a roadmap for State aid reform 2005-
2009 COM (2005) (accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/archive.html).  
29 See State Aid Control Overview (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html) 
(accessed on 15 September 2015). 
30 Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 [1994] ECR I-04103 para 40.  
Other cases in which the Court of Justice refers to the reasons for the EU state aid rules includes 173/73 Italy v 
Commission [1974] ECR 709 para 26 where the court stated that “The aim of Article 92 [now Article 107] is to 
prevent trade between Member States from being affected by benefits granted by the public authorities which, in 
various forms, distort or threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods.” See also Case C-39/94 Syndicat Français de l' Express International (SFEI) and others v La 
Poste and Others [1996] ECR I-3547 para 58. 
31 For a general overview see L Coppi “The role of economics in State aid analysis and the balancing test” in E 
Szyszcak (ed) Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (2011) 64 64-89.   
32 L Coppi “The role of economics in State aid analysis and the balancing test” in E Szyszcak (ed) Research 




limited by Article 107 of the TFEU which provides a detailed description of illegal 
state aid.33 Coppi further notes that the exceptions to the state aid rules which are 
expressly listed in Articles 107 (2) and (3) of the TFEU also are an obstacle to 
applying economic analysis to state aid.34 The lack of economic analysis in the 
context of state aid was stressed by the then European Commissioner for 
Competition Policy, Neelie Kroes, who in 2007 stated that “even if we knew 
economic analysis was useful, we did not always make systematic use of it.”35  
However, the Commission’s attitude towards economic analysis for state aid cases is 
changing. The SAAP constituted the first modernization of the state aid rules, since 
its inception. Described as a “roadmap to the future development of EC state aid 
policy”, the SAAP provides that “a more refined economic approach” would be 
followed to evaluate state intervention in markets.36 Economic analysis of state aid 
has thus been given more prominence by the SAAP. The Commission’s commitment 
to make greater use of economic analysis in the context of state aid is also illustrated 
by its introduction of a “balancing test”. The Commission states in the SAAP that 
“appreciating the compatibility of state aid is fundamentally about balancing the 
negative effects of aid on competition with its positive effects in terms of common 
interest.”37 Hancher, Ottervanger and Slot thus correctly noted that economic 
analysis of state aid within the EU has become “indispensable”.38  
Kleiner explains the reasons for the state aid rules by using three analysing models 
which have played a role in the development of the EU state aid regime. The first 
model is called the “derogatory model”, which connects state aid closely to the 
European single market.39 In terms of this analysis any state aid by a member state 
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may make the removal of trade barriers obsolete.40 Lower import prices are one 
result of the removal of trade barriers. State aid, however, eliminates this benefit.41 In 
terms of Kleiner’s “derogatory model” a state aid control regime thus ensures “the 
preservation of the single market”.42 Secondly, Kleiner uses the “competition model” 
to explain the negative effects which state aid may have on competition within the 
EU.43 In this respect state aid regulation is a tool to ensure that markets are 
functioning efficiently by addressing market failures.44 Kleiner is of the opinion that 
unlike his “derogatory model, which perceives state aid outright as wrong for the 
single market, the “competition model” allows the possibility of “good State aid”.45 
Thirdly, Kleiner lists the “political integration model” which considers the state aid 
control regime as a means for “controlling governments and coordinating their 
economic policies”.46 This model thus envisages greater integration.47 Kleiner’s 
different models are well aligned with the reasons for the existence of EU state aid 
control provided above by other scholars, the Commission and the Court of Justice. 
Although most justifications for the existence of the state aid control regime refer to 
the internal market as the overarching reason, extensive reference is also made to 
those other aspect alluded to by Kleiner.48 In particular Kleiner’s “good State aid” 
argument can be justified on the basis of Article 107 of the TFEU together with 
Commission Regulations49 which allow certain exemptions50 to the state aid 
prohibition51 and therefore already recognises that there is “good State aid”. 
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Undertakings in all member states should thus compete as if they are operating in 
one State. State aid by member states to any public or private undertaking, operating 
within its jurisdiction may severely affect competition between undertakings and 
trade between member states. It will place the benefitting undertaking in a better 
position than its competitors operating either in the same or in another member 
state. Consequently any activities which may give an unjustified benefit to an 
undertaking need to be regulated.  
3 A historical overview of how the EU state aid rules developed and evolved  
3 1 European Integration 
The state aid control regime is a direct result of the European integration process 
which started after World War II. This consequently justifies a comprehensive 
overview of the European integration process in order to understand and appreciate 
the reasons for the existence of the EU state aid control regime.  
The idea of a united Europe had been around long before the two world wars but 
only became a serious possibility after Europe was morally and economically 
destroyed by the two world wars.52 It is a “historical process” in terms of which nation 
states in Europe decided to transfer certain of their sovereign powers to a 
supranational institution.53 David Cameron, a former British Prime Minister, 
described the EU as “a group of countries that used to fight each other and kill each 
other, and have actually now come together in a common endeavour”.54 This 
description provides a true picture of where the EU has started and where it is today; 
from animosity between European states to peace and prosperity as part of a 
supranational institution. 
As stated in chapter three, the first integration efforts started with the establishment 
of the ECSC in 195155 by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
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West Germany56 through the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (the ECSC Treaty). This treaty was a direct result of the Schumann Plan, 
named after Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister at the time.57 Schuman 
proposed that European nations placed their coal and steel industries under the 
auspices of a supranational institution. Schuman’s proposal resulted from his opinion 
that “"Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. It will be built 
through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”58 He believed 
that by placing the steel and coal industries of Germany and France under the 
supervision of an independent body, it would help to diminish or eliminate the 
competition between the two nations since animosity between France and Germany 
was central to armed conflict in Europe.59 The ECSC Treaty thus provided the “basis 
for a broader and deeper community amongst peoples long divided by bloody 
conflict.”60 
Schuman’s proposal was at first seen as “wishful thinking” but it materialised and the 
ECSC was created as the “first modern experiment in partial supra-national 
government”. The ECSC Treaty achieved what was not expected to happen so soon 
after the end of a bloody World War Two, namely closer working relations between 
former enemies. Whatever animosity there was during the war was set aside in the 
interest of a more integrated Europe. Any doubts as to whether a treaty would 
managed to thaw the once icy relations between its member states, soon started to 
disappear.61 Friedmann states that within two years of the coming into effect of the 
ECSC Treaty, “an atmosphere of harmony and co-operation” could be sensed at the 
headquarters of the ECSC.62  
The ECSC Treaty ignited the flame of European integration. The ECSC was a major 
reason for the rapid improvement of relations between France and Germany after 
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the war. It remains a matter of conjecture as to when and if Europe might have seen 
better relations between its nations after the war if it were not for the ECSC Treaty. 
Soon after the creation of the ECSC, talk of greater integration in other economic 
and political spheres started.63 Plans for integration in the fields of agriculture, 
transportation, currency and banking were discussed.64 The European Defence 
Community, another one of France’s initiatives to keep Germany under control by 
creating closer ties, was created in 1952 as a next step to greater integration. It 
arose as a result of a declaration on the rearmament of Germany by the then Prime 
Minister of France, Rene Pleven, which later became known as the “Pleven Plan”.65 
France suggested the European Defence Community as a counter measure to “rapid 
normalization” of the German armed forces. This community, however, failed to 
become the same success story as the ECSC. At that point nation states were more 
willing to forego sovereignty in regard to economic matters but they were more 
reluctant to give up control over matters such as defence and foreign affairs.66  
The six founding nations of the ECSC Treaty were willing to broaden cooperation. 
Proposals were made for greater economic cooperation, cooperation in regard to 
transport, the use of nuclear energy, a European market with no trade barriers and 
the harmonization of social policies.67 Paul-Henri Spaak, one of the founding fathers 
of European integration, chaired an inter-governmental committee which was tasked 
with looking into the proposals.68 The committee’s work resulted in what became 
known as the Spaak Report, which was accepted by the six states that would 
become the founding member states of the European Economic Community.69 As a 
result more European integration followed in 1957 with the signature of two treaties 
in Rome. The first became known as the treaty on the European Economic 
Community (the EEC Treaty), which is also known extensively in the literature and 
English speaking countries such as Great Britain70 as the common market treaty. It 
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established the EEC. The second treaty, which became known as the Euratom 
Treaty, established Euratom. Euratom, the lesser known of the two communities 
created at the same time, was tasked (i) to contribute to the raising of the standard of 
living in the member states and (ii) to the development of relations with the other 
(non-member state) countries by creating the conditions necessary for the speedy 
establishment and growth of nuclear industries.71 This task would be achieved, inter 
alia, with the promotion of research in nuclear energy, the dissemination of technical 
information in regard to nuclear energy, establishment of uniform safety standards 
for workers of the nuclear energy industry, the equal distribution of nuclear fuels and 
by ensuring that nuclear materials would be used for peaceful purposes.72 
The EEC on the other hand focused on general economic cooperation between the 
member states. The EEC had “a far broader scope” than the ECSC, which only 
focused on the coal and steel industries of the member states. It has been described 
as “an organism of supranational character in constant evolution towards greater 
unity in virtually all aspects of life”73 and as “a new legal order of international law”.74 
The preamble of the EEC Treaty stated that the six founding nations were 
determined to establish the foundations of an ever closer union amongst the 
European people. Although the ECSC Treaty established a common market for the 
steel and coal industries only, the EEC Treaty went further by establishing a 
common market for all sectors of the EEC economy. By the 1960s there were thus 
three European communities in existence; each with its own scope of application and 
institutional framework. The Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single 
Commission of the European Communities, also referred to as the Merger Treaty, 
brought significant changes in 1965 with regard to further and greater integration. 
The six nation states which participated in the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC wanted 
further progress towards European integration. They recognised the importance of a 
unified institutional framework for the three existing European communities. 
Consequently it was decided to establish a single Council and a single Commission 
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of the European Communities.75 The single Council replaced the Special Council of 
Ministers of the ECSC, the Council of the EEC and the Council of the Euratom.76 The 
single Council retained the powers and competences which these separate 
institutions had in terms of the treaties which established them. The treaty also 
created a Commission of the European Communities (the Commission). This 
Commission replaced the High Authority of the ECSC, the Commission of the EEC 
and the Commission of Euratom.77 The Commission retained all the powers and 
competence conferred on these three individual administrative bodies by the treaties 
which established them.  
The TEU, commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, was signed in 1992 by the 
twelve member states at the time.78 It amended the Treaty establishing the EEC in 
order to establish a single European Community.79 It substantially amended the EEC 
Treaty and replaced all reference to the EEC with the term European Community 
(EC).80 The change from the EEC to the EC was a timely indication that future 
integration was not meant to be merely of an economic nature but that it would be 
extended to include other policy areas. The Maastricht Treaty created the EU as it is 
known today and it is founded on the three pillars of the European Communities, 
namely the EEC, the ECSC and Euratom.81 The Lisbon Treaty, which came into 
force on 1 December 2009, bestowed legal personality on the EU82 and the EC 
Treaty became known as the TFEU.83 The Treaty of Lisbon also determines that the 
EC is replaced and succeeded by the EU.84 It is within this context that the state aid 
rules as it is known today started to be applied; first within the ECSC and the EEC, 
then the EC and the present-day EU. Hence it is important that an overview of the 
state aid control rules as it was in the founding Communities of the EU is provided.  
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3 2 The state aid prohibition in the ECSC Treaty 
The member states concluded the ECSC Treaty for a period of fifty years.85 Articles 
2 and 3 of the ECSC Treaty set out the tasks of the ECSC and its institutions. Such 
tasks, included contributing to economic expansion, growth of employment and a 
rising standard of living in the member states, to ensure an orderly supply of coal 
and steel to the common market, to ensure that all comparably placed customers in 
the common market have equal access to the sources of production, observation of 
prices and the conditions under which they are set, and to ensure conditions which 
would encourage the production potential of undertakings.  
The regulation of state aid in the EU was started by Article 4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty. 
Article 4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty stated that subsidies or aids granted by States, or 
special charges imposed by States, in any form whatsoever are incompatible with 
the common market for coal and steel and thus prohibited within the Community. 
There was no definition of state aid in the ECSC Treaty. The CJEU provided its 
definition of the concept as found in the ECSC Treaty in the “first State aid case” of 
De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen v The High Authority86 when it said that: 
 “The concept of aid is wider than that of a subsidy because it embraces not only 
positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also interventions which, in 
various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an 
undertaking.”  
The court however qualified its definition by saying the definition is only acceptable if 
it actually is “borne out” by the provisions of the Treaty or its objectives. The court 
further stated that the words “in any form whatsoever” created an unusually wide 
meaning of the prohibition of state aid especially since these words were not part of 
the other subsections of Article 4 of the ECSC Treaty.87 The provision thus placed an 
“absolute ban” on any state aid to the undertakings in the coal and steel industry.88  
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The ECSC Treaty did also not contain a de minimis rule.89 All state aid was banned 
by Article 4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty.90 In this regard, the CJEU in Neue Maxhutte 
Stahlwerke and Lech-Stahlwerke v the Commission stated that the wording of Article 
4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty did not provide that any aid with a slight impact on 
competition is removed from the scope of the prohibition. Hence the Commission 
had no duty to determine whether the aid distorts or threaten to distort competition.91 
The court further stated that Article 4 (c) prohibits all aid, without restrictions and 
there are no exceptions. Consequently Article 4 (c) did not “embody” a de minimis 
rule.92  
Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty was the only limitation on the wide prohibition under 
Article 4 (c).93 It provided that: 
"In all cases not provided for in this Treaty where it becomes apparent that a 
decision or recommendation of the Commission is necessary to attain, within the 
common market in coal and steel and in accordance with Article 5, one of the 
objectives of the Community set out in Articles 2, 3 and 4, the decision may be taken 
or the recommendation made with the unanimous assent of the Council and after 
the Consultative Committee has been consulted. Any decision so taken or 
recommendation so made shall determine what penalties, if any, may be imposed." 
The article allowed the High Authority to make decisions or recommendations in 
order to achieve the objectives of the ECSC Treaty. Such decisions or 
recommendations could be made with the unanimous consent of the Council and 
after consultation with the Consultative Committee. The High Authority started to use 
Article 95 from the beginning of the 1980s when the coal and steel industry had to be 
reconstructed to establish a “Community scheme” to allow state aid in certain 
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circumstances.94 Some “major modernization, rationalization and restructuring 
efforts” required an updated approach to the blanket ban in the ECSC Treaty.95 
Hence the Commission adopted various “Aid Codes”96 justified by Article 95, in order 
to allow aid within the coal and steel industries.97 The “Aid Codes” relaxed or lifted 
the wide ban placed on the allocation of state aid to the coal and steel industries. By 
relaxing the blanket ban on state aid to these two industries it became possible for 
aid to be allocated to undertakings under certain circumstances.98  
In regard to any procedure relating to the state aid prohibition in the ECSC Treaty, it 
is important to note that the ECSC Treaty contained no procedural rules on the 
application of the state aid prohibition. A procedure for notification to the High 
Authority of any planned aid was not necessary because of the general ban on state 
aid. The absence of any procedure could also be justified by the limited scope of the 
ECSC Treaty (it applied to only two sectors of the Community economy). However, 
as mentioned above, when the two sectors required modernisation to keep up with 
development and when the Commission enacted the Aid Codes, the Commission 
also implemented a number of procedural rules.99  
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The ECSC Treaty and the last two active “Aid Codes” expired in July 2002. 
Hereafter, the coal and steel industries were integrated with the general “economic 
framework” of the EU. Consequently the state aid control regime which was effective 
in the EU at the time when the ECSC Treaty expired became also applicable to the 
steel and coal industries. Hence, the same procedural rules now apply for state aid 
to the coal and steel industries.  
3 3 The state aid prohibition in the EEC Treaty  
After World War II many industries were nationalised in Europe.100 This meant that 
the initial six member states of the EEC had control over a number of industries of 
their economies. Accordingly, high-levels of state intervention existed within all these 
state-controlled industries. Article 92 of the EEC Treaty addressed this position. 
Article 92 contained a similar prohibition than Article 4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty, but 
this time not only in regard to particular sectors of the Community’s economy. It 
applied to every economic sector within the EEC.   
Like the ECSC Treaty, the EEC Treaty provided no specific definition of state aid. 
One reason given for the absence of a concise definition is that any concrete 
definition would have left gaps that would have allowed states to easily circumvent 
the provision.101 Instead, Article 92 of the EEC Treaty introduced certain 
requirements which an activity or transaction had to meet in order for it to be aid that 
falls within the ambit of the prohibition. Article 92 provided as follows: 
“1. Except where otherwise provided for in this Treaty, any aid, granted by a Member State 
or granted by means of State resources, in any manner whatsoever, which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain enterprises or certain productions 
shall, to the extent to which it adversely affects trade between Member States, be deemed 
to be incompatible with the Common Market. 
2. The following shall be deemed to be compatible with the Common Market: 
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(a) aids of a social character granted to individual consumers, provided that such aids 
are granted without any discrimination based on the origin of the products 
concerned; 
(b) aids intended to remedy damage caused by natural calamities or other 
extraordinary events; or 
(c) aids granted to the economy of certain regions of the Federal Republic of 
Germany affected by the division of Germany, to the extent that such aids are 
necessary in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by such 
division. 
3. The following may be deemed to be compatible with the Common Market: 
(a) aids intended to promote the economic development of regions where the 
standard of living is abnormally low or where there exists serious under-
employment; 
(b) aids intended to promote the execution of important projects of common 
European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance of the economy of a Member 
State; 
(c) aids intended to facilitate the development of certain activities or of certain 
economic regions, provided that such aids do not change trading conditions to such 
a degree as would be contrary to the common interest. Any aids to shipbuilding 
existing on 1 January 1957 shall, to the extent that such aids merely offset the 
absence of customs protection, be progressively reduced under the same conditions 
as apply to the abolition of customs duties, subject to the provisions of this Treaty 
relating to the common commercial policy in regard to third countries; and 
(d) such other categories of aids as may be specified by decision of the Council acting 
by means of a qualified majority vote on a proposal of the Commission.” 
All advantages which were granted either directly or indirectly through state 
resources, whether it is the state itself granting the advantages or a private or public 




92(1) of the EEC Treaty.102 In order to qualify as state aid, the advantage needed to 
be made from state resources which constituted an additional financial burden for 
the state or by any public or private bodies established by the state.103 All financial 
means which a public authority may use to support an undertaking was covered by 
the scope of Article 92(1) of the EEC Treaty.104 
Article 92 (2) listed all those measures which were considered per se compatible aid, 
also sometimes referred to as the “automatic exceptions”.105 Article 92 (3) listed 
those measures which could have been considered compatible aid, also sometimes 
referred to as the “discretionary exceptions”.106 In regard to those state aid measures 
listed in Article 92 (2), the Commission had no discretion about its compatibility with 
the common market but only had to ensure that conditions were met in order for the 
aid measure to qualify under this provision. The Commission only had discretion to 
decide whether aid measures which fell within the scope of Article 92(3) were 
consistent with the state aid rules.107 Since Article 92 (3)(d) provided the Council with 
the authority, after proposals by the Commission, to add other categories of aid to 
those listed in Article (2) and (3), those exemptions listed in the two sub-articles were 
thus not an exhaustive list of state aid measures which could be deemed to be 
compatible with the common market. Today these “automatic exceptions” and 
“discretionary exceptions” remain firmly in place in the TFEU, with very little 
change.108  
Unlike the position in the ECSC Treaty in regard to procedural rules, such rules, 
formed part of the EEC Treaty right from the beginning and did not have to be 
implemented via Aid Codes. Procedural rules were required right from the start 
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particularly since this treaty provided a list of exemptions from the basic prohibition of 
state aid. The procedural rules were set out in Article 93 of the EEC Treaty. In terms 
of Article 93 member states were required to notify the Commission when they 
intended to grant aid to an undertaking or alter existing aid, in order for the 
Commission to determine the compatibility of the aid with the common market. The 
most important aspect of the procedural requirements was the notification of state 
aid by member states. The Commission was required to inform the member state 
that it had received the notification. Section 3 of Article 93 provided that: 
“The Commission shall be informed, in due time to enable it to submit its comments, 
of any plans to institute or to modify aids.” 
The CJEU provided clear guidance on the procedure in Lorenz vs Germany.109 It 
stated that in terms of paragraph 1 of Article 93, where existing aid was concerned, 
the Commission was entitled to request a member state to abolish or amend the aid 
within a time frame provided by the Commission, while paragraph 3 sets out “prior 
control” for any new aid. The court also stated that by awarding the Commission 
sufficient time to submit its comments regarding any new aid or alteration to existing 
aid, the drafters of the EEC Treaty wanted to ensure that the Commission could 
properly consider, investigate and “form a prima facie opinion” on the compatibility of 
the aid with the treaty.110  
Member states were thus not allowed to implement the state aid measures until the 
Commission had made a final decision as to its compatibility with the common 
market, thus complying with the so-called “standstill clause”.111 In the event that the 
Commission had decided that the planned aid was not compatible with the common 
market, it requested the member state to either abolish the plan to grant aid or to 
alter the existing aid within a specified time period. The Commission and any other 
member state with an interest, could refer the matter to the CJEU in the event that 
the member state which was planning to give aid or alter aid, did not comply with the 
Commission’s request.112   
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In conclusion, it is submitted that unlike the founders of the ECSC who had no 
precedent to refer to when they drafted the first state aid rules, the founders of the 
EEC had the opportunity to learn from the application of the state aid rules within the 
coal and steel industries. It is thus not surprising that the drafters of the treaty 
considered all those valuable lessons learned through the application of the state aid 
rules in the coal and steel industries, when the state aid rules under the EEC Treaty 
were formulated. The lessons learned are clearly reflected in the main difference 
between the state aid control regime under the ECSC Treaty and the EEC Treaty. In 
terms of Article 4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty, aid did not have to distort or threaten to 
distort competition in order for it to be considered incompatible with the common 
market.113 This was because a general ban on state aid in any event existed until the 
1980s when the Commission started to use the abovementioned “Aid Codes” to 
circumvent the general ban. In terms of the EEC Treaty, however, only those aid 
measures which distort or threaten to distort competition and adversely affect trade 
between member states were deemed to be incompatible with the common market. 
The CJEU  thus made an important statement when it noted in Steinike & Weinlig v 
Federal Republic of Germany that the prohibition in Article 92 (1) is “neither absolute 
nor unconditional” since both the Commission and the Council have wide powers to 
“admit aids in derogation from the general prohibition in Article 92 (1)”.114 The ECSC 
Treaty was therefore not only the first treaty to start the integration process but it also 
allowed the Europeans to gain valuable experience with state aid rules that came in 
handy when EEC state aid rules were developed. 
3 4 The treaty currently in force: the state aid prohibition in the TFEU 
Beside certain Commission regulation on procedure and Council exemptions to the 
application of the state aid rules, few amendments have been made to the original 
EEC Treaty provisions on state aid.115 A number of reasons may be submitted for 
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this. Firstly, it may be an indication that the state aid rules established in 1957 had 
been very effective in controlling state aid by member states and that member states 
were happy with the state aid rules as they were initially implemented. Therefore 
there was no need over the years for drastic changes to something that had worked. 
Secondly, it might be that enforcement of the regime was not vigorous enough. 
Therefore any deficiencies which would have been exposed by vigorous 
enforcement were not picked up. However, the many successful challenges of state 
aid by the Commission, as shown by the EU jurisprudence, seem to favour the first 
explanation. In the light of this it is important to analyse the elements of the state aid 
prohibition as found in the TFEU.   
4 The elements of the EU state aid prohibition  
4 1 Introduction 
While the notion of state aid has been the subject of various scholarly writings,116 the 
five elements listed in Article 107 (1) of TFEU remain the most important point of 
departure for any analysis of what state aid entails.117 A concept found nowhere else 
in the world, the state aid control regime of the EU, sets a regulatory framework that 
determines when and how member states may intervene in their economies. While 
the antitrust component of the EU competition policy is generally aimed at the 
behaviour of undertakings, those that are privately owned and government owned, 
state aid control is aimed at the behaviour of member states.118 In order for any 
member state’s intervention to qualify as state aid, certain elements set out in the 
TFEU must be present. In accordance with Article 107(1) of the TFEU the most 
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important characteristics which a state aid measure needs to show before it falls 
within the ambit of the prohibition are (i) it must be granted by a member state, (ii) or 
through state resources (iii) it must actually distort or threaten to distort competition, 
(iv) it must favour enterprises or productions and (v) it must adversely affect trade 
between member states.119 All these elements must be simultaneously present in 
order for a state aid measure to qualify as such. These elements will now be 
discussed.  
4 2 State aid granted by a member state or through state resources 
The Commission states: 
“A company which receives government support obtains an advantage over its 
competitors. Therefore, the EC Treaty generally prohibits State aid unless it is 
justified by reasons of general economic development. To ensure that this 
prohibition is respected and exemptions are applied equally across the European 
Union, the European Commission is in charge of watching over the compliance of 
State aid with EU rules.”120 
Hence, this element of the prohibition targets all types of state benefit which an 
undertaking may receive from a member state whether through subsidies or tax 
benefits. The various ways in which governments may provide financial assistance to 
undertakings include (i) grants, (ii) capital injections, (iii) loans, (iv) guarantees and 
(v) provision or purchase of goods of services.121 The Court of Justice stated that 
“Article 92(1) [now Article 107(1)] of the Treaty covers all the financial means by 
which the public sector may actually support undertakings, irrespective of whether or 
not those means are permanent assets of the public sector.”122  
The distinction made between aid granted by a state and aid through state resources 
is intended to ensure that both aid granted directly by the states and aid granted by a 
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public or private body designated or established by the State, is covered by the 
scope of the prohibition.123 Advantages can only be categorised as aid within the 
meaning of the state aid prohibition if they are granted directly or indirectly through 
State resources and be imputable to the State.124 If the state, for example, uses an 
intermediary such as a public or private body to provide aid, such measures would 
be covered by the prohibition.125 In this regard the “principle of imputability” is 
applicable.126 In accordance with this principle the actions of a public or private body 
may be attributed to the member state, even though a number of “indicators arising 
from the circumstances of the case and the context” have to be considered before 
state aid measure can be imputed to the member state.127 These indicators may 
include but are not limited to: 
(i) a public undertaking’s integration into the structures of a public administration; 
(ii) the nature of a public undertaking’s activities and the exercise of the latter on the 
market in normal conditions of competition with private operators; 
(iii) the legal status of the undertaking (in the sense of its being subject to public law 
or ordinary company law); 
(iv) the intensity of the supervision exercised by public authorities over the 
management of a public undertaking; 
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(v) any other indicator showing an involvement by public authorities in the adoption 
of a measure or the unlikelihood of them not being involved; and 
(vi) the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains.128 
Hence, no distinction is drawn between cases where aid is directly granted by the 
state and where aid is granted by public or private bodies established or appointed 
by the State to administer the aid.129 Any state aid which is attributable to a member 
state comes within the ambit of the prohibition and both aid granted by the State and 
through State resources are thus covered by the notion of state aid.130 
It has to be pointed out, however, that even when a state aid measure is granted by 
a member state or through state resources, the state aid measure might still be 
declared to be compatible with the internal market. This would be the case if the 
Commission decides that the measure is exempted from the state aid prohibition in 
terms of Article 107 (2) or Article 107 (3),131 the Block Exemption Regulation,132 the 
de minimuis rule133 or if the member state successfully argues that the state aid 
qualifies for exemption in terms of the Market Economy Investor Principle (MEIP) or 
private investor test.134 
4 3 State aid must distort or threaten to distort competition and adversely 
affect trade135 between member states  
These two requirements are “as a general rule inextricably linked”, particular when 
the state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other 
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undertakings competing in intra-Community trade.136 EU case law has confirmed on 
a number of occasions that any state aid granted to an undertaking which operates 
its business in the internal market may cause distortion of competition and affect 
trade between member states simultaneously.137  
Therefore negative effects which state aid may have on trade between member 
states, is as important as the distortive effect it may have on competition.138 This is 
shown by the creation of the “effects test” by the CJEU. In Italy v the Commission139 
the court said that since the aim of Article 92 (now Article 107) is to protect trade 
between member states and the prevention of any distortion of competition, the 
Article does not look at aid measures “by reference to their causes or aims but 
defines them in relation to their effects”.140 Hence the Commission does not have to 
prove a “real effect” on trade or that competition is “actually” distorted. If that were 
the case, “such a requirement would ultimately give Member States which grant 
unlawful aid an advantage over those which notify the aid at the planning stage.”141 
The Commission also does not have to carry out an economic analysis of the actual 
effects on the relevant market, as long as it explains to the parties involved how the 
aid is capable of affecting trade and distorting competition.142 It is therefore only 
necessary for the Commission to determine whether a measure by a member state 
has the ability to affect trade between member states or distort competition.143 No 
real effect on trade or actual distortion of competition needs to be examined.144 The 
Commission only has to explain and provide sufficient reasons for its explanation of 
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how the aid in question would distort competition and affect trade between member 
states.145  
It is thus not the form which the aid measure takes but rather the effect of the aid 
measure, which determines whether the aid is compatible with the internal market or 
not. As stated in Italy v the Commission,146 the nature of the aid measure is not 
sufficient to shield it from the application of the state aid regime. Heidhues and 
Nitsche states that in the case of other areas of competition policy, the Commission 
equates any anti-competitive behaviour to “harm to the consumer”, while in the case 
of state aid, the effect of unlawful state aid is equated to “harm to rivals”.147 The 
authors, however, suggest that the Commission should not only consider the effect 
on rivals when it has to consider the compatibility of a state aid measure with the 
internal market, but it should also consider the effect on the welfare of both the rivals 
of the undertaking that would receive the aid and the consumer.148 
Although the above two requirements are “as a general rule inextricably linked”, EU 
jurisprudence also give separate content to them. In regard to the requirement that 
competition must be distorted or threatened to be distorted by the state aid, EU case 
law presumes that “operating aid”149 to an undertaking, which provides the 
undertaking with “artificial financial support”, may distort competition in the sector in 
which it was granted.150 And whenever the Commission finds that there is “operating 
aid”, the Commission does not have to “explain in minute detail why that aid distorted 
competition”.151 
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In regard to the requirement that state aid must adversely affect trade between 
member states, it is settled EU law that there is no threshold or percentage below 
which it may be considered that trade between member states is not affected.152 
Even if the aid is a small amount or if the undertaking which receives the aid is small, 
it does not necessarily mean that trade between member state might not be 
affected.153  
4 4 State aid must favour particular enterprises or production lines: the 
selectivity criterion 
When a member state provides state aid to an undertaking or production line which a 
private investor under normal market conditions would not have done, it might 
constitute state aid within the meaning of the state aid prohibition since the member 
state might be favouring that undertaking or production line.154 If a state aid measure 
is not equally applicable to undertakings, but only to particular undertakings or one 
particular undertaking, even if that undertaking or undertakings are in a comparable 
factual and legal situation than its competitors, such different treatment might create 
the condition of selectivity.155  The Commission states that: 
“…a key aspect to assess selectivity is to determine whether the measure in question 
is of general application or, on the contrary, applies only to certain undertakings or 
certain sectors of the economy in a given Member State.” 156  
Golfinopoulos states that the question of selectivity is of particular interest when 
advantages arising from tax schemes are examined by the Commission.157 This was 
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seen in a number of recent state aid cases in which tax benefits, which were 
awarded to undertakings by member states, were scrutinised by the Commission. 
When the Netherlands provided certain tax benefits to a subsidiary of Starbucks, a 
multinational corporation, the Commission decided that it was a selective tax 
advantage since the corporation tax payable by the Starbucks subsidiary in the 
Netherlands was artificially lowered in an agreement between the entity and the 
Dutch tax authorities.158  
In regard to fiscal state aid the CJEU has devised a three-step analysis to determine 
whether a measure is selective.159 Firstly, it is necessary to identify and examine the 
common or ‘normal’ regime applicable in the member state concerned.160 Secondly, 
it is necessary to demonstrate that the tax measure at issue is selective as the 
measure derogates from the common regime inasmuch as it differentiates between 
economic operators who are in a comparable factual and legal situation.161 Thirdly, a 
determination must be made on whether the ‘normal’ tax regime applicable in the 
member state concerned justifies any derogation.162 
Following this three-step analysis in conjunction with establishing the presence of all 
the elements needed for state aid to exist, the Commission decided that the 
agreement between the Starbucks’ subsidiary and the Dutch tax authorities 
conferred a selective advantage on the enterprise for the purposes of Article 107(1) 
of the Treaty. This was because the individual scheme lowered the company’s 
taxable profit in the Netherlands as compared to other companies whose taxable 
profits is determined by their market transactions.163 The existence of all the 
elements for state aid was confirmed and since the aid was provided in 
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contravention of the procedural requirements as provided for in Article 108(3) of the 
TFEU,164 the aid was unlawful and had to be recovered.165  
The Commission found similar selective advantages given by Ireland166 and 
Luxembourg167 respectively to other multinational entities. In the Ireland case, two 
subsidiaries of the Apple Group operate business in Ireland.168 The Irish tax 
authorities issued certain tax rulings which the Apple subsidiaries used to calculate 
their annual corporate tax liability in Ireland. Such calculations were accepted by the 
Irish tax authorities. 169 The Commission applied the three-step analysis applicable to 
fiscal benefits and the other requirements for state aid. It concluded that the Irish tax 
authorities’ tax rulings resulted in a lowering of the Apple subsidiaries’ corporation 
tax liability under the ordinary rules of taxation of corporate profit in Ireland as 
compared to other companies whose corporate tax liability is determined by their 
transactions in the market. Hence, the tax rulings were considered to be a selective 
advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) of the TFEU.170 The state aid provided 
to the two Apple subsidiaries were declared to be unlawful as Ireland did not comply 
with the procedural requirements in regard to the notification of state aid and had to 
be recovered by Ireland from the two entities.171  
                                                          
164 See the comprehensive discussion on the procedural rules in para 6 of this chapter. 
165 Paras 435-436 of the Commission Decision (EU) 2017/502 of 21 October 2015 on State aid SA.38374 
(2014/C ex 2014/NN) implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks (notified under document C (2015) 7143) 
Official Journal of the European Union No L 83 29/03/2017. 
166 Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1283 of 30 August 2016 on State aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 
2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple Official Journal of the European Union No L 187/1 19/7/2017. 
167 See Commission Decision (EU) 2018/859 of 4 October 2017 on State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) 
implemented by Luxembourg to Amazon Official Journal of the European Union No L 153/2 15/6/2018; and 
“Commission finds Luxembourg gave illegal tax benefits to Amazon worth around EUR 250 million 2017 (361) 
EU Focus 25 25-26. 
168 Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1283 of 30 August 2016 on State aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 
2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple Official Journal of the European Union No L 187/1 19/7/2017;  
“Commission rules that Ireland gave illegal tax benefits to Apple worth up to EUR 13 billion” 2016  (348)  EU 
Focus 26 26-28; and F Hansen “Taking More Than They Give: MNE Tax Privateering and Apple’s “Ocean” 
Income” 2018 (19) German Law Journal  693 693- 725. 
169 Para 221 of Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1283 of 30 August 2016 on State aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 
2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple Official Journal of the European Union No L 187/1 
19/7/2017. 
170 Para 361 of Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1283 of 30 August 2016 on State aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 
2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple Official Journal of the European Union No L 187/1 
19/7/2017. 
171 Paras 412- 424 of Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1283 of 30 August 2016 on State aid SA.38373 (2014/C) 
(ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple Official Journal of the European Union No L 





The second finding was against Luxembourg which awarded certain tax benefits to 
Amazon. The Commission found that the tax benefits were awarded under an 
individual scheme only applicable to Amazon.172 Hence, there was selectivity as 
neither Luxembourg nor Amazon could advance any possible justification for the 
favourable treatment.173 The advantage awarded to the Amazon subsidiary was thus 
found to be selective in nature.174 The Commission further found that the tax ruling 
by the Luxembourg tax authorities in favour of the Amazon subsidiary satisfies all the 
conditions of Article 107(1) of the TFEU since it led to a lowering of the entity's 
corporate income tax liability in Luxembourg.175 Hence, state aid was awarded 
unlawfully because there was no compliance by Luxembourg with the procedural 
requirements in Article 108(3) of the TFEU.176 Consequently, Luxembourg was 
ordered to recover the aid from the beneficiary entity.177  
To verify whether any favouritism of an undertaking or production line exists, that is 
whether the selectivity requirement is met, the Commission may apply the Market 
Economy Investor Principle (MEIP).178 In term of this principle it must be determined 
whether a private investor under normal market conditions would have acted as the 
member state did. Described as “the yardstick for the determination of whether 
measures adopted by public authorities constitutes State aid within the meaning of 
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Article 87 (1) EC”, the MEIP was first applied to the steel and shipbuilding sectors.179 
The General Court stated in Dunamenti Eromu Zrt v European Commission180 that: 
“…it must be noted that the test of a private operator in a market economy is 
satisfied where the State in fact merely acts in the same way as any private operator 
would do acting in normal market conditions. In such circumstances, there is no 
advantage attributable to intervention by the State, because the beneficiary could 
theoretically have derived the same benefits from the mere functioning of the 
market.”  
Thus simplified, the MEIP concerns the question whether a private investor would 
invest in the undertaking in the same way the state authority did. If the answer to this 
question is affirmative, the investment could be seen as part of normal market 
investment.181 If the answer, however, is negative, the state aid may qualify as 
favouritism by the member state towards the particular undertaking. In terms of the 
MEIP principle, if a financing measure could not be equated with “equity capital 
according to standard company practice in a market economy” it will be considered 
state aid and the state aid control regime will be applicable.182 It is thus important to 
determine whether the state aid measure falls within the state’s capacity as state 
authority or whether it arise due to the state’s responsibility as a shareholder.183 In 
this regard the CJEU in Électricité de France (EDF) v the European Community184 
stated that it is not the form of the state aid measure, but the nature, subject-matter 
and the objectives of the measures that are decisive, in determining whether the 
state acts in its capacity as state authority or shareholder.185  
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The MEIP was first given administrative and judicial recognition by the Commission 
and the CJEU respectively in 1984 in a case of state aid against Belgium.186 In 1982 
the Belgian government decided to grant assistance through a regional investment 
body to an undertaking which manufactured equipment for the food industry. It 
provided capital in the amount of BFR 145 million to the undertaking. The 
Commission found that the aid granted by the Belgian government was incompatible 
with the common market (now internal market) and thus not in compliance with 
Article 92 of the EEC Treaty (now Article 107 of the TFEU) and that the aid should 
be abolished.187 The Belgian authorities applied to the CJEU to have the 
Commission’s decision declared void. They argued that by prohibiting them from 
increasing the capital of the undertaking, the Commission was discriminating against 
them in comparison with a private shareholder.188 They further argued that it is 
normal and legitimate for a shareholder to provide additional capital to support an 
undertaking which that shareholder controls and which is experiencing temporary 
difficulties.189 They also stated that the Commission should have kept this in mind 
when making its decision on whether the subscription to capital constituted state aid 
within the ambit of Article 92 of the EEC Treaty. The Commission argued that “the 
company's financial situation was a handicap which makes it very unlikely that it 
could have raised the finance it needed to survive on the private capital market”.190 
The Commission also noted that the undertaking had experienced financial 
difficulties for quite some time. Therefore the money injected in the undertaking 
constituted aid within the scope of the treaty and not a subscription to risk capital as 
can be found in the market.191 It further stated that public authorities in their capacity 
as shareholders are not prevented from supporting an undertaking but if they do 
provide such support, the competition rules of the Treaty must be observed.192 The 
CJEU decided firstly, that the undertaking would not have survived without public 
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funds, considering its financial results and other determining factors such as its 
historical development. Secondly, it found that the undertaking’s circumstances at 
that moment would have made it rather difficult for any capital to be obtained in the 
private market or from a private shareholder.193 Therefore the provision of capital to 
the undertaking by the Belgian government was state aid in the “form of a State 
rescue operation”. The CJEU laid down the MEIP by stating that: 
“In the case of an undertaking whose capital is held by the public authorities, the 
test is, in particular, whether in similar circumstances a private shareholder, having 
regard to the foreseeability of obtaining a return and leaving aside all social, 
regional-policy and sectoral considerations, would have subscribed the capital in 
question.”194 
After acceptance of the MEIP as part of the state aid control regime, there were 
many instances in which the principle was applied by the court. The principle was 
used by Germany in Linde AG v the Commission195 when it submitted that granting 
of the “investment subsidy” to Linde AG for the construction of a production plant for 
carbon monoxide was purely based on “commercial considerations”.196 The 
Commission found part of the aid measure to be incompatible with the common 
market (now internal market). It said that the subsidy conferred an advantage to 
Linde AG in that it firstly, allowed the undertaking to add another carbon monoxide 
facility to those it already operated without any costs to it and secondly, the subsidy 
enabled Linde AG to extend its range of products.197 This decision by the 
Commission convinced Germany to apply to the CJEU for the partial annulment of 
the Commission decision. After examining these transactions the court found that the 
arrangement between the German government and the recipient undertaking 
represented a “normal commercial transaction” and that the contested subsidy forms 
part of that arrangement and is thus justified on commercial grounds.198 The court 
further stated that the Commission failed to examine whether “economic operators” 
in the same position would have been willing to pay the same amount of the 
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“investment subsidy”.199 The court consequently decided that the Commission failed 
to prove to “the requisite legal standard” that the arrangement between the German 
government and the recipient undertaking of the “investment subsidy” was state aid 
as prohibited by the Treaty. 
Ryanair v the Commission of the European Communities200 is another case which 
proves that the principle has now become an established part of state aid 
assessments. The MEIP became part of the Commission’s analysis to determine the 
legality of state aid measures and member states also started to use the principle as 
a defence to validate state aid. This case involved two agreements entered into by 
Ryanair in 2001. The first agreement was with the Walloon Region, the owner of the 
Charleroi airport in Belgium (the Walloon Region agreement) and the other was with 
an airport, the Brussels South Charleroi Airport (the Charleroi agreement) which is 
described in the case as a “public sector company controlled by the Walloon 
Region”. The Walloon Region agreement granted a reduction of at least fifty percent 
in landing charges to Ryanair and changed the airport opening hours in order to 
accommodate Ryanair. The agreement also provided for compensation of loss 
Ryanair might have suffered in the event that the reduced airport charges or the 
changed opening hours affected its profits. In terms of the Charleroi agreement 
Ryanair agreed to have between two and four aircrafts on a permanent basis at the 
Charleroi airport and to use every aircraft for at least three rotations per day for at 
least fifteen years and in the event that it withdrew from the airport that it would pay 
certain reimbursement.201 The agreement also made provision for a contribution by 
the Charleroi airport for all cost which Ryanair would incur while establishing its base 
at the airport.202 The Commission, however, became aware of the advantages 
awarded to Ryanair after receiving complaints and through the media, at which point 
it informed Belgium of its decision to start the procedural actions provided for in 
Article 108 of the TFEU Treaty. It argued that since the Walloon Region and the 
Charleroi airports were operated by the Belgian government and are consequently 
governed by the EU state aid control regime, all advantages awarded to Ryanair 
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were supposed to be notified to the Commission, which did not happen. In assessing 
the advantages the Commission refused to apply the MEIP. It argued that the fixing 
of the landing charges was not an economic activity but that the Walloon Region 
exercised a “legislative and regulatory competence”. It thus concluded that the 
advantages awarded to Ryanair were aid within the ambit of the Treaty. Ryanair 
contested the Commission’s decision before the CJEU. The Court stated that a 
distinction has to be drawn between the state acting in the same way as a private 
investor and its actions as a public authority. In the event that it acts as a public 
authority, the application of the private investor principle is excluded as the conduct 
of the State can never be compared to that of a private investor in a market 
economy.203 The court decided even though a body with regulatory powers to fix 
airport charges enters into a scheme which reduces airport charges, it does not 
automatically disqualify its activities from being examined by using the private 
investor principle, as such a scheme could also possibly have been put in place by a 
private operator.204 It decided that the Commission erred in not applying the private 
investor principle to the aid measures.205 
4 5 The de minimis rule 
It would be impractical for the Commission to look into every single state aid 
measure within the EU on its own initiative. Not only would this create an impossible 
workload for the Commission but it may also lead to a situation where the 
Commission might adopt a pick-and-choose approach in regard to the state aid it 
wishes to investigate. This can cause some harmful instances of state aid to escape 
scrutiny by the Commission. Beside a pick-and-choose approach, the Commission 
might be unaware of planned state aid measures by a member state as the member 
state might have neglected its Treaty duty of notifying the aid to the Commission.206  
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This and other reasons noted by the Commission, which include an effort to reduce 
the administrative burden on the member states and on the Commission and to 
simplify matters for SMEs,207 led to the implementation of the de minimis rule as part 
of EU state aid law. In accordance with the de minimis rule, thresholds are set for 
state aid which may be granted to undertakings by member states without such aid 
measure having to be notified in advance to the Commission.208 In essence the de 
minimis rule aims to place small amounts of state aid, which is unlikely to have an 
“appreciable effect” on competition and trade within the internal market, outside of 
the scope of the state aid prohibition. Aid without an “appreciable effect” on trade 
and competition between Member States and below a certain amount is thus not 
considered to be state aid within the meaning and scope of Article 107 of the TFEU.  
 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 994/98209 allowed the Commission to decide by means 
of regulation that certain aid does not meet the criteria as stated in Article 107 (1) 
and thus the Commission may exempt such aid measure from compliance with the 
procedural rules if it does not exceed a certain amount.210  
Consequently, the Commission adopted its first Regulation which dealt with small 
amounts of aid to undertakings in 2001.211 This became known as the de minimis 
rule. The purpose of the de minimis rule has been described by the Court of 
Justice212 as follows:  
“…it should be borne in mind that the de minimis rule is intended to reduce the 
administrative burden on both the Member States and the Commission, which must 
be able to concentrate its resources on cases that are genuinely important at 
Community level.” 
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The investigation of aid measures which are relatively small, with little or no impact 
on competition and trade between members state, can unnecessarily take up the 
Commission’s time and resources which could have been directed to more 
problematic aid measures.213  
The first de minimis Regulation was revised in 2006214 and again in 2013215 with the 
last version of the Regulation valid until 2020, but this involved only a few changes to 
the basic rules regarding de minimis exemptions.  
In terms of the de minimis Regulation any aid measures which falls within the 
thresholds set by the Commission shall be deemed not to meet all the criteria of 
Article 107 (1) of the TFEU and shall therefore not fall under the notification 
requirement of Article 108(3) of the Treaty. An undertaking is allowed to receive from 
a member state an amount of EUR 200 000.00 as de minimis aid over a period of 
three years.216 This threshold applies irrespective of the form of the de minimis aid or 
the objective pursued by the undertaking to which the aid is granted.217 Undertakings 
in all sectors of the single market benefits from the application of the de minimis rule 
with some exceptions.218  
                                                          
213 L Rubini The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (2009) 
397. 
214 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the Treaty to de minimis aid Official Journal of the European Communities No L 379/5 [2006]. 
See also M Berghofer “The New De Minimis Regulation: Enlarging the Sword of Damocles” (2007) 1 
European State Aid Law Quarterly 11 11-24 for more on the 2006 De Minimis Regulation.  
215 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid Official Journal of the European 
Union No 352/1 [2013]. 
216 Article 3 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 
107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid Official Journal of the 
European Union No 352/1 [2013].  
The first threshold set by the Commission in 2001 was a ceiling of EUR 100 000 over any period of three years. 
See the Preamble of Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 
87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid Official Journal of the European Communities No L 10/30 [2001]. 
217  Article 3 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of 
Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid Official Journal 
of the European Union No 352/1 [2013]. 
218 The exceptions include:  (a) aid granted to undertakings active in the fishery and aquaculture sector, b) aid 
granted to undertakings active in the primary production of agricultural products; (c )aid granted to undertakings 
active in the sector of processing and marketing of agricultural products under certain circumstances;  (d) aid to 
export-related activities towards third countries or Member States; and (e) aid contingent upon the use of 
domestic over imported goods. See Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 
2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de 




 Unlike the Block Exemption Regulation219 (BER) which focuses on exempting state 
aid to certain sectors of the member states’ economies from the state aid control 
rules, by declaring them compatible with the internal market, the de minimis rule 
focuses on those aid measures which are considered not to meet all the criteria of 
Article 107 (1) because of the actual amount of aid allocated to an undertaking.220 
Hence no declaration of compatibility is necessary. Aid which qualifies as exempted 
aid in terms of the BER may therefore still impact on competition and trade, but due 
to the block exemption it is considered to be compatible with the internal market. De 
minimis aid on the other hand, is deemed not to impact on competition and trade due 
to its insignificance and therefore does not meet the criteria of Article 107 (1) of the 
TFEU.  
The de minimis rule and how it is applied has not been without criticism. Rubini 
argues that an insignificant amount of aid does not necessarily mean that it does not 
have the ability to distort competition.221 Rubini further argues that the focus should 
instead be on the beneficiary and its economic situation at the moment the aid is 
awarded as the “same amount may mean different things to different recipients”.222 
The author argues that the market power of the undertaking at the time of the aid 
should be a determining factor on whether the aid could be distortive and not the 
amount of the aid.223 It is submitted that Rubini is correct to observe that even small 
amounts of aid could still contravene Article 107(1) of the TFEU despite the 
objectives with this form of exemption. It is further submitted that even a small aid 
measure could place an existing competitor in a better position than its competitors 
or creates the ability to block any new entrants from a market. Nevertheless, the risk 
that this will happen is considerably reduced as the amounts of aid become smaller. 
It is submitted that in a modern and expanded EU, group exemptions and monetary 
thresholds to the state aid prohibition was to be expected, since the Commission is 
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the only EU institution which is empowered to determine the compatibility of state aid 
measures with the internal market. When the founding treaty was enacted in 1957, 
such a responsibility would not have placed immense pressure on the Commission 
since there were only six member states involved. But if the Commission today have 
to investigate every single state aid measure, it could take up too much of the 
Commission’s resources and time. 
5 Aid exempted from the state aid prohibition   
5 1 Introduction 
Articles 107 (2)224 and (3)225 of the TFEU226 exempt certain state aid measures from 
the state aid prohibition. The Commission also regularly reviews the categories of aid 
which could be exempted because of the power it has in terms of Article 107 (3) (e) 
of the TFEU, which allows the Commission to exempt state aid measures from the 
state aid prohibition. As a result of this power, regulatory instruments which exempt 
certain state aid measures from the state aid prohibition were issued and 
implemented by the Commission. Hence, exemptions may be “mandatory” in Article 
107 (2) and “discretionary” in Article 107 (3). Discretionary exemptions may be either 
in terms of the more specific criteria set out in section 107(3)(a)-107(3)(d) or in terms 
of the more general section 107(e). This section will first look at the practically most 
important more specific Regulation by which exemption is given, the Block 
Exemption Regulation. Thereafter exemptions for rescue measures especially those 
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that applied in the 2008 financial crisis will be analysed. Not only was the financial 
crisis the most significant test for the European state aid regime but rescue 
measures are particularly relevant to state aid of SOEs in South Africa. Next, a few 
observations about Guidelines and other similar measures regarding exemptions will 
be made. Finally, the status of exempting legislation outside of the state aid regime 
will be considered. 
5 2 The Block Exemption Regulation (BER) 
Whenever state aid measures meet the criteria listed in Article 107 (1) of the TFEU, 
such funding cannot be implemented by the member state without notifying the 
Commission.227 The European Council, however, has the power to declare that 
certain categories of aid are exempted from the notification requirement. In terms of 
Article 109 of the TFEU, after having received a proposal from the Commission, the 
Council may make any appropriate regulations which may address the application of 
the state aid rules. Article 109 further states that the Council may adopt regulations 
which exempt categories of state aid from the application of the notification 
procedure.228  
After having received a proposal229 from the Commission, the Council adopted its 
first “enabling regulation”230 in 1998. It empowered the Commission to declare that 
certain categories of state aid measures were exempted from the notification 
requirement.231 In its proposal at the time, the Commission stated that “state aid can 
be used to replace barriers to trade that have been dismantled in the single market 
integration process.”232 Hence, it wanted a more effective state aid control regime in 
which its resources would be directed and used in assessing the most “distorting 
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cases” of state aid.233 The Commission wanted “efficient supervision” and simplified 
administration of the state aid regime which would not weaken its monitoring. The 
Commission also wanted a system that would bring about a reduction in the general 
levels of aid allocated by member states.234 It felt that block exemptions would best 
achieve these aims and increase transparency and legal certainty.235 Some of the 
reasons listed in the Commission’s proposal for more “effective and strict state aid 
control” included (i) globalisation, (ii) technological development, (iii) the completion 
of the single market, (iv) enlargement of the EU, (v) unemployment levels, since the 
Commission felt that member states would use state aid as a tool to combat 
unemployment and (vi) the need to complement the fundamental freedoms of the 
EU.236 The Commission thus wanted to ensure that the state aid controls were 
sufficient to keep up with all the above developments.  
As a result the Commission issued its first regulations on state aid measures which 
could be deemed compatible with the internal market and thus be exempted from the 
notification obligation in Article 108 (3) of the TFEU. The initial sectoral regulations 
which were issued by the Commission only provided exemption to specific sectors237 
where the Commission had sufficient experience to define general compatibility 
criteria.238 Consequently there was initially no general block exemption regulation for 
state aid measures. This was in stark contrast with antitrust rules in European 
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competition policy. The Commission has been empowered to grant general block 
exemptions to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
between undertakings since 1965.239 Several such exemptions had been granted.240 
Individual exemption regulations were issued until the Commission issued its first 
General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER 2008)241 for state aid measures in 
2008.242 The GBER applied across all sectors.243 Described as an “important tool of 
simplification and prioritization”, the GBER 2008 defined the type of state aid 
measures that did not have to be notified to the Commission. State aid measures 
listed in the GBER 2008 were not only exempted from the notification requirement 
but they were also considered to be compatible with the internal market,244 even 
though they may have met all the requirements of the state aid prohibition.245  
The GBER 2008 has now expired246 and was replaced with a new block exemption 
regulation (BER 2014).247 While the exemptions in the GBER 2008 covered a wide 
range of aid measures across a number of fields such as (i) regional aid; (ii) SMEs 
investment and employment aid; (iii) aid for the creation of enterprises by female 
entrepreneurs; (iv) aid for environmental protection; (v) aid for consultancy in favour 
of SMEs and SME participation in fairs; (vi) aid in the form of risk capital; (vii) aid for 
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research, development and innovation; (viii) training aid; and (ix) aid for 
disadvantaged or disabled workers,248 the scope of the BER 2014 is even wider. 
This is because the Council empowered the Commission to extend the block 
exemption to a number of new categories of aid.249 The new categories of aid which 
were included by the BER 2014 are (i) aid to make good the damage caused by 
certain natural disasters; (ii) social aid for transport for residents of remote regions; 
(iii) aid for broadband infrastructures; (vi) aid for culture and heritage conservation; 
(v) aid for sport and multifunctional recreational infrastructure; (vi) aid for local 
infrastructures; (vii) aid for regional airports; and (viii) aid for ports.250  
Most of the exempted aid measures are however subjected to certain thresholds.251 
Member states are also not allowed to circumvent these thresholds by artificially 
splitting up the aid schemes or aid projects.252  
Various checks and balances have also been built into the BER 2014 (such 
measures were also in the GBER 2008) in order to ensure that member states do 
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not award aid outside of the exemptions without complying with the procedural 
requirements of the state aid control regime. These include that: 
(i) member state must submit the summary information about each aid measure 
exempted in terms of the BER 2014, together with a link providing access to the full 
text of the aid measure, including its amendments, within 20 working days following 
its entry into force to the Commission;253  
(ii) member states must maintain detailed records with the information and 
supporting documentation of the state aid measure and such records have to be kept 
for ten years from the date on which the ad hoc aid was granted or the last aid was 
granted under the scheme;254 and 
(ii) member states, on request, must provide the Commission with any requested 
information and supporting documents regarding the state aid measure within a 
period of 20 working days from receipt of the request or such longer period as may 
be fixed in the request.255 
By implementing block exemptions, the Commission’s workload has been lightened. 
It can now focus its attention on those state aid measures which severely distorts 
competition and impacts on trade between member states. The block exemptions 
can also be applied by the national courts of the member states when complaints are 
received.256 This is because the criteria for compatibility with the internal market 
were codified in the BER, which makes it easier for national courts to establish 
whether an infringement of the state aid rules has indeed occurred. When there is a 
complaint about a state aid measure, the national courts can thus consult the BER to 
determine whether such measure is covered by the scope of the BER.  
5 3 Rescue measures especially in the 2008 financial crisis as an example 
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Many governments provide state aid as a rescue measures during crises. One such 
crisis was the 2008 global financial crisis. During the 2008 crisis many governments 
provided state aid to undertakings whose failure would have crippled the financial 
system and could have led to widespread failures of enterprises.257 Many of these 
enterprises were private undertakings in which the governments previously held no 
equity. Yet the “too big to fail” argument was used as a justification to provide state 
aid to rescue these undertakings from failing as the failure of a big firm could have a 
contagion effect. 
Since the crisis originated in the US, some of the largest financial institutions in the 
US had to be rescued from financial collapse by the government. While Lehman 
Brothers went into bankruptcy in September 2008,258 many other big US banks were 
saved from collapse through a number of methods. Merryl Lynch was acquired by 
the Bank of America,259 American International Group (AIG), which was at the time 
the world largest insurance company, was provided with “immediate liquidity 
assistance” by the Federal Reserve260 which saved it from collapse, Bear Sterns 
were saved from collapse through a “government assisted sale to JP Morgan261 in 
March 2008, after it “was forced to sell itself”262 and by September 2008 Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs each received a Federal Reserve bailout of 96.1 billion 
Dollars and 31.5 billion Dollars respectively.263 
 Outside of the US, many EU member states also provided aid through rescue 
packages to safe enterprises from failure. The following are salient examples: 
- The British government provided aid to financial institutions such as Northern Rock 
bank264 and the Royal Bank of Scotland;265 
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- The German government provided state aid to the Hype Real Estate Group, one of 
its biggest financial institutions;266 and  
-ABN AMRO was partially nationalised by the Dutch government.267  
Within the EU as a supranational institution, however, rescue aid by a member state 
may distort competition and affect trade between member states. Therefore the 
Commission generally deals with such measures within the confines of the state aid 
prohibition and its Guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in 
difficulty.268 The Commission’s original guidelines of 1994 recognised that there are 
certain circumstances when state aid to rescue and restructure firms in difficulty may 
be justified.269 Article 107 (3) (b) of the TFEU also allows the Commission to 
consider certain aid compatible with the internal market if the aid may “remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. Together, the Commission’s 
Guidelines and Article 107 (3) b) form the basis for an exemption when there is the 
need for rescue and restructuring aid. Even with this exemption in place, the 
Commission views the ‘one time, last time’ principle270 as important in this context, 
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as it wants to avoid that undertakings which may anticipate that they are likely to be 
rescued when they run into difficulty, embark on “excessively risky and 
unsustainable business strategies.” Also, Soltesz and Kockritz state that rescue aid 
to undertakings by member states is “generally perceived very critically by the 
Commission” and that failing firms should be allowed to exit the market if such failing 
is due to normal and unhampered competition. Hence rescue and restructuring aid 
should only be allowed in exceptional circumstances271 under specific conditions set 
by the Commission which the Commission deems “necessary to ensure that the aid 
does not distort competition”.  
The financial crisis of 2008 was one of integrated Europe’s biggest challenges since 
World War Two. Since rescue aid during the crisis could be justified on the basis of 
the systemic risk that was posed to the economies of member states as well as the 
wider integrated EU economy, a uniform and coordinated approach on state aid to 
those undertakings in distress had to be adopted. Nicolaides and Rusu state that the 
Commission had to intervene when member states were injecting capital into banks 
during the crisis.272  
Although each member state may have experienced the financial crisis differently 
due to the peculiarity of its economy, it was necessary that a supranational 
framework had to be created to ensure member state acted within the scope of the 
state aid rules when providing state aid to financial institutions.273 The Commission 
was also aware that if member states had to act on their own without a coordinated 
approach during the crisis, a “subsidy race” between them could ensue and that it 
could harm the internal market.274 The Commission wanted to prevent such a 
scenario from materialising. It also wanted to avoid any state intervention which 
would have undermined the objectives of less state aid as envisage by the SAAP.275 
Consequently the Commission issued various regulatory instruments on temporary 
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state aid measures which could be used by member states in order to assist financial 
institutions during the crisis.276 The legal basis for these regulatory instruments is 
Article 107 (3) (b) of the TFEU which provides that aid “to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State” may be considered to be compatible 
with the internal market. The Commission wanted to (i) unblock bank lending to 
companies and thus guarantee continuity in their access to finance and (ii) 
encourage companies to continue investing in the future.277 The temporary state aid 
measures, that were allowed during the financial crisis, inter alia, included (i) aid 
which exceeded the de minimis allowance which is set in the de minimis Regulation, 
as long as it conformed to certain requirements, which included that no more than 
EUR 500 000 could be granted per undertaking;278 (ii) subsidised loan guarantees 
granted for a limited period, because the Commission view it as “an appropriate and 
well targeted solution to give firms easier access to finance”;279 (iii) public or private 
loans granted to companies at a beneficial interest rate;280 (iv) aid in the form of an 
“interest-rate reduction” for the production of “green products;281 and a temporary 
adaptation of the limits which are allowed for state aid to promote risk capital 
investments in small and medium-sized enterprises.282 
These measures ensured a coordinated response to the financial crisis by member 
states. Therefore any aid falling within the ambit of the temporary measures was not 
in contravention of the state aid rules and thus considered not to affect competition 
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and trade between member states. Monitoring and reporting measures were put in 
place to ensure that member states stayed within the temporary framework when 
they provided aid measures. 
With its regulatory instruments the Commission thus made it possible for member 
states to respond immediately to the crisis to limit the impact on their economies and 
the wider EU economy and it ensured that member states did not breach the state 
aid prohibition. 
5 4 Guidelines and similar instruments 
The Commission issues Guidelines and other similar instruments to give clarity on 
the types of activities that will be exempted from the state aid provisions. Some of 
these Guidelines apply to specific sectors while others apply across sectors.283 It has 
been stated that “according to settled case-law, in the specific area of State aid, the 
Commission is bound by the guidelines and notices that it issues, to the extent that 
they do not depart from the rules” of the Treaty.284 Guidelines accordingly will be 
used to determine whether the conduct of a person falls within an exemption.285 
Member states and beneficiaries of aid will have to study these Guidelines carefully if 
they do not want to run the risk that the aid will be declared incompatible with the 
internal market. 
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5 5 Exemptions in and outside of the state aid regime 
It may in the EU be very difficult to determine when and to what extent conduct will 
be exempted. This is well illustrated by three cases286 dealing with a tax exemption 
from excise duty on mineral oils in Gardanne, France, the Shannon region in Ireland 
and in Sardinia, Italy. These regions in the respective member states, all produce 
alumina, a white powder which is extracted from bauxite by a refining process and 
then it is used to produce aluminium. Mineral oils may be used as fuel for alumina 
production. There is only one producer of alumina in each of Ireland, Italy and 
France. In Ireland the exemption applies to an undertaking called Aughinish which is 
located in the Shannon region, in Italy the exemption applies to Eurallumina which is 
located in Sardinia and in France the exemption applies to an alumina refinery which 
is located in the Gardanne region. All three companies are located in areas that are 
eligible for regional aid.287  
The Irish Republic has since May 1983 exempted oils used for the production of 
alumna, from excise duty.288 In terms of a Council Directive of 1992 harmonised 
rates of excise duties had to be imposed on mineral oils.289 However, the exemption 
by Ireland from this requirement, was authorised by the Council in October 1992 in 
accordance with the Directive.290 There were several further decisions by the Council 
to extend the authorisation and the last decision extended it until 31 December 2006. 
The Italian Republic has since 1993 exempted these mineral oils used as fuel for the 
production of alumina in Sardinia from excise duty.291 The exemption was similarly 
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authorised by the Council in 1993.292 A number of subsequent extensions of the 
authorisation followed in later years and the last decision concerning the exemption, 
extended it until 31 December 2006.293 The French Republic has since 1997 
exempted mineral oils used as fuel for the production of alumina in the Gardanne 
region, from excise duty. The exemption was first authorised by the Council on 30 
June 1997294 and this was extended on a number of occasions until the last 
extension expired on 31 December 2006.295  
In May 1998, June 1998 and July 2000, the Commission requested information from 
the Italian, French and Irish authorities, in order to verify whether the exemption at 
issue fell within the scope of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 107 
and 108 of the TFEU). The authorities of all member states responded, whereafter 
the Commission requested them to notify the exemptions as state aid. Their follow-
up replies, however, “did not have the status of a notification”.296 Hence, the 
Commission decided on 30 October that it will initiate a formal investigation 
procedure provided for in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty (now Article 108 (2) of the 
TFEU) regarding this matter. This was notified to the parties on 5 November 2001 
and it was published in the Official Journal on 2 February 2002.297  
After a prolonged investigation the Commission decided in December 2005 that the 
tax exemptions granted by France, Italy and Ireland constituted state aid within the 
meaning of the state aid prohibition in the treaty. France, Ireland and Italy were 
therefore required to take all necessary measures to recover the state aid granted 
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used as fuel for alumina production in Gardanne, in the Shannon region and in Sardinia respectively 




from 3 February 2002 onwards, from the recipients.298 Although the Commission 
found that the state aid given before this date was incompatible, it did not require 
recovery of it on the basis of legal principles that are not relevant here.  
Several years of complex litigation followed the Commission’s decision.299 On 22 
April 2016 the General Court handed down the final judgments and confirmed the 
Commission’s initial decision.300 Most importantly for present purposes, the Court 
rejected all the arguments for the contention that the authorisation of the Council 
precluded the application of the state aid rules to these exemptions. 301  
- The importance of the principle of legal certainty was recognised. This principle 
aims to ensure that "that situations and legal relationships governed by EU law 
remain foreseeable” and that “observance of the principle of legal certainty also 
requires that the institutions avoid, as a matter of principle, inconsistencies that might 
arise in the implementation of the various provisions of EU law”.302 However, it was 
accepted that the power of the Council to harmonise excise duty had to be 
distinguished from the power of the Commission to regulate state aid. The 
authorisation of the exemption from excise duty therefore did not affect the power of 
the Commission to apply state aid law.303 
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- It was argued that the Lex Specialis in terms of which the authorisation was given 
could displace the general state aid rules as they dealt with different powers as 
explained before. However, it was similarly accepted that the authorisation could not 
displace the state aid regime as they operated in different spheres.304 
- It was accepted that the Commission could not be estopped from applying the state 
aid rules simply because it did not previously take steps to do so or removed any 
uncertainty as to which of these rules applied. European law did not recognise 
estoppel although legitimate expectation and legal certainty could be protected in 
some situations, but these principles were not applicable in this case.305 
- In certain cases the legitimate expectations of parties would be protected but in this 
case it would not allow the parties to argue that state aid was illegal. It only protected 
them from having the state aid reclaimed up to the point where they were disabused 
of their expectation, that is when the Commission on 2 February 2002 published that 
it would initiate formal investigation procedures.306 
These cases make it clear that it may be difficult to determine the scope of state aid 
rules and the extent to which other rules may limit the scope of state aid rules. These 
issues will be even more difficult where state aid rules are both enacted and applied 
by a country rather than a supra-national body. However, the cases illustrate that 
some general legal rules may be developed to address these difficulties.  
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6 Procedural rules relating to the state aid prohibition 
6 1 Introduction 
 
In order to ensure that the state aid prohibition is uniformly applied throughout the 
EU single market and to create transparency and legal certainty307 certain 
procedures have been incorporated in the founding treaties, the treaties currently in 
force and in other regulatory instruments.308 Member states have to comply with 
these procedures before state aid can be granted to any undertaking which have an 
economic activity within its territory. These procedural rules ensure that no 
undertaking gets an “economic advantage” by receiving state aid.309  
 
The procedural rules are set out in Article 108 of the TFEU and the “Procedural 
Regulation” of 2015.310 The main feature of the procedural rules is that member 
states must inform the Commission of any plans to grant aid to an industry, to a 
particular undertaking or for a certain production line or if the member state wants to 
alter existing aid.311 Member states are not allowed to put into effect any aid that 
needs to be notified before the Commission has taken a decision authorising such 
aid. This is referred to as the “standstill clause”. Even if a state aid measure prima 
facie seems to be compatible with the internal market, the member state which 
intends to grant the aid still needs to notify the Commission of the planned aid.312 
Any aid which was granted in breach of the notification requirement is thus unlawful. 
Even if the Commission declares the state aid compatible afterwards, it is not 
legitimised through the Commission’s declaration of compatibility. In fact, the 
Commission may issue certain corrective measures for aid awarded before its 
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declaration of compatibility. These include that the Commission may require the 
member state to suspend the aid or to recover any unlawful aid.313  
 
It is thus important to differentiate between the legality of aid and its compatibility 
with the internal market.314 Legality has to do with whether member states have 
followed the correct procedure, when it decided to implement state aid. If the 
required procedure was not followed and the aid measure was implemented by the 
member state without the knowledge and approval of the Commission, such aid was 
unlawfully implemented and the Commission can make a declaration to this effect. It 
can request the member state to abolish or alter the aid measures. It may also 
require the recipient of the aid to return the aid.  
 
In regard to the question of compatibility, the procedural rules in Article 108 of the 
TFEU are indeed followed by the member state before implementing any planned 
aid but the Commission has the final say on whether the planned state aid is 
compatible with the internal market or not. Only the Commission can decide on the 
compatibility of the aid with the single market. Should the Commission decide that 
the planned aid is not compatible; the member state has to abandon its plans to 
implement the aid. All these procedural rules were codified in a procedural regulation 
which will now be discussed.  
 
6 2 The “Procedural Regulation” 
Article 109 of the TFEU enables the Council to make regulations which sets 
conditions for the application of Article 108, in particular in regard to the requirement 
that aid must be notified to the Commission. In terms of this article the Council is 
also permitted to determine certain categories of aid which could be exempted from 
the notification procedure. As a result, the Council adopted the first “Procedural 
Regulation” in 1999.315 It was meant to be a codification of the “consistent practice 
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for the application of Article 93” (now Article 108), developed by the Commission in 
accordance with the case-law of the CJEU.316 As part of the modernization plans for 
the EU state aid rules and since the “Procedural Regulation” of 1999 had been 
amended on several occasions, the Council enacted a new “Procedural Regulation” 
in 2015 which repealed the “Procedural Regulation” of 1999.317 Hence the 
Procedural Regulation of 2015 is the focus of this discussion.  
The “Procedural Regulation” applies to aid in all sectors even though special 
procedural regulations are applied in certain sectors.318 The regulation distinguishes 
between existing aid and new aid. This is due to the developing nature of the EU 
state aid policy and also because aid which did not constitute state aid when it was 
put into effect, may since have become aid within the ambit of the prohibition.319 It 
sets out two different processes on how the Commission will deal with new aid on 
the one hand and how it will deal with existing on the other hand.320 Existing aid 
includes firstly, all aid schemes and individual aid that were in place before the treaty 
entered into force in a number of EU member states, secondly, all aid schemes and 
individual aid that were authorised either by the Commission or the Council, thirdly, 
aid that is deemed to be authorised after the Commission failed to act within the two 
month time-limit after it received a notification from the member state and the 
member state has proceeded with the implementation of the aid after informing the 
Commission of its decision to do so and lastly, aid that was initially on its 
implementation not considered to be state aid but became state aid afterwards due 
to the evolution of the internal market and the member state has not taken steps to 
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alter it.321 New aid is defined as “all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual 
aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid”.322  
In terms of the “Procedural Regulation” a member state must notify the Commission 
of any plan to give new aid. In the notification the member state must provide all 
information323 that is necessary to help the Commission with its preliminary 
examination324 into the state aid measure and with its final decision after a formal 
investigation325 into the aid measure was initiated. The Commission has two months 
after receiving a complete notification from a member state to conclude a preliminary 
examination of the notified aid.326 All aid that was notified to the Commission shall 
only be implemented after the Commission has authorised it.327 In the event that the 
Commission, after its preliminary examination, find that no doubts are raised as to 
the compatibility of the notified aid with the internal market, the Commission shall 
decide that the aid measure is compatible with the internal market.328 However, 
should the Commission, based on its preliminary examination, be unable to decide 
that the planned aid is compatible with the internal market; the Commission will start 
the formal investigation procedure set out in Article 108(2) of the TFEU.329 During the 
formal investigation the Commission will gather all necessary information which will 
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allow it to assess the compatibility of the planned state aid measure.330 All interested 
parties331 are allowed to submit comments during the formal investigation. The 
member state which planned to provide the aid is not allowed to implement the aid 
until the Commission has reached a final decision on its compatibility with the 
internal market.332 The Commission will only close its formal investigation when it 
has made a final decision as to the compatibility of the aid measure with the internal 
market. It can decide firstly, that the notified measure does not constitute aid, 
secondly, that the aid is compatible with the internal market and thirdly, that the 
notified aid is not compatible with the internal market.333 Should the Commission 
decide that the aid is not compatible with the internal market, it will require the 
member state not to put the aid into effect.334 
In regard to existing aid, member states are required to provide the Commission with 
all necessary information which will enable the Commission to review the exiting aid 
measure.335 If the Commission, after having received such information and the 
review of the aid measure, concludes that it is not or no longer compatible with the 
internal market, it shall inform the member state concerned of this decision. The 
member state should be provided with one month to submit its comments on the 
Commission’s decision.336 If the Commission is still of the view that the existing aid 
measure is not or no longer compatible with the internal market, it has to make 
certain proposals to the member state concerned in regard to the aid measure. The 
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Commission may recommend (i) substantive amendments to the existing aid 
measure, (ii) to the member state to follow the procedural requirements in the TFEU 
and the Procedural Regulation or (iii) that the member state abolishes the aid 
measure.337 If the member state concerned accepts the Commission’s 
recommendation it will be bound by the acceptance and if not, the Commission may 
start a formal investigation into the aid measure.338  
There is no doubt that the codification of the procedural rules created legal certainty 
in regard to the application of the state aid prohibition. It sets out clearly when, how 
and under what circumstances member states are obliged to follow the procedural 
rules and what could happen if member states do not follow the rules. This makes it 
essentially impossible for member states to argue that they were not aware of 
particular procedural aspects of the state aid prohibition.  
7 The state aid prohibition and its application to Public Undertakings and 
Services of General Economic Interest   
 
7 1 Public Undertakings  
 
The EU, like other countries, also draws a distinction between public and private 
undertakings. A public undertaking, the equivalent of an SOE in South Africa, has 
been defined as "any undertaking over which the public authorities may exercise 
directly or indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their 
financial participation therein, or the rules which govern it".339 All other undertakings 
outside of this definition are private undertakings. Despite this distinction, EU law 
does not allow for differential treatment of private and public undertakings in regard 
to competition rules in general and state aid rules in particular. This has been 
established in EU primary legislation, case law and Commission communications. 
Koenig and Von Wendland are thus correct when they state that the “supranational 
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legal tools” which the Commission can use to spot any hidden advantages given to 
public undertakings by member states and which could infringe the state aid 
prohibition are numerous.340 
 
- Firstly, Article 106 (1) of the TFEU does not allow differential treatment of public 
undertakings. It provides that in the case of public undertakings and all undertakings 
to which member states grant special or exclusive rights, the member states may not 
enact or maintain in force any measure contrary to the competition and state aid 
rules contained in Articles 101 to 109. All undertakings which are entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest and those which have the 
character of a revenue-producing monopoly are subjected to the competition rules, 
for as long as the application of the competition rules does not obstruct the 
performance of the particular tasks assigned to these undertakings.341  
-Secondly, the EU courts have on numerous occasions342 confirmed that EU 
competition rules apply to all undertakings that conduct economic activities, 
regardless of their ownership.343 The concept of an undertaking is comprehensively 
discussed in chapter two above.344 It suffices to state here that in Höfner v 
Macrotron345 the CJEU made clear that the concept of an undertaking encompasses 
every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the 
entity and the way in which it is financed”.346 And in Steinike und Weinlig v 
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Germany347 the CJEU also confirmed that the treaty provisions on state aid covers 
all private and public undertakings and all their production.  
- Thirdly, the Commission also confirmed this position in its directive on the 
transparency of financial relations between member states and public 
undertakings.348 The Commission recognised that public undertakings play a 
substantial role in the national economy of the member states and that member 
states in some situations may grant special or exclusive rights to particular 
undertakings.349 It also recognised that these undertakings are often in competition 
with private undertakings.350 Therefore the Commission emphasised that the treaty 
eliminates any unjustified discrimination between public and private undertakings in 
the application of the rules on competition.351 The Commission, however points out 
that the complex nature of financial relations between public authorities and public 
undertakings may cause difficulties when the Commission has to exercise its 
supervisory duties to ensure no state aid is awarded which is incompatible with the 
internal market.352 Consequently the Commission noted that fair and effective 
application of the state aid rules to both private and public undertakings alike can 
only be achieve if the financial relation between public authorities of member states 
and public undertakings are transparent.353 Especially since member states are able 
to exercise influence over public undertakings in various ways such as (i) financial 
participation or (ii) rules governing the management of the undertaking.354 The 
Commission noted that such transparency would ensure that a clear distinction is 
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354 Joined cases 188 to 190/80 French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and 




made between the role of the member state as public authority and its role as a 
market participant355 because member states may act by either (i) exercising their 
public powers or (ii) by carrying on economic activities of an industrial or commercial 
nature.356 In order to determine in which capacity the member state is acting, the 
activities of the member state need to be considered.357 This distinction is important 
because the competition and state aid rules will apply as normal if the member state 
carries on economic activities on a market, while specific rules will apply when it 
exercises its public powers.  
 
A transparent relation between member states and public undertakings will also 
ensure that the Commission has knowledge of: 
 
 “(a) public funds made available directly by public authorities to the public 
undertakings concerned; 
(b) public funds made available by public authorities through the intermediary of 
public undertakings or financial institutions; 
(c) the use to which these public funds are actually put.”358 
 
The objective of the directive is to promote the effective application to public 
undertakings of the state aid provisions contained in Articles 107 and 108 of the 
TFEU.359 The directive, together with the state aid provisions of the TFEU and the 
various judgements of the CJEU, ensures the equal treatment of both public and 
private undertakings.360  
 
 
                                                          
355 Para 8 of Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial 
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356 Case 118/85 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [1987] ECR- 2599 para 7. 
357 Case 118/85 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [1987] ECR -2599 para 7. 
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7 2 Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI)  
 
The notion of SGEI has been developed in case law,361 primary EU legislation362 and 
instruments363 issued by the EU Commission.364 Nevertheless, no particular 
definition has been ascribed to the concept. What are SGEI and why do they exist in 
the EU? The EU Commission states: “Services of general economic interest (SGEI) 
are economic activities that public authorities identify as being of particular 
importance to citizens and that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under 
different conditions) if there were no public intervention.”365 Article 14 of the TFEU 
provides the clearest reason for the existence of SGEI in the EU where it states that 
SGEI are rooted in the shared values of the EU and they play a central role in 
promoting social and territorial cohesion. The article encourages the EU and its 
member states to take care that SGEI operate on the basis of principles and 
conditions which enable them to fulfil their missions. In essence SGEI are public 
services which are entrusted by member states to either private or public 
undertakings and are “performed for an economic consideration”366  
 
Article 1 of Protocol 26 of the TFEU provides member states with a wide discretion to 
designate a service as a SGEI, “tailored as closely as possible to the needs of the 
users.”367 Member states may also exercise their discretion to designate a service 
                                                          
361See Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft 
Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747; European Commission v Hungary (C-171/17) EU:C:2018:881; BUPA v 
Commission [2008] E.C.R. II-8; and Chronopost SA v Union Francaise de l'Express (UFEX) (C-83/01 P) 
EU:C:2003:388  
362 See Protocol No. 26; Articles 14 and 36; and Article 106(2) of the TFEU.  
363 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the 
European Union (2012/C 8/4);  Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation 
granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest Official 
Journal of the European Union (2012/L 7/3); European Union framework for State aid in the form of public 
service compensation (2011) Official Journal of the European Union (2012/C 8/15); and Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general 
economic interest Official Journal of the European Union (2012/L 114/8). 
364For more on the concept see also MT Karayigit “The notion of Services of General Economic Interest” (2009) 
15(4) European Public Law 575-595. 
365 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/public_services_en.html (accessed on 6 February 2020). 
366  European Commission v Hungary (C-171/17) EU:C:2018:881. 
367 European Commission v Hungary (C-171/17) EU:C:2018:881 para 28. See also T Muller “Efficiency 





which is already offered on the market as a SGEI if it can show that “unsatisfactory 
conditions not consistent with the public interest, as it is defined by the Member 
State concerned”368 are present. This discretion gives recognition to the differences 
in the social position and economic development in each member state. It is further 
based on the notion that only a member state knows what public services it needs to 
deliver to its people to ensure social cohesion.369 It is also this wide discretion that 
makes an outright definition of SGEI impossible since the concept will certainly be 
differently implemented in each member state, depending on the needs of its 
citizens. As a result of the discretion of member states, SGEI exist in a wide variety 
of areas such as public transport services, postal services370 and national electricity 
supply.371 However, the discretion of the member state is open to challenge if the 
Commission is of the opinion that the member states wrongly designated a service 
as a SGEI.372  
 
A number of important statements on SGEI by the CJEU in European Union v 
Hungary373 provide greater clarity on the position which SGEI occupies in the EU. 
- Firstly, “services may be considered to be services of general economic interest 
only if they are provided in application of a special task in the public interest 
entrusted to the provider by the Member State concerned. This assignment should 
be made by way of one or more acts, the form of which is determined by the Member 
State concerned, and should specify the precise nature of the special task.” 374 
- Secondly, “[s]ervices of a general economic interest are entrusted with important 
tasks relating to social and territorial cohesion. The performance of these tasks 
should not be obstructed…”375 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Quarterly 39-46 and N Fiedziuk “Towards decentralization of state aid control: the case of services of general 
economic interest” (2013) 36(3) World Competition 387-408. 
368 European Commission v Hungary (C-171/17) EU:C:2018:881 paras 56-57. 
369 See in this regard the comments made by M Aleksander “Services of General Economic Interest: Towards 
Common Values” (2016) 1 European State Aid Law Quarterly 28. 
370 Case C-340/99 TNT Traco v Poste Italiane [2001] ECR 1-4109 para 53. 
371 Case C-159/94 Commission v France [1997] ECR 1-5815. 
372 M Aleksander “Services of General Economic Interest: Towards Common Values” 2016 1 European State 
Aid Law Quarterly 23 and W Sauter “The Altmark package mark II: new rules for state aid and the 
compensation of services of general economic interest” 2012 33(7) European Competition Law Review 307. 
373 European Commission v Hungary (C-171/17) EU:C:2018:881. 
374 European Commission v Hungary (C-171/17) EU:C:2018:881 para 70. 




- Lastly, member states have the freedom “to define, in conformity with [EU] law, 
what they consider to be services of general economic interest, how those services 
should be organised and financed, in compliance with State aid rules, and which 
specific obligations they should be subject to.”376 This freedom of the member states 
is also referenced by the EU Commission in its Communication on the application on 
the application of the state aid rules to compensation granted for SGEI.377  
 
For purposes of this study it is important to determine how and to what extent EU 
state aid rules apply to SGEI. This is important since providers of SGEI in most 
instances have public service obligations which can in several respects be compared 
to those of SOEs in South Africa. 
 
7 2 1 SGEI and the EU state aid rules 
 
The main governing instruments of SGEI for purposes of state aid control are the 
TFEU378 and the so-called “SGEI package”,379 referring to the “SGEI 
Communication”,380 “SGEI Decision”,381 “SGEI Framework”382 and “SGEI de minimis 
Regulation”.383  
 
                                                          
376 European Commission v Hungary (C-171/17) EU:C:2018:881 para 72. 
377 See Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the 
European Union C8/4 (2012) para 2. 
378 See Protocol No. 26; Articles 14 and 36; and Article 106(2) of the TFEU.  
379 For more on the “SGEI package” see A Sinnaeve “What's New in SGEI in 2012 - An Overview of the 
Commission's SGEI Package” (2012) 2 European State Aid Law Quarterly 347-367; D Geradin “Public 
compensation for services of general economic interest: an analysis of the 2011 European Commission 
framework” (2012) 11(2) European State Aid Law Quarterly 51-62; D Geradin “The new SGEI package” 2012 
3(1) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 1-3; and W Sauter “The Altmark package mark II: new 
rules for state aid and the compensation of services of general economic interest” 2012 33(7) European 
Competition Law Review 307-313. 
380 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the 
European Union (2012/C 8/4). 
381 Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the 
European Union (2012/L 7/3).  
382 European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (2011) Official Journal 
of the European Union (2012/C 8/15).  
383 Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of 
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The EU Commission states that: 
“For certain services of general economic interest to operate on the basis of 
principles and under conditions which enable them to fulfil their missions, financial 
support from the State may prove necessary to cover some or all of the specific costs 
resulting from the public service obligations.”384 
 
SGEI can be provided by both private and public undertakings without requirements 
for state financing, while other providers will need compensation to deliver SGEI.385 It 
is when there is provision of financial support by public authorities in member states 
to the providers of SGEI, that the state aid rules may become applicable since the 
compensation may constitute state aid.386  
 
With their entrusted mission in mind, a special set of state aid rules apply to SGEI. 
State aid in this context is treated more leniently than in other situations.387 This 
more lenient approach is expressed in Article 106 (2) of the TFEU which provides 
that: 
 
“Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest 
or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the 
rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as 
the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of 
the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be 
affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union.” 
 
                                                          
384 Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the 
European Union (2012/L 7/3) para 2. 
385 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the 
European Union C8/4 (2012) para 2. 
386 For when state aid rules may become applicable to SGEI, see N Phedon “Competition and Services of 
General Economic Interest in the EU: Reconciling Economics and Law” (2003) 2 European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 183-210. 
387 See Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft 
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Furthermore, the lenient application of state aid rules to SGEI endures in a number 
of other primary sources, including instruments issued by the Commission388 and the 
fundamental case of Altmark Trans and Regierungpräsidium Magdeburg v 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark (Altmark).389 These sources place financial support 
granted to the providers of SGEI outside the scope of the EU state aid rules, if 
certain criteria are met. In Altmark the CJEU dealt comprehensively with the 
application of state aid rules to public compensation for SGEI and provided clarity on 
when SGEI enjoy different treatment under the state aid rules. The court stated that 
for public compensation to escape classification as state aid it must meet the 
following criteria: 
- “First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to 
discharge, and the obligations must be clearly defined.” 
- “Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated 
must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it 
conferring an economic advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking over 
competing undertakings.” 
- “Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of 
the costs incurred in the discharge of public service obligations, taking into account 
the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations. 
Compliance with such a condition is essential to ensure that the recipient 
undertaking is not given any advantage which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by strengthening that undertaking's competitive position.” 
- “Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations, in a 
specific case, is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would 
                                                          
388 See Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the 
European Union (2012/L 7/3).); European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service 
compensation (2011) Official Journal of the European Union (2012/C 8/03); Communication from the 
Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision 
of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the European Union 2012/C 8/02; Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general 
economic interest Official Journal of the European Union (2012/ L 114/8); and Communication from the 
Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision 
of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the European Union 2012/C 8/02. 
389Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft 
Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747. For an analysis of this case see E Szyszczak “Altmark assessed” in E Szyszczak 




allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least 
cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the 
basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately 
provided with means…so as to be able to meet the necessary public service 
requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into 
account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.” 
 
If compensation by a public authority falls short of any of the Altmark criteria, the 
compensation falls within the ambit of the state aid rules. The rules will apply in the 
same way as it would to any other state aid. This includes compliance with all 
procedural rules of the state aid control system by the public authority of the member 
state unless it can be absolved from the state aid rules via the “SGEI package” which 
refer to the legislative instruments issued by the Commission. Overcompensation by 
the public authorities of member states for SGEI should therefore be avoided since 
the state aid rules can become applicable for the excess even if it is not applicable to 
the compensation which covers the cost of fulfilling the public service obligations.390 
  
Firstly, the Commission adopted an SGEI-specific de minimis Regulation391 which 
states that certain compensation measures do not constitute State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107 of the TFEU. The Commission felt that it was appropriate to 
introduce this measure, alongside the general de minimis Regulation,392 as there 
was a need for specific de minimis rules for undertakings providing SGEI.393 The 
Regulation provides that any aid granted to undertakings for the provision of a SGEI 
is deemed not to meet all the criteria of Article 107(1) of the TFEU and is exempted 
from the notification requirement of Article 108(3) of the TFEU, if the total amount of 
                                                          
390 Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the 
European Union (2012/L 7/3) para 16. See also K Van Buiren, M Gerritsen & J Van der Voort “The Prohibition 
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aid does not exceed EUR 500 000 over any period of three fiscal years and the other 
listed requirements are met.394 
 
Secondly, the Commission issued a Decision395 which sets out the conditions under 
which public service compensation granted to undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of SGEI is compatible with the internal market and exempt from the 
requirement of notification in Article 108(3) of the TFEU.396 The exemption under the 
decision will only be applicable if the period of the entrustment of the SGEI does not 
exceed 10 years397 and the exemption will only continue if the conditions for the 
application of the Commission’s decision continue to be met.398 Aid covered by the 
exemptions includes: 
(a) aid which does not exceed an annual amount of EUR 15 million for the provision 
of SGEI in areas other than transport and transport infrastructure;399 
(b) aid for SGEI provided by hospitals; 
(c) aid for SGEI to meet social needs; 
(d) aid for air or maritime links to islands under limited circumstances; and 
(e) aid for airports and ports under limited circumstances.400 
                                                          
394 Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 
and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings 
providing services of general economic interest interest Official Journal of the European Union (2012/L 114/8). 
395 Commission Decision 2012/21/EU of 21 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to 
certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest Official Journal of the 
European Union (2012/L 7/3). 
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granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest Official 
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granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest Official 
Journal of the European Union (2012/L 7/3). 
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the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation 
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Furthermore, the amount of compensation is not allowed to exceed what is 
necessary to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, 
including a reasonable profit, with the Decision providing the method on how to 
determine the net cost.401  
 
Lastly, the principles set out in the EU framework for State aid in the form of public 
service compensation (2011)402 apply to public service compensation in so far as it 
constitutes state aid not covered by the aforementioned Commission Decision or the 
SGEI-specific de minimis Regulation. The framework spells out the conditions under 
which such state aid can be found compatible with the internal market403 and applies 
to public service compensation in the field of air and maritime transport. The 
framework states that:  
 
“State aid falling outside the scope of Decision 2012/21/EU may be declared 
compatible with Article 106(2) of the Treaty if it is necessary for the operation of the 
service of general economic interest concerned and does not affect the development 
of trade to such an extent as to be contrary to the interests of the Union.”404 
 
The special regime regarding SGEI will be further considered in developing the 
proposal for state aid regulation for South Africa in chapter 5. It shows that there may 
be good reasons to sometimes leave the consideration of the promotion of public 
interest to the executive or the politicians and to exclude them from consideration by 
regulators, it will assist the determination of the types of aid and entities that should 
be regulated in South Africa, and it will assist regulators in determining public interest 
even where they have jurisdiction to consider whether certain state aid is proper.  
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8 Enforcement of the EU state aid prohibition  
 
The Commission405 is the watchdog for competition in the EU. It is responsible for 
enforcing the EU state aid rules and to ensure the consistent application of the state 
aid rules. Its members are chosen for a period of five years from among the 
nationals of the member states on the basis of a system of strictly equal rotation 
between the member states which reflects the demographic and geographical range 
of all the member states.406  
 
Article 17 of the TEU provides that the Commission shall ensure the application of 
the various treaties and oversee the application of EU law under the control of the 
CJEU. The Commission is thus responsible for the “day-to-day application” of EU 
competition rules. The CJEU pointed out in Steinike und Weinlig v Germany407 that 
the intention of the EEC Treaty, in providing through Article 93 (now Article 108) for 
aid to be kept under constant review and supervision by the Commission, is that a 
finding that aid may be incompatible with the common market, is to be arrived at by 
means of an appropriate procedure which it is the Commission' s responsibility to set 
in motion. Any decision by the Commission, however, is subject to review by the 
CJEU.408 The Commission is thus the administrative enforcement body of the state 
aid rules while the CJEU is the judicial arm responsible for overseeing the proper 
and correct application of the state aid rules.  
 
Since uniform interpretation of the EU treaties is a fundamental principle of the EU, it 
is expected that certain matters are dealt with only on Union level with limited and 
regulated participation by national authorities. The EU state aid rules fall within this 
category. Persistency, consistency, uniformity and absence of political pressure from 
governments of member states are some of the reasons why the enforcement of EU 
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state aid rules have been the responsibility of only the Commission since their 
enactment by the EEC Treaty.409 
 
National courts, however, were given a limited role410 in interpreting and enforcing 
state aid rules, since Union citizens may invoke Union law in their national courts. 
Enforcement of the state aid rules by national courts is referred to as “private 
enforcement”. Competitors of beneficiaries of illegal aid may approach the national 
courts for relief and the national courts have to refer to the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU when making decisions on these matters. Therefore, there is no paucity of 
jurisprudence on the EU state aid rules that emanates from the national courts of 
member states.  
 
The involvement of national courts is the result of the “direct effect” principle,411 
which has been described as “the possibility of natural or legal persons in Member 
States being able to rely on Treaty provisions”.412 This ability of Union citizens to 
invoke Union law in their national courts was described in Van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratis Der Belastingen.413 The CJEU stated that: 
 
 “…the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit 
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only 
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights 
which become part of their legal heritage.”414 
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Although national courts cannot make decisions on the compatibility415 of aid with the 
internal market, as that is the exclusive competence of the Commission, they do 
however have a “complementary” role. In Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou AE (DEI) v 
European Commission416 the Court of Justice said: 
 
 “It should be noted, first of all, that, in accordance with settled case-law, 
implementation of the State aid control system is a matter, first, for the Commission 
and, second, for the national courts, each of which fulfil complementary and 
separate roles” 
 
National courts protect the rights of individuals (natural and corporate individuals) 
who may be affected when a member state has given aid that is possibly in breach 
of the procedural rules of Article 108 of the TFEU, until the Commission has had an 
opportunity to make a final decision regarding the compatibility of such aid with the 
internal market.417 
 
Steinike & Weinlig v Federal Republic of Germany (Steinike & Weinlig)418 was one of 
the first cases to shed light on the competence of national courts to apply Article 107 
of the TFEU (at the time Article 92 of the EEC Treaty). The CJEU considered the 
competence of national courts to invoke the state aid rules in the national legal 
system whether at the behest of a private party or by its “own motion”.419 The court 
stated that despite certain limitations, national courts can be called upon to interpret 
the provisions of Article 107. The court further stated that proceedings which require 
a national court to interpret the state aid rules in order to determine whether state aid 
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was introduced without observance of the preliminary examination procedure 
provided for in the treaty, may be commenced before national courts.420  
 
Since Steinike & Weinlig many other cases have dealt with the competence of 
national courts with regard to the state aid rules. In Syndicat français de l'Express 
international (SFEI) and others v La Poste and others421 the court stated that 
national courts must ensure individuals that any infringement of the procedural rules 
of Article 93 (3) of the EEC Treaty (now Article 108 (3) of the TFEU) by a member 
states will result in actions being taken by the national courts. In Kirsammer-Hack v 
Sidal422 the CJEU again emphasised the important role which national courts can 
play in the enforcement of the state aid rules. The court said that even though the 
implementation and enforcement of Union state aid rules is a matter for the 
Commission, the Commission's powers in regard to the state aid rules do not 
preclude individuals from bringing proceedings before a national court in order to 
determine whether a state measure which was not notified should have been notified 
in accordance with Article 93(3) of the EEC Treaty (now Article 108 (3) of the TFEU). 
In Fédération nationale du commerce extérieur des produits alimentaires and 
Syndicat national des négociants et transformateurs de saumon v France423 the 
CJEU stated that national courts must offer to individuals, who may have been 
affected by a breach of the procedural requirements of the state aid rules, a prospect 
that all the necessary inferences will be drawn, in accordance with their national law, 
as regards the validity of the state aid measures, the recovery of financial support 
granted in disregard of the procedural requirements and possible interim 
measures.424 
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The Commission also made its intention of greater cooperation with national courts 
in state aid matters known through its first notice on the matter in 1995.425 The 
purpose of the notice was to offer guidance on cooperation between national courts 
and the Commission in state aid matters. The notice also “introduced mechanisms 
for cooperation and exchange of information between the Commission and national 
courts.”426 The Commission noted that there were frequent concerns that its final 
decision in state aid matters are reached long after the distortion of competition has 
caused injury to third parties.427 The Commission also recognised that it was not 
always in the position to act promptly to protect the interest of third parties.428 It 
therefore recognised that national courts are better placed to ensure that 
infringement of the procedural aspect of the state aid rules are dealt with and 
remedied.429 The Commission noted that while it must examine all aid measures 
which fall under Article 107 (1)430 in order to assess their compatibility with the 
internal market, national courts must ensure that member states comply with their 
procedural obligations.431 It made clear that national courts must safeguard the rights 
which individuals enjoy as a result of the direct effect of the “standstill clause” in 
Article 108 (3).432 It advised that national courts should use all appropriate devices 
and remedies and apply all relevant provisions of national law to give effect to the 
direct effect of the “standstill clause”.433 The advantages listed by the Commission 
for individuals if national courts were more involved in state aid measures include: 
(i) that claims for damages as a result of a breach of the “standstill clause” may be 
brought before national courts since the Commission cannot award damages;  
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(ii) that courts may grant interim relief, for example by ordering the freezing or return 
of monies illegally paid and may be able to order termination of infringements of the 
state aid rules more quickly;  
(iii) that a claim under Union law and one under national law may be combined, 
which is impossible with a matter before the Commission; and  
(iv) that national courts may award costs to the successful party while this is not the 
case with a matter before the Commission.434  
 
The crucial role which national courts could play in the enforcement of EU state aid 
was also emphasised by the CJEU in Andrea Francovich et al. v Italy when it said: 
 
“The full effectiveness of Community rules [now Union rules] would be impaired and 
the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were 
unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community 
law for which a Member State can be held responsible.”435 
 
In 2005 the Commission adopted the SAAP, a road map for significant State aid 
reform.436 A central objective of the SAAP is to get member states to reduce the aid 
measures they grant but to instead redirect aid resources to “common interest 
objectives”. The competence of national courts in regard to the state aid rules formed 
a crucial part of the SAAP. The SAAP also envisaged a further role for national 
courts whereby they would be determining whether state aid measures fall within a 
block exemption or under the de minimis rule and are exempted from the notification 
procedure.437 The SAAP states that Article 108 has direct effect in member states 
and it entitles the national courts to either suspend or provisionally order recovery of 
aid which was awarded before the Commission has approved it.438 It also states that 
private litigation on state aid before national courts may increase discipline in the 
field of state aid. In terms of the SAAP the Commission wants national courts to 
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focus on the protection of rights of all interested parties such as competitors of those 
who received unlawful aid and the enforcement of negative decisions439 where aid 
needs to be recovered.440  
As a result of the state aid reform by the SAAP, the Commission replaced its 
cooperation notice which was issued in 1995.441 The aims of the previous 
cooperation notice are now being pursued by a new Commission Notice of 2009 and 
the national courts have been given a significant role in enforcing the state aid 
rules.442 Firstly, it is settled that the national courts have the powers to interpret the 
notion of state aid,443 since the Commission is of the view that case law, Commission 
guidance and decision making practice provide valuable assistance to national 
courts and potential claimants for this purpose.444 And if national courts are unsure 
whether a measure constitutes state aid, they may ask for a Commission opinion to 
assist them.445 Secondly, when proceedings in a national court are dealing with the 
applicability of the BER446 or an existing or approved aid scheme, the national court 
may assess whether all the conditions of the BER or the scheme are met.447 The 
national court may ask the Commission for an opinion if it has doubts concerning the 
applicability of a Block Exemption Regulation or an existing or approved aid 
scheme.448 Thirdly, national courts may be asked to intervene where a member state 
has granted aid without respecting the standstill obligation.449 Such intervention will 
protect the rights of individuals affected by the unlawful implementation of the aid.450 
Affected individuals are in most instances the competitors of the beneficiaries of 
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state aid and the Commission views the protection of their rights as one of the most 
important roles of national courts in the enforcement of state air rules.451 Hence, the 
Commission is of the view that national courts are the perfect forum to get redress 
for competitors and other third parties affected by unlawful state aid, especially since 
a number of remedies are available to the affected parties in the national courts. 
These remedies are (i) preventing the payment of unlawful aid; (ii) recovery of 
unlawful aid (regardless of compatibility); (iii) recovery of illegality interest; (iv) 
damages for competitors and other third parties; and (v) interim measures against 
unlawful aid.452 Lastly, national courts also play an important role in the enforcement 
of recovery decisions made by the Commission when the member state fails to 
implement the Commission’s recovery order.453  
 
It is submitted that greater involvement of the national courts in the enforcement of 
the state aid rules, is a welcome development of state aid reform. It is further 
submitted that greater involvement of the national courts will not only assist the 
Commission in its enforcement of the state aid rules, but those injured454 may 
receive expedient and prompt relief. 
 
9 The position on state aid control outside of the EU: the case of the United 
States of America and the World Trade Organization (WTO)  
 
The EU state aid rules are arguably the world’s only comprehensive state aid control 
regime. The EU has been described as the only “public authority” in the world which 
has a state aid control regime forming part of its broader competition policy.455 
Bartosch states that the EU state aid control regime can be found “nowhere else on 
this planet.”456 Accordingly a full international comparison is not possible.457 Two 
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legal phenomena that have some of the traits of the European state aid regime 
nevertheless can be described briefly namely:  
- the US commerce clause; and  
- the WTO subsidy regime..  
This study does not intend to provide a full analysis of these aspects but a concise 
description is provided to show the uniqueness of the EU state aid regime. 
 
 9 1 The US Commerce Clause458 
 
9 1 1 What does the Commerce Clause regulate? 
Ganoulis and Martin observes that the general prohibition of state aid by the TFEU 
treaty stands in stark contrast to the absence of controls over subsidies or other aid 
granted by the individual States in the United States.459 Subsidies and tax 
exemptions to corporations by individual States and even the United States federal 
government, however, are not unknown concepts.460 This is for instance illustrated 
by cases such as DaimlerChrysler Corporation v Charlotte Cuno (DaimlerChrysler 
case)461 and Bacchus Imports Ltd v Dias.462 
 
The United States has a “Commerce Clause” as part of its Constitution463 which 
protects interstate commerce and competition. The “Commerce Clause” authorises 
Congress “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
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States, and with the Indian Tribes”.464 Not only does the “Commerce Clause” provide 
Congress with the power to regulate interstate commerce but States are also limited 
when it comes to discrimination against interstate commerce through the use of 
State regulations.465 It is thus established law that the Commerce Clause “has a 
negative aspect that denies the States the power to unjustifiably discriminate against 
or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”466 The very nature of the 
Commerce Clause has been summarized as follows: 
 
“Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every 
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free 
access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his 
exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. 
Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing 
area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of 
the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.”467 
 
In New Energy Company of Indiana v Limbach468 the Supreme Court stated that “the 
Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism, that is, regulatory measures 
designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state 
competitors.”  
 
The Commerce Clause thus prohibits those “chief evils” which may impact on 
interstate trade and competition. Any actions by a federal State to protect its 
residents are not outright prohibited though, but it has to be within the confines of the 
Commerce Clause.469 
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In the abovementioned DaimlerChrysler case, for example, both the city of Toledo 
and the State of Ohio offered municipal tax exemptions and state franchise tax 
credits to DaimlerChrysler Corporation, which at the time manufactured Jeeps. The 
purpose of the tax benefits was to encourage DaimlerChrysler to expand its 
operations in the city of Toledo. Local and state taxpayers challenged the offered tax 
benefits on the basis that it violated the “Commerce Clause” of the Constitution of 
the United States. The complainants claimed that the tax breaks depleted the State 
and the local treasuries to which they contributed and “diminishes the total funds 
available for lawful uses and imposes disproportionate burdens on them”. The 
District Court found that neither of the tax benefits violated the “Commerce Clause”, 
while a Court of Appeals found that only the state franchise tax credit violated the 
Commerce Clause. The matter was brought to the United States Supreme Court 
since DaimlerChrysler wanted a review of the invalidation of the franchise tax credit 
and the complainants sought to review the upholding of the property tax exemption. 
Even though the Supreme Court dismissed the complainants’ challenge on the basis 
that they did not have standing,470 it still made observations as to “policy decisions 
concerning state spending”. The court stated that it is unclear whether the tax breaks 
complained of in the case do in fact deplete the treasury since the aim of those tax 
benefits was to “spur economic activity” which then may lead to increases in 
government revenue.471 The court made reference to one of its classic statements 
made in 1938: “but the interest of a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal treasury 
furnishes no basis for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.”472 It 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”” See also DH Schenk “The Cuno Case: a Comparison of 
U.S. Subsidies and European State Aid” (2006) 1 European State Aid Law Quarterly 3 3.   
470 Article III of the Constitution of the United States determines when a person has standing to bring a matter 
before a federal court. The court states that there are many instances in which the court “has denied federal 
taxpayers standing under Article III to object to a particular expenditure of federal funds simply because they 
are taxpayers unless the taxpayer complies with the three elements laid down in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife 
504 U.S. 555 (1992) 560–561 which are (i) the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is  concrete and particularized, (ii) there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of 
the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court; and 
(iii) it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable 
decision. 
471 DaimlerChrysler Corporation  v  Cuno  547 U.S. 332 (2006) 344. 
472 Alabama Power Co. v Ickes 302 U.S. 464 (1938) 477.  
See also Commonwealth of Massachusetts v Mellon 262 U.S. 447 (1923) 601 in which the Supreme Court stated 





also noted that state policymakers, as is the case with federal policymakers, has 
wide discretions to make policy decision on state spending.473 
 
Despite the recognition of the State’s abilities to make policy decision on state 
spending, any State regulatory measures on interstate commerce which discriminate 
against interstate commerce and which create “an economic barrier against 
competition” will probably be invalidated as violating the Commerce Clause, unless 
the State can show that the discrimination is justifiable by a “valid factor unrelated to 
economic protectionism”.474 US citizens have the right to have access to the markets 
in other federal States on “equal terms” to inhabitants of the state.475 US federal 
states therefore may not make rules or regulations which provide home enterprises 
with a “competitive advantage” over those operating outside of their borders. Any 
such “differential treatment” between home enterprises and those from outside the 
border of the State, will likely be in conflict with the Commerce Clause. No State 
should thus have regulations on interstate commerce in place which aim is 
“economic protectionism”.476 Therefore, if any federal State regulation causes 
discrimination against enterprises outside its border it may be viewed as being 
against interstate commerce and could be challenged.477  
 
9 1 2 How does the Commerce Clause compare with EU state aid control? 
 
Schenk argues that the purpose of EU state aid control and the Commerce Clause is 
not so different.478 This is because the state aid prohibition in the EU promotes 
market integration by establishing a level playing field between undertakings and 
prevents member states from distorting competition, while the Commerce Clause 
ensures that the individual States do not disrupt or burden interstate commerce in a 
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discriminatory manner.479 Hence, some parallels can be drawn between EU state aid 
control and the Commerce Clause in the US.  
Firstly, actions by federal States through state legislation may impact on interstate 
commerce and hurt “out-of-state” competitors by creating barriers to interstate trade. 
Labelled “one of the chief evils”, state tariffs and laws may affect interstate 
commerce and “out-of- state” competitors480 just as much as state aid by a member 
state of the EU may affect trade and competition in the EU, as it may give its 
residents, corporate or natural, “an advantage” in the marketplace. Both the US 
Commerce Clause and EU state aid control thus want to protect trade and 
competitors. Trade here means interstate trade in the US and trade between 
member states in the internal market in the EU.  
  
Secondly, these systems have well established rules on the validity or lawfulness of 
a discriminatory state regulatory measure and a state aid measure respectively. In 
the US, the Supreme Court has established such rules over years. In terms of settled 
law the courts have to inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates 
“evenhandedly” with only “incidental” effects on interstate commerce, or 
discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) 
whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether 
alternative means could promote this local purpose as well, without discriminating 
against interstate commerce.481 The burden to show that the state’s regulatory 
measure is discriminatory rests on the party who is challenging it but when 
discrimination is established the burden shifts to the state. Then the state must justify 
the “local benefits” under the regulatory measure.482 In this regard the Supreme 
Court has stated that when the purpose of a state’s regulatory measure has to be 
determined, no special attention will be given to the name, description and 
characterization which was given to the regulatory measure by the state but the 
focus instead will be on the “impact of the law”.483  
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The Supreme Court has over time also established two principles to assist with the 
determination on the validity of a federal State’s regulatory measures. The “virtually 
per se rule of invalidity” invalidates any discriminatory regulatory measures 
implemented by a federal State unless the State can “show that it advances a 
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives.”484 Hence any laws of federal States which treat “out-of-
state” and “in-state” economic activities differently may be declared invalid as Justice 
Blackmun stated in Maine v Taylor:485  
 
“Shielding in-state industries from out-of-state competition is almost never a 
legitimate local purpose, and state laws that amount to “simple economic 
protectionism” consequently have been subject to a “virtually per se rule of 
invalidity.”486 
 
Then there is the “balancing test”, which was established in Pike v Bruce Church 
Inc:487 
 
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting 
interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can 
be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”488 
 
The “balancing test” therefore ensures a balance between the legitimate goals of the 
federal state’s regulatory measures and any burden it may impose on interstate 
commerce. 
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In the EU the position on state aid granted in contravention of Article 107 of the EU 
treaty is simple and straightforward. This is clearly because of the EU’s 
comprehensive legal framework. The EU regime has been comprehensively 
discussed above in this chapter.489 It suffices to state here that the state aid is 
unlawful for as long as it has not been notified and consented to by the Commission 
and it will lead to certain actions by the Commission.490 Even if the Commission 
declares the state aid compatible with the internal market the Commission’s decision 
does not make the aid lawful.491  
  
It is however submitted, that even with the well-established judicial rules in place the 
comparison that can be drawn with EU state aid control is limited especially because 
of the absence of a legislative framework established by Congress (the 
Constitutional Commerce Clause allows Congress to legislate on interstate 
commerce).492 It remains within the discretion of the courts whether a state 
regulatory measure which discriminates against “out-of-state” economic activities is 
invalid or not. Schenk, for example, argues that the restrictions imposed by the 
commerce clause are not straightforward.493 Hence federal States can only be 
guided by judicial precedent and jurisprudence on the Commerce Clause to make 
sure that their regulatory measures on interstate commerce are not against the spirit 
of the Commerce Clause. It is however unlikely that a State will first start researching 
the jurisprudence on the Commerce Clause to avoid any legal challenge before it 
implements or executes regulatory measures which may impact on interstate 
commerce. It is submitted that such a situation would be against the spirit of the 
principle on federalism494 which clearly allows individual States to implement 
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regulatory measures which they view as being to the benefit of the people of the 
state. It is further submitted that States do not necessarily first decide on the 
regulatory measures’ compatibility with the Commerce Clause before implementing 
it. It is only when the state regulatory measures which may discriminate between 
“out-of-state” and “in-state” economic activities are being challenged on the basis 
that they breach the Commerce Clause, that the protection granted to interstate 
commerce by the Commerce Clause is triggered. There is however no guarantee 
that a court will decide against a state’s regulatory measures even if there is some 
level of discrimination between “out-of-state” and “in-state” economic activities495 for 
as long as the State can show that the discrimination is justified by a “valid factor 
unrelated to economic protectionism”.496 
  
Thirdly, like in the EU, there is also a market-participant doctrine497 which a federal 
state could use in its defence against a challenge under the Commerce Clause. The 
market-participant doctrine differentiates between a State's acts in its governmental 
capacity and as a market participant. Only when a State acts in its governmental 
capacity, for example through “burdensome regulation”, do its actions become 
subjected to the Commerce Clause. In the words of the Supreme Court, the 
Commerce Clause was not only meant to authorise Congress to enact laws which 
protect and encourage commerce among the States, but it was also meant to create 
a trade environment free from interference by the States.498 Even though the States 
maintain wide powers to legislate for the benefit of their citizens, the Commerce 
Clause places a limitation upon the power of the States. Therefore a federal state 
may use the doctrine only if any of its policies are challenged under the Commerce 
Clause and while implementing and executing the policies it acted as a market-
participant and not as a sovereign.  
 
In the EU, however, member states do not have to act as market participants in 
order to use the MEIP (when a member state act as a market participant, EU 
                                                          
495 See in this regard the case of DaimlerChrysler Corporation v Cuno 547 U.S. 332 (2006) which is discussed 
in this paragraph. 
496 New Energy Company of Indiana v Limbach 486 U.S. 269 (1988) 274. 
497 For more on the market-participant doctrine see New Energy Co. of Indiana v Limbach 486 U.S. 269 (1988) 
277. 




competition rules will in any event apply as it would under normal market 
circumstances). Member states can use the MEIP as a defence when they have 
granted state aid which is challenged, even while they act as a sovereign. This 
differentiates the MEIP from the market-participant doctrine in the US. The member 
state should only be able to prove that a private investor would have invested in the 
undertaking to which it granted the state aid in the exact same way as it did.499 If the 
member state is successful with using the MEIP as a defence, the state aid will not 
be viewed as being in contravention of the state aid prohibition.500 
  
In conclusion a number of observations can be made in regard to the Commerce 
Clause and EU state aid control.  
Firstly, in essence the Commerce Clause achieves in the United States what the 
state aid rules achieve in the EU, namely undistorted competition and uninterrupted 
interstate commerce.  
Secondly, just as an EU without state aid control rules might have led to “economic 
protectionism” by member states towards their own undertakings, a US without the 
Commerce Clause might also have seen uncontrollable “economic protectionism” by 
federal States of their economies. “Economic protectionism” in the case of the EU 
might have led to unlimited state aid by member states while “economic 
protectionism” in the US might have led to discrimination against out-of-state 
enterprises, products or services by a federal State through the use of State 
regulations.  
Thirdly, although there are some parallels that can be drawn between EU state aid 
control and the US Commerce Clause, there will always be a divergence between 
the US and EU in this area of law. The US, as pointed out by Schenk,501 rarely 
provides financial assistance to undertakings. State financial assistance provided to 
undertakings, is usually in the form of tax exemption by the federal state and the 
states are allowed in terms of the principle of federalism to act in the best interest of 
their inhabitants.  
                                                          
499 See para 4. 4 of this chapter for a discussion on the MEIP in the EU. 
500 See the discussion in para 4.4 of this chapter. 
501 See note 1 in DH Schenk “The Cuno Case: a Comparison of U.S. Subsidies and European State Aid” (2006) 




Lastly, even though the Commerce Clause could be viewed as the US’s equivalent 
of the EU’s state aid rules, it has to be kept in mind though that the state aid rules in 
the EU operate on a supranational level and apply within twenty eight nation states, 
while the US is one nation state with constituent federal states that are given some 
sovereign powers in terms of the constitution.  
 
9 2 WTO subsidy control system  
 
9 2 1 The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
 
The WTO regulates international trade. It is the only other institution that maintains a 
subsidy control system which is in some limited respects comparable to the EU state 
aid rules. This study does not intent to do a detailed analysis of the WTO, its purpose 
and how it functions. It will, however, only focus on its subsidy control system in so 
far as it shows parallels with the EU state aid control system.502 For this purpose, a 
short and concise summary will be provided on how the WTO came into being.503 
 
The WTO subsidy control system has its roots in the General Agreement on Tariff 
and Trade Treaty of 1947 (GATT).504 The GATT, once described as “the principal 
international mechanism for the regulation of international trade”,505 is the 
predecessor of the WTO. After World War II, the United States was at the forefront of 
a drive to form an international trade organization. A draft trade agreement was 
negotiated between twenty three countries, however ultimately only eight countries 
signed the initial GATT agreement, and the United States was one of these 
                                                          
502 A comprehensive and thorough comparison of the WTO subsidy regime and the EC state aid control regime 
has been written by L Rubini The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative 
Perspective (2009). For more comparison of the WTO subsidy system and the EU state aid control regime see L 
Rubini “The International Context of EC State Aid Law and Policy: The Regulation of Subsidies in the WTO” 
in A Biondi, P Eeckhout & J Flynn (eds) The Law of State Aid in the European Union (2003) 149 149. See also 
See T Jaeger “Distinguishing state and private subsidies: a closer look at the state character test” in J Drexl & V 
Bagnoli State-initiated Restraints of Competition (2015) 296 297.  
503 The WTO subsidy rules are also relevant to regional regulation of state aid. See in this regard the discussion 
on the regional economic communities in Africa in para 2.2.1 of chapter 5.   
504 See JH Jackson The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations 
(2000) 94. For further reading on the GATT and Subsidies see also C-H Nam “Export-Promoting Subsidies, 
Countervailing Threats, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” (1987) 1(4) The World Bank 
Economic Review  727  727-743. 
505 PM Kelly & JM Melton “The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” (1990) 25(2) Texas International 




countries.506 Kelly and Melton state that the GATT was meant to be a multilateral 
agreement which “reciprocally reduce tariffs”507 for trade between the contracting 
parties of the GATT. It however evolved to include trade in services, foreign direct 
investment and intellectual property rights.508 The contracting parties held regular 
rounds of negotiation sessions to “discuss trade problems and disputes concerning 
the interpretation and implementation of the GATT rules.”509  
  
The GATT already contained controls over the use of subsidies in international 
trade.510 In terms of Article XVI of the GATT, contracting parties were required to 
notify each other of any subsidies that could increase exports from or reduce imports 
of products to its territory.511 The contracting party who provided the subsidies were 
supposed to provide information on the extent and nature of the subsidization, the 
estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or 
products imported into or exported from a contracting party’s territory and the 
circumstances which made the subsidization necessary.512 In the event that the 
subsidization would have caused a serious threat to the interest of the other parties, 
the contracting party who provided the subsidies had to discuss with the other 
contracting parties the possibilities of limiting the subsidization.513 In order to counter 
subsidies by contracting parties, Article VI (3) of the GATT allowed for countervailing 
duties to be levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy granted directly or 
indirectly for the manufacturing, production or export of any products 
 
By the time of the Tokyo Rounds of negotiations between the contracting parties a 
quest for greater control of subsidies in international trade was led by the United 
                                                          
506 “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” (1989) 14(1) North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation iv. 
507 PM Kelly & JM Melton “The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” (1990) 25(2) Texas International 
Law Journal 317 317. 
508 C Reitz “Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” (1996) 17(2) University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law   555 556- 557.            
509 PM Kelly & JM Melton “The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” (1990) 25(2) Texas International 
Law Journal 317 317. 
510 See Article XVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947. See also JH Jackson The 
Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations (2000) 94.  
511 See Article XVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947. See also C-D Ehlermann & M 
Goyette “The Interface between EU State Aid Control and the WTO Disciplines on Subsidies” (2006) 4 
European State Aid Law Quarterly 695 695. 
512 See Article XVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947. 




States.514 Subsequent to the Tokyo Rounds the contracting parties implemented 
stricter rules for export subsidies.515 These rules were set out in the Agreement on 
interpretation and application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, better known as the GATT Subsidies Code. Coccia states that 
the Subsidies Codes were meant to discourage subsidization of domestic products 
by the GATT contracting parties and to set the rights of those contracting parties 
which were affected by any subsidization.516 The Subsidies Codes contained a 
procedure for an investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any 
alleged subsidy,517 an opportunity for the signatory state against whom the allegation 
was made to clarify the situation518 and the possible action which could be taken 
against the signatory state which granted the subsidization. 
 
The WTO as it is known today came into being after the "Uruguay Round 
Agreements" of 1994 and it does not only deal with trade tariffs but with a number of 
non-tariff issues, such as intellectual property rights.519 It consists currently of 164 
nations. At present subsidized exports in international trade is governed by the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM) and all member 
states have to abide by the subsidy control system set out by this agreement.  
 
The SCM sets out the elements which must be present in order for a subsidy to 
exist. These are (i) that there must be a financial contribution, (ii) by a government or 
any public body within the territory of a Member and (iii) that such financial 
contribution must have led to a benefit.520 The SCM prohibits subsidies which cause 
adverse effects and serious prejudice to the interest of member states.521 Any 
subsidy granted or maintained by a member state must be notified to the Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in order for other member states to 
                                                          
514 JH Jackson The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations 
(2000) 94. 
515 JH Jackson The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations 
(2000) 94. 
516 M Coccia “Settlement of disputes in the GATT under the subsidies code: two panel reports on E.E.C. export 
subsidies” (1986) 16(1) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 2. 
517 Article 2 of the Subsidies Code. 
518 Article 3 of the Subsidies Code. 
519 C Reitz “Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” (1996) 17(2) University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 555 557.           
520 See Article 1 of the SCM.  




evaluate the trade effects of the subsidy and to understand the operation of the 
notified subsidy programme.522 “Prohibited subsidies”523 in terms of the SCM include:  
 
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other 
conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I; 
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use 
of domestic over imported goods. 
 
 Articles 4 and 7 of the SCM set out the remedies which are available to a member 
state when it feels that another member state has granted or is maintaining a 
subsidy. It may request consultation with the member state which is suspected of 
granting or maintaining the subsidy and if no mutual agreement has been reached 
within thirty days after the start of the consultation, then the matter gets referred to 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.524 There will be a determination whether the 
subsidy is indeed a prohibited subsidy with adverse effects to the interest of other 
member states. If it is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the member state in question 
will be asked to withdraw the subsidy525 or take appropriate steps to remove the 
adverse effects.526 The member state against which a decision is made also has the 
possibility to appeal the determination. Beside the remedies in Articles 4 and 7, 
member states affected by subsidies may also implement countervailing duties to 
offset the effect of any subsidy granted by another member state.527  
  
9 2 2 How does the WTO subsidy control system compare with EU state aid 
control? 
  
It is submitted that the two systems are only comparable in a limited sense. The 
WTO subsidy control system is aimed at strengthening its import and export tariff 
controls while the EU state aid control regime is focused on the protection of 
                                                          
522 Article 25 of the SCM. 
523 Article 3 of the SCM. 
524 Article 4 of the SCM. 
525 Article 4.7 of the SCM. 
526 Article 7.8 of the SCM. 




competition and trade within its jurisdiction.528 The state aid regime is “more 
constraining on the EU's Member States than the WTO disciplines on subsidies.”529  
 
There are, however, a number of parallels between the two systems.530 Firstly, both 
prohibit certain government actions by their member states. In the case of the WTO 
it is the provision of subsidies by member states and in the case of the EU it is state 
aid by member states. The difference is clear though in regard to the meaning of the 
two concepts. The WTO system only focuses on subsidies while the EU state aid 
concept is much wider. The EU concept of state aid is comprehensively discussed 
above in this chapter.531 Hence it suffices to state here that the state aid notion 
targets all type of state benefit which an undertaking may receive from a member 
state, including grants, capital injections, loans, and guarantees.  
Secondly, both regimes apply a procedural system which protects member states 
against unilateral action by other member states.532 In the EU it starts with the 
member state’s notification of the state and in the WTO with the notification of 
subsidy programmes to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures.533 If there is no compliance with the procedural rules in the EU, the 
Commission may start investigative proceedings on its own initiative. In the WTO, 
however, a prohibited subsidy must be challenged by a member state first, before 
there are any consequences. The WTO will not start an investigating on its own 
initiative.534  
Lastly, just like the EU535 state aid control regime, the WTO subsidy control regime 
also affords member states the opportunity to have certain subsidies exempted from 
the prohibition. Subsidies that are exempted from the WTO subsidy prohibition 
include (i) assistance for research activities (ii) assistance to disadvantaged regions 
                                                          
528 See T Jaeger “Distinguishing state and private subsidies: a closer look at the state character test” in J Drexl & 
V Bagnoli State-initiated Restraints of Competition (2015)296 300. 
529 C-D Ehlermann & M Goyette “The Interface between EU State Aid Control and the WTO Disciplines on 
Subsidies” (2006) 4 European State Aid Law Quarterly 695 695.   
530 See in this regard also B Slocock “EC and WTO Subsidy Control Systems - Some Reflections” (2007) 2 
European State Aid Law Quarterly 249 249-256. 
531 See the comprehensive discussion on the concept of state aid in para 4.2 of this chapter. 
532 See the discussion in paras 6 and 9.2.1 of this chapter respectively on the procedural rules of the EU state aid 
prohibition and the WTO subsidy control regime. 
533 See the discussions in paras 6 and 9.2.1 of this chapter respectively. 
534 See the discussions in paras 6 and 9.2.1 of this chapter respectively. 




within the territory of a Member; and (iii) assistance to promote adaptation of existing 
facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations.536 
In the light of the above discussion it is safe to argue that the EU state aid control 
regime is unique in its scope, coverage and broad enforcement mechanisms It 
indeed places more constraints on its member states than any of the two systems 
discussed above. 
10 Concluding Remarks 
State aid control has emerged as one of the EU competition policy’s most pivotal 
aspects after it was once considered to be the “Cinderella of competition policy”.537 It 
is now a “visible tool” of economic policy within the EU.538 The economic stability 
within the EU is to a certain extent protected by the strict state aid control regime, 
especially since member states’ actions in regard to both private and public 
undertakings are covered by the state aid rules. 
  
It is more than fifty years since the EEC and the ECSC treaties entered into force 
and although many treaties have been added to the founding treaties of the EU, the 
provisions on state aid have only been subjected to minor changes.539 It 
nevertheless may be asked whether the state aid regime should not be made more 
flexible, in order to accommodate the market differences within the various member 
states. For example, the economy of one member state may be more prone to 
market failure than the economy of another. In such an instance, the member state 
where market failure is likely, may not be able to intervene and provide aid to avoid 
overall failure. Member states however have no option but to subject themselves to 
the state aid rules when they decide to join the EU. The Brexit540 debates have 
shown that not everyone in the EU is happy with the strict rules of the state aid 
control regime. When deciding which side to support, the “Remain Campaign” or the 
                                                          
536 Article 8 of the SCM. 
537 F Wishlade “When Policy Worlds Collide: Tax Competition, State Aid, and Regional Economic 
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538 L Rubini The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Perspective (2009) 59. 
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“internal market”.  
540 Brexit is commonly accepted to refer to Great Britain’s exit from the EU, which is supposed to happen in 




“Leave Campaign”, a former British Justice Secretary, Michael Gove, decided to join 
the “Leave Campaign”. In his widely published decision to do so, he inter alia 
justified his decision on the basis that: “whoever is in Government in London cannot 
support a steel plant through troubled times. I believe that needs to change.”541 Mr. 
Gove was referring to the prohibition which the state aid regime places on the 
provision of aid, which removes the prerogative to decide when and how state aid 
may be allocated from the domestically elected governments of EU member states. 
This is perhaps a sentiment shared by others in the EU as well, but since the state 
aid rules are such an integral part of EU integration, any such sentiments are unlikely 
to bring about significant change to the basic state aid regime. Some of these 
concerns were already taken into account when the SAAP, which modernised the 
state aid rules, was drafted.542 However, some criticism persists. 
 
Nevertheless, the discussion in this chapter has shown that state aid control can play 
a positive role in ensuring that SOEs become more efficient, competitive and 
independent from government funds. Since public undertakings in the EU, which 
remained part of many member states’ economies after the big privatization drive of 
the 1970s and 1980s, do not have a blanket right to request state aid, they are 
forced to ensure that they remain financially independent, viable and efficient. Since 
state aid in the EU can only be provided within the framework of Article 107 of the 
TFEU and Commission Regulations, there will be no unjustified financial “handouts” 
by the member states. 
 
In light of the positive role which state aid control could play to create efficient SOEs, 
the next chapter will propose that it should be possible to transplant the EU concept, 
with domestic considerations, to a single state such as South Africa to assist its 
ailing SOEs.  
END OF CHAPTER  
                                                          
541 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/12166097/david-cameron-cabinet-leave-
brexit-EU-referendum-june-23-live.html (accessed on 20 February 2016). 
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1 Reasons for the proposed extension of the application of competition law to 
state financing of SOEs2  
 
1 1 Protecting of the competitive process 
 
1 1 1 Introduction 
 
Countries all over the world, developed and developing, recognise the fundamental 
need for competition between business enterprises.3 Those benefiting the most from 
competition between firms are consumers. Not only do consumers get products and 
services at competitive prices but competition also stimulates innovation and 
growth.4 Hence, the more competition there exists between business enterprises, the 
                                                          
2 The Cambridge Business English Dictionary (Cambridge University Press 2011) abbreviates state-owned 
enterprises as “SOEs”. Although the discussion in this chapter focuses mostly on “national public entities”, all 
recommendations that are made in this chapter should be extended to “provincial public entities” and entities on 
municipal level as well. Since this study is done from a competition law perspective, commercialised SOEs and 
those operated in accordance with normal business practices are the focus. Therefore when reference is made to 
SOEs it should be understood to refer to these types of SOEs unless it is otherwise clearly stated. 
3 This is indicated by the fact that most developing countries now also have competition laws in place. See “The 
Benefits of Competition Law and Policy for Developed and Developing Countries” (2004) 6(1) OECD Journal 
of Competition Law & Policy 40 40-56. See also D Van Zandt “Competition Law and Policy In Flux: The 
Developing Country Experience” (2006) 26(3) Northwestern Journal of International Law  and Business  493 
493 where he states that, “The most developed nations of today have prospered in large part due to an 
increasingly sophisticated set of competition policies and competition law. The successful implementation of 
competition policy has led to the thriving economies of developed countries, and developing countries aiming to 
do the same can benefit from the lessons of the developed world. The benefits include the stellar growth, 
efficiency and stability of today's world powers.” See also EM Fox “Competition Policy: The Comparative 
Advantage of Developing Countries” (2016) 79(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 69 69-84.  
4 See OECD  “Competition and Poverty Reduction”   
(http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF/WD%282013%295
9&docLanguage=En). In its submission to the OECD’s Global Forum on Competition the United States of 





more these enterprises will try to create new products and services or improve the 
existing ones, all of which benefit the consumer. Competition between business 
enterprises is therefore at the core of a healthy growing economy and as such must 
be nurtured, protected and encourage at all time. In South Africa this is done in 
terms of the Competition Act.5  
 
Since its inception in 1998, the Competition Act6 has done well to protect competition 
in South Africa. Many cartels7 have been uncovered by the Competition Commission 
and the necessary penalties for such actions were imposed.8 Businesses which have 
been abusing their dominant power within markets have been brought to book. 
South African competition authorities have been very successful in addressing 
anticompetitive behaviour. There is therefore no doubt that the Competition Act and 
the actions that have been taken by the competition authorities in terms of the Act 
can be hailed as a great success story.9  
 
 Nevertheless, one issue remains a great challenge to free and fair competition: the 
various benefits which SOEs enjoy as a result of their state ownership.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
whole, but also to improve the lives of individual consumers. Economies with competitive domestic markets 
tend to have higher levels and rates of growth in per capita income.” 
5 See para 5 chapter three for a comprehensive discussion of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. It suffices to 
restate here that the Act provides a regulatory framework for protecting competitors against anti-competitive 
behaviour. Chapter two of the Competition Act list all the prohibited practices. These include agreements or 
concerted practices by firms or decisions by an association of firms which has the effect of substantially 
preventing or lessening competition in a market or fixing of prices or divides the market or leads to collusive 
tendering. The abuse of a dominant position in a market is also prohibited. The Act also provides a regulatory 
framework for mergers because unregulated mergers may “eliminate or stifle” competition.  
6 See para 5 of chapter three for a comprehensive discussion of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
7 Justices Wallis and Pillay describe cartels as follows: “Cartel conduct, where ostensible competitors collude to 
set prices, or terms of trade, or divide markets, fix tenders or engage in similar conduct, is one of the most 
difficult types of anti-competitive behaviour to identify, prove and bring to an end. This is because a successful 
cartel is conducted secretly and its continued success depends on its members not breaking ranks to disclose 
their unlawful behaviour to the competition authorities.” See Agri Wire (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner of 
the Competition Commission [2012] 4 All SA 365 (SCA) 367. 
8 See cases such as Agri Wire (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner of the Competition Commission [2012] 4 All SA 365 
(SCA); Reinforcing Mesh Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission [2013] 2 CPLR 455 (CAC); Pioneer 
Foods (Pty) v Competition Commission in re: Competition Commission v Tiger Brands Ltd t/a Albany; 
Competition Commission v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko [2009] 1 CPLR 239 (CT). 
9 For more on the successes of the competition authorities see for example para 1-7 of the “Annual Report on 
Competition Policy Developments in South Africa” OECD (2017). 
(available at https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2017)51/en/pdf); and par. 1- 5 of “Annual Report 
on Competition Policy Developments in South Africa” OECD (2015).  See also D Lewis Enforcing Competition 




1 1 2 To what extent do competition laws at present apply to SOEs and the 
financing of SOEs by the state in South Africa?  
 
Like many competition law regimes worldwide, South Africa’s competition legislation 
follows closely that of the United States and the EU.10 It regulates certain prohibited 
practices by firms and mergers between firms.11 Hence, the focus of competition law 
in South Africa is the behaviour of firms. In accordance with the Competition Act a 
firm includes a person, partnership or a trust.12 For purposes of the merger regime13 
a firm may be the “acquiring firm”, the “primary acquiring firm”, the “target firm” or the 
“primary target firm” and for purposes of the “prohibited practice regime”14 a firm may 
be a dominant firm or a party to an agreement or concerted practice which prevents 
or lessens competition in a market.  
 
The Competition Act applies to all economic activity within or those having an effect 
within South Africa with very few exceptions.15 At present there is no exact definition 
of what “economic activity” for purposes of the Competition Act entails and 
Sutherland and Kemp correctly point out that not “every activity which has economic 
consequences can be so described.”16 Hence, the authors are of the opinion that this 
needs to change and a more precise meaning needs to be developed for purposes 
of the Competition Act.17 Until that moment, however, for as long as an activity by a 
firm has economic consequences, that activity will come within the ambit of the 
concept. South Africa is not the only country where it is difficult “to draw a hard line 
between economic and non-economic activities” for purposes of competition law. 
This is also a matter which the EU courts have grappled with extensively since the 
EU treaties, like the South African Competition Act, do not have an exact definition of 
                                                          
10 See the discussion of US and EU competition law in para 4.3.2 and para 4.3.7 of chapter three respectively. 
11 See the discussion on South African competition law in para 4.3.8 of chapter three.  
12 Section 1 of the Competition Act 80 of 1998. 
13 Chapter three of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 regulates mergers in South Africa. 
14 Chapter two of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 regulates prohibited practices in South Africa. 
15 The Competition Act lists the following as being exempted from the application of Article 2 (1):  collective 
bargaining and collective agreements as defined in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 as well as concerted 
conduct which is designed to achieve as non-commercial socio-economic objective or similar purpose.  
16 See para 4.4 of chapter 4 of P Sutherland & K Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2017). 
17 See para 4.4 of chapter 4 of P Sutherland & K Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2017). 
For more reasons why perhaps a more precise meaning of “economic activity” is required see para 4.4 of 




the notion.18 Since EU competition law only applies to undertakings which conduct 
economic activity,19 it was important for EU courts to determine what is considered to 
be an economic activity for purposes of EU competition law. South African 
competition law could in future draw on that meaningful interpretation for the 
advancement of its own notion.  
 
The EU Commission, which is responsible for enforcing EU competition law, 
previously stated that the question of how to distinguish between economic and non-
economic services has often been raised but an answer cannot be given a priori and 
requires a case-by-case analysis.20 Therefore there is extensive case-law on the 
concept in the EU. The case- law has established criteria which are used to classify 
the nature of an activity for purposes of EU competition law. The basic test is 
whether the entity in question is engaged in an activity which consists in offering 
goods and services on a given market and which could, at least in principle, be 
carried out by a private actor in order to make profits.21 An activity may thus be of an 
economic nature22 if it requires participation in a market or the carrying on of an 
activity in a market context.23 Case-law24 has thus established a clear link between 
participation in a market and the carrying on of an economic activity.25  
 
                                                          
18 See E Szyszczak, The Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets in the EU (2007) 9-10 and E 
Kloosterhuis “Defining non-economic activities in competition law” (2017) 13(1) European Competition Law 
Journal 117-149. 
19 See Höfner v Macrotron GMBH Case C-41/90 EU:C:1991:161 paras 21-22 
20 Communication on a single market for 21st century Europe--Services of general interest, including social 
services of general interest: a new European commitment COM(2007) 725 final 5. 
21 See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 17 May 2001 in Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner 
v Landkreis Südwestpfalz ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 para 67. See also Case 118/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 
2599 para 7; Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851 para 36; and Case C-309/99 Wouters v 
Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-1577 para 46 and Joined Cases C-
264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01 AOK Bundesverband v Ichthyol Gesellschaft Cordes [2004] E.C.R. 
I-2493 paras 47-51. 
22 See the written Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 10 November 2005 in Federacion 
Espanola de Empresas de Tecnologia Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:453 para 13. 
23 See the written Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 10 November 2005 in Federacion 
Espanola de Empresas de Tecnologia Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:453 para 13. 
24 See Case C-35/96 Commission v Italv [1998] ECR 1-3851 para 37; Joined Cases C 180/98 to C-184/98 
Pavlov and Others [2000] ECR I-6451 para 75 and Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis 
Südwestpfalz ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 para  19. 
25 See the written Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 10 November 2005 in Federacion 
Espanola de Empresas de Tecnologia Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities 




In his written opinion on Federacion Espanola de Empresas de Tecnologia Sanitaria 
(FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities,26 Advocate General Maduro 
stated that it is both the fact that an activity may be carried on by private operators 
and that the activity is carried on under market conditions that is decisive in regard to 
its economic nature.27 He further stated that market conditions are distinguished by 
conduct which is undertaken with the objective of capitalisation, which is 
incompatible with the principle of solidarity. The principle of solidarity which is 
fundamental to both domestic and Union law28 requires that the application of the EU 
competition rules be excluded.29 Boeger30 states that the solidarity principle acts 
both as a "buttress" that shields the member states’ competences from 
EU competition law and upholds the political rights of the member states’ citizens to 
decide collectively how much solidarity they wish to extend towards one another. 
Hence, it has been accepted in the EU that certain activities in the public interest and 
those which forms part of the essential functions of the State are not economic in 
nature. Examples include maintenance and improvement of air navigation safety,31 
the protection of the environment,32 the management of the public social security 
system, including sickness funds33 and sickness funds which are entitled in 
accordance with German legislation to the fixed maximum amounts payable by them 
in respect of the cost of medicinal products.34 Even so, only because certain tasks 
are entrusted to public agencies, the economic nature of such tasks is not 
automatically removed from the scope of competition law. In Höfner v Macrotron 
                                                          
26 ECLI:EU:C:2006:453. 
27 See the written Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 10 November 2005 in Federacion 
Espanola de Empresas de Tecnologia Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:453 para 13. 
28 See “Commission Decision of 19 December 2012 on State aid SA.20829 (C 26/2010, ex NN 43/2010 (ex CP 
71/2006)) Scheme concerning the municipal real estate tax exemption granted to real estate used by non-
commercial entities for specific purposes implemented by Italy” Official Journal of the European Union L 166 
18/06/2013 para 50. 
29 See Advocate General Maduro’s written Opinion on Federacion Espanola de Empresas de Tecnologia 
Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities ECLI:EU:C:2006:453 para 10. See also N 
Boeger “Solidarity and EC competition law” (2007) European Law Review 32(3) 319-340. 
30 N Boeger “Solidarity and EC competition law” (2007) 32(3) European Law Review 320. 
31 See Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft (Eurocontrol) [1994] ECR I-43. 
32 See Case C-343/95 Diego Cali & Figli [1997] ECR I-1547. 
33 Christian Poucet v Assurances Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-
Roussillon ECLI:EU:C:1993:63. 
34 Joined Cases C 264/01, 306/01, 354/01 & 355/01, AOK Bundesverband v Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, 




GMBH 35 the CJEU noted that employment procurement entrusted to a public 
agency, the German Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Federal Office for Employment), is an 
economic activity.36 In Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz37 the court 
stated that the provision of public ambulance service, which in Germany was 
entrusted to the administrative districts of each State ('Landkreise') and the towns 
which are administrative districts in their own right ('Kreisfreie Städte'), constitute an 
economic activity for purposes of the application of competition law. Therefore each 
activity is analysed on a case-by-case basis. Advocate General Maduro stated that 
EU case-law has shown that it is essential to consider each activity carried out 
separately in order to determine whether it should be classified as 
an economic activity and that such a separate classification is even more necessary 
where a public body is concerned, as it can act as an economic operator in relation 
to one activity, while at the same time carrying on functions that are non-economic in 
nature.38 When an entity carries on such “mixed activities”, it is subjected to 
competition law only in respect to the part of its activities which is of an economic 
nature.39 In sum, in the EU as long as an activity consist firstly, of the offering of 
goods and services on a given market and secondly, has the ability to generate 
profit, it will be classified as economic activity40 regardless of the fact that it is 
delivered by a public entity.  
 
                                                          
35 Case C-41/90 EU:C:1991:161 paras 21-22. 
36 Joined cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Christian Poucet v Assurances Générales de France and Caisse 
Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon ECLI:EU:C:1993:63. The court state in this case that: “Sickness 
funds, and the organizations involved in the management of the public social security system, fulfil an 
exclusively social function. That activity is based on the principle of national solidarity and is entirely non-
profit-making. The benefits paid are statutory benefits bearing no relation to the amount of the contributions. 
Accordingly, that activity is not an economic activity and, therefore, the organizations to which it is entrusted 
are not undertakings within the meaning of Articles 85 and 96 of the Treaty.”  
37 Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz ECLI:EU:C:2001:577. The court stated: “In the 
present case, the medical aid organisations provide services, for remuneration from users, on the market for 
emergency transport services and patient transport services. Such activities have not always been, and are not 
necessarily, carried on by such organisations or by public authorities. According to the documents before the 
Court, in the past Ambulanz Glöckner has itself provided both types of service. The provision of such services 
therefore constitutes an economic activity for the purposes of the application of the competition rules laid down 
by the Treaty.” 
38 See Advocate General Maduro’s written Opinion on Federacion Espanola de Empresas de Tecnologia 
Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities ECLI:EU:C:2006:453 para 43. 
39 See Advocate General Maduro’s written Opinion on Federacion Espanola de Empresas de Tecnologia 
Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities ECLI:EU:C:2006:453 para 68. 
40 Case 118/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2599 para 7; Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-




South Africa’s SOEs carry on activities which consist of offering goods and/or 
services on a relevant market and generate profits but also have public interest 
functions. Hence, many of them also have “mixed activities”. SAA, PRASA and the 
SABC are only a few examples. When referring to the phrase “all economic activity” 
as found in section 3(1) of the Competition Act, the court in Standard Bank 
Investments Corporation Ltd v The Competition Commission41 noted that “These 
words of great generality extend its operation to the countless forms of activity which 
people undertake in order to earn a living. But the extension is not unlimited, as the 
existence of the five exceptions (a) to (e) proclaims.” Beside those exceptions listed 
in section 3 of the Competition Act, South Africa like the EU, might also in future 
have to develop specific criteria in order to classify activities as economic even if 
each activity is still evaluated on an individual basis, much like the position in the EU. 
 
Section 81 of the Competition Act extends its application to the state. It provides that 
the Competition Act binds the State. The Competition Tribunal of South Africa made 
it clear though, that Section 81 of the Competition Act only binds the state when it 
acts through a firm such as a state entity which competes in a market firstly through 
the selling of goods and services and secondly by generating a turnover or acquiring 
assets.42 Once these requirements are met, “The Act is so constructed that public 
entities enjoy neither preference nor prejudice by virtue of their official status when 
their actions are considered in terms of the Act.”43  
 
When the state acts through a firm such as an SOE, which competes in a market by 
selling goods or services and generates a turnover or acquires assets, it is 
performing an economic activity and because of section 81, the Competition Act will 
be applicable.44 The economic activities of SOEs therefore fall within the ambit of the 
Competition Act.45 In this regard, the South African competition regime is in line with 
the majority of competition law regimes all over the world, which regulate the 
                                                          
41 2000 JDR 0129 (T) para 9.  
42 AEC Electronics (Pty) Ltd v The Department of Minerals and Energy [2009] 2 CPLR 379 (CT) para 19. 
43 Phutuma Networks (Pty) Ltd v Telkom SA Ltd [2011] 1 CPLR 213 (CT) 221. 
44 See AEC Electronics (Pty) Ltd v The Department of Minerals and Energy [2009] 2 CPLR 379 (CT). 
45 See AEC Electronics (Pty) Ltd v The Department of Minerals and Energy [2009] 2 CPLR 379 (CT) 384 
where the Competition Tribunal of South Africa stated that “it does seem to us that this [Section 81] applies 
when the State acts qua firm i.e. a State owned entity that is a firm that competes in a market by selling goods 




activities of private enterprises and not necessarily the sovereign activities by the 
state.46 Hence, the Competition Tribunal is correct when it noted that it does not 
have the competence to instruct the state how to act or not to act outside of the 
competition law boundaries.47 
 
When the South African government allocates state aid to SOEs, it is neither acting 
as a firm nor is it executing an economic activity which will trigger the application of 
the competition laws. Hence the allocation of state aid is immune from current South 
African competition laws. At present there is very little that can be done to protect 
competitors in South Africa in these circumstances as the granting of state aid is not 
covered by the scope of the competition laws. 
  
1 1 3 Harm to competition that can be done by granting state aid to SOEs 
 
The statement by Peter Sutherland, a former EU Competition Commissioner, on the 
harm which state aid can cause to competition summarises one of the core 
submission of this study when he says that “Government aid to industry can be as 
damaging from the competition point of view as anticompetitive behaviour by 
enterprises, if not more so.”48 Benefits and privileges bestowed on SOEs by the state 
take different forms. Geddes correctly summarises the position with regard to the 
benefits and privileges which SOEs enjoy due to their state ownership: 
 
“Government firms are often endowed with government-granted privileges and 
immunities not enjoyed by private rivals. Those benefits may include monopoly 
                                                          
 46 The exclusion of state acts which may harm competition from the scope of competition law is however 
changing in many jurisdictions as more and more competition law regimes start to regulate even sovereign 
activities by states if such activities could potentially be harmful to competition as long as such regulation does 
not interfere with the state’s ability to govern.  See for example TJ Muris “Principles of a Successful 
Competition Agency” (2005) 72 (1) University of Chicago Law Review 170 where the author states that:  
“While antitrust law most often involves enforcement against private parties, competition agencies must also 
consider the effects of government actions. Protecting competition by focusing solely on private restraints is like 
trying to stop the water flow at a fork in a stream by blocking only one channel. A system that sends private 
price fixers to jail, but makes government regulation to fix prices legal, has not completely addressed the 
competitive problem. It has simply dictated the form that the problem will take.” See also EM Fox and D Healey 
“When the State Harms Competition- the Role for Competition Law” (2014) 79 (3) Antitrust Law Journal 769-
820 
47 AEC Electronics (Pty) Ltd v The Department of Minerals and Energy [2009] 2 CPLR 379 (CT) para 20. 




power, credit guarantees, freedom from paying investors an expected rate of return, 
exemption from bankruptcy, tax exemptions, direct subsidies, and immunity from 
antitrust prosecution, disclosure requirements, and other regulations. All such 
privileges are valuable. Those privileges give government firms an artificial 
competitive advantage over private rivals. By artificial, I mean that government 
firm’s competitive advantage is not based on economic factors such as superior 
management skills, more efficient technology, enhanced innovation, better labor 
relations, better corporate governance, or harder work. The firm’s competitive 
advantage is an artefact of its government-granted benefits.”49  
 
Such benefits and privileges may impact significantly on the private competitors of 
SOEs and on free and fair competition. It provides SOEs which conduct economic 
activity with an “artificial competitive advantage”.50  
 
The EU is the only jurisdiction which has a state aid control regime51 as an integral 
part of its competition framework which ensures that any such harm is limited or 
excluded. However, the threat to free and fair competition by state aid generally, not 
only in the EU, has been widely acknowledged by various scholars.52 It is also clear 
that ordinary competition rules are insufficient to control these risks to the 
competitive process. Sokol, for example, observes that government intervention 
comes with risks to competition and states that the impact of SOEs on competition 
“is significant and will continue to be for some time”.53 Adamantopoulos54 notes that 
the threat posed to free and fair competition by public undertakings (SOEs in South 
Africa) is twofold. 
                                                          
49 RR Geddes “Introduction” in RR Geddes (ed) Competing with the Government: Anticompetitive Behavior and 
Public Enterprises (2004) xi xi. 
50 RR Geddes “Introduction” in RR Geddes (ed) Competing with the Government: Anticipative Behavior and 
Public Enterprises (2004) xi xii.  
51 See chapter four for a comprehensive discussion of the EU state aid rules. 
52 EM Fox & D Healey “When the State harms Competition- The role for Competition Law” (2014) 79(3) 
Antitrust Law Journal 769 769-820; RR Geddes Competing with the Government: Anticompetitive Behavior and 
Public Enterprises (2004); and TK Cheng, I Lianos & DD Sokol Competition and the State (2014). 
53 DD Sokol “Anticompetitive Government Regulation” in DD Sokol & I Lianos (eds) The Global Limits of 
Competition Law (2012) 83 85.  
54 K Adamantopoulos “State Aid and Public Undertakings with Specific Reference to the Airline Sector” in A 




- Firstly, the possible cross-over from the State’s role as “public authority and 
protector of a public interest and its capacity as owner of the particular undertaking” 
is part of the threat.  
- Secondly, there is “the danger posed by the sheer quantum of the State’s 
resources and the possibility that they could be used to distort competition”.55  
Verouden56 argues that: 
 
“Subsidies to firms present us with something of a dilemma. On the one hand, 
subsidies are given by public authorities so one would hope for sound public policy 
reasons. For instance, subsidies are given to promote R&D [research and 
development] activity, to foster environmental protection or to improve the fate of 
certain disadvantaged regions. On the other hand, subsidies that are given to some 
firms but not to others may distort competition between these firms” 
 
The South African competitive process is also not immune to this threat. In South 
Africa the threat to free and fair competition by state aid to SOEs in any form, 
whether by guarantees, subsidies, indemnities or securities, is a genuine concern.57 
SOEs in South Africa can frequently rely on direct state benefits which sets them 
apart from their private competitors. The harm that state aid to SOEs could cause to 
the competitive process was show-cased in a recent case in the High Court, even 
though the court did not decide on the issues relating to competition. In June 2015 
the North Gauteng High Court found that a R5 billion guarantee to SAA, which in 
every sense qualifies as state aid, is not unfair after Comair, a “franchise partner” of 
British Airways which operate within South Africa, wanted the court to declare the 
government’s decision to provide the guarantee to SAA unlawful and unconstitutional 
and for the guarantee to be reviewed and set aside.58 Comair argued that the 
decision to grant the guarantee “clearly leads to a distortion of the market, because it 
requires no specific alteration by SAA of the very conduct that has caused its 
                                                          
55 K Adamantopoulos “State Aid and Public Undertakings with Specific Reference to the Airline Sector” in A 
Biondi,P Eeckhout & J Flynn (eds) The Law of State Aid in the European Union (2004) 219 219-220. 
56 V Verouden “EU State Aid Control: The Quest for Effectiveness” (2015) 4 European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 459 459. 
57 Such concerns have been manifested, for example, in case law against SAA. See for example Comair Ltd v 
Minister of Public Enterprises 2016 (1) SA 1 (GP). 




financial difficulties, and reflected great harm upon firms that compete under the 
commercial disciplines of the market”.59 The court however, did not reach its decision 
based on issues which the South African competition authorities have to investigate 
and decide on, such as Comair’s allegations of market distortion and anti-competitive 
behaviour. In this regard it pointed out the principles established by the 
Constitutional Court in Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security60 which states that 
from the moment rules and structures have been created for the speedy and 
effective resolution of disputes and protection of rights in a particular area of law, it is 
preferable for that system to be used. The court thus stated that it cannot entertain 
the matters which are within the jurisdiction of the competition authorities. It therefore 
based its decision on Comair’s allegations regarding the principle of legality and 
certain provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) 
which Comair was relying on. 
State aid to SOEs may impact on the competitive process in various ways.  
Firstly, free and fair competition within markets is known to foster innovation.61 
Moses and others state that in order to be “competitive in the global economy, it is 
critical for organisations, industries and countries to innovate” and that innovation is 
a “key driver of long-term economic growth, competitiveness and a better quality of 
life.62 The possibility of unlimited state aid to SOEs may impact on the willingness by 
private competitors to innovate. Geddes states that efficient private competitors may 
reduce their investment in new activities if there is “significant government 
competition or uncertainty about future government competition”.63 Innovation refers 
to “the process of transforming an idea, generally generated through research and 
development, into a new or improved product, process or approach, which relates to 
the real needs of society and which involves scientific, technological, organisational 
                                                          
59 See Comair Limited v Minister of Public Enterprises 2016 (1) SA 1 (GP). 
60 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC). 
61 See the discussion on innovation in para 2 and para 4.2 of chapter 3. See also N Godfrey “Why is Competition 
important for growth and poverty reduction” OECD Global Forum on International Investment 27-28 March 
2008 3; M Neumann  Competition Policy History, Theory and Practice (2001) 14; and H Cefrey The Sherman 
Antitrust Act: Getting Big Business Under Control (2004) 6. 
62 C Moses, MM Sithole, W Blankley, D Labadarios, H Makelane &  N Nkobole “The state of innovation in 
South Africa: findings from the South African National Innovation Survey” (2012) 108 (7-8) South African 
Journal of Science 1  1. 
63 RR Geddes “Case Studies of Anticompetitive SOE Behavior” in RR Geddes Competing with the Government: 




or commercial activities”.64 South Africa’s seriousness about innovation as part of its 
policies for economic growth is reflected in various pieces of legislation such as the 
National Advisory Council on Innovation Act65 and the Technology Innovation 
Agency Act.66 These Acts establish a National Advisory Council on Innovation which, 
inter alia, advises on the co-ordination and stimulation of the national system of 
innovation and the promotion of co-operation within the national system of 
innovation67 and a Technology Innovation Agency “to support the State in stimulating 
and intensifying technological innovation in order to improve economic growth and 
the quality of life of all South Africans by developing and exploiting technological 
innovations”68 respectively. It is also reflected in the number of institutions which 
forms part of South Africa’s “National Innovation System”. These include, inter alia, 
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the Human Sciences 
Research Council (HSRC) and the Medical Research Council (MRC).69 The South 
African government has introduced a number of “support mechanisms” to promote 
innovation, inter alia, the R&D Tax Incentive Programme, which is available for 
businesses of all size, the Industry Innovation Partnership, which provides co-
funding to support innovation initiatives and Technology Stations, which provide 
science, engineering and technology services to small, medium and micro 
enterprises (SMMEs) and entrepreneurs to help them, for example, with product 
development and product improvement.70 SOEs which are part of the portfolio of the 
Ministry of Public Enterprises and even those outside of this Ministry’s portfolio are 
                                                          
64 Section 1 of the National Advisory Council on Innovation Act No 55 of 1997.  
See also I Booyens “Are small, medium- and micro-sized enterprises engines of innovation? The reality in 
South Africa” (2011) 38(1) Science and Public Policy 67 67 where innovation is described as “the creation of 
new products, services, processes and organisational methods, or adaptations of those that exist, based on new 
knowledge.” 
65 Act 55 of 1997. 
66 Act 26 of 2008.  
67 Section 4 of the National Advisory Council on Innovation Act 55 of 1997. 
68 Section 3 of Technology Innovation Agency Act 26 of 2008. 
69 For more on these institutions see H Zhang National Innovation Systems: South Africa and China Compared 
PhD thesis Stellenbosch (2012). See also ST Manzini “Measurement of Innovation in South Africa: An Analysis 
of Survey Metrics and Recommendations” (2015) 111(11-12) South African Journal of Science 1 1-8;   and C 
Moses, MM Sithole, W Blankley, D Labadarios, H Makelane & N Nkobole “The state of innovation in South 
Africa: findings from the South African National Innovation Survey” (2012) 108 (7-8) South African Journal of 
Science 1 1-5. 






considered to be “R&D [research and development] performing SOEs.”71 As such 
these enterprises may get extensive public financial support as active market 
participants to innovate. This may result in a situation where there may not be proper 
reward for private enterprises which operate within the market of the SOE to 
innovate. Firstly, an SOE which obtains public funds for innovation may develop new 
products and services which are similar to those of the private enterprise. Secondly, 
because of subsidization by the government, the SOE may then offer those new 
products and services at a lower price than the private competitor does. This may 
create a position which might not be ideal for private enterprises in regard to their 
aims of profit maximization and return on investment for shareholders. Some forms 
of innovation, such as very high risk innovation, may indeed be more appropriately 
done through state intervention but Mazzucato and Semieniuk are correct when they 
state that “there is no automatism whereby public involvement in financing innovation 
leads to superior outcomes”.72 
 
Secondly, free and fair competition between enterprises encourages 
entrepreneurship which leads to benefits for consumers.73 Entrepreneurship is 
important for economic development.74 Booysens is therefore correct when she 
states that almost every business or organisation has its origins in the activities of 
entrepreneurs.75 State aid to SOEs has the potential to stifle entrepreneurship. 
Prospective entrepreneurs might be intimidated by the presence in a market of a 
SOE which has the unlimited ability to obtain financial aid from the government. Less 
entrepreneurship may lead to fewer competitors in sectors of the economy.  
 
Thirdly, free and fair competition encourages new entries into sectors of the 
economy which might prevent dominance by incumbent enterprises. However, 
government subsidies and privileges may cause potential competitors to be unwilling 
                                                          
71 M Kahn “Rhetoric and Change in Innovation Policy: The Case of South Africa” (2013) 18(2) Science, 
Technology and Society: An International Journal 189 200.  
72 M Mazzucato & G Semieniuk “Public financing of innovation: new questions” (2017) 33(1) Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 24 42. 
73 For additional reading on competition and entrepreneurship see IM Kirzner Competition and 
Entrepreneurship (1973). 
74 J Munemo “Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries: Is Africa Different?” (2012) 17(1) Journal of 
Developmental Entrepreneurship 1 1. 
75 I Booysens “Are small, medium- and micro-sized enterprises engines of innovation? The reality in South 




to enter a market where there is an SOE which may at any time rely on government 
financial assistance. This may allow SOEs to become powerful market players. Take 
for example the airline industry in South Africa. Over the years South Africans have 
seen numerous airlines come and go. At least two have blamed their demise on the 
uncompetitive behaviour of SAA.76 SAA is the one airline that continues to operate, 
albeit under constrained financial conditions. The airline has been saved from 
bankruptcy by the government on many occasions. This privilege was not bestowed 
on its competitors who had to go out of business when their financial matters were 
not in order. The state of affairs which is present in South Africa’s airline industry has 
the potential to deter new entrants from entering the domestic airline market. The 
founder of Nationwide Airline, Vernon Bricknell, recently said that “he will never go 
into the airline industry in South Africa again, unless the playing fields are levelled 
and he would be spared fighting SAA with its deep pockets all the time.”77 This 
position is present in many sectors where SOEs operate. It is submitted that the 
entry into markets by potential new market entrants might increase substantially if 
potential market entrants are aware that state aid control rules will always serve as 
some kind of protection from unguided aid to an SOE in the market.  
 
Lastly, SOEs are often found guilty of uncompetitive behaviour and administrative 
fines have frequently been imposed on them.78 Litigation on anticompetitive practices 
committed by commercialised SOEs in South Africa is a regular occurrence in South 
Africa. SOEs may “have stronger incentives than profit- maximizing firms to pursue 
activities that disadvantage competitors”79 Sappington and Sidak state that such 
increased incentive to disadvantage competitors may be a result of governmental 
                                                          
76 See para 1.2 (a) for the reference to domestic airlines such as Nationwide and 1Time. 
77https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/ill-have-saa-liquidated-if-they-dont-pay-former-nationwide-
ceo/).  
78 See for example cases such as Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd [2009] 2 
CPLR 509 (CT); and The Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd [2005] 2 CPLR 303 (CT) 
where the Competition Act was applied to the conduct and behaviour of SOEs. The payment of a penalty may 
impact on an SOE’s finances and as a result the SOE may require financial assistance. Even though the amount 
of the administrative penalty is paid into the National Revenue Fund,78 it does not detract from the fact that the 
stability of the SOE’s financial position might be disrupted by such a penalty which as a result might lead to the 
requirement for state funds. 
79 DEM Sappington & JG Sidak “Anticompetitive Behaviour by State-Owned Enterprises: Incentives and 
Capabilities” in RR Geddes (ed) Competing with the Government: Anticompetitive Behavior and Public 




policy or other forces which place emphasis on revenue or output of the SOEs.80 The 
authors state that the emphasis on revenue or output may result in “aggressive 
action in pursuit of expanded output and revenue, including anticompetitive behavior 
against private, profit-maximizing enterprise.”81 They list the potential anticompetitive 
activities as (i) setting prices below cost; (ii) misstating of costs;(iii) the choosing of 
inefficient technologies to circumvent restrictions on below-cost pricing; raising the 
operating costs of existing rivals; and erecting entry barriers to preclude the 
operation of new competitors.82 In South Africa increased incentives may also be 
created by government policies which make it difficult for SOEs to cut costs, such as 
moratoria on retrenchments as well as costly public interest mandates. In order to be 
sustainable while at the same time complying with these policy mandates, SOEs are 
almost forced to engage in excluding and harming of competitors. Williams and Al-
Shabaz propose that state or private ownership as such would not necessary impact 
on the efficiency of a firm. However, they accept that “[s]ince governments often use 
state-owned companies as vehicles for the advancement of policies other than 
generating a stream of income, the companies often are not operating under 
comparable conditions.”83 It is this aspect that may serve as an incentive for anti-
competitive conduct in South Africa. Hence, state aid control rules could have a 
greater disciplinary effect which could strengthen SOEs as competitive entities. SAA 
for example continues to get state aid to keep it going as a business concern84 whilst 
the airline is also one of the repeat offenders under the Competition Act. SAA has on 
various occasions committed anti-competitive behaviour which led to prejudice to 
other competitors in South Africa’s domestic air transport sector.85 One example of 
                                                          
80 DEM Sappington & JG Sidak “Anticompetitive Behaviour by State-Owned Enterprises: Incentives and 
Capabilities” in RR Geddes (ed) Competing with the Government: Anticompetitive Behavior and Public 
Enterprise (2004) 1 2. 
81 DEM Sappington & JG Sidak “Anticompetitive Behaviour by State-Owned Enterprises: Incentives and 
Capabilities” in RR Geddes (ed) Competing with the Government: Anticompetitive Behavior and Public 
Enterprise (2004) 1 2. 
82 DEM Sappington & JG Sidak “Anticompetitive Behaviour by State-Owned Enterprises: Incentives and 
Capabilities” in RR Geddes (ed) Competing with the Government: Anticompetitive Behavior and Public 
Enterprise (2004) 1 2. 
83 TJ Farer “Privatization as an International Phenomenon” (1993) 87 American Society International Law 
Proceedings 105 109. 
84 The National Treasury recently announced that it was giving SAA funds in terms of section 16 of the PFMA. 
Section 16 of the PFMA deals with the use of funds form the National Revenue Funds in emergency situations. 
See the media statement “Recapitalisation of the South African Airways” 
(at http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2017/2017070101%20SAA%20recapitalisation.pdf). 




its anticompetitive behaviour is the various incentive scheme agreements,86 which 
SAA concluded with travel agents between 1999 and 2005. In terms of some of the 
incentive schemes travel agents were paid a commission to sell SAA domestic 
tickets instead of those of its competitors. Two recent successful cases by 
Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Limited,87 one of SAA’s former competitors, and Comair 
(Pty) Limited,88 an existing competitor of SAA respectively, shows the unacceptable 
anticompetitive behaviour by a SOE which has become dominant through state 
support. Nationwide was awarded damages in the sum of R104.625 million because 
of SAA's anti-competitive conduct while Nationwide was still in operation and Comair 
was awarded R552 million altogether on the basis of its combined damages claim 
(damages in the sums of R104,2 million and R450,0 million for its two claims 
respectively).89 But even with repeated fines issued against SAA by the competition 
authorities and successful claims against it for damages, SAA continues to maintain 
market power in the domestic airline industry. It would seem that the fines and 
damages awarded will not necessarily stop it from committing anti-competitive acts.  
 
1 1 4 State aid regulation as a means of addressing competition concerns with 
state aid to SOEs  
 
In the Preamble to the Competition Act it is stated that an efficient, competitive 
economic environment will benefit all South Africans. This ideal may not be fully 
                                                          
86 See Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd [2009] 2 CPLR 509 (CT); See also 
Comair Ltd v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd [2016] 2 CPLR 419 (GJ). 
87 Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) [2016] 4 All SA 153 (GJ). 
88 Comair Ltd v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd [2017] 2 All SA 78 (GJ). 
89 The court also ordered SAA to pay interest of 15.5 % on the two amounts, which will run from 9 January 
2006 to date of final payment and 24 February 2010 to date of final payment respectively. SAA also has to pay 
the cost order made by the court. SAA appealed to the SCA against the judgement of the Gauteng Local 
Division. It wanted the SCA to look into whether the damages were correct and appropriately determined and 
whether the correct methodology was used by the Gauteng Local Division.  The case was enrolled on the SCA 
court roll for February as “South African Airways SOC Limited v Comair Limited (782/2017)”. See 
http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/bulletin/2019_01.pdf. However, before the appeal was heard by the SCA, SAA 
and Comair entered into a final settlement agreement which was made an order of court by the SCA. Hence, 
SAA decided to withdraw its appeal. Subsequently, in February 2019, Comair made the following 
announcement regarding the settlement agreement to its shareholders: “In terms of the Settlement Agreement, 
SAA will pay Comair a settlement amount of R1 108 040 000 plus interest (“Settlement Amount”). The 
Settlement Amount will be made in accordance with a payment schedule commencing on 28 February 2019 and 
terminating on 28 July 2022, or earlier should SAA elect to make payments earlier than agreed. In addition, 
SAA will pay Comair’s taxed legal costs incurred to date. Both Comair and SAA will withdraw the appeal and 





realised if unlimited state aid is provided to SOEs. It is submitted that the 
unregulated allocation of state aid to economically engaged SOEs may undermine 
the various goals of the Competition Act and affect the overall success of 
competition policy. The Competition Act itself makes no reference to the compatibility 
of state aid with competition legislation. However, aims such as the provision to 
consumers of competitive prices and product choices and to ensure that small and 
medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the 
economy may be jeopardised if the allocation of state aid causes certain sectors of 
the economy to be dominated by SOEs.  
 
It is submitted that if the state continues to be a player in the market, which it is 
entitled to do, measures should be in place to ensure that enterprises owned by the 
state compete with their private counterparts on a level playing field. In this context 
Weaver correctly notes that state aid control and the rest of competition law has the 
same aim namely to create a level playing field for competitors.90 There are no 
legislative provisions which address the competition concerns which state aid may 
raise in South Africa.91 It is submitted that the basic principles of competition law 
should be applied to the provision of state aid where aid is given to SOEs that are 
operating as a commercial enterprise. The law should ensure that competitive 
neutrality92 is observed in respect of SOEs which are commercialised and operate in 
accordance with normal business principles. Competitive neutrality “occurs where no 
entity operating in an economic market is subject to undue competitive advantages 
or disadvantages.”93 Adamantopoulos states that the application of a neutrality 
principle ensures scrutiny when the state financially intervenes in regard to the 
affairs of a public undertaking.94 In light of the above, the regulation of state aid as an 
option to achieve competitive neutrality and to ensure free and fair competition 
amongst all enterprises in South Africa is explored in this chapter.  
                                                          
90 AM Weaver “Convergence through the Crisis: State Aid Modernization and West European Varieties of 
Capitalism” (2015) 21 Columbia Journal of European Law 587 601. 
91 See the discussion in para 1.2 (c) of this chapter. 
92 For a detailed discussion of the competitive neutrality principle see OECD Competitive Neutrality: 
Maintaining a Level Playing Field between Public and Private Business (2012) 1-119. 
93 OECD Competitive Neutrality: Maintaining a Level Playing Field between Public and Private Business 
(2012) 9.  
94 K Adamantopoulos “State Aid and Public Undertakings with Specific Reference to the Airline Sector” in A 





It is however important to remain mindful of the difficulties95 of applying competition 
law to state financing of SOEs in South Africa. The granting of state aid to SOEs in 
South Africa continues to be important “political decisions”. The proposals made in 
this chapter will take such difficulties into account. This study also takes note of 
Judges Davis and Jali’s96 caution in Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) 
Ltd v Competition Commission97 that great care should be taken before applying 
principles borrowed from other competition law regimes. However, it is also 
important to note that certain aspects of South African competition law could make 
the implementation of a state aid control regime in South Africa plausible. The 
competition regime already goes beyond “traditional antitrust concerns”. Beside 
traditional objectives of antitrust, South African competition law is also used “to 
promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons”.98 The provision in section 2 (f) of the 
Competition Act has widened South Africa’s competition laws beyond “traditional 
anti-trust concerns”. The South African competition authorities are stepping into 
spheres which normally do not fall within the framework of competition policy. This is 
because of section 9(2) of the Constitution which recognizes that it might be 
necessary for legislation and other measures to be adopted to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Section 
2(f) seems to have included the Competition Act as legislation that falls into this 
category as this provision seeks to recognize that the Act serves as a corrective 
measure aimed at rectifying previous discrimination or disadvantage in the form of 
economic exclusion. Accordingly, both the Preamble and section 2(f) of the 
Competition Act expresses the spirit of the Constitution. Another indication of the 
                                                          
95 See the discussion on these difficulties in para 2 of this chapter. 
96 Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission 2005 (6) BCLR 613 (CAC) 
616.  
97 Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission 2005 (6) BCLR 613 (CAC) 
616.  
98 Section 2 (f) of the Competition Act.  
The South African Competition Appeal Court stated in Anglo South Africa Capital (Pty) Ltd v Industrial 
Development Corporation of South Africa [2003] 1 CPLR 10 (CAC) 20  that: 
“The purpose of the Act as set out in section 2(f) is unique to the South African competition regime. Such an 
objective is contained in neither the United States of America Anti-trust laws nor the European 
Union Competition Laws. This objective seeks to incorporate in the Competition Act the constitutional 





uniqueness of some parts of South African competition law is David Lewis’ 
observation that in South Africa “antitrust was not part of a market liberalisation 
agenda; it was a central feature of the democratic process.”99 Competition law in 
South Africa was thus “rooted in democratisation rather than liberalisation”.100 In the 
light of South Africa’s own distinctive competition law provision, the implementation 
of state aid rules might be more easily achieved where the competition authorities 
already have to deal with matters beyond “traditional anti-trust concerns”. Since the 
addition of state aid rules would not be the first expansion of “traditional anti-trust 
concerns” of South Africa’s competition law, it can be accepted that these authorities 
are sufficiently skilled to oversee the balance between state aid and compliance with 
competition law.  
 
1 2 Aid to SOEs and its contribution to failures of governance and good 
financial management  
 
1 2 1 A Contextual Analysis 
 
“Corruption and maladministration101 are inconsistent with the rule of law and the 
fundamental values of our Constitution. They undermine the constitutional 
commitment to human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms. They are the antithesis of the open, accountable, 
democratic government required by the Constitution. If allowed to go unchecked 
and unpunished they will pose a serious threat to our democratic State.”102 
 
Two of the biggest concerns with South Africa’s SOEs are financial mismanagement 
or irregularities103 and the lack of proper corporate governance.104 The “sound 
                                                          
99 D Lewis Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (2013) 9. 
100 D Lewis Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (2013) 11. 
101 My emphasis. 
102 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC) 80. 
103 The many investigative reports published by the Public Protector’s Office on irregularities in SOEs provide a 
broad impression of the many irregularities of all kinds that take place in the daily operations of SOEs. See for 
example the following investigative reports published by the Public Protector:  
(i) “Report on and investigation into an allegation of improper conduct by the former chairperson of the board of 





financial governance of SOEs” which is described as a crucial measure for better 
fiscal management,105 is absent in many SOEs and concerns are persistently raised 
about the performance and governance of SOEs. This is despite the stringent 
PFMA106 which regulates governance and financial management and the recognition 
by the South African courts of the importance of good corporate governance in 
SOEs.107 Many SOEs are not effectively managed and their management are 
perceived to breach basic principles of governance with impunity at least partly 
because they are able to rely on the financial muscle of the state.108 Even those 
SOEs which were commercialised as part of South Africa’s economic development 
initiatives such as Eskom109 and SAA110 still receive state aid on a regular basis. This 
should not be the case if the SOEs are properly governed. Hence, there can be no 
doubt that state support perpetuates inefficient governance and financial 
mismanagement, which in turn creates financial dependence of SOEs on the state. 
 
As a result of the lack of proper corporate governance and financial mismanagement 
many SOEs, notwithstanding their crucial public interest mandates, have become 
intolerable burdens on the public purse and the wider economy. Poor governance 
and financial management have also caused SOEs to become threats to free and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(ii) “A report on an investigation into allegations of maladministration, systemic corporate governance 
deficiencies, abuse of power and the irregular appointment of Mr. Hlaudi Motsoeneng by the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)”; and 
 (iii) “Report on an investigation into allegations of maladministration, corruption and related improper conduct 
relating to the lease of the Eco Point Office Park and utilisation of labour brokers by the South African Post 
Office” 
All reports can be accessed on (http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/investigation_report.asp) 
The court cases discussed in para 1. 2 (b) of this chapter have also shown this. 
104 See A Thomas "Governance at South African state‐owned enterprises: what do annual reports and the print 
media tell us?" (2012) 8(4) Social Responsibility Journal 448 448-470 for more on the poor governance within 
some of South Africa’s SOEs.  
105 OECD Financing State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of National Practices (2014) 7.  
106 See para 1.2(c) of this chapter for a discussion of the PFMA.  
107 See South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Mpofu [2009] 4 All SA 169 (GSJ) 170 where the court 
stated that: “The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 recognises the importance of good 
governance: Section 195 deals with basic values and principles governing public administration. In terms of this 
section there must be a high standard of professional ethics. In fact this standard must be promoted and 
maintained. These principles apply to organs of state and public enterprises. In state-owned enterprises, like 
other organisations, good corporate governance is ultimately about effective leadership. An organisation 
depends on its board to provide it with direction, and the directors need to understand what that leadership role 
entails.” 
108 Such inference can be drawn from many of the Public Protector’s reports on mismanagement and poor 
governance in SOEs and the case law. See note 74 above for examples of the investigative reports published by 
the Public Protector and par. 1.2(b) of this chapter for examples of case law dealing with this issue. 
109 The Eskom Conversion Act No 13 of 2001 converted Eskom into a public company with share capital 




fair competition because the combined effect of bad financial management and poor 
standards of corporate governance brought about by state support contributes to 
competitive harm111 to competitors of SOEs. An SOE such as SAA, for example, 
would long have ceased business due to its continuous financial instability,112 in 
many instances caused by mismanagement, if it were a private enterprise. However, 
the airline only continues to operate as a firm with market dominance, because of 
government funding while many of its former competitors have ceased business 
operations.113 Financial aid from the government is therefore “artificially improving” 
SAA’s financial position. In a sense the airline receives perpetual “immunity from 
bankruptcy” through government intervention and it is not rigorously required to 
exercise good governance and high standards of financial management. One of 
SAA’s competitors in a competition law matter against it noted that it is the SOE’s 
“undisciplined commercial behaviour” which caused it continuously to experience 
financial troubles in turn leading to the need for further state aid.114  
 
In his Budget Speech of 2018, former Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba, also alluded 
to the governance and operational issues in SOEs, when he stated that National 
Treasury, with its “limited fiscal room” cannot continue to “subsidize inefficiency”.115 
The 2018 Budget Review showed that an astronomical amount of R466 billion is 
given to SOEs in the form of guarantees and SOEs such as SAA and the SAPO 
                                                          
111 See para 1.1(c ) for the harm which state aid may cause to the competitive process. 
112 SAA’s financial instability became so severe that in 2014 it was removed from the oversight of the Minister 
of Public Enterprises and placed under the oversight of the Minister of Finance. A leading economics scholar at 
the University of the Witwatersrand also questions why South Africa should have a national airline which 
continues to burden its budget and considers SAA a major liability. See J Rossouw “South Africa must free 
itself form the burden of owing a national airline” The Conversation (17 August 2016) (can be accessed at 
http://theconversation.com/south-africa-must-free-itself-from-the-burden-of-owning-a-national-airline-64004) 
113 SAA’s competitors included companies such as 1Time Limited, a low cost airline and Nationwide Airlines. 
Both however stopped doing business: 1Time stopped operations in 2012 after being placed under business 
rescue and eventually being liquidated and Nationwide Airlines in 2008, with Nationwide’s maintenance issues 
of its aircrafts largely blamed for its “loss of passenger volumes” and its subsequent liquidation. See for 
example Justice Nicholls summary on “The rise and fall of Nationwide Airlines” in Nationwide Airlines (Pty) 
Ltd (in liquidation) v South African Airways [2016] JOL 36742 (GJ) 11-17. See also Geddes where the author 
states that all the benefits and privileges enjoyed by SOEs allow them to set prices below those of their 
competitors which are economically efficient and as a result may force their rivals out of business. See RR 
Geddes “Case Studies of Anticompetitive SOE Behaviour” in RR Geddes (ed) Competing with the Government: 
Anticompetitive Behaviour and Public Enterprises (2004) 27 53.  
114 Comair Ltd v Minister of Public Enterprises 2016 (1) SA 1 (GP) 5. 
115 Budget Speech (2018) 20  




were also recapitalised.116 SAA for example has a R19 billion guarantee in place 
while it was recapitalised with R10 billion in 2017.117 Eskom has a R350 billion 
guarantee, SAA has a R19 billion guarantee and Transnet has a R3.5 billion 
guarantee in place.118 The Budget Review noted that guarantees to some SOEs 
remain a major risk to the fiscus. It is submitted that there can be no doubt that poor 
financial management and governance in SOEs contribute to these guarantees and 
the high risk that they may be called upon.  
 
It is therefore understandable that state funding to poorly governed SOEs has 
become such a highly charged and hotly debated topic in South Africa. National 
news headlines such as “Parastatals weigh on SA’s future”, “SAA119 and the R550-
million bailout”, “Pension-fund bailout for Eskom”, “SOEs drag SA to the state of 
junk”120 and “Parastatals bailed out again-with promises of a fix” are a regular 
occurrence in the South African media and many of these news inserts question the 
continuous bailout of SOEs. This situation is or at least will become unsustainable.  
 
The lack of proper governance, good financial management and the non- delivery by 
SOEs on their mandates even while being mostly state funded, also undermine how 
South Africans view the crucial roles of SOEs and the need for the state to support 
them. Hence, some have started to accept that these concerns which they have with 
SOEs and their funding should be addressed with privatisation. For them the 
privatisation121 of SOEs has become the panacea for all governance problems. 
Privatisation has for instance been touted by the South African Institute of Race 
                                                          
116 Budget Review (2018) 91 
(accessible at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2018/review/FullBR.pdf). 
117 See the media statement issued on the recapitalisation of SAA  
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2017/2017070101%20SAA%20recapitalisation.pdf). 
118 Budget Review (2018) 90-91 
(accessible at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2018/review/FullBR.pdf). 
119 Even the courts have noticed the public scrutiny which SAA as a SOE has been subjected to. Justice 
Sutherland in South African Airways SOC v BDFM Publishers (Pty) Ltd 2016 (2) SA 561 (GJ) 565 said “SAA is 
a public company and an organ of state whose financial affairs have been the subject of intense public interest 
and media scrutiny for several years, in which its viability as a going concern has been the main theme together 
with the financial support given to it by the state.” 
120 See the Financial Week (29 September 2016). 
121 For more on privatisation in South Africa see E Goosen The Future of Rail Transport in South Africa in a 




Relations (IRR) as the “only viable option for struggling SOEs”122 and the “key to real 
economic transformation”.123  
 
Privatisation is one solution to solve the governance problems in SOEs as well as 
the problems surrounding the financing of SOEs. It is however not always the ideal 
option. Firstly, since so many of South Africa’s SOEs have public interest roles, 
privatisation may obstruct the achievement of socio-economic goals set by the 
government. Secondly, privatisation may only work if the government puts strict 
regulation in place in order to prevent those SOEs from becoming privately-owned 
monopolies124 since SOEs in a number of sectors such as public utilities, railways 
and postal services are state monopolies.125 They are monopolies either because 
there are no competitors in the sector because of significant barriers to enter the 
sector or because of subsidization from the government. Regardless whether SOEs 
are loss-making entities, state aid allows them to remain dominant entities in their 
sectors. Hence, government monopolies are found in sectors which the government 
considers strategic or where the government considers it necessary to provide such 
services and goods to South Africans itself.  
 
What transpired after the privatisation of Iscor serves as an example of how a 
government owned monopoly can become a privately owned monopoly. Iscor,126 
                                                          
122 J Kane-Berman “Privatisation or Bust”  (2016) 27(4) Liberty: The Policy Bulletin of the IRR 1-33 
123 See L Sharp “Privatisation is key to real economic transformation” Business Day (11 September 2014). 
124 In this regard reference can be made to the privatisation of Sasol. It was privatised in three tranches: Sasol 
Limited, the holding company, was privatised in 1979, Sasol II followed in 1983 and Sasol III followed in 1991. 
See RB Horwitz Communication and Democratic Reform in South Africa (2004) 114. Notwithstanding its 
privatisation Sasol still enjoyed elevated treatment by the government because of its “special strategic status” 
and the government continued to provide state support, which only ended after Apartheid. This in essence 
ensured that Sasol continued to have a monopoly in its market, however not as an SOE but as a privately-owned 
enterprise. See S Sparks “Between ‘Artificial Economics’ and the ‘Discipline of the Market’: Sasol from 
Parastatal to Privatisation” (2016) 42(4) Journal of Southern African Studies 711 723.   
125 Current state monopolies include, for example, Eskom which has monopoly power over electricity supply in 
South Africa and Transnet, with its diversified operations which have monopolies in port management, railway 
and pipeline operations.  Eskom’s monopoly power is fully describe by the following quote:  “In South Africa 
we have several examples of monopolies. Perhaps the best known example is Eskom. If you want electricity in 
your house or community, you can’t go to a number of suppliers and asked to be connected. You must either ask 
Eskom or do without electricity.” See J Pape Economics: An Introduction for South African Learners (2000) 22.  
By describing themselves as the “custodian of rail, ports and pipelines” in South Africa, Transnet’s monopoly is 
clear. See https://www.transnet.net/Divisions/Pages/DivisionsHome.aspx (accessed on 12 January 2016). 
126 Iscor is now known as Mittalsteel South Africa Limited, an “iron and steel manufacturing company”. Mittal 
SA is South Africa’s biggest steel producer and is the primary producer of certain steel products. See Harmony 
Gold Mining Company Ltd v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd [2007] 1 CPLR 37 (CT) See also Mittalsteel SA Ltd 




once described by the Competition Tribunal of South Africa (the Tribunal) as an 
“uncontested firm within an incontestable market”, was privatised and incorporated 
as a privately owned company in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 in 1989. 
The Tribunal described how Iscor continued its “passage from inefficient state owned 
enterprise to profit maximising monopolist”.127 It also noted that “shortly after its 
[Iscor’s] privatization, a state owned monopoly had effectively been transformed into 
a privately owned and unregulated monopoly”.128 Iscor (today known as Mittal SA) 
became a “privately owned and unregulated monopoly” within its monopolised 
domestic market and it had the ability to exploit “its structural power by reducing 
output in order to increase price” and it did so by removing “excess” output from the 
domestic market”.129 This highlights that the privatisation of Iscor might not have 
been the best option at the time. It is not unreasonable to believe that the South 
African government has learned some valuable lessons from the privatisation of 
SOEs such as Iscor and Sasol. It would therefore not be unreasonable to argue that 
the government has reason to be wary of privatisation as the only option to solve the 
woes caused by SOEs.130 Furthermore, trade unions such as COSATU131 also note 
their reasons for continuously objecting to any privatisation of SOEs. They believe 
that privatisation may lead to: 
(i) a deterioration of service, especially to the poorest communities, as the ethos of 
public service is replaced by pursuit of quick profits; 
(ii) job losses, as the new private owners try to cut their costs and extract as much 
labour from as few workers as possible; 
(iii) widening the already massive inequality in the distribution of wealth, as the new 
owners enrich themselves, and bring no benefits to the majority of the people; 
(v) limiting the ability of government to intervene to achieve social objectives, 
including job creation, better service delivery and protection of the environment. 
                                                          
127 See Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd [2007] 1 CPLR 37 (CT) para 126. 
128 See the statement by the Competition Tribunal in Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd v Mittal Steel South 
Africa Ltd [2007] 1 CPLR 37 (CT) para 126. 
129 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd [2007] 1 CPLR 37 (CT) para 166. 
130 Organisations such as COSATU, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the now defunct Anti-
Privatisation Forum (APF) undoubtedly contributed to this wariness. For more on the APF see D McKinley 
“Lessons in community-based resistance? South Africa’s Anti-Privatisation Forum” (2016) 34(2) Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 268-281. 




As a consequence options other than privatisation need to be explored to ensure 
that SOEs become more efficient, improve operational performance and remain 
competitive. The regulation of state aid to SOEs is therefore one such option to 
explore.  
 
In conclusion, a number of observations can be made with regard to the poor 
governance and financial management of SOEs.  
Firstly, there can be no doubt that when financial maladministration and poor 
governance within SOEs are rooted out, these entities will become more attractive 
for investment and other funding outside of government and at the same time they 
may become more self-reliant. This will remove the burden from the public purse.  
 
Secondly, directly related to effective financial management and good governance of 
SOEs, is how the state funding is ultimately spent by those in charge of the SOEs. 
When those in charge of SOEs are aware that the way in which state funding is 
spent may be scrutinised, they would perhaps make greater efforts to ensure that 
funds are used in ways which are in line with the PFMA and for those purposes 
which the funds were meant for. Although billions of rand are annually spent on 
SOEs, many SOEs are struggling to fully meet their developmental mandates. 
Millions of South Africans still do not benefit from services which are supposed to be 
delivered by SOEs. Firstly, services such as water and sanitation are often not 
available to the poorest South Africans, secondly, public transport operated by 
PRASA which is mostly used by poor South Africans does not function as it should 
and thirdly, electricity distribution and supply is not always guaranteed as illustrated 
by the recent “load shedding” crisis. The South African government even recently 
had to sell its shareholding in Vodacom, one of South Africa’s leading mobile 
networks, to obtain funds to assist Eskom which had struggled to provide South 
Africa with the necessary electricity supply and thus comply with its mandate.132 
These are all indications that SOEs, notwithstanding the state funds which they 
receive, do not meet their respective mandates. There is no doubt poor governance 
is a major contributor to non-delivery on mandates. Corporate governance failures 
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often mean that public funds have to be made available to cover commercial losses 
and that public funds received from the National Treasury by SOEs are not spent on 
public mandates only. A principle of public funds for public mandates could ensure 
significant savings for the National Treasury since it will not have to fork out 
additional billions of rand for SOEs to allow them to conduct commercial activities. 
This however, can only be achieved if both the governance and financial 
management of the SOEs are in order.  
 
All monies that are saved because SOEs are properly managed and state funding is 
spent as it should be could be invested in socio-economic programmes or will not 
have to be borrowed. In the long term it is untenable that the government applies 
funds which could be used for other socio-economic programmes, to provide 
continuous unlimited state aid to poorly governed SOEs to allow them to perform or 
at least also perform commercial activities. It is submitted that limited state resources 
should not be used to allow SOEs to conduct commercial activities in the absence of 
good governance and financial management as well as compliance with the SOE’s 
mandate. The government should be able to rely on SOEs to generate income on 
their commercial activities and not the other way round and this is possible if the 
SOEs are governed in ways set out in South Africa’s regulatory framework on 
corporate governance and financial management. In Johannesburg Housing 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers of the Newtown Urban Village,133 Judge 
Willis made the following statement in regard to the limited availability of funds to the 
state for realising socio-economic demands:  
 
“Anywhere in the world, when it comes to funding programmes for socio-economic 
development, the state has only three levers which it can pull: profits from state 
enterprises, taxation or debt.”134  
 
                                                          
133 2013 (3) BCLR 337 (GSJ) para 104. 
134 Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers of the Newtown Urban Village 
2013 (3) BCLR 337 (GSJ) para 104. Although this comment was made in the context of the case, it does not 
detract from the fact that SOE should be for the government a source of income, while in South Africa, 




It is submitted that the South African government’s reliance on “profits from state 
enterprises”, as indicated by Judge Willis, remains a distant reality because at 
present poorly governed SOEs rely on the government for funding instead of the 
government relying on them for profits.  
 
Lastly, effective governance and proper financial management may help South 
Africans to understand that not all SOEs should be targets for privatisation because 
of their crucial mandates.  
 
1 2 2 Examples from the case law of governance failures of SOEs that are still 
receiving state aid 
 
Regardless of all the debate, public outrage, the robust PFMA and the recognition by 
the courts of the role of proper governance of SOEs, financial irregularities and poor 
governance within SOEs continue unabated as shown by various court cases in the 
recent past against the management of SOEs. Even poor and undisciplined 
management of SOEs, which turns them into financial burdens on the National 
Treasury, often does not appear to disqualify them from being granted wide-ranging 
further financial assistance, because of the frequent political connections of those 
managers and the public interest mandates of the enterprises. 
 
An example of this is the case of SAA which in 2011 sued Khaya Ngqula ("Ngqula"), 
its former Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") for the sum of R26,581,794.77. SAA 
alleged that this claim arose because of a breach of fiduciary duties by Ngqula.135 
SAA also sued Ngqula for the rand equivalent of US $3,400,000.00 which arose from 
a sponsorship agreement with an Argentine golfer as it argued that Ngqula had no 
authorisation to spend such an amount on sponsorships and R229,170.00 for 
unauthorised expenses by Ngqula.136 This behaviour was considered to be in conflict 
with section 66 of the PFMA which places restrictions on the borrowing of money, 
                                                          
135 See South African Airways (Pty) Ltd v Ngqula 2011 JDR 1305 (GSJ). 




the issue of guarantees or any other commitment that binds the public entity or the 
Revenue Fund.137  
 
In September 2009 at Transnet Freight Rail, a division of Transnet, Gama who was 
the CEO at the time, was suspended and a disciplinary process was started against 
him due to serious allegations regarding maladministration in respect of two 
contracts which were awarded under his supervision.138 One contract concerned a 
tender process regarding fifty locomotives and the second contract concerned the 
procurement of security services from a company called General Nyanda Security 
Risk Advisory Services (Pty) Limited (GNS).139 In regard to the locomotive contract it 
was alleged that Gama concluded the contract in disregard of a condition by the 
Transnet Board that another division of Transnet namely Transnet Rail Engineering 
should carry out all engineering on the assembly and maintenance of the 
locomotives. It was stated that Gama’s failure to adhere to this condition led to 
serious financial consequences for Transnet.140 In regard to the contract with 
General Nyanda Security Risk Advisory Services (Pty) Limited (GNS), it was stated 
by Transnet that Mr Gama concluded the contract without following a tender process 
and without having the authority to enter into the contract as Gama’s authority to 
enter into such a type of contract was said to be limited to a value of R10 million, 
while the total estimated value of the contract was close to R19 million and 
subsequent spending on the contract amounted to some R55 million.141  
 
Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (SOC) 
Limited142 is another case which showed how mismanagement may affect the 
                                                          
137 Section 66 of the PFMA provides that: “(1) An institution to which this Act applies may not borrow money 
or issue a guarantee, indemnity or security, or enter into any other transaction that binds or may bind that 
institution or the Revenue Fund to any future financial commitment, unless such borrowing, guarantee, 
indemnity, security or other transaction— 
(a) is authorised by this Act; and 
(b) in the case of public entities, is also authorised by other legislation not in conflict with this Act; and 
(c) in the case of loans by a province or a provincial government business enterprise under the ownership 
control of a provincial executive, is within the limits as set in terms of the Borrowing Powers of Provincial 
Governments Act 1996(Act No. 48 of 1996).” 
138 Gama v Transnet Limited 2010 JDR 0059 (GSJ). 
139 Gama v Transnet Limited 2010 JDR 0059 (GSJ) para 9. 
140 Gama v Transnet Limited 2010 JDR 0059 (GSJ) para 10. 
141 Gama v Transnet Limited 2010 JDR 0059 (GSJ) para 11. 




finances of an SOE. Mthimunye- Bakoro was the chief financial officer of Petroleum 
Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (PetroSA) at the time when a substantial 
loss of billions of rand was reported for the financial year ending March 2015. The 
board initiated an investigation to determine the cause of the losses and also the 
poor performance of Mthimunye-Bakoro. It came to the conclusion that the poor 
financial performance could be attributed partly to Mthimunye-Bakoro's conduct as  
she was in charge of the SOE’s financial affairs and that the financial health of the 
SOE fell within Mthimunye-Bakoro's duties and responsibilities as the group chief 
financial officer. The board also concluded that Mthimunye-Bakoro had committed 
acts of serious misconduct and possible contraventions of the PFMA. 
 
1 2 3 The PFMA’s limited ability to address financial management concerns 
with SOEs  
 
An analysis of financial management and SOEs is incomplete without some brief 
comments about the PFMA. The PFMA143 transformed the way public money is 
spent in South Africa. It is meant to ensure proper and transparent financial 
management of SOEs. While the PFMA governs the financial management of SOEs, 
statutes such as the enabling legislation144 of SOEs and to a certain extent some 
other general legislation which include the Companies Act and the Competition Act 
govern their general operation.  
 
Schedules one, two and three of the PFMA list all those institutions to which the Act 
apply and the categories into which they fall.145 Schedule one lists the constitutional 
institutions, which, inter alia, include the Commission for Gender Equality, the 
Human Rights Commission, the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa 
and the Public Protector.  
 
Schedule two lists the major public entities which include SOEs such as SAA, 
Telkom and Broadband Infraco Limited, all of which are commercialised SOEs. All 
                                                          
143 See also the discussion on the PFMA in para 3.6 of chapter 2.  
144 The South African Post Office SOC Limited Act  22 of 2011; South African Airways Act  5 of 2007; and 
Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited Act  51 of 2003 are all enabling legislation of SOEs. 




provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 which apply to public companies, apply 
to the commercialised SOEs which are registered as such in terms of the Companies 
Act. However, in terms of section 9 of the Act the member of the Cabinet responsible 
for the SOE may request a total, partial or conditional exemption from one or more 
provisions of the Act. The applicability of provisions of the Companies Act to SOEs 
was discussed and decided on in Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v 
Motau.146 The Constitutional Court had to decide on the applicability of section 71(1) 
and (2) of the Companies Act to the removal of board members of an SOE, which in 
this case was Armscor. The court said that the effect of section 9 of the Companies 
Act is that “state-owned companies are for all intents and purposes to be treated as 
public companies unless a cabinet member has procured an exemption (in whole or 
in part) from the obligation to comply with the Companies Act.”147 The court decided 
that the Minister in this case did not apply for an exemption from the provisions of the 
Companies Act and as a result she was bound by Article 71(1) and (2) when she 
wished to remove board members. Furthermore, the Minister did not take those 
steps required by the Companies Act when she dismissed the two relevant board 
members in this case. Hence, she failed to observe the provisions of the Companies 
Act and therefore acted unlawful.  
 
Steenkamp v Central Energy Fund SOC Ltd148 and SOS Support Public 
Broadcasting Coalition v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Limited149 
also dealt with the applicability of the provisions of the Companies Act to SOEs. The 
two provincial High Courts150 however followed different approaches to the 
application of the provisions of the Companies Act to SOEs. In Steenkamp the 
removal of board members of PetroSA was the issue at hand. The Central Energy 
Fund SOC Ltd (the CEF), the holding company of PetroSA of which the Minister of 
Energy, the political head of the Department of Energy, is the sole shareholder 
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recommended the removal of two directors of PetroSA for a number of reasons.151 
The two former directors approached the court and contended that they were 
unlawfully removed as directors since the CEF failed to comply with the relevant 
provisions of the Companies Act. The court decided that there was compliance with 
the provisions of the Companies Act. Hence, the removal of the two board members 
was valid. SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition concerned the constitutionality 
and lawfulness of the powers that the Minister of Communications exercises in 
respect of the directors of the SABC Board including the power of the minister to 
remove any of the directors (including non-executive directors). One of the issues 
which the court had to determine was whether section 71 of the Companies Act may 
be applied to the removal of directors of the SABC or whether the procedures under 
sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 (the Broadcasting Act) must 
be followed. Three non-executive directors of the SABC were removed without due 
regard to the provisions of section 15 of the Broadcasting Act. The applicants in the 
matter argued that the removals were unlawful for non-compliance with the special 
provisions governing the removal of SABC directors under sections 15 and 15A of 
the Broadcasting Act. Hence, a declaratory order was sought to state that members 
of the SABC board may not be removed save in compliance with sections 15(1) and 
(2) and 15A of the Broadcasting Act. The court looked at both the procedures for the 
removal of directors provided in terms of section 15 of the Broadcasting Act and 
section 71 of the Companies Act and declared that members of the SABC Board 
may not be removed safe in compliance with sections 15(1) and (2) of the 
Broadcasting Act. Its findings, inter alia, included: 
(i) that sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting Act ensure that there is a level of 
oversight in the removal of a director of the SABC Board and that neither the Minister 
of Communications nor the SABC Board can remove a director unilaterally. 
(ii) that removal requires an inquiry and must be based on specified and objective 
grounds for removal and where the National Assembly recommends removal, the 
President has no discretion and must remove the director from office. 
(iii) that section 71 of the Companies Act, on the other hand, empowers firstly, the 
Minister of Communications to remove any member of the Board, for any reason, 
                                                          
151 These include that the failure to communicate reasons for losses suffered by the SOE, failure to meet agreed 
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subject only to the requirement of notice under section 71(2). Secondly, the Board is 
empowered to remove any member of the Board, among other things, for negligence 
or dereliction of duty by a simple majority, subject only to the requirement of notice 
and comment under section 71(4). 
(iv) that the removal provisions of the Companies Act cannot be construed as 
applying to the SABC because the Broadcasting Act prevails over the Companies 
Act as it was specifically enacted to govern the operations of the SABC.  
(v) that the removal processes prescribed under the Companies Act denies 
members of the SABC Board security of tenure and thus undermines the 
independence of the SABC Board in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution. 
(vi) that the Broadcasting Act is the specific legislation enacted by Parliament in 
respect of the national public service broadcaster, with the broadcasting services to 
be “owned and controlled by South Africans”.  
(vii) by permitting the removal of board members unilaterally at the instance of the 
Minister of Communications as sole shareholder and removal by simple majority vote 
of the Board, section 71 of the Companies Act undermines their independence. The 
threat of removal without any oversight, on any ground, and without due enquiry, 
would render SABC Board members not likely to express views not aligned with that 
of the government or the majority Board members. 
(vii) although section 5(4)(b)(i) of the Companies Act provides for specific statutes 
and provisions in other statutes to prevail in the event of inconsistency with the 
provisions of the Companies Act, the Broadcasting Act is not listed under that 
provision and accordingly none of the provisions of the Broadcasting Act is made 
applicable in the event of inconsistency with the Companies Act. Since this goes 
against section 7(2) and 16 of the Constitution, the relevant provisions of the 
Companies Act are invalid to this extent. 
 
It is clear that the court’s approach in SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition on 
the application of the provisions of the Companies Act to the removal of directors on 
the board of the SABC came as a result of the existence of a special procedure for 
the removal of directors in the Broadcasting Act. It affirms that should there be a 
conflict between provisions in the Companies Act which are applicable to SOEs and 




case the removal of directors, the provisions in the SOEs enabling legislation will 
trump those in the Companies Act. This may be the position even if no exemption, 
total, partial or conditional, is in place in regard to the application of the provisions of 
the Companies Act to SOEs.152 It is possible that the court in Steenkamp might have 
followed the same approach as in SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition, if a 
special procedure for the removal of directors existed in the enabling legislation 
which governs PetroSA.  
 
Schedule three lists other national public entities such as those entities which are 
purely governmental agencies and do not operate as business enterprises but 
instead deliver recognised services such as Legal Aid South Africa, the Financial 
Intelligence Centre and the National Credit Regulator. Schedule three also lists those 
SOEs which in accordance with the Act are classified as “national government 
business enterprises”. These entities provide goods and services in accordance with 
ordinary business principles and include entities such as the Public Investment 
Corporation Limited, PRASA and Sentech.  
 
The PFMA puts a number of strict requirements in place to ensure the protection of 
public money and provides significant boundaries on how, when and for what 
purposes public funds can be used. These include (i) that every public entity must 
have an authority which must be accountable for purposes of the PFMA,153 (ii) 
disciplinary proceedings and even criminal proceedings against accounting 
authorities and officials of SOEs in cases of financial misconduct,154 (iii) the 
submission of an annual budget and corporate plan by government business 
enterprises and those entities listed in Schedule two of the PFMA,155 and (iv) the 
power of the National Treasury to intervene when there is a “serious or persistent 
material breach” of the PFMA by any institution to which the PFMA applies, which 
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153 Section 9 of the PFMA. 
154 Sections 81 to 86 of the PFMA. 




may lead to the withholding of funds in terms of section 216 (2) of the Constitution.156 
These are all powerful measures to ensure the protection of public money and to 
root out any financial mismanagement of SOEs.  
 
However, those in charge of SOEs continue to contravene the provisions of the 
PFMA regularly. Contraventions happen within a number of SOEs such as 
PetroSA,157 SAA,158 PRASA,159 SAPO160 and the SABC.161 Consequently SOEs 
continue to be dependent on government funding.  
 
It is thus apparent162 that even the powerful provisions of the PFMA and stringent 
corporate governance rules and principles163 are not enough to deter the 
                                                          
156 Section 6 (2) (f) of the PFMA.  
157 See Mthimunye- Bakoro v Petroleum and Oil Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 338 
(WCC) para 9. 
158 SAA stated for example in their “South African Airways Group Integrated Annual Report ”  of  2014, page 
79 the following on non-compliance with the PFMA: “In an effort to further reduce PFMA non-compliance 
within SAA, management has developed and implemented action plans that will see a significant reduction to 
PFMA non-compliance in the coming financial year. The focus of these plans is to ensure that there is 
consequence management in place and improved processes.” 
(available at https://www.flysaa.com/eg/en/.../Financials/SAA_Front_section_copy.pdf). In one of their most 
recent annual report, the “South African Airways Group Integrated Annual Report for the Year Ended 2016” 67, 
SAA stated the following on non-compliance with the PFMA: “The organisation will continuously review and 
update interactions that will assist the organisation to further reduce the PFMA non-compliance. Some of the 
interactions that are currently being monitored are:  Review of the contract management department. The 
optimal structure will assist the organisation in ensuring contract management process is effective and efficient 
to discharge the cost effective, transparent and fair objectives of procurement process. • Review the control 
measures such as disciplinary process, to ensure consistent enforcement within the organisation.” (available at 
https://www.flysaa.com/hu/en/Documents/Financials/SAA_IAR_2016.pdf). 
159 See the Public Protector Report titled “Derailed: A report on an investigation into allegations of 
maladministration relating to financial mismanagement, tender irregularities and appointment irregularities 
against the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA)” Report No 3 of 2015/16 (available at 
http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2015-16/PRASA_FINAL_28_August_2015.pdf). 
160 See the Public Protector Report “Postpone Delivery: Report on an investigation into allegations of 
maladministration , corruption and related improper conduct relating to the leasing of the Eco Point Office Park 
and utilisation of labour brokers by the South African Post Office” Report No 5 of 2105/16 (available at 
http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2015-
16/SAPO%20REPORT%20Postponed%20Delivery.pdf). 
161 For allegations and findings of various irregularities, including financial irregularities, within the SABC see 
for example South African Broadcasting Corporation v Avusa Ltd 2010 (1) SA 280 (GSJ);  South African 
Broadcasting Corporation Soc Ltd v Democratic Alliance 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA); the Public Protector Report  
“A report on an investigation into allegations of maladministration, systemic corporate governance deficiencies, 
abuse of power and the irregular appointment of Mr. Hlaudi Motsoeneng by the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation  (SABC)” Report  No 23 of  2013/2014 (http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2013-
14/SABC%20FINAL%20REPORT%2017%20FEBRUARY%202014.pdf) and the recent case Democratic 
Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd (SABC); Democratic Alliance v Motsoeneng  
[2017] 2 BLLR 153 (WCC). 
162 See the examples of the non-compliance with the PFMA in footnotes 119- 123 in para 1.2 (c) of this chapter. 
163 Described by Justice Davis as the “animating idea of which is to ensure net gains in wealth for shareholders, 





management of certain SOEs from repetitive engagements in widespread financial 
mismanagement. Although the PFMA already came into effect eighteen years ago, 
we still see a situation in South Africa where SOEs too often require government 
financial intervention because of governance failures or improper financial 
management. This shows that there are gaps that need to be filled to promote good 
governance and financial management that would ensure that SOEs are able to 
function without the need for continual government funding. 
 
1 2 4 Could state aid rules guided by EU-state aid rules fill some of the 
regulatory gaps left by existing legislation that concern governance and 
financial management? 
 
Discontent over when and how financial aid by the government to troublesome SOEs 
should be granted, had reached such an alarming level that the ANC-led government 
saw the need to establish a Presidential Review Committee on State-Owned 
Enterprises (the Committee) in May 2010. The Committee submitted its final 
report164 in which it made thirty one crucial recommendations on the way forward. 
The recommendations, inter alia, include (i) the enactment of a “single overarching 
law” to govern all SOEs, (ii) a framework for the appointment of SOE boards and 
CEO’s, (iii) a framework for collaboration among SOEs, (iv) a central remuneration 
authority; (vi) a consolidated funding model for commercial SOEs; and (vii) that the 
government address the issue of commercial SOEs that are not financially viable.165 
The implementation timeframe for the recommendations stretches from 2012 until 
2025. While the recommended Presidential State-Owned Enterprises Coordinating 
Council has been established,166 it remains to be seen how many of the other 
recommendations will be implemented in accordance with the time frame suggested 
by the Committee. It is submitted that the government should pursue timeous 
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implementation of the recommendations within the suggested implementation phase, 
especially if it will address the poor governance and financial management of SOEs.  
 
While acknowledging both the efforts by the government to correct what is currently 
wrong with the governance and the financial management of SOEs and the strict 
requirements in regard to financial management stated in the PFMA, the fact that 
poor financial management and governance are still the order of the day in many 
SOEs, shows that there are gaps that need to be filled. Hence, it is proposed that the 
implementation of state aid control rules may fill some of the gaps and supplement 
the PFMA. Examples of how state aid control rules could help to do this include: 
(i) State aid rules may assist in ensuring improved governance and financial 
management and if these are adhere to, it will most likely remove the need for 
regular financial assistance, which will have a significant positive impact on the 
availability of public funds.  
(ii) State aid rules will most likely also ensure that the state funding will be utilised for 
those purposes for which it was granted.  
 
Although state aid rules may not be the complete solution for aid that perpetuates an 
uneven playing field between SOEs and their private competitors and regularly 
threatens free and fair competition, it will certainly bolster the regime by which SOEs 
are regulated. This is especially since the examination of the EU state aid control 
rules167 has shown a number of characteristics that could help to address the 
problem of reconciling the financing of SOEs in South Africa with other pursuits such 
as free and fair competition and proper governance which ensure financial 
independence. These characteristics include (i) that state aid to public undertakings 
(SOEs in South Africa) can be controlled without necessarily having a negative 
impact on the execution of the undertakings’ public mandates; (ii) the EU state aid 
control regime is able to distinguish between the situation where firms should be 
independent and self-sustained and when state aid to firms is necessary; and (iii) 
that governments are still able to provide state aid if such aid would serve a general 
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public interest168 and if the procedural rules of the state aid regulatory framework are 
complied with. 
 
A former chairman of Eskom, Reuel Khoza, correctly contended that: “State-owned 
corporations in a transforming South Africa can, in fact, set an example of what a 
corporation should be.”169 However, at the current trajectory, SOEs in South Africa 
rather set an example of what corporations should not be, with widespread financial 
mismanagement, cronyism, corruption and nepotism. Hence, it is submitted that 
state aid rules influenced by the EU state aid rules may lead to better financial 
management and corporate governance of SOEs. State aid rules will also ensure 
that state aid is not considered to be the easy way out after mismanagement of 
SOEs, but that it is really the last resort in instances where the demise of the SOE 
not only threatens the South African economy but will also impact on South Africa’s 
overall “developmental and national needs”. 
 
2 The difficulties with the application of state aid rules in South Africa   
 
Even though the state aid control model of the EU is regarded by this study as a 
yardstick for state financing of SOEs in South Africa, it is acknowledged that the 
regulation of state aid will have to be adapted for South Africa and could be more 
difficult in this jurisdiction. Certain country-specific170 factors may make it difficult to 
implement state aid rules in South Africa. The obstacles to applying state aid rules in 
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2 1 The public interest function of South African SOEs  
 
It is acknowledged throughout this study that SOEs should play a significant role in 
South Africa’s development process.171 In justifying its decisions to provide working 
capital to SAA in 2018 government emphasised the creation of an efficient enterprise 
but also that this SOE had to be enabled to allow it to serve the “developmental 
agenda”.172 Accordingly, there should be limits to the application of competition law 
to SOEs and their activities. The answer for such limitation lies in the reasons for the 
existence of the SOEs. There are many reasons for governments operating SOEs173 
and many SOEs do not necessarily exist for profit maximization but are required to 
pursue other goals. Koch lists a number of reasons for governments to be involved in 
the economy. These include (i) the provision of safety and security; (ii) support for 
public health, education and research; and (iii) the provision of water, sanitation, 
communications, energy and transportation infrastructure.174 Other reasons for 
conducting businesses as SOEs include pride or that the enterprise started out as an 
SOE and the government wants the status quo to remain. 175  
 
In South Africa the government uses SOEs as instruments to achieve many of its 
socio-economic goals. SOEs are considered to be an “administrative device” used 
by the government to execute some of its responsibilities to its citizens. Gcabashe 
states that SOEs “provide the state with the means to direct investment in order to 
redress the past imbalances and to create the infrastructure required to stimulate 
                                                          
171 For more on the developmental role of SOEs in South Africa see OECD State-Owned Enterprises in the 
Development Process (2015) (at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264229617-en). 
172 Five strategic objections forms part of the long-tern turnaround strategy and include (i) support for South 
Africa’s development agenda; (ii) achieve and maintain financial stability; (iii) provide excellent customer 
service; (iv) consistent, efficient and effective operations; and (v) performance excellence. See South African 
Airways Group Integrated Report for the year ended 31 March 2017 41  
(available at https://www.flysaa.com/documents/51855150/0/SAA_IAR+2017.pdf/22db54be-b1f5-404a-99fd-
d12f3fe9e56b). 
173 See para 1.2 of chapter 2 for a comprehensive discussion on the reasons for the continuous use of SOEs by 
governments.  
174 S Koch “The secret to successful state-owned enterprises is how they’re run” The Conversation (22 January 
2016) 
(Accessible at http://theconversation.com/thesecrettosuccessfulstateownedenterprisesishowtheyrerun53118). 
175 M Gulati & D Skeel “How to Get the Government-Owned Corporation Working” (2001) 36(48) Economic 




economic growth”.176 The government has to promote two important goals. On the 
one hand it needs to ensure sustainable economic growth and on the other hand it 
has to work to alleviate poverty. Present socio-economic conditions in South Africa 
make it appear as if these two goals are irreconcilable. However, Rodick correctly 
observes that “historically nothing worked better than economic growth to enabling 
societies to improve the life chances of their members, including those at the very 
bottom”.177 If the ANC-led government can ensure sustainable economic growth 
through its policies and if Rodick’s observation on the impact of economic growth on 
“life chances” historically is anything to go by, economic growth is certain to have a 
direct positive impact on poverty levels in South Africa. The only uncertainty 
therefore is the degree to which it will improve “life chances” for the poor people of 
South Africa. 
 
It is acknowledged that the existence of SOEs in certain sectors help with the 
development of the economy since SOEs, inter alia, assist with infrastructure 
development. They are frequently responsible for maintaining networks and provide 
service such as power, roads, transport, water, communications, which the rest of 
the South African economy depends on.178 These enterprises are some of the 
biggest employers in South Africa, thus having a positive impact on the high 
unemployment rate. SOEs may make it possible for previously disadvantaged 
people to become owners in enterprises as the State may use SOEs to spread 
ownership to historically disadvantage people. It may do so by selling some of its 
interest in SOEs to historically disadvantaged persons through a public offer. In this 
instance special purpose companies may be used and the shares may be offered to 
the historically disadvantage people for a minimal share price, just like the 
government did in regard to Telkom in 2003.179 Consequently, SOEs may help to 
achieve some of the broader goals stated in the Competition Act.180 
                                                          
176 RJ Khoza & M Adam The Power of Governance: Enhancing the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises 
(2007) vii. 
177 D Rodick One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth (2007) 2. 
178 This was noted by former Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan in his 2016 Budget Speech 
(accessible at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2016/speech/speech.pdf). 
179 In 2003 the South African government offered discounted shares in Telkom to historically disadvantaged 
people through a public offering. Each applicant was entitled to acquire shares of up R 5 000.00. See “Deals of 






Due to the exclusion of the majority of South Africans from basic services in the past, 
it is not difficult to understand why the State prefers to deliver certain goods and 
services itself, instead of leaving it to the private sector. Services such as postal 
services as well as electricity generation and distribution need to reach every South 
African. After nearly twenty five years of democracy, the governmental endeavours 
to reduce poverty and to ensure sustainable economic development for all, has only 
borne limited fruit. South Africans therefore expect the government to be pro-active 
in improving lives. Hence, the government uses SOEs to (i) ensure that the required 
essential services reach every South African, (ii) fight poverty and inequality, (iii) 
create jobs; and (iv) develop infrastructure. SOEs are therefore well established 
enterprises within the South African economy. This was the position even before the 
dawn of democracy in South Africa.181 To this extent Carrick is correct when he 
states that the government’s involvement in the market is not always disastrous and 
government’s bad reputation as a producer may be undeserved.182 This study 
therefore agrees with Sokol183 when the author states that governments may even 
restrain competition for “welfare-enhancing reasons”. 
 
It is also reassuring to know that the notion that SOEs are essential economic 
players is not unique to South Africa. SOEs once also formed an essential part of the 
economies of countries which are today known as developed countries.184 
Substantial financing of SOEs is also not unique to South Africa. OECD member 
countries, which include mostly the developed countries, also have “national 
practices” in place to finance SOEs. The OECD recognised the role which SOEs can 
play in a country’s economy when it stated that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which was issued by the Department of Public Enterprises at http://www.dpe.gov.za/newsroom/Pages/Telkom-
share-offer-is-not-discriminatory.aspx. 
180 See the discussion on the goals of the Competition Act in para 4.3.8 of chapter 3. 
181 See para 3.3 of chapter 2 for a comprehensive discussion of prominent South African SOEs before and after 
the dawn of democracy. 
182 PM Carrick “New Evidence on Government Efficiency” (1988) 7(3) Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 518 518. 
183 D Sokol “Anticompetitive Government Regulation” in DD Sokol & I Lianos (eds) The Global Limits of 
Competition Law (2012) 83 84.  




“State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are important actors in the global economy. Some 
countries have many SOEs. In others, SOEs are less prevalent but operate in sectors 
of strategic importance such as public utilities. Sound financial governance of SOEs 
means better fiscal management and more efficient resource allocation in the 
broader economy. Policy makers come under growing pressure to ensure that SOEs 
create value for their owners who are, ultimately, the taxpayers and the broader 
public.”185 
It could be argued that SOEs should be privatised and that state support should be 
given to private firms to allow them to perform public interest functions. Special rules 
such as the European SGEI regime could then be applied to these entities to ensure 
that they are able to receive support to fulfil their mandates. It is at least conceivable 
that private firms would be able to perform these mandates more efficiently than 
SOEs. However, it would seem that the very broad role that public interest plays in 
South Africa would make this impossible. Moreover, it is clear that this would not be 
possible in the current political climate. It is clear that the government will not give up 
control over aspects of the economy where they already have strong influence. It is 
for this reason that the state aid regime proposed in this thesis will also propose 
more limited powers for regulators in South Africa than the powers which the EU 
Commission has in Europe with regard to state aid. 
 
It is unrealistic to expect the South African government to completely step back from 
financially assisting SOEs to help them achieve their mandates. If the government 
did not provide state aid to commercialised SOEs to help them achieve their 
governmental mandates, it would place them at a disadvantage in comparison to 
their private competitors because SOEs have to achieve both their pure commercial 
goals and governmental mandates.186 Since the majority of SOEs have a 
developmental role and a socio-economic purpose, it is understandable that the 
government would not want to have any limitations placed on its capabilities to 
provide state aid to SOEs. And no government agency or the courts should intrude 
upon this power because the South African government, like governments all over 
                                                          
185 My emphasis.  
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186 See in this regard the general comments made in OECD Financing State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of 




the world, should be able to act in the general public interest without restrictions. 
This principle was recently upheld when the High Court stated that: 
 
 “The government had a wide discretion to select the means to achieve 
constitutionally permitted objectives and the courts could not interfere simply 
because they did not like them or because other means might have been 
selected.”187  
 
This statement may have been made in regard to SAA only, but it is without a doubt 
the position with respect to every government financial intervention concerning 
SOEs. It is important to be conscious of the limitations of South Africa’s competition 
laws in the context of the state’s financing of SOEs. It is outside the ambit of 
competition law to limit the state’s ability to achieve its developmental goals. Any 
attempt to try and eliminate state aid to SOEs completely, for purposes of protecting 
competitors of SOEs, is unrealistic in South Africa. Because SOEs are seen as the 
“service delivery arm of Government that ensures accelerated socio-economic 
development”,188 competition law cannot blindly be extended to the state funding of 
SOEs. For as long as South Africa’s socio-economic problems persist, it will remain 
necessary for the government to grant state aid to SOEs in order for those SOEs to 
fulfil their socio-economic purposes. The state’s prerogative to intervene financially 
when required for the sake of all South Africans can therefore not be limited by the 
application of competition law and it is recognised that any such limitations would not 
be easily considered.  
 
However, continuous financial irregularities, poor governance and repeated 
anticompetitive behaviour189 within SOEs make it difficult to always justify the 
privileges enjoyed by them on the basis of their socio-economic mandates.190 Ellyne 
crucially observes that “State-owned enterprises can serve South Africa’s 
                                                          
187 Comair Ltd v Minister of Public Enterprises 2016 (1) SA 1 (GP) 2. 
188 SOEs were described as such by the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services. See 
(https://www.dtps.gov.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=229&Itemid=105).   
189 These enterprises commit anticompetitive practices to the same or perhaps even a greater degree than their 
private counterparts. Only because they have socio-economic mandates does not necessarily mean that they do 
not commit anticompetitive practices. 




development state ambitions. But sound policies and governance practices are 
needed to ensure they stand as value creators and do not become financial burdens 
to the public purse.” As a result it is submitted that the socio-economic mandates of 
SOEs should not entirely exclude the possibility of having regulatory measures in 
regard to state aid.  
 
2 2 Supranational status of the EU and state aid in related countries 
 
The most obvious difference between South Africa and the EU is that the EU is a 
supranational institution. It should be asked whether it is appropriate for South Africa 
to implement state aid control rules based on a regulatory framework which was 
created for multiple states, each with their own SOEs. The EU state aid control rules 
formed a central part of its integration because a system was needed to ensure that 
governments did not benefit their own enterprises with state aid, to the disadvantage 
of enterprises in other member states. Even though trade barriers in the EU were 
removed as a result of economic integration, the provision of state aid to enterprises 
by member states would have negated such removal. The supranational status of 
the EU is clearly one of the reasons why state aid regulation functions properly. For 
this reasons it will be more difficult to implement a similar system in a single state.191  
 
This is illustrated by the problems that have been encountered in the “candidate 
countries”192 in South-Eastern Europe with which the EU have concluded 
Stabilization and Association Agreements193 and the “EU neighbourhood”194 
                                                          
191 See para 2 of chapter 4 for a complete discussion of the reasons for the restrictions on state aid in the EU. 
192 At present the “candidate countries” are Albania (candidate status in 2014); the Republic of North Macedonia 
(candidate status in 2005), Montenegro (candidate status 2010) and Serbia (candidate status 2012). 
193 The EU has concluded Stabilization and Association Agreements with Kosovo (2014), Macedonia (FYR) 
(2001), Serbia (2008), Montenegro (2007); Albania (2006); and Bosnia-Herzegovina (2008). Kosovo and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina do not have the status of “candidate country” yet but are considered to be “potential 
candidate” countries.     
194 This refers to the following countries, although the EU has different forms of relations with them: Algeria, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Kyrgyz, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, 
Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine (https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-
policy-coordination/international-economic-relations/enlargement-and-neighbouring-countries/neighbouring-




countries with which the EU have concluded Association Agreements which provide 
for the establishment of a “deep and comprehensive” free trade area.195  
 
The legislative basis for the Stabilization and Association Agreements and 
Association Agreements is Article 49 of the TEU, Article 8 of the TEU and Article 217 
of the TFEU. Article 49 allows for any European State to become a member state of 
the EU as long as it respects the values196 of the EU and is committed to promote 
such values. Article 8 of the TEU allows the EU to enter into association agreements 
with neighbouring countries not necessarily to become member states, but to 
develop a “special relationship” and to conclude agreements with these countries 
which may have reciprocal rights and obligations. Article 217 allows the EU to 
conclude association agreements with third countries which involved reciprocal rights 
and obligations, common action and special procedure.  
 
With the prospect of membership, “candidate countries” are expected to comply with 
the “Copenhagen Criteria”197 and align their laws and policies with that of the EU. 
“EU neighbourhood countries” who want to develop a “special relationship”198 with 
the EU are also required to align their laws with EU laws. The requirement for 
alignment is inherently part of both the Stabilization and Association Agreements 
which were concluded with the “candidate countries” in South-Eastern Europe and 
the Association Agreements which were concluded with “EU neighbourhood” 
countries like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The Stabilization and Association 
Agreements prepare “candidate countries” for membership of the EU and the 
Association Agreements together with the “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
                                                          
195  The Association Agreement with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are examples of agreements which include 
the establishment of a “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area”. For a discussion the Ukraine Association 
Agreement see E Stuart & I Roginska "State Aid Regulation and Future Industrial Policy in Ukraine" (2016) 1 
European State Aid Law Quarterly 59-71 where the authors note some of the difficulties Ukraine has 
experienced while transposing EU law into national law. 
196 See these values in Article 2 of the TEU. See “European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993: 
Conclusions of the Presidency” (available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf). 
197 The “Copenhagen Criteria” were adopted by the EU at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 
1993. In terms of these requirements candidate countries need to achieve stability of institutions to “guarantee 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the [EU].” See “European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993: Conclusions of the Presidency” (available 
at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf). 




Area” Agreement prepare “EU neighbouring” countries for a “special relationship”199 
with the EU. With these agreements the EU aims to integrate EU law over a period 
of time into the national law of associated countries and to achieve harmonisation of 
national law with EU law.200 Therefore these agreements include “principles, 
concepts and provisions of EU law which are to be interpreted and applied as if the 
third State is part of the EU.”201 Even if there are instances when the agreements 
may contain clauses which are directed at country-specific issues,202 the broader 
aims of both the Stabilization and Association Agreements and Association 
Agreements, which make provision for a “deep and comprehensive” free trade area, 
are generally similar. The aims, inter alia, include:  
(i) political, economic and institutional stability; 
(ii) the development of a political relation between the EU;  
(iii) the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law; 
(iv) the transitioning into a functioning market economy; 
(v) the promotion of harmonious economic relations and the gradual develop of a 
free trade area with the EU;  
(vi) to provide an appropriate framework for enhanced political dialogue; and  
(vii) the fostering of regional cooperation in all the fields covered by the agreement. 
 
The association agreements thus establish a broad framework for the relationship 
between the EU and the countries with which the agreements are concluded and 
they ensure greater cooperation and continuous dialogue in a number of policy 
areas, such as economic and monetary policy, environmental policy and consumer 
protection. Competition policy, including state aid control, also forms part of the 
policy areas covered in the association agreements. As with other policy areas, the 
                                                          
199 In this regard special reference can be made to the Association Agreements concluded with Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia. 
200 C Pippan “The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western 
Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality” (2004) 9(2) European Foreign Affairs Review 219 233. 
201 R Dragneva & K Wolczuk “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the challenges of inter-
regionalism” (2014) 39(3/4) Review of Central and East European Law 213 222. 
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Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality” (2004) 9(2) European Foreign Affairs Review 219 225; and N 
Simidjiyska “From Milosevic's reign to the European Union: Serbia and Montenegro's Stabilization and 
Association Agreement” (2007) 21(1) Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 147-176.  See also the 






EU ensured through the associaition agreements that the position on state aid 
control in “candidate countries” in South-Eastern Europe and “EU neighbourhood” 
countries with which it has a “special relationship”, replicates its state aid regime. 
Hence, the Stabilization and Association Agreements with “candidate countries” and 
Association Agreements203 (like the ones that make provision for a “deep and 
comprehensive” free trade area) contain provisions on state aid control.204 These 
provisions require that the “candidate countries” and “EU neighbourhood” countries 
implement a domestic system of state aid control205 and establish an “operationally 
independent authority”, which will be in place until accession,206 to enforce the 
domestic system. According to Botta and Schwellnus207 the requirement to establish 
national monitoring authorities208 was first introduced in the European Agreements 
(EAs)209 which were concluded between the EU and the Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEE-countries).210 The authors further note that the EU 
included this requirement in the EAs after it realised the “tremendous challenge” of 
                                                          
203 See for instance the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which is in effect since September 
2017. It replaced the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1998 between the EU and Ukraine is one 
example where the EU required an “EU neighbourhood” country to implement a domestic state aid control 
system which replicates the position in the EU (the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is available at 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A22014A0529%2801%29). For more on the 
position in Ukraine regarding state aid control see  See E Stuart & I Roginska "State Aid Regulation and Future 
Industrial Policy in Ukraine" (2016) 1 European State Aid Law Quarterly (2016) 59 59;  R Croce & H 
Stakheyeva “Competition law and state aid reform in light of EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and its impact 
on business in Ukraine” (2014) 35(1) European Competition Law Review 23-28; and A Dimitrova & R 
Dragneva “Shaping Convergence with the EU in Foreign Policy and State Aid in Post-Orange Ukraine: Weak 
External Incentives, Powerful Veto Players” (2013) 65(4) Europe-Asia Studies 658 672.  
204 The Association Agreement with Georgia is an exception in this regard. Even though it provides for a “deep 
and comprehensive” free trade area between Georgia and the EU, it does not incorporate EU state aid rules. 
Instead, it includes the WTO rules on subsidies in Article 206. 
205 Article 75 of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo; Article 69 of the 
Stabilization and Agreement between the EU and Macedonia (FYR); Article 73 of the Stabilization Agreement 
between the EU and Serbia; Article 73 of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and 
Montenegro; Article 71 of the Stabilization Agreement between the EU and Albania; Article 267 of the 
Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine; and 341 of the Association Agreement between the EU 
and Moldova. 
206 After accession the competence shifts to the EU Commission. 
207 M Botta & G Schwellnus “Enforcing state aid rules in EU candidate countries: a qualitative comparative 
analysis of the direct and indirect effects of conditionality” (2015) 22(3) Journal of European Public Policy 335 
337. See also DV Popovic & F Caka “State Aid Control in South-East Europe: Waiting for a Wake-up Call” 
(2017) 18 European Business Organization Law Review 333 334. 
208 For a comprehensive list of the national authorities which enforced state aid rules in the CEE-countries 
before accession was completed see L Biegunski (2012)”Forms of State Aid Authorities in Associated Countries 
of  Central and Eastern Europe” (2012) 3 European State Aid Law Quarterly 567 568. 
209 In this regard reference can be made to the Europe Agreements that were concluded between the EU and 
with Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
210 These countries included Estonia, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, all of which became 




having to monitor all restructuring aid which the CEE-countries granted to former 
SOEs after they were privatized.211 The Stabilization and Association Agreements 
with “candidate countries” and the Association Agreements with “EU neighbourhood 
countries” do not stipulate how the national monitoring authorities should be 
structured. This was also the position in the EAs.212 Hence, the institutional design of 
the national monitoring authorities differed to a great degree in the CEE-countries.213 
The same position is now seen in “candidate countries” and “EU neighbourhood” 
countries where the enforcement of the national state aid legislation is either done by 
a government-linked body or an existing competition authority.214 In nearly all the 
“candidate countries” in South-Eastern Europe the enforcement of national state aid 
legislation was entrusted to a government-linked body:215 
-In Serbia it is the Commission for the Control of State Aid, under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Finance.216 
-In Montenegro it is the Commission for the Control of State Aid, which seems to 
have very little independence from the government since the members of the 
Commission is appointed by the government and the Chairperson of the 
Commission is proposed by the Minister of Finance.217 
                                                          
211 M Botta & G Schwellnus “Enforcing state aid rules in EU candidate countries: a qualitative comparative 
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212 See M Cremona “State Aid Control: Substance and Procedure in the Europe Agreements and the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (2003) 9(3) European Law Journal 265 268 and A Birnstiel & H 
Heinrich “State Aid in the accession States” in E Szyszczak (ed.) Research Handbook on European State Aid 
Law (2011) 44 47. 
213 See in this regard L Biegunski “Forms of state aid authorities in associated countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe” (2012) 11(3) European State Aid Law Quarterly 567–72. 
214 See in this regard DV Popović “Institutional Design of State Aid Authorities in South East Europe: The Unfit 
Legal Transplant and Its Ramifications” in B Begović  & D Popović (eds) Competition Authorities in South 
Eastern Europe (2018) para 3 where the author states the two diverse methods followed by “Candidate 
Countries” when they established their national monitoring authority. 
215 See in this regard DV Popović “Institutional Design of State Aid Authorities in South East Europe: The Unfit 
Legal Transplant and Its Ramifications” in B Begović & D Popović (eds) Competition Authorities in South 
Eastern Europe (2018) par. 3 and DV Popovic & F Caka “State Aid Control in South-East Europe: Waiting for 
a Wake-up Call” (2017) 18 European Business Organization Law Review 333 340-344. 
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European Business Organization Law Review 333 341. 
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- In Albania it is the State Aid Commission and the State Aid Directorate, but the 
independence of the State Aid Commission, which is the main body for state aid 
control, is questionable since it is chaired by the Minister of the Economy.218  
Macedonia is the only “candidate country” which entrusted the enforcement of 
national state aid law to its existing competition authority, the Commission for the 
Protection of Competition.219 In Ukraine and Moldova, both “EU neighbourhood 
countries”, the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMC) and the Moldovan 
Competition Council (MCC) respectively are responsible for enforcing the national 
state aid legislation. Both the AMC and the MCR are described as “reasonably 
independent” from the government220 or an “autonomous agency”.221  
 
These different national monitoring authorities are required to enforce the national 
system of state aid control until accession, when the EU Commission becomes the 
sole enforcer of the supranational state aid rules.222 But the enforcement of a 
national system of state aid control by monitoring authorities can be a daunting task. 
Challenges faced by national monitoring authorities, inter alia, include: 
 
1. Difficulty in applying complex EU law in a single jurisdiction that is not yet a 
member state. Schutterle223 alerts to the challenges faced by associated countries 
when having to implement the EU state aid rules where he states: 
 
“For the law makers, administrations and enterprises of the Candidate Countries, the 
acceptance, transposal into domestic rules and effective implementation of the EC 
                                                          
218 DV Popovic & F Caka “State Aid Control in South-East Europe: Waiting for a Wake-up Call” (2017) 18 
European Business Organization Law Review 333 343. 
219 DV Popović “Institutional Design of State Aid Authorities in South East Europe: The Unfit Legal Transplant 
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State Aid Law Quarterly 59-71. 
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State aid acquis is one of the major legal, economic and probably also mental 
challenges of accession preparation.” 
 
According to Ciric and Botta,224 misapplication or neglect of EU state aid rules 
frequently occurs in these countries and it has manifested particularly in regard to 
SGEI in the SEE-countries. The authors show that in nearly every SEE-country,225 
the Altmark criteria are either being neglected or misapplied when the national 
monitoring authorities have to decide whether aid granted to a provider of SGEI 
constitute state aid.226 They advise that: 
 
“The lack of enforcement of the EU acquis during the accession phase may have long 
term negative consequences once the candidate country finally joins the EU. 
Therefore, the EU Commission should carry out a deeper scrutiny of the decisions 
adopted by the State aid authorities during the pre-accession, in order to ensure a 
defacto enforcement of the State aid rules.”227 
 
2. The very lengthy transitional periods during which the national monitoring 
authorities have to apply the national system of state aid control. This may impact on 
how effective the rules are being enforced. Botta228 points out that the length of 
transition into an EU member state for “candidate countries” in South-Eastern 
Europe has significantly increased and this may undermine the incentive to 
rigorously enforce the state aid rules. 
 
                                                          
224 See R Ciric & M Botta” “Enforcement of State Aid Law in the Area of Services of General Economic 
Interest in EU Candidate Countries (2015) 2 European State Aid Law Quarterly 213-223. 
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3. Reluctance by granting authorities to notify aid and uncertainty as to the 
applicability of the rules on the side of the national monitoring authority.229 Botta 
explains the reluctance to notify as “a lack of awareness by several state aid 
providers of their binding duty of notification” and advise for more advocacy.230 It is 
submitted that this can lead to a situation where state aid which should not have 
been granted is indeed granted firstly, because it was not notified and secondly 
because the national monitoring authority might not pursue the public authority which 
granted the aid because of uncertainty on its side.  
 
4. A lack of independence of national monitoring authorities in associated countries. 
Botta231 states that at least four232 of the current “candidate countries” have opted for 
the establishment of a State Aid Commission, which is normally headed by the 
Minister of Finance and that it is very unlikely for the Minister of Finance to condemn 
as unlawful state aid which in most cases would have been granted by the 
department of which he is the head. 
 
5. Uncertainty as to whether local authorities make correct decisions on a state aid 
scheme without supervision of the EU Commission. Ciric and Botta233 note that the 
EU Commission does not check whether decisions by national monitoring authorities 
are correct and in line with decisions from the CJEU while Cremona234 states that 
there is no basis under which the EU Commission will review specific decisions of 
the national monitoring authority in the associate countries and the national 
monitoring authority is also not obliged to consult the Commission. The absence of 
review by the EU Commission in essence leads to a situation where state aid, which 
the Commission might have considered incompatible with the internal market, are 
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231 M Botta “State aid control in south-east Europe, the endless transition” (2013) 12(1) European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 83 88. 
232 These include Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. 
233 R Ciric & M Botta “Enforcement of State Aid Law in the Area of Services of General Economic Interest in 
EU Candidate Countries (2015) 2 European State Aid Law Quarterly 213 214. 
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approved by the national monitoring authority as they are considered to be in line 
with the national state aid legislation. 
 
With all the challenges to the enforcement of a national system of state aid control in 
mind, Cremona235 is rightly sceptical of the appropriateness of importing “into a 
single State a system designed to deal with inter-State competitiveness”. Cremona 
also notes the “practical difficulties of applying Community norms and standards 
outside the procedural structures, integration mechanisms and single market 
objectives of actual EU membership.”236 Botta237 is perhaps correct when he 
concludes that:  
 
“The EU founding fathers were well aware that the EU Member States would have 
not been willing to self-enforce a system of State aid control, and thus they 
delegated this function to a supranational body like the European Commission. This 
logic is still valid today, both for the EU Member States, and as well as for the SEEs, 
which hopefully sooner rather than later will complete their transition to join the EU 
family.” 
 
Botta further concludes that:238 
“national State aid authorities should not be granted the decision- making power to 
review and approve national State aid schemes. The power of approving/rejecting 
the notified aid schemes should be granted only to a supranational authority, which 
is more likely to preserve its autonomy from the aid grantors. [The] the European 
Commission should thus have the power to review notified national aid schemes of 
the EU candidate countries since they gain the EU candidate status. This task, in fact, 
cannot be delegated to a national authority…” 
 
                                                          
235 M Cremona “State Aid Control: Substance and Procedure in the Europe Agreements and the Stabilisation 
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236 M Cremona “State Aid Control: Substance and Procedure in the Europe Agreements and the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements (2003) 9(3) European Law Journal 265 266. 
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Since the EU state aid rules are used as the yardstick for the proposed national state 
aid legislation, these doubts about the appropriateness of supranational rules for a 
single state have to be kept in mind. Some of the difficulties mentioned will not be 
directly relevant to the question whether a single state such as South Africa should 
have state aid rules: 
- Some of these problems will not be unique to single states that attempt to enforce 
state aid rules, but they will be prevalent in any new jurisdiction that applies state aid 
rules.  
- Other problems may be unique to the European system. The problems regarding 
the application of the complex web of European norms of state aid fall into this 
category. For South Africa this merely shows that the European state aid rules must 
be carefully approached when they are imported. 
- Furthermore, certain difficulties exist because state aid rules in this context are 
applied to align countries with the EU often for purposes of future accession. This 
does not mean that it would not be worthwhile to apply a state aid regime in a single 
country that is not interested in future membership of the EU. 
However, it is also clear that a major concern is that monitoring authorities which are 
merely state institutions will not be able to properly supervise state aid and enforce 
state aid law. South Africa is likely to also face this obstacle. At least in Europe 
related countries may apply state aid rules as they are incentivised by closer co-
operation or membership of the EU. In South Africa there is no such incentive. It 
should therefore be asked whether state aid rules for South Africa cannot be 
accommodated in a regional framework. 
 
2 2 1 Selected Regional Economic Communities in Africa and their competition 
policies239 
 
                                                          
239 This study does not intend to provide a comprehensive discussion of those selected regional economic 
communities. Many scholars and experts on African integration have done admirable work in this regard. What 
the study will indeed do is to take a closer look at the competition policies of those selected regional economic 
communities. For more information on the competition regimes within the various African regional economic 
communities see T Hartzenberg “Competition Policy in Africa” in C Herrmann, M Krajewski & JP Terhechte 
(eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2013) 147 165. See also AB Darku &  AB Appau 
“Analysing Sub-Saharan Africa Trade Patterns in the Presence of Regional Trade Agreements- The case of 




As it would be preferable to enforce state aid rules in a supra-national structure, it 
therefore should be asked whether there is a structure in Africa within which state aid 
of SOEs can be properly regulated and whether South Africa could become part of 
such a structure. Such questions justify a closer look at selected African regional 
economic communities and their competition policies,240 including SADC, to show 
why the study suggests state aid rules for South Africa as a single state only and not 
for the regional economic community of which it is a member state. In this context it 
can be stated that multinational integration is not completely new to the African 
continent. There are multiple regional economic communities on the continent.241 
Since there is no economic integration in Africa on a continental level which is 
comparable to the EU, besides the African Union, which is mostly a political 
organisation, regional economic communities are the most likely vehicles for 
economic development. Regional economic communities are in most cases inter-
governmental organisations, rather than supranational bodies, that aim to improve 
the economies of their regions. Hart observes that (i) suspicion, (ii) political instability 
and (iii) an unwillingness to give up elements of state sovereignty are some of the 
reasons why complete integration is difficult on the African continent.242 The benefits 
of regional economic integration243 were noted by many African countries after 
obtaining their independence with the end of colonialism. Van Weijen states that due 
to the small size of African markets, economic integration was needed to create 
                                                          
240 See J Drexl, M Bakhoum, EM Fox, MS Gal & DJ Gerber Competition Policies and Regional Integration in 
Developing Countries (2012) for a worthwhile and comprehensive read on the interface between regional 
integration and competition policy. 
241 For a comprehensive reading on the various economic groupings see N Mwase “Coordination and 
Rationalisation of Sub-Regional Economic Integration Institutions in Eastern and Southern Africa: SACU, 
SADC, EAC and COMESA” (2008) 9(4) Journal of World Investment and Trade 333 333-352. 
242 SG-A Hart “Integrating Trade and Human Rights in West Africa: An Analysis of the Ecowas Experience” 
(2000) 32 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 57 59. 
243 Long before the establishment of Africa’s first regional economic communities, regional integration to 
ensure the maintenance of international peace and security was already recognised by the United Nations when 
it signed its United Nations Charter in 1945.  Article 52 (1) of the UN Charter provides that: 
“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with 
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional 
action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations.”  Since the inception of the UN Charter, different parts of the world have seen 
the creation of regional arrangements which do not only work towards peace and security but also towards 
economic, political and social development. Examples are the European Union in Europe, Mercosur in South 
America, described as a process of integration which started in 1991 between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay 
and Uruguay [see F Domínguez &  MA  Guedes de Oliveira Mercosur: Between Integration and Democracy  
(2004)] and  the North American Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA) in North America signed in December 1992 
between the United States of America, Canada and Mexico, described as the “most comprehensive free trade 




economies of scale.244 Goldstein and Ndung’u state some of the reasons for African 
states joining regional groupings and these include (i) improving economic policy, (ii) 
reducing poverty, and (iii) managing the process of liberalisation.245 The regional 
economic communities on the continent are the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC).246  
 
The introduction of legislation enacted by a supranational body could be a perfect 
opportunity for African states, which do not have the necessary capabilities, to 
establish regulation in a field such as competition law and policy. African states 
appear to be reluctant to surrender their sovereignty with regard to regulation of 
competition in general to a supranational body.247 It is even less likely that they will 
give up their sovereignty with regard to state aid.248 It will certainly be more difficult to 
establish state aid rules, than it was for the six249 original members of the EU when 
they decided to establish the first European Communities.250 All the above factors 
make it difficult to make recommendations for SADC or any other regional economic 
community of which South Africa is a member.  
 
A discussion of selected regional economic communities will now follow. This 
discussion will show that some regional organisations such as COMESA do have 
competition rules in place which may apply cross-border under certain 
                                                          
244 J Van Weijen “COMESA, free trade area by October 2000” (2000) 6(5) International Trade Law & 
Regulation 153 153. See also BD Nomvete “Regional Development and Economic Cooperation in Africa” 
(1993) 61(4) South African Journal of Economics 281 281- 289.  
245 See A Goldstein & NS Ndung’u “Regional Integration Experience in the Eastern African Region” OECD 
Development Centre Working Paper No 171 8. 
246 For comprehensive reading on Africa’s regional economic organisations see RF Oppong “The African 
Union, The African Economic Community and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities: Untangling a 
Complex Web” (2010) 18 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 92 92-103. 
247 This is the case even though those African states that are COMESA member states have already partially 
submitted to COMESA’s regional competition legislation. See the discussion on COMESA’s competition 
legislation in para 2.2.1 of this chapter. 
248 See the discussion on state aid rules in the selected regional economic communities below in this chapter.  
Para 2.2.1.1 (c) discusses the position in COMESA, para 2.2.1.2 (c) discussion the position in SADC and para 
2.2.1.3 (ii) discussed the position in ECOWAS.  
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circumstances, but at present251 there is no supra-national enforcer comparable to 
the European Commission and it appears unlikely that state aid rules will be adopted 
by the regional organisations of which South Africa is or could be a member state. 
This discussion will also help to establish whether state aid rules introduced in South 
Africa is likely to be followed and implemented in one or more of Africa’s regional 
economic communities with the necessary changes to suit them. The three selected 
regional economic communities252 whose competition policies will be scrutinized are 
COMESA, SADC and ECOWAS, which together with the EAC have been described 
as “Africa’s four leading RECs today”.253 Firstly, COMESA is discussed because it is 
considered to be one of the “largest trading organizations”254 in Africa and has 
“Africa’s first supranational competition authority”.255 It covers Africa’s eastern and 
southern regions and member states stretch from Libya in the north to Swaziland in 
the south. Secondly, SADC is discussed because South Africa is a member state. 
Thirdly, ECOWAS is discussed since Nigeria, Africa’s second biggest economy, is a 
member state and it played a leading role in the formation of ECOWAS: the country 
was the driving force behind West African integration in the 1960s.256  
   
 
2 2 1 1 COMESA 
(a) Background to COMESA  
 
“The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa is a programme essentially 
aimed at opening up the internal market made up of about 320 million people. It is a 
programme to create a common economic and social area which will give people 
new opportunities for development. It is a programme intended to promote more 
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competition regime in para 2.2.1.3 of this chapter. 
252 There are of course other regional economic organisations such as the East African Community, the 
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253 This description was given by K Gottschalk “The African Union and its sub-‐-regional Structures” (2012) 
1(1) Journal of African Union Studies 9 23. 
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competition but also more co-operation. It is a programme aimed at removing 
obstacles to trade and investment but establish minimum set of rules that must be 
followed up, for without this the market cannot function in a balanced manner.”257 
 
COMESA was created in 1993 by the Treaty for the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern African Community258 after its humble beginnings as a preferential trade 
area agreement between eastern and southern African states. The Treaty for the 
Establishment of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African 
States (the PTA treaty) was signed between eastern and southern African 
countries259 after various efforts to achieve economic cooperation.260 The PTA treaty 
came into force in September 1982.261 In terms of Article 2 of the PTA treaty it was 
the first step towards the establishment of a common market amongst eastern and 
southern African states. The aim of the preferential trade area was to promote co-
operation and development amongst member states in all fields of economic 
activity.262 In 1993 COMESA became the successor of the Preferential Trade Area 
for Eastern and Southern African States (the PTA) when the PTA Treaty was 
reconstituted as COMESA. Today COMESA consists of nineteen member states263 
although it does not include South Africa. 
 
(b) Why is South Africa not a COMESA member state?  
                                                          
257 See H Sinare “The Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa: What is New, 
What Future Prospects” (1995) Basic Documents of International Economic Law para 8.  
258 For a short and concise summary on COMESA and its objectives see JJ Henning “Convergence of 
governance systems in SADEC: the OHADA and COMESA examples” (2003) 28(3) Journal for Juridical 
Science 156 156-164. See also KK Mwenda “Legal Aspects of Regional Integration: COMESA and SADC on 
the Regulation of Foreign Investment in Southern and Eastern Africa” (1997) 9(2) African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 325 325-331. 
259 The African states which sign the Treaty for the Establishment of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and 
Southern African States (the PTA Treaty) on 21 December 1981 includes Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia.  
260 In this regard see J Van Weijen “COMESA, free trade area by October 2000” (2000) 6(5) International 
Trade Law & Regulation 153 153. 
261 J Van Weijen “COMESA, free trade area by October 2000” (2000) 6(5) International Trade Law & 
Regulation 153 153. See also D Van der Merwe “Economic cooperation in Southern Africa: Structures, Policies, 
Problems” (1991) 24(3) The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 386 392. 
262 Article 3 of the PTA Treaty. 
263 The member states are Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Libya, Seychelles, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.   Those countries which were part of the initial efforts in 1966  to achieve the economic community 
includes Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
In this regard see J Van Weijen, “COMESA, free trade area by October 2000” (2000) 6(5) International Trade 





South Africa has been given the opportunity, upon fulfilling certain obligations,264 to 
become a member state of COMESA.265 However until now, it has chosen not to 
become a member state. This prompts the question why South Africa as one of the 
leading southern African states has made this choice. Ngongola states that due to 
the different regional integration arrangements in southern Africa there was going to 
be speculation with regard to the arrangement which South Africa would prefer.266 It 
is not unreasonable to suggest that there must have been hopes within all southern 
African regional arrangements that South Africa would become a member, not only 
because it is the leading economy on the continent but also because of other factors 
such as its influence in the world and the degree to which its laws are developed and 
naturally for trade reasons. SADC however was South Africa’s preferred choice.267 
 
The South African government never provided particular reasons for choosing SADC 
over COMESA. It has also not opted for membership of both regional economic 
communities as many other African states have done.268 Although such an 
overlapping of membership between SADC and COMESA might not be 
problematic269 for those countries which have chosen to do so, South Africa might 
view it as problematic for several reasons. Firstly, a membership fee has to be paid 
to both organisations. Perhaps South Africa believes that it will not get value from 
paying two membership fees. Secondly, South Africa might have wanted to avoid 
having to comply with two sets of rules (that could include rules on competition).270 
Double membership could cause significant duplication of South Africa’s 
                                                          
264 See Article 1 of the COMESA Treaty. 
265 See Article 1 of the COMESA Treaty. 
266 C Ngongola “The reconstitution of the Southern African Development Community: Some International 
Trade Law perspectives” (2000) 117(2) South African Law Journal 256 256. 
267 South Africa became a member state on 9 August 1994. See S Amos “The role of South Africa in SADC 
regional integration: the making or braking of the organization” (2010) 5(3) Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Technology 124 124. 
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responsibilities in terms of the competition law regime of COMESA and the possible 
regime of SADC on the one hand and South Africa’s domestic competition law 
regime on the other hand. Lastly, another factor which could be looked at is the 
diversity of legal systems in the countries which belong to COMESA. Member 
countries range from common and civil to Islamic law.271 This however is not such a 
significant factor where SADC is concerned. At least eleven of the SADC member 
states were under former British control, either as a protectorate or a colony and it is 
inevitable that British legal principles are being applied today in many SADC 
countries with South Africa having a hybrid legal system. It is therefore submitted 
that known common legal principles make it easier for a group of countries to 
negotiate rules and regulations for their institution.272  
 
(c) Competition Policy within COMESA: The COMESA Competition Regulations 
and the COMESA Competition Rules 
 
The legal foundation of COMESA’s competition policy can be found in Article 55 and 
Article 52 of the COMESA Treaty respectively. Article 55273 deals with prohibited 
agreements and concerted practices between undertakings which may impact 
negatively on competition within the Common Market. Article 52 declares any 
subsidies by member states which may distort or threaten to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, to be incompatible 
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36(3) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 583 583-592. 
272 For a comprehensive discussion of the convergence of legal systems in Southern Africa see G van Niekerk 
“The convergence of legal systems in Southern Africa” (2002) 35(3) The Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa 308 308-318. 
273 Article 55 of the COMESA treaty provides as follows: 
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 Provided that the agreement, decision or practice does not impose on the undertaking restrictions inconsistent 
with the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty or has the effect of eliminating competition. 




with the Common Market. Consequently these two articles should be looked at 
together.  
 
Article 55(3)274 empowers the Council of COMESA to enact regulations to regulate 
competition within member states. Such regulations were enacted in 2004275 and 
became the COMESA Competition Regulations.276 COMESA recognised that the 
expansion of business activities beyond borders of the member states may also 
increase the likelihood that anti-competitive practices in one member state may 
adversely affect competition in another member state.277 The purpose of the 
Regulation is thus to promote and encourage competition within COMESA by (i) 
preventing restrictive business practices and other restrictions that deter the efficient 
operation of markets and (ii) to protect consumers against offensive conduct by 
market actors.278 As such it enhances the welfare of the consumers in the region.279 
The Regulations apply to all economic activities, conducted by private or public 
persons, which have an effect within COMESA.280 Hence, all transactions with a 
regional dimension and impact fall within the scope of the COMESA Competition 
Regulations while all other transactions are still addressed by the national 
competition authorities of the COMESA member states.281 Unlike EU rules, which 
contain no definition of the concept “undertaking”282 and had to be interpreted by the 
EU courts, the COMESA Competition Regulations contain a clear definition of the 
concept. It includes any person, public or private, involved in the production of goods 
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Member States.” 
275 The Regulations can be found in the Official Gazette of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
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276 The COMESA Competition Commission which was established in terms of Article 6 of the COMESA 
Competition Regulations and the Board of Commissioners (the Board) which was established in terms of Article 
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or trade in goods or the provision of services.283 The COMESA competition law 
provisions will therefore clearly apply to SOEs and their activities.  
 
COMESA, unlike the EU, has however not made state aid regulation part of its 
Competition Regulations. As previously mentioned, article 52284 of the COMESA 
treaty deals with subsidies granted by member states which may have a distortive 
effect on competition. Nevertheless, the COMESA competition authorities285 do not 
have the power to investigate subsidies granted by member states, even if such 
subsidies may impact on competition in the region. Instead, the COMESA treaty286 
allows for countervailing duties to be levied by a member state which imports a 
subsidised product from another member state. The countervailing duty will be an 
amount equal to the estimated subsidy determined to have been granted directly or 
indirectly by a member state for the manufacturing, production or export of any 
product. This position is thus reflective of those provisions in the WTO’s Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures which provides for countervailing duties 
on subsidised products.287 The following observations can therefore be made in 
regard to the COMESA subsidy control provisions:  
 
                                                          
283 Article 1 of the COMESA Competition Regulations. 
284 It provides as follows: 
“1. Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any subsidy granted by a Member State or through state 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between the Member States, be 
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manufacture, production or export of such product in the country of origin or exportation.” 
285 See the discussion below in this paragraph on the powers of the COMESA Competition Commission. 
286 Article 52 (2) of the COMESA treaty. 




First, although the wording of Article 52 of the COMESA treaty bears only slight 
resemblance to the EU’s state aid control provisions,288 in essence it reaches the 
same results as the EU state aid rules because the COMESA subsidy control regime 
does not only ensure fair trade between the member states but it also ensure that 
certain undertakings or production lines are not benefitted to the disadvantage of 
others. Furthermore, the protection of competition in COMESA is not compromised 
because of the possibility of countervailing duties by member states whose 
undertakings are disadvantaged by subsidies. Member states are therefore not left 
without recourse if subsidies affect competition. 
 
Second, like the EU treaty, the COMESA treaty does not provide a definition of the 
term subsidy. The EU jurisprudence provides guidance on the scope of the term 
“subsidy”. It remains to be seen what the COMESA Court of Justice289 will include 
under this concept: that is whether it will be a broad or narrow interpretation and 
even perhaps whether COMESA will follow the same route as the EU in this regard. 
 
Third, Article 52 of the COMESA treaty makes no distinction between private and 
state-owned undertakings. Hence, it would not be unreasonable to infer that the 
subsidy control regime is also applicable to SOEs.  
 
Lastly, beside the prohibition on the allocation of subsidies and state resources to an 
undertaking or for the production of certain goods by a member state, Article 52 also 
extends its scope to assistance by a third country290 which may impact on 
competition within COMESA. 
 
(d) Comments on the COMESA competition policy 
 
The COMESA Competition Regulations, as in the EU, has supranational application 
in regard to anticompetitive acts with a cross-border dimension. Such status has 
                                                          
288 For a detailed comparison between the EU state aid control regime and the WTO subsidy regime see L 
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Common Market. The Court of Justice became operational in 1998. See Articles 19- 44 of the COMESA treaty 
for, inter alia, the composition, functions and jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 




been established by Article 10 of the COMESA Treaty which determines that 
regulations made by the Council, shall be binding on all member states. In this 
regard the COMESA competition authorities are correctly described as “Africa’s first 
supranational competition authority”.291 This is especially true because COMESA 
has a Competition Commission which has the legal capacity to perform and execute 
all those functions bestowed on it by the Competition Regulations in the territory of 
each member state.292 The Competition Commission293 is responsible for promoting 
competition within COMESA by, inter alia, monitoring and investigating any anti-
competitive practices by undertakings within COMESA, reviewing regional 
competition policy with the view to constantly improving the Competition Regulations, 
and assisting member states to promote national competition laws with the objective 
of harmonising the national laws with the COMESA Competition Regulations.294 It 
has significant powers to remedy and penalise anticompetitive conduct by 
undertakings within COMESA.295 
 
Furthermore, COMESA’s subsidy control regime aims to protect free and fair 
competition by prohibiting subsidies that may distort competition. This brings 
COMESA’s subsidy control rules somewhat closer to the EU state aid control 
regime. However, this regime cannot be fully compared with the EU’s state aid 
control regime.  
 
2 2 1 2 SADC  
 
(a) Background to SADC 
 
Thomas refers to two important regional and international developments that 
motivated African countries to desire closer ties, namely (i) the independence of 
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292 Article 6 of the COMESA Competition Regulations. 
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African countries from their colonial powers and (ii) the end of the cold war.296 
Moreover, there are related but somewhat unique reasons why SADC was 
established. 
 
SADC has its roots in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC).297 The SADCC was established after the adoption of a declaration, the 
“Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation” Declaration (the Declaration), in 
April 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia.298 The goals of the SADCC were listed as (i) the 
reduction of economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa in particular, (ii) 
closer links to create greater regional integration, (iii) implementation of national, 
interstate and regional policies through the use of available resources and (iv) to 
secure international cooperation and support for the economic liberation of the 
region.299 It has been widely stated that the SADCC was southern African countries’ 
response to the dominance of apartheid South Africa in the southern region of 
Africa.300 The heads of state of the nine countries which signed the Declaration, 
aimed for economic development and independence from South Africa301 and an 
integrated development of the region.302 Thomas argues that the need for closer 
economic relations in other parts of the world, such as in Latin America, was another 
                                                          
296 See the Introductory note to the SADC Treaty by RH Thomas “Angola-Botswana-Lesotho-Malawi-
Mozambique-Namibia- Swaziland-Tanzania-Zambia-Zimbabwe: Treaty of the Southern Africa Development 
Community” (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 117 117. 
297 See C Ngongola “The Reconstitution of the Southern Africa Development Community: Some International 
Trade Law Perspectives” (2000) 117(2) South African Law Journal 266 266- 273 for a comprehensive historical 
background of SADC. 
298 Countries which were part to the Declaration include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See M Forere “Is discussion of the "United States of Africa" 
premature? Analysis of ECOWAS and SADC integration efforts” (2012) 56(1) Journal of African Law 29 38. 
299 See these goals quoted in JB Boyd Jr “A Subsystemic Analysis of the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference” (1985) 28(4) African Studies Review 46 47; and R Leys & A Tostensen “Regional 
Co-operation in Southern Africa: The Southern African Development Co-Ordination Conference” (1982) 9(23) 
Review of African Political Economy 52 53. 
300 See for example VI Goncharov, CRD Halisi & Y Tarabrin “Recommendations: Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference and African Security” (1988) 17(1) Issue: A Journal of Opinion 37 37. 
See also M Forere “Is discussion of the "United States of Africa" premature? Analysis of ECOWAS and SADC 
integration efforts” (2012) 56(1) Journal of African Law 29 38; and GG Maasdorp “A Changing Regional Role 
for SADCC?” (1989) 12(1) Harvard International Review 10 10. 
301 At that time the Apartheid regime in South Africa was at it heights. 
302 See the Introductory note to the SADC Treaty by RH Thomas “Angola-Botswana-Lesotho-Malawi-
Mozambique-Namibia- Swaziland-Tanzania-Zambia-Zimbabwe: Treaty of the Southern Africa Development 
Community” (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 117 117. See also M Forere “Is discussion of the "United 
States of Africa" premature? Analysis of ECOWAS and SADC integration efforts” (2012) 56(1) Journal of 




reason why southern African countries wanted closer ties.303 Forere supports this 
observation by Thomas when he states that:  
 
“It was not only dependence on South Africa that prompted SADCC states to resort 
to integration of the southern Africa region, but also the emergence of powerful 
trading arrangements in other regions of the world that prompted African leaders 
into finalizing their own plans for a pan-African Economic Community (AEC), to 
evolve from RECs with specific trade liberalization and market integration 
targets.”304  
 
From the early 1990s there were several reasons why the states which signed the 
Declaration which established the SADCC wanted South Africa as a member of a 
newly constituted organization. Positive developments in South Africa towards a 
democratic dispensation at the time begged consideration on the position of the 
SADCC towards South Africa.305 It was foreseen that a democratic South Africa 
would be a good possible partner in any integration efforts in the southern region.306 
According to Thomas, it was also considered that the political change in South Africa 
was going to lead to greater investment in the whole southern region but with South 
Africa as the “preferred choice”.307 Thomas noted the following factors that would 
make South Africa the “preferred choice” for investment as: (i) South Africa had a 
more attractive investment climate at the time, (ii) its infrastructure, which is 
comparable with that of developed countries and (ii) its managerial, technical and 
technological capacities were better than those of other countries in the region.308 
Consequently, a summit was held in Windhoek, Namibia, in August 1992 during 
                                                          
303 See the Introductory note to the SADC Treaty by RH Thomas “Angola-Botswana-Lesotho-Malawi-
Mozambique-Namibia- Swaziland-Tanzania-Zambia-Zimbabwe: Treaty of the Southern Africa Development 
Community” (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 117 117. 
304 See also M Forere “Is discussion of the "United States of Africa" premature? Analysis of ECOWAS and 
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Mozambique-Namibia- Swaziland” (1993) 32 International Legal Materials117 117. 
306 See the Introductory note to the SADC Treaty by RH Thomas “Angola-Botswana-Lesotho-Malawi-
Mozambique-Namibia- Swaziland” (1993) 32 International Legal Materials117 117. 
307 See the Introductory note to the SADC Treaty by RH Thomas “Angola-Botswana-Lesotho-Malawi-
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Community” (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 117 117. 
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which the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community was adopted. 
SADC was established and its objectives, inter alia, include development and 
economic growth of the region as well as to alleviate poverty and enhance the 
standard and quality of life of people of southern Africa.309 In August 1994, a few 
months after its first democratically elected government was inaugurated, South 
Africa became a member of SADC. At present SADC consists of fifteen member 
states.310  
 
(b) Competition Policy within SADC: the Declaration on Regional Cooperation 
in Competition and Consumer Policies  
 
The SADC treaty does not have specific competition-related provisions. 
Nevertheless, Article 21 of the SADC treaty allows for member states to cooperate in 
all areas necessary to foster regional development and integration while Article 22 of 
the treaty states that member states may conclude protocols to govern such areas of 
cooperation. The SADC Trade Protocol is one such protocol. It entered into force in 
January 2001 as a result of the member states’ recognition that the development of 
trade is essential to the economic integration of SADC311 and also because of 
member states’ desire to achieve greater cooperation in the area of trade.312 Article 2 
states the objectives of the Trade Protocol as (i) to liberalise intra-regional trade in 
goods and services on the basis of fair, mutually equitable and beneficial trade 
arrangements, (ii) to ensure efficient production within SADC, (iii) to contribute 
towards the improvement of the climate for investment, (iv) to enhance the economic 
development, diversification and industrialisation of the SADC region, and (v) to 
establish a free trade area within the SADC region. 
  
With regard to competition policy Article 25 of the Trade Protocol provides that 
member states shall implement measures within the community which prohibit unfair 
business practices and promote competition. SADC recognised the crucial role 
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310 The SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic 
of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
311 See the Preamble of the SADC Trade Protocol. 




which competition policies could play in achieving among other goals, economic 
growth and economic efficiency within the region.313 It was however noted that not all 
member states of the SADC have competition policies in place. Therefore a 
community-wide approach for the protection of competition became necessary to 
guard against unfair business practices. There are also other reasons for a SADC-
wide competition policy besides the rooting out of unfair business practices. Firstly, 
the level of development of the different economies of the SADC member states has 
to be kept in mind. On the one hand a member state such as South Africa has a 
fairly well-run economy but some other economies are not doing as well, either 
because of political instability in a country, such as in Zimbabwe, or because of a 
lack of foreign direct investment. Secondly, some member countries have 
sophisticated competition policies in place with effective enforcement institutions, 
while the same cannot be said of other member states. Consequently SADC agreed 
on a system of effective cooperation in the application of member states’ competition 
laws.  
 
In September 2009 the SADC member states signed the Declaration on Regional 
Cooperation in Competition Law and Consumer Policy (the DRCCC). The DRCCC 
derived from Article 25 of the Protocol on Trade in the SADC region. Article 1 of the 
DRCCC requires member states to adopt, strengthen and implement the necessary 
competition laws with the ultimate aim of achieving a regional framework in 
competition policy. The DRCCC in its present form is therefore only a cooperation 
framework314 and focuses on “effective cooperation” between member states which 
have their own functional national competition law regimes. The cooperative nature 
of the DRCCC was confirmed when member states signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Inter-Agency Cooperation in Competition Policy, Law and 
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Enforcement (SADC MoU) on 26 May 2016 in Gaborone, Botswana.315 The main 
objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is to enhance the enforcement of 
national competition laws through closer cooperation between national competition 
authorities.316 The effect of such cooperation317 in essence will lead to the sharing of 
information on cases and coordinated approaches to the investigation of cases.318  
 
(c) State intervention and subsidies in SADC  
 
The position in SADC with regard to the granting of subsidies by member states is 
based on the WTO subsidy rules. Article 19 of the SADC Trade Protocol of 1996, 
which deals with subsidies by member states, seeks to protect trade between 
member states and prevent distortion of competition through the regulation of 
subsidies. Article 19(1) of the SADC Trade Protocol provides that member states 
shall not grant any subsidies which distort or threatens to distort competition in the 
region and that member states may implement a new subsidy only in accordance 
with the WTO rules.319 Member states are allowed to protect trade and by extension 
competition through the levying of countervailing duties against another member 
state if a subsidy was granted by that other member state.320 The prohibition of 
subsidies in the SADC Trade Protocol is therefore the only reference to state funding 
of enterprises by member states.  
 
(d) Comments on the SADC competition policy  
                                                          





316 Preamble of the “Memorandum of Understanding amongst Competition Authorities of the Member States of 
Southern African Development Community on Cooperation in the field of Competition Policy, Law and 
Enforcement”.  
317 A Joint Committee will facilitate the cooperation between national competition authorities and the national 
competition authorities of each member state will have a representative serving on the Committee. While 
serving in such a position no representative of a member state shall be required to communicate information 
which is considered to be confidential information in terms of domestic law. See Articles 3 and 5 of the 
“Memorandum of Understanding amongst Competition Authorities of the Member States of Southern African 
Development Community on Cooperation in the field of Competition Policy, Law and Enforcement”.  
318https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/competition-authorities-sadc-member-states-signed-memorandum/ 
(accessed on 12 March 2017). 
319 See para 9 of chapter 4 for a discussion on the WTO rules.  





Unlike COMESA,321 SADC competition rules do not have a supranational existence 
and there is no supranational body to enforce competition law. In regard to antitrust 
matters, SADC’s framework for protecting competition generally is not as strong as 
that of COMESA. The reason for this is that cooperation only might not be as 
successful or effective as enforcement by a supranational enforcer, especially if the 
competition authorities from one member state are not as capable or cooperative as 
others. The supranational status322 of COMESA competition law with regard to 
matters with a cross-border dimension provides it with wider powers to investigate 
such activities. It allows the COMESA Competition Commission to be the main 
investigator while in SADC it might be that more than one national competition 
authority has to start its own investigation into the same antitrust matter. Even with 
coordinated approaches as provided for by the SADC MoU, one anticompetitive 
activity may lead to multiple investigations running concurrently because more than 
one national competition authority will be investigating it. As a result the investigation 
of one antitrust matter may have an impact on the resources of more than one 
national competition authority. Another observation is that, unlike the COMESA 
Competition Regulations, the SADC Trade Protocol is not unambiguously applied to 
all undertakings, private or public.  
 
In regard to the subsidy control regime, it is submitted that SADC has recognised the 
need to control state intervention with trade and by extension competition when it 
decided to implement the WTO subsidy rules. Article 19(1) of the SADC Trade 
Protocol, like the provisions in the COMESA treaty, closely matches the WTO rules 
on subsidies by member states and has little in common with the EU state aid rules. 
SADC’s position however, is somewhat weaker than COMESA’s when it comes to 
making member states aware of the potential distortive impact of subsidies. It is 
submitted that the existence of the COMESA regional competition authority and 
competition system could make the difference. Although COMESA competition 
authorities do not have state aid related powers they may discourage member states 
from granting subsidies and make them aware of the negative impact of subsidies on 
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trade, competition and the economy as a whole. SADC does not have a regional 
competition authority which could do the same. In SADC there are only individual 
competition authorities of the member states. They may find it politically difficult to 
address state aid of their own governments or the governments of other member 
states.  
 
SADC’s current cooperation-only framework in regard to competition matters, 
together with its application of the WTO subsidy rules, means it is not sensible to 
propose a state aid control system for SADC. Hence, South Africa as a single state 
and not as a member of SADC is the focus of the proposals made in this study. 
 
2 2 1 3 ECOWAS  
 
(a) Background on ECOWAS  
 
ECOWAS is an economic community which comprises all the countries of West 
Africa, both “anglophone and francophone”.323 It has its headquarters in the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. Forere states that the idea for a regional body for West African 
countries to accelerate economic growth was already raised in 1964 even though 
ECOWAS was only formally created in 1975.324 Poor economic conditions in the 
region and the quest for more significant cooperation and trade relations amongst 
countries in the region played a crucial role during the formation of the idea to 
establish an economic community.325  
 
The treaty for the economic community of West African states was signed at Lagos 
in May 1975.326 It established ECOWAS which at present consists of sixteen 
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member states.327 The aims and objectives of ECOWAS inter alia include (i) to 
promote co-operation and integration within the region, (ii) to establish an economic 
union in West Africa which will raise the living standards of its people, (ii) to maintain 
and enhance economic stability of the region, (iv) to foster relations among the 
ECOWAS member states, and (v) to contribute to the progress and development of 
the African Continent.328 To achieve these aims and objectives various requirements 
have to be met by the ECOWAS member states such as (i) the harmonisation and 
co-ordination of national policies on a variety of matters such as transport, 
communications, energy and education, (ii) the harmonisation and co-ordination of 
policies for the protection of the environment (iii) the promotion of the establishment 
of joint production enterprises, (iv) the establishment of a common market and (v) 
the establishment of an economic union.329 
 
Furthermore, ECOWAS is based on important fundamental principles which all 
member states have to adhere to. Such principles inter alia include (i) equality and 
inter-dependence of member states; (ii) solidarity and collective self-reliance; (ii) 
inter-State co-operation, harmonisation of policies and integration of programmes; 
(iv) non-aggression between member states; and (v) maintenance of regional 
peace.330 Like all regional organizations, the aims and objectives of ECOWAS can 
only be achieved through the cooperation of member states and through the efficient 
performance of the ECOWAS institutions.331 The member states of ECOWAS 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the revised Treaty from all member states. All Community Conventions, Protocols, Decisions and Resolutions 
made since 1975 though, remain valid and in force, except for those instances when these instruments are 
incompatible with the revised treaty. See Article 92 of the revised ECOWAS treaty. The EOWAS Treaty of 
1975 is published in International Legal Materials (1975) 14(5) 1200 1200-1209. The ECOWAS Treaty of 
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327 The current member states of the ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’ Ivoire, the 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo. 
328 Article 3 of the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States. In the ECOWAS treaty 
the aim of the treaty is  stated as follows: “to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic 
activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural 
resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions an-: in social and cultural matters for the purpose of 
raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer 
relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.” See 
Article 1 of the ECOWAS treaty in International Legal Materials (1975) 14(5) 1200 1200-1209. 
329 Article 3 of the ECOWAS treaty. 
330 Article 4 of the EOWAS treaty. 
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cooperate on various matters such as agriculture,332 industry, science, technology 
and energy,333 the environment and natural resources,334 transport, communications 
and tourism,335 trade, customs, taxation, statistics, money and payments336 and 
many more other areas. Competition within ECOWAS is one such area of 
cooperation. 
 
(b) Competition Policy in ECOWAS: The Draft Legislation337 
 
ECOWAS’s competition policy emanates from Article 3 of the ECOWAS treaty which 
provides for the harmonization and coordination of national policies in the area of 
trade. Harmonised and cooperative trade would enhance economic stability if 
efficiency and competitiveness are achieved within the ECOWAS common 
market.338 Comparable to the position within COMESA, the ECOWAS Competition 
authority deals with regional competition matters while domestic matters fall within 
the ambit of the competition authorities of individual member states.339 The legal 
basis for the ECOWAS competition policy is found in two drafts Acts. The 
Supplementary Act adopting Community Competition Rules and the Modalities of 
their Application within ECOWAS340 sets out the substantive competition rules which 
would be applicable within ECOWAS. The Supplementary Act on the Establishment, 
Function of the Regional Competition Authority for ECOWAS341 deals with matters 
such as the creation, composition, duties and powers of the ECOWAS Competition 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Secretariat, the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development, Specialised Technical Commissions 
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See Article 6 of the ECOWAS treaty. 
332 Article 25 of the ECOWAS treaty. 
333 Articles 26 to 28 of the ECOWAS treaty. 
334 Article 29 to 31 of the ECOWAS treaty. 
335 Articles 32 to 34 of the ECOWAS treaty. 
336 Articles 35 to 53 of the ECOWAS treaty. 
337 For more on the two pieces of draft legislation see T Hartzenberg “Competition Policy in Africa” in C 
Herrmann, M Krajewski & P Terhechte (eds)  European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2013) 167 
167.  
338 See the Preamble to Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 adopting Community Competition Rules and the 
Modalities of their application within ECOWAS.  
339 EM Fox & D Crane Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law (2010) 522. 
340 Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 adopting Community Competition Rules and the Modalities of their 
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(accessible at http://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/rei260/rei260.35tt1.pdf). Also discussed in OECD Investment 
Policy Reviews: Nigeria 2015 (2015) 219.  
341 Supplementary Act A/SA.2/06/08 on the Establishment, Function of the Regional Competition Authority for 




Authority. ECOWAS wanted competition rules that are consistent with international 
standards and promote fairness in trade and effective liberalization of trade.342 Both 
Acts remain only drafts since they have not yet officially come into force. 
Nevertheless, an overview of their provisions is warranted as the Acts will come into 
force when a number of constraints are addressed.343 
 
(i) The Draft Supplementary Act adopting Community Competition Rules and 
the Modalities of their application within ECOWAS344 
 
The Preamble to the Draft Act states that the relevant member states of ECOWAS 
have recognised that in order to achieve economic growth within the common 
market, the ECOWAS economy had to be efficient and competitive. The intention 
with the draft legislation was to implement competition rules345 within ECOWAS 
which would “promote fairness in trade and effective liberalization of trade”.346 The 
ECOWAS competition rules347 apply to all anticompetitive practices and mergers 
which may have an effect on trade within ECOWAS with certain activities exempted 
from the scope of its application.348 Article 4 (3) also extends the application of the 
ECOWAS competition rules to SOEs.349 Hence public enterprises in ECOWAS are 
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344 See P Kuruk “Negotiating Competition Policy in Multilateral Trade Agreements: European Union Overtures 
to West Africa and the WTO” (2005) 36 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 651 685 for a 
discussion of the Draft ECOWAS legislation on competition. 
345 Article 13 of the ECOWAS Competition Rules provides that the application and the implementation of the 
Competition Rules will be enforced by the Regional Competition Authority. The “organizational and operating 
rules” of the Regional Competition Authority is defined in a Draft Supplementary Act on the Establishment, 
Function of the Regional Competition Authority for ECOWAS. 
346 Preamble of the Supplementary Act A/SA 1/06/08 adopting Community Competition Rules and the 
Modalities of their application within ECOWAS. 
347 Article 3 of the Supplementary Act A/SA 1/06/08 adopting Community Competition Rules and the 
Modalities of their application within ECOWAS  states the purposes of the ECOWAS competition rules as 
follows: 
“(a) promote, maintain and encourage competition and enhance economic efficiency in production, trade and 
commerce at the regional level;  
(b) prohibit any anti-competitive business conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts competition at the regional 
level;  
(c) ensure the consumers’ welfare and the protection of their interests;  
(d) expand opportunities for domestic enterprises in Member States to participate in world markets.” 
348 Article 4 of the Supplementary Act A/SA 1/06/08 Adopting Community Competition Rules and the 
Modalities of their Application within ECOWAS. 
349 Article 4 (3) of the Supplementary Act A/SA 1/06/08 Adopting Community Competition Rules and the 




subjected to the same competition rules as other enterprises unless the application 
of the competition rules obstructs the performance or the particular tasks assigned to 
such enterprises.350 ECOWAS member states will not be allowed to enact or 
maintain any measures which are contrary to the competition and state aid rules of 
ECOWAS but: 
 
“Enterprises entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having 
the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in 
this Supplementary Act, in so far as the application of rules contained herein does not 
obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.”351 
 
(ii) State aid to enterprises within ECOWAS  
 
Article 8 of the ECOWAS Competition Rules deals with state aid to enterprises and 
mirrors Article 107352 of the TFEU. Article 8 provides that: 
 
“(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Supplementary Act, any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favoring certain enterprises or the production of 
certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the ECOWAS Common Market.  
(2) The following shall be compatible with the Common Market:  
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such 
aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; 
and  
(b) aid to remedy the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences.  
(3) The following may be considered to be compatible with the ECOWAS Common 
Market:  
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(a) aid to promote the socioeconomic development of areas of the Community 
where the standard of living is exceptionally low or in which there is serious 
underemployment;  
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of Community interest or to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State;  
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an 
extent contrary to the common interest;  
(d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect 
trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to 
the common interest; and  
(e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by a decision of the Authority of 
Heads of State and Government on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers 
acting on a proposal from the ECOWAS Competition Authority.”  
 
It is no surprise that ECOWAS took the wording of its state aid control rules from the 
EU since the EU is the only supranational institution with effective state aid control 
rules. In the event that the draft legislation does become law, this extraordinary step 
by ECOWAS will be admirable especially if it is kept in mind that ECOWAS is made 
up of countries with relatively underdeveloped economies.353 It is surprising that 
these countries seem to be prepared to accept significant constraints on their 
sovereignty with regard to state aid to their public undertakings and to leave it to 
ECOWAS to decide whether it is in order for them to grant state aid or not, should 
the draft legislation become law.  
 
(c) Comments on the ECOWAS competition policy  
  
ECOWAS has to be commended for the progress it has made in adopting a draft 
competition policy with supranational application, which would not be applicable to 
antitrust matters only but to state aid matters as well. This is especially significant 
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since many ECOWAS member states do not have competition policies of their own 
in place. Although it has been quite a while since the draft ECOWAS competition 
legislation was signed, there are still clear indications that ECOWAS strives to have 
its competition regime in effect in the near future.354 In accordance with an 
agreement which was signed during the Heads of State Summit in Dakar, Senegal in 
June 2016, the ECOWAS Competition Authority’s headquarters was assigned to the 
Republic of Gambia.355 Furthermore, on 12 July 2018 President Adama Burrow of 
the Gambia, together with the United Nations (UN) Special Representative for West 
Africa and the Sahel, attended the inauguration of the ECOWAS Regional 
Competition Authority Headquarters in Bijilo, Gambia.356  
 
The implementation of the ECOWAS competition regime will however not be easy as 
there are a number of constraints which will have to be address before it can come 
into effect. The most significant constraint is what Adebajo called “the different and at 
times competing integration projects between francophone and anglophone West 
Africa”.357 The West African Economic and Monetary Union, commonly known by its 
French acronym of UEMOA, is another regional organisation in West Africa. It was 
established on 10 January 1994 to replace its predecessor, the Communaute 
Economuque de l’ Afrique de Ouest (CEAO).358 Its member states consist of mostly 
the French-speaking359 West African nations and all these countries360 have the CFA 
franc as their common currency. All member states of UEMOA are also member 
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(i)the amendment made to the Supplementary Act which established the ECOWAS Regional Competition 
Authority by Supplementary Act A/SA.4/07/13. It amends the Supplementary Act A/SA.2/12/08 on the 
Establishment, Functions and Operation of the Regional Competition Authority for ECOWAS (retrievable at 
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http://www.ecowas.int/signing-of-agreement-between-republic-of-the-gambia-and-ecowas-dakar-senegal-4th-
june-2016/) (accessed on 10 August 2016). 
355 See http://www.ecowas.int/signing-of-agreement-between-republic-of-the-gambia-and-ecowas-dakar-
senegal-4th-june-2016/ (last visited on June 2016). 
356 See “President of Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS) Commission and the United 
Nations (UN) Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel Concluded a High-Level Visit to the 
Gambia” 12 July 2018 SyndiGate Media Inc. Abuja. 
357 A Adebajo “Introduction” in A Adebajo & I Rashid (ed) West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace 
in a Troubled Region (2004) 1 4. 
358 See A Adebajo “Introduction” in A Adebajo & I Rashid (eds) West Africa's Security Challenges: Building 
Peace in a Troubled Region (2004) 1 4. 
359 Guinea- Bissau is the only Portuguese speaking West African country which is member state along with the 
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states of ECOWAS.361 The UEMOA has an existing competition law regime in place 
which governs both traditional competition affairs and the financial relations between 
member states and public enterprises.362 Heineman states that a particular feature of 
the UEMOA competition law regime is the “radical centralization of competition 
law”.363 The author further states that “[the] WAEMU Commission has exclusive 
competence to apply competition law to the detriment of national competition 
authorities, which are restricted to cooperation with the regional authority.”364 The 
“strong degree of centralization” is sure to create conflict in regard to enforcement 
and coordination between the potential ECOWAS regional competition law regime 
and the existing competition law regime of UEMOA.365 How to deal with such 
potential conflict scenarios need to be addressed before any further developments in 
regard to the ECOWAS competition law regime can take place. Therefore 
Adebajo’s366 doubt about the co-existence of ECOWAS and UEMOA is highly 
relevant even though the author makes his observations about the two organisations 
generally and not the two competition law regimes in particular. Adebajo firstly 
wonders, which of the two organisations’ treaties will take precedence, since all 
UEMOA member states are also ECOWAS member states. The author secondly 
asks whether there eventually will be convergence between ECOWAS and UEMOA 
and if not whether the co-existence of the two organisations will “retard” market 
integration in West Africa. Thirdly, Adebajo wonders whether UEMOA will grant 
“most-favored-nation treatment” to other ECOWAS member states if its integration 
goals prove to be more successful than those of ECOWAS. Lastly, it is asked 
whether a common external tariff will also apply to other non-UEMOA ECOWAS 
member states.  
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362 M Bakhoum “Introduction” in J Drexl, M Bakhoum, EM Fox, MS Gal & DJ Gerber (eds) Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries  (2012) 1 6. 
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Multiple and overlapping membership of regional organisations is not only found in 
West Africa. It will be clear from previous sections that many African countries 
belong to more than one regional economic organisation. However, in this region it 
might create greater challenges, in light of the differences between ECOWAS 
countries, as noted by Ngom.367  
(i) The differences in regard to the member states’ legal systems because some 
have adopted the “common law” system and others the “civil law” system, depending 
on the member states’ colonial past. Connected with this is the “linguistic diversity” of 
member states: the language of the member states’ former colonial power, which 
includes English, Portuguese and French, is now often the governmental language 
of the member state. This could make it difficult to agree on the applicable legal 
system and the working language for the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority; 
(iii) The level of economic development of the member states, with least developed 
member states more prone to economic intervention by the state and more 
developed member states, such as Nigeria, leaning more towards private enterprise. 
Ngom is however confident that these constraints will eventually be overcome, 
especially since economic development of all member states is the main objective of 
the ECOWAS competition policy368 and the other regional organisations.  
 
Whenever in the future these difficulties are overcome and the ECOWAS regional 
competition law regime comes into effect, there would be no formal difference 
between the legal position in ECOWAS and in the EU, with regard to state aid 
control. Although ECOWAS plans to have supranational status for its state aid rules 
in the future, it is realistic to acknowledge that it will take a while for that to happen 
and it might take generations for ECOWAS to achieve the same success as the EU. 
This however should not dampen the enthusiasm for Africa’s first potential state aid 
control regime which expressly forms part of the competition rules and is not just 
aimed at confirming the subsidy rules of the WTO like COMESA and SADC did. 
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States” in J Drexl, M Bakhoum, EM Fox, MS Gal & DJ Gerber (eds) Competition Policy and Regional 




Similar success than that experienced by the EU is a possibility especially in light of 
the institutional and other changes which took place in 2006. One such change was 
that the ECOWAS Secretariat became the ECOWAS Commission.369 Another 
significant change concerned the way ECOWAS laws are implemented within 
member states.370 According to ECOWAS “Under the new legal regime, the principle 
of [supra-nationality] becomes more pre-eminent and there is now a de-emphasis on 
the adoption of Conventions and Protocols.”371 The position before the change was 
that new legislation, especially those setting out obligations for member states, were 
subjected to “lengthy Parliamentary ratification processes” which caused huge 
delays, while others such as “Decisions” had immediate applicability within member 
states.372 The change to the legislative regime ensures that Supplementary Acts, 
which are “Community Acts”373 and complementary to the ECOWAS revised treaty 
binds all member states and ECOWAS institutions immediately after it comes into 
force.374 This places the implementation of ECOWAS laws in member states on the 
same footing as in the EU. 
 
Both ECOWAS’s draft Acts on competition policy were written as Supplementary 
Acts. Consequently, when these two Supplementary Acts come into force, they will 
be applicable within the member states without any need for ratification by the 
member states.375 At present though the relevant provision in the ECOWAS 
Supplementary Act focuses only on the substance of a state aid prohibition. It does 
not provide any procedural rules which member states will have to follow when state 
aid is to be granted or existing aid to be altered.376 This however should not create 
an obstacle to the implementation of the ECOWAS state aid control rules, especially 
in the light of the new ECOWAS legislative regime for Community Acts.377 This new 
legislative regime will make it easier for the ECOWAS Competition Authority to 
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propose a particular procedure to be adopted for notifying the granting of new aid or 
the altering of existing aid. Such a procedure can be implemented either by using a 
Regulation or a Supplementary Act which will have automatic effect in the member 
states. 
 
The ECOWAS competition regime would be of great interest to other African regional 
economic communities. If successful it could point the way forward for other African 
regional economic communities although it still has a long way to go. 
 
2 2 2 Concluding remarks on supranational status as an obstacle to a regional 
state aid control regime which could be applied to South Africa 
 
State aid control rules, because of their nature, are only applicable to conduct by the 
State. However, it may not be easy to get the government to comply with its own 
rules: the government that enforces the rules will be the very same body that will 
have to comply with them and there is no assurance that there will be substantial 
compliance. This difficulty is eliminated in the EU by the supranational status of 
competition rules and the European Commission which ensures that member states 
do not violate the state aid control rules. The EU Commission can hold the 
government of a member state responsible if the rules are not complied with.378  
 
Although a regional state aid control regime which could be applied to state aid in 
South Africa would have been ideal, at present it is just not realistic to suggest that 
such a system can be created. South Africa is a member state of the African Union 
(AU)379 and a number of regional organisations, such as SADC380 and the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU).381 None of them has sufficiently developed 
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competition law policies which could be applied in the same way as in the EU.382 
SADC is the regional economic community with the least developed competition 
policies.  
 
There are also other reasons why the study focuses on South Africa as a single state 
only. Firstly, multiple and overlapping membership383 of different regional 
organisations by African states may make it impossible to focus on one particular 
regional economic community and to recommend a state aid policy for any of them 
as it may cause problems of implementation if recommendations are to be 
considered. Secondly, the heterogeneous nature of the member states’ economies 
also makes it difficult since some member states like South Africa have a bigger 
economy, while others, for example, Namibia or Malawi have much smaller 
economies. Thirdly, the extent to which competition laws and policies have been 
implemented in African states also plays a role. Even though many African countries 
have already marked their sixtieth year as independent states, many still do not have 
sufficient competition legislation in place in order for this study to suggest a regional 
state aid policy. The position in the SADC member states, for example, provides a 
clear picture of how the position in regard to competition laws and policies differs all 
over Africa. Mamhare divides the SADC member states into four categories in 
accordance with the level of development of competition policy in the states.384 The 
first category is those SADC member states with “operational” competition laws and 
policies. The second category is those states which have passed laws without 
having implemented them yet. The third category includes those member states 
which are in the process of preparing competition laws and policies and lastly those 
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member states which are still preparing to implement competition laws.385 What also 
plays a role is what Mamhare identifies as the “structural and substantive difference” 
between competition law models as well as the “degree of autonomy and 
independence” of the competition authorities.386 Lastly, according to Bakhoum, 
although the benefits of regional competition policies are widely acknowledged, it is 
difficult to design competition laws and policies for developing countries which take 
into account their “economic, political and cultural situations”.387 Bakhoum further 
states that a regional competition policy should not be designed and implemented in 
the abstract but with consideration of the “local context”, which keeps in mind the 
“historical context, the political situation, the economic feature of the member states, 
the size of the member states, the degree of intensity of trade within a common 
market, the legal traditions (civil law or common law), the language differences, and 
the institutional settings of the member states.”388  
 
In conclusion, the scrutiny of the position on competition law and state aid control in 
the three regional economic communities reaffirms the projection of this study that it 
will be difficult to implement any proposals for a regional state aid control regime in 
the regional economic community of which South African is a member state. Firstly, 
with ECOWAS trying hard to overcome the impediments which stand in the way of 
the implementation of a potential state aid control regime and the COMESA 
competition authorities being limited to the traditional antitrust matters due to the 
nature of the state subsidy rules, it is highly unlikely that SADC, after taking note of 
the positions in ECOWAS and COMESA, will consider any proposals on state aid 
control, especially not if it is part of competition policy. Its focus at present is on the 
cooperation between domestic competition authorities in antitrust matters only. 
Secondly, as much as COMESA’s competition authority is Africa’s first supranational 
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competition authority,389 their hands are essentially tied when there is state aid as 
they are limited in their abilities to protect the competitive process against state 
financial aid by member states. Unless member states actively exercise their right to 
levy a countervailing duty against products which are subsidised by the member 
state from which it is imported, competition will inevitably be affected. Although they 
can make member states aware of the negative impact of subsidies on competition, 
they cannot force a member state to exercise its right to use countervailing duties 
and in essence protect competition. Inertia on the side of the member states could 
therefore mean that subsidised products will compete with similar or the same 
products which were not subsidised and even if this will undeniably distort 
competition within COMESA, there is not really much which the COMESA 
competition authority can do. Thirdly, with regard to ECOWAS one cannot help but to 
admire its desire to have similar state aid rules like the EU. However, it has to be 
recognised that the obstacles which stand in the way of the implementation of the 
state aid control regime, in particular questions as to the working language of its 
Competition Authority and the legal system which should be applied, will only be 
solved with willpower among all member states. In SADC similar will power will be 
required from the fifteen SADC member states to transition from a cooperation-only 
framework to supranational regulation of competition law similar to the position in 
COMESA. Even though the discussion on SADC has shown that there are existing 
challenges with SADC’s cooperation-only framework,390 it appears as if the SADC 
member states would rather focus on addressing these challenges instead of 
attempting to transition to a supranational competition law regime which would pose 
further and new challenges of a different nature. The challenges it would face to 
transition are wide-ranging. It inter alia includes:  
(i) the absence of operational competition laws in some member states;  
(ii) differences in economic conditions of the SADC member states;  
(iii) different “political and cultural situations” in member states; and 
(iv) overlapping membership of various regional economic communities 
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Chapeyama391 correctly identifies other challenges to a potential SADC 
supranational competition law regime. These are (i) fear of loss of sovereignty; (ii) 
lack of political will; (iii) the lack of respect for the rule of law; and (iv) SADC’s poor 
record with regard to the implementation of goals. There is no doubt that it will take a 
very long time and lots of convincing to bring the SADC member states close to a 
discussion on a potential transition to a supranational competition law regime. 
 
Lastly, it is highly probable that SADC will continue to deal with state aid by member 
states to enterprises in the same way as it currently does should it get a 
supranational competition regime. This is because it is certain to follow COMESA in 
this regard as COMESA would by then continue to be the regional economic 
community with the most tested supranational competition law regime on the African 
continent. With COMESA’s competition authority having no substantial powers to 
protect the competitive process against state financial aid except to create 
awareness among member states of its potential negative impact, it is doubtful that 
SADC would implement a system that goes any further. It will most certainly rely on 
the lessons learned by COMESA. 
 
2 3 Further obstacles to the adoption of state aid rules for SOEs in South 
Africa 
 
2 3 1 Government will be reluctant to give up its powers to decide on state aid 
to SOEs 
  
The government is likely to resist having its powers to grant state aid to SOEs 
curbed. This is also observed in countries that apply state aid as they are related to 
the EU.392 Such reluctance is not necessarily unacceptable if it is understood that all 
SOEs in South Africa have a public interest function and that they help the 
government to deliver some of its key responsibilities to South Africans.393 However, 
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it is proposed that there are good arguments why government should at least be 
prepared to subject its state aid to SOEs to limited scrutiny as proposed in the 
ensuing sections.  
Firstly, these state aid rules could be designed to merely build on the government’s 
recognition that free and fair competition amongst all firms is paramount for a strong 
economy. Through the enactment of the Competition Act, the government has 
recognised the significant positive changes which competition can bring for all South 
Africans. This recognition even forms part of the Preamble to the Competition Act 
where it states that “an efficient, competitive economic environment, balancing the 
interest of workers, owners and consumers and focussed on development, will 
benefit all South Africans.”394 Also, although market competition is not expressly 
protected in the Constitution, its importance for public welfare has been recognised 
by the courts. In Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd v Gründlingh395 the 
Constitutional Court had to consider whether principles of market competition were 
constitutionally recognised. It stated that the Bill of Rights does not expressly 
promote competition principles but that the right to freedom of trade which is 
enshrined in section 22 of the Constitution is “consistent with a competitive regime in 
matters of trade and the recognition of the protection of competition as being in the 
public welfare”. In Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and 
Others396 the Constitutional Court justified the right to freedom of trade on the basis 
that: “In broad terms this section has to be understood as both repudiating past 
exclusionary practices and affirming the entitlements appropriate for our new open 
and democratic society. Thus, in the light of our history of job reservation, restrictions 
on employment imposed by the pass laws and the exclusion of women from many 
occupations, to mention just a few of the arbitrary laws and practices used to 
maintain privilege, it is understandable why this aspect of economic activity was 
singled out for constitutional protection.” By extending the application of the 
Competition Act also to the economic activities of the state,397 the government in 
essence gave effect to the desired “competitive economic environment.” It is 
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submitted that the government can do even more to achieve that desired 
“competitive economic environment” that will benefit all South Africans if it provides a 
system for the evaluation of certain state aid398 which may have the potential to 
distort competition.  
Secondly, the aims and visions of the National Development Plan 2030 can also be 
presented as motivation for the government to have certain state aid scrutinized. The 
National Development Plan aims to “eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 
2030”. When persistent state aid is granted to SOEs due to avoidable actions, 
money is taken away from other developmental projects which could achieve the 
aims of the National Development Plan. Hence it would be beneficial to all South 
Africans if the government allows certain types of distortive state aid which could 
threaten the “competitive economic environment” to be evaluated.  
 
Thirdly, the state aid rules that are proposed are meant to promote a co-operative 
relationship between competition authorities and state aid granters. It is proposed 
that decisions of the Competition Commission on state aid will not be binding but it is 
hoped that the status of the Commission as an impartial and sound regulator will 
convince government to comply with its decisions. 
 
The problem of government’s non-compliance with state aid rules nevertheless will 
remain a nagging problem. The solution may be imperfect but it is proposed that it is 
the best current solution for problems with state aid to SOEs. 
 
2 3 2 A potential conflict between the proposed state aid rules and existing 
national legislation that allow state aid to SOEs   
 
State aid legislation will not be supra-national as is the case in the EU. State aid 
legislation in South Africa, enacted as ordinary national legislation may conflict with 
other national legislation. It may be difficult to resolve these types of conflicts. 
However, it is also clear that state aid regimes have also been made applicable in 
other countries and the obstacles created by this can be surmounted. It appears that 
                                                          




the United Kingdom will continue to have a state aid regime after Brexit,399 Eastern 
European countries were required to regulate state aid before they became EU 
members400 and the EU has made state aid rules a condition of comprehensive trade 
relationships with countries such as the Ukraine.401 
 
The Constitution does not expressly deal with these difficulties. It declares its own 
supremacy.402 It also regulates conflicts between national and provincial legislation 
as well as national legislation and a provincial constitution.403 It does not deal with 
the relationship between different national statutes.  
 
Of course statutory state aid rules will be subject to the Constitution. But 
constitutional supremacy will not be of special relevance in resolving the types of 
statutory conflicts that will arise when powers to grant state aid in one statute is 
restricted by state aid rules in another. It will become apparent from the ensuing 
discussion that guarantees granted by the state in favour of SOEs are treated as the 
most important form of state aid that should be subjected to regulation. The 
Constitution404 grants powers to give guarantees for loans to national government, 
provincial government and municipalities, only “if the guarantee complies with any 
conditions set out in national legislation”. The use of the term “may” and the 
qualification makes it clear that state aid regulation provisions will not conflict with 
the Constitution but could be viewed even as an expression of section 218. This will 
be particularly true of the limited state aid provisions that will be proposed here. In 
this sense it will merely add to the state aid provisions set out in the PFMA.405 When 
the government grants the guarantees in accordance with the conditions in the 
PFMA406 and publishes an annual report407 on the guarantees it has granted for a 
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particular financial year, it is in compliance with what is expected from it in terms of 
both the PFMA and the Constitution. 
 
It is most important for the problem at hand to consider the legal position where 
provisions in different national statutes are inconsistent. It is not uncommon for 
different legislative provisions in different national statutes to overlap or even conflict. 
According to the maxim lex posterior priori derogant, later national legislation which 
is inconsistent with earlier legislation will override such earlier legislation. Later 
legislation can override earlier legislation either expressly or by implication. Later 
legislation therefore will override earlier legislation even if it does not specifically 
refer to the earlier legislation or does not expressly determine that it will override 
earlier legislation.408 One Parliament does not have the power to bind future 
parliaments in ordinary legislation. However, courts will be reluctant to apply the lex 
posterior maxim where later legislation revokes earlier legislation by implication.409 
There are two interpretive presumptions that steer courts in this direction. Legislation 
is presumed to not change the law more than is necessary. This presumption is 
frequently applied with regard to legislation that changes the common law but it also 
impacts on legislation that conflicts with earlier legislation. Furthermore, general 
provisions are presumed not to revoke specific provisions (generalia specialibus non 
derogant).410 Later, general enactments therefore will not override more specific 
existing legislation.  
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It may be difficult to apply these principles in determining the relationship between a 
national statutory instrument that allow for state aid and the national statute that 
regulates state aid. It is proposed that general provisions that allow for grants of 
state aid and are compatible with the state aid rules will in most cases have to be 
interpreted in a manner that allows them to be concurrently applied. This will be the 
case whether the enabling provision was enacted before or after the state aid 
regulation. Most cases of overlap will probably be resolved in this manner. 
 
Only on rare occasion will state aid rules and enabling legislation be so clearly 
incompatible, that only one provision could prevail. Where enabling legislation 
precedes the state aid rules and are formulated in a manner which is clearly 
incompatible with the state aid rules, it will have to be determined whether the state 
aid rules were intended to override the enabling legislation to the extent necessary to 
enable concurrent application. If the enabling legislation follows the state aid rules, 
the question will be whether the enabling legislation was intended to override the 
state aid rules. The fact that enabling legislation precedes or follows the state aid 
rules would not be determinative of the relationship between the statutory provisions 
but it would at least impact on the manner in which the hierarchy will have to be 
determined. 
 
In an attempt to resolve these types of problems, some statutes contain provisions 
that determine the hierarchy of legislation in cases where they are inconsistent. The 
Labour Relations Act for instance determines that: “If any conflict, relating to the 
matters dealt with in this Act, arises between this Act and the provisions of any other 
law save the Constitution or any Act expressly amending this Act, the provisions of 
this Act will prevail.”411 The Companies Act determines that an attempt should first 
be made to interpret the Act and other statutes that apparently are inconsistent with 
it in a manner that allows for them to be applied concurrently. If this is not possible, 
the Companies Act will trump other statutes except for a small number of statutes 
listed in the Companies Act.412 The PFMA provides that it will prevail in situations 
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where it is inconsistent with other legislation.413 The exact consequences of these 
types of statutory provisions have not yet been carefully considered in the case law. 
These types of provisions will provide a court with further justifications for concluding 
that later legislation does not override earlier legislation that is given statutory priority 
in the earlier legislation. The Constitutional Court has concluded that the Labour 
Relations Act trumped the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act in the context of 
employment relations even though the latter act was enacted after the former. 
Skweyiya J concluded that “When PAJA was promulgated, five years after the 
current LRA came into force, section 210 remained untouched. The Legislature, 
aware of the implications of this provision in the LRA, enacted PAJA without altering 
section 210. This is significant, in that it would appear that the Legislature intended 
that PAJA should not detract from the pre-eminence of the LRA and its specialised 
labour disputes mechanisms.”414 However, it is clear that these types of provisions 
cannot override later legislation that clearly conflicts with the legislation that is given 
preference in an earlier statute.415 It will be proposed that a similar type of provision 
could be inserted in the state aid legislation, despite the limits of such legislation. 
Nevertheless, it will be proposed that such a priority provision should be added to the 
statutory provisions regarding state aid in order to further bolster their impact.  
 
In conclusion, it is proposed that state aid statutory provisions can be enacted that 
will in most cases be complementary and not inconsistent with statutory powers to 
grant state aid. The state aid rules should explicitly contain provisions that make it 
clear that they should apply to all grants of state aid that fall within its ambit, 
irrespective of the statutory basis for those grants. This again will broaden the 
sphere of operation of state aid provisions, although it will not exclude the possibility 
that a later statute will not explicitly exclude the operation of the state aid rules from 
a particular grant of state aid. However, this is unlikely to occur. Most powers to 
grant the types of state aid that will be covered by the proposed state aid regulations 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Pty) Ltd v MFV “Polaris” and others [2018] 3 All SA 219 (WCC) para 65; Minister of Defence and Military 
Veterans v Motau and others 2014 (8) BCLR 930 (CC) para 74. See also Von Siebel and Others v Accentuate 
Limited and Others (47008/13) [2015] ZAGPJHC 99 (13 March 2015) para 26 although this paragraph is badly 
formulated. 
413 Section 3(3) of the PFMA. 
414 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 50. 




will be derived either directly or indirectly from the PFMA. It will in most cases be 
possible to apply the state aid rules concurrently with the PFMA. This will be the 
case even where the state aid is supported by a budget process and appropriation 
act as provided for in the PFMA. The PFMA determines that draft legislation to 
amend the PFMA can only be introduced in Parliament by the Minister of Finance or 
after the Minister has been consulted on the contents of the draft legislation.416 It is 
contended that the proposed state aid provisions do not fall into this category and 
that, in any event, the PFMA as ordinary national legislation cannot determine the 
process by which future legislation must be enacted. Nevertheless, to remain on the 
safe side, it would be better to comply with these requirements. Of course future 
amendments of the PFMA or newly enacted enabling legislation may exclude grants 
of state aid from the ambit of the state aid regime, but it is unlikely that this will be 
done except in extraordinary circumstances. 
 
3 A proposal of the state aid rules that could be applied to state financial aid to 
SOEs in South Africa and how it could be applied  
 
3 1 To what entities should it apply? 
 
The EU state aid rules which form the basis for the recommendations made in this 
study, applies to all undertakings,417 regardless of their ownership, including public 
undertakings418 and the providers of SGEI.419 Article 106420 of the TFEU ensures that 
                                                          
416 Section 4 of the PFMA. 
417 See Steinike & Weinlig v Federal Republic of Germany [1977] ECR 595 where the Court of Justice stated 
that the treaty provisions on state aid control covers both private and public undertakings with the exemptions 
mentioned in what was then Article 90(2) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. At present it 
is found in Article 106 (2). 
418 A public undertaking in the EU is described by the EU Commission as: “any undertaking over which the 
public authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, 
their financial participation therein, or the rules which govern it.” See Commission Directive of 25 June 1980 on 
the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings Official Journal of the 
European Communities 1980/L 195/35. See also French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 2545. 
419 See the discussion on SGEI in para 7.2 of chapter 4. 
420 For more on this section see the discussion in para 7 of chapter 4 with the heading: “The state aid prohibition 
and Public Undertakings (SOEs). The EU Commission first applied article 106 in 1985 when it challenged a 
Greek Law which required that all public property, including the assets of Greek public undertakings, must be 
insured exclusively with public-sector insurance companies. The Greek law also required the staff of State-
owned banks to recommend to their customers to take out insurance with an insurance company owned and 





competition law applies to those public undertakings to which member states may 
have granted special or exclusive rights and those undertakings which have been 
entrusted with SGEI if the rules do not obstruct the performance of their particular 
task. Hence the state aid regime is applicable to every undertaking “engaged in 
economic activity, regardless of its legal personality or status, or the way in which it 
is financed.”421  
 
The implementation of state aid rules without qualification is not possible in South 
Africa for the reasons mentioned above.422 It is proposed that, especially at the 
outset, a more careful approach should be followed in South Africa. Only a smaller 
number of particularly problematic firms in the form of SOEs should be included in 
the regulatory regime. The proposed regime should start out in a focused manner. 
That means that the South African regime will be narrower than its European 
equivalent. However, although the EU includes all undertakings within its regulatory 
regime, it then exempts some forms of state aid. Several entities will be excluded 
from the proposed regime for reasons that are similar to those that underlie 
exemption of activities in the EU. 
 
It is further necessary to determine to which SOEs state aid rules should apply. 
Horwitz423 divides SOEs in South Africa into three categories based on their public 
interest role. The first category of SOEs is those serving a clear public interest424 and 
here SOEs such as Eskom, the SAPO and the SABC are included. Horwitz defines 
the clear public interest of these SOEs by the role which they play in the “provision of 
basic needs, essential infrastructure, or services.”425 Horwitz’s second category 
covers those SOEs which are serving some public interest426 and SAA, Armscor and 
Denel are listed in this category. Horwitz states that SOEs in this category have no 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
allowed for such restrictions to exist, were incompatible with Article 90 (1) of the EEC Treaty, which is at 
present Article 106 (1) of the TFEU. See Commission Decision of 24 April 1985 concerning the insurance in 
Greece of public property and loans granted by Greek State-owned banks Official Journal of the European 
Communities No L 152/25 (1985). See also P Sutherland “EEC Competition Policy” (1985) 54 Antitrust Law 
Journal 667 672-673. 
421 See A Jones “The Boundaries of an Undertaking in EU Competition Law” (2012) 8(2) European 
Competition Journal 301 302. 
422 See the discussion in para 2.1 of this chapter.   
423 RB Horwitz Communication and Democratic Reform in South Africa (2004) 357. 
424 My emphasis. 
425 RB Horwitz Communication and Democratic Reform in South Africa (2004) 357. 




particular role in the provision of essential services but that they are “historically in 
[the] public sector for national security or strategic reasons”.427 The third category of 
SOEs is those serving no public interest428 such as Alexkor and the South African 
Forestry Company (SAFCOL). According to Horwitz these SOEs had no role at all 
under South Africa’s first development plan which was the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme.429 Many SOEs have changed categories since this 
particular classification was made and the National Development Plan 2030 instead 
of the Reconstructive and Development Programme of South Africa is now the policy 
document which sets out the long-term aims to “eliminate poverty and reduce 
inequality”.430 Moreover, public interest can have a narrow or wide meaning. Is it in 
the public interest to maintain an SOE to protect employment? What remains the 
same though is that SOEs either have a “clear public interest”, “limited public 
interest” or “no public interest” mandate. 
 
It may be proposed that a classification of SOEs in accordance with their mandates, 
similar to Horwitz’s classification above, could be helpful in state aid control matters. 
Such a classification could be used to exempt state funding to SOEs with clear 
public interest activities from scrutiny. However, it is submitted that such an 
approach will not adequately address the threat posed by state aid to competition. 
This is because potential harmful state aid could be given to SOEs that fall in an 
exempted category. The essential mandates of SOEs such as Eskom, SAPO, the 
SABC and PRASA will allow them to be placed in the category of those SOEs with a 
clear public interest role, since most of these SOEs have public service obligations 
similar to SGEI in the EU. Their activities have a significant impact on the daily lives 
of many South Africans. They benefit many South Africans, in particular those who 
might possibly have been excluded from the services and goods which these SOEs 
deliver. Yet it is these SOEs that are regularly receiving state aid which harms 
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competition and should therefore be condemned.431 It would therefore make no 
sense to exclude these entities from the application of the proposed regulatory 
regime. The objective of the proposed regulatory scheme would not be achieved if 
any of these SOEs were to be excluded, without any qualifications, from the 
application of proposed state aid rules only because they have a clear public interest 
role. 
 
If SOEs such as Eskom, SAPO, the SABC and PRASA would operate in the EU, 
they would be regarded as firms and fall within the state aid regime but their 
activities would most likely be classified as SGEI because of their public service 
obligations. On this basis at least some of the state aid provided to them would 
escape scrutiny in terms of the state aid regime. But in order to be classified as such, 
they at first would have to comply with the criteria set out in Altmark and the “SGEI 
package”.432 It is contended that these firms should in South Africa similarly fall 
within the state aid regime but that relief from scrutiny in terms of the proposed state 
aid regime should be given elsewhere.  
 
It is therefore recommended that state aid control rules should apply to all SOEs that 
are regarded as firms433 and perform commercial activities as described in the 
PFMA, regardless whether the SOEs have or also have a clear public interest role. 
As in the EU, the focus should rather be on the state aid itself, the effect of the state 
aid and in the contex of South Africa, the reasons why SOEs are in perpetual need 
of state aid to help them to continue to deliver their goods and services 
uninterrupted, instead of the type of enterprise. SOEs such as PRASA, the SABC 
and SANRAL which, at least in part have to operate in accordance with normal 
business practices and which are the ones regularly requiring state financial aid 
should be covered by the scope of state aid control rules as state aid to these SOEs 
allows them to maintain their position of state monopolies. However, special 
provision should be made for these SOEs since they are entrusted by the state to 
                                                          
431 See the reference to the many Public Protector Reports of financial irregularities and even criminal conduct 
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Rail Agency (Pty) Ltd [2017] 3 All SA 971 (GJ). 
432 See para 7.2 of chapter 4. 





perform specific public service obligations similar to SGEI in the EU. It is submitted 
that only those SOEs, which do not conduct commercial activities and therefore do 
not constitute firms, which include the constitutional institutions, boards and 
commissions,434 should from the outset be excluded from the application of state aid 
rules.  
 
Although the focus of this proposal and this study is state aid granted to SOEs, it is 
recognised that state aid to enterprises which are not SOEs occurs fairly frequently. 
The proposals in this study are focused on state aid to SOEs because of the specific 
problems that it poses in South Africa and the difficulties with making proposals even 
in this limited context. This is a topic that will be left for future research or other 
researches. For the moment it is merely observed that state aid to firms that are not 
SOEs can also be the subject of market inquiries.435 Moreover, this study will merely 
highlight some of the problems that may arise when state aid to firms that are not 
SOEs is evaluated. 
 
It is generally less likely that state aid to firms that are not SOEs will serve clear 
public interests goals. However, there clearly will be many cases where state aid to 
these firms could be in the public interest. Two examples will be mentioned: 
- Firstly, private enterprises could have public interest roles as part of their 
operations. The state could fund these public interest activities through the annual 
national budget. Appropriations to these private enterprises form part of the annual 
appropriations which are made to the government department which has oversight of 
the developmental programme of which the private enterprises are part. Examples of 
private enterprises which receive appropriations in the annual national budget 
includes non-grid electrification services providers, enterprises which are part of the 
Recycling Enterprise Support Programme, enterprises which are part of the 
Cooperatives Incentive Scheme for enhancing entrepreneurship and the 
development of small business development, enterprises which are part of the 
Tourism Sector Support Services and plays a role in the development of the tourism 
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sector to ensure South Africa is a competitive tourism destination.436 All these private 
enterprise which are given appropriations in the annual national budget have one 
thing in common, they are all involved in particular governmental development 
programmes.  
- Secondly, state aid may be given to prevent systemic harm to the financial system 
or the broader economy. In the aftermath of the financial crisis437 in 2008, 
governments all over the world provided rescue aid to enterprises, in particular 
financial enterprises such as banks. It is clear that the financial rescue of enterprises 
during the financial crisis did not depend on the enterprise’s ownership but on how 
devastating its failure would have been for its home country’s economy at large. 
Governments of countries such as the United States and Great Britain relied on the 
maxim that some enterprises were “too big to fail”438 and therefore rescued them 
from failure.439 Even the EU, with its strict state aid rules, makes provision for state 
aid to rescue and restructure undertakings in difficulty.440 Rescue and restructuring 
aid is allowed in terms of strict guidelines. The EU Commission feels strongly that 
the exit of inefficient undertakings forms a normal part of the operation of the market 
and that the rescue of undertakings which gets into difficulties should not be the 
norm.441 Therefor the state aid rules are still strictly applied to failing undertakings 
and any deviation from the state aid rules are only allowed in limited instances.442 
Rescue and restructuring aid gave rise to some of the most controversial state aid 
cases and is among the most distortive types of state aid.443 The 2008 financial crisis 
was one of those instances in which the EU Commission allowed a deviation from 
the strict application of the state aid rules but not without qualification because in its 
guidelines the Commission has reinforced the “one time, last time” principle, which 
                                                          
436 This becomes clear from the various Appropriation Acts which were proclaimed over the years. 
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prevents repeated rescue or restructuring aid to keep ailing undertakings alive.444 If it 
is in future decided to extend state aid regulations to firms that are not SOEs, then 
adequate provision should be made for the proper consideration of these kinds of 
public interest considerations. As with state aid to SOEs the effects of the aid on 
public interest and on competition will have to be considered and balanced in a 
developing country such as South Africa.445 
 
3 2 To what forms of state aid should it apply?  
 
3 2 1 Introduction 
 
In South Africa state aid to SOEs takes many forms.446 In the broadest sense any 
financial support which the state provides to SOEs is state aid. It will range from 
something as subtle as special tax exemptions to the giving of security, loans, 
purchases of shares to allocations of funds by government as “transfers and 
subsidies”.447 Nevertheless, it should be carefully considered whether all or only 
some of these forms of state aid should be covered by the proposed state regime. 
 
The South African government grants state aid to the SOEs for a number of reasons. 
It could, for example, be granted: 
(i) because of undercapitalisation;  
(ii) to enable SOEs to borrow money, which they otherwise might not have been able 
to do: the SOEs thus receive governmental guarantees to make borrowing possible;  
(iii) because of irregular expenditure448 and fruitless and wasteful expenditure which 
cause a deficit in funds of SOEs;449  
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(iv) because of losses from criminal conduct such as fraud and corruption, which are 
rife in many of South Africa’s crucial SOEs; and  
(v) because of operational losses, due to external factors such as difficult trading 
conditions rather than failures of governance. 
 
3 2 2 The role of the PFMA in regulating the financing of SOEs450 
 
In order to determine to what forms of state aid the proposed state aid rules should 
apply, it is paramount to know how financial support, provided to public institutions 
(that include SOEs) is regulated in South Africa. In general government finances are 
regulated in terms of the PFMA.  
 
A brief overview of the broad controls over funding by the national government is 
given here in order to provide some context for the proposals on the types of state 
aid that should be covered by state aid regulations. For this purpose the focus will be 
placed on the regulation of national finances.451 Processes and measures452 required 
by the PFMA are aimed at ensuring that there are at all times accountability and 
transparency where the government provides financial support to SOEs. The PFMA 
is not concerned with the competitive effects of the funding of SOEs but it is still 
relevant to an understanding of the types of state aid that should be regulated in 
competition law. 
 
With few exceptions, revenues received by government will be paid into the National 
Revenue Fund.453 Withdrawals may be made from this fund only in terms of an 
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annual appropriation by an Act of Parliament or as a direct charge against the 
fund.454 The annual appropriation455 will be done by reference to a national annual 
budget.456 
 
The PFMA lists the institutions to which it applies.457 Some institutions are mainly 
funded by national or provincial government from revenue funds and this includes 
the constitutional institutions, national and provincial public entities458 and national 
and provincial departments.459 Annual budgets explicitly provide for appropriations 
that should be made to departments.460 The different national and provincial 
departments with oversight over constitutional institutions and the public entities 
transfer the funds to them from the appropriations made in the national annual 
budget. For example, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development will 
transfer funds to the institutions over which it has oversight. These include the Public 
Protector, Legal Aid South Africa and the South African Human Rights Commission.  
 
SOEs fall into a different category and because of their particular relevance, the 
financing of SOEs and the role which the PFMA plays in this will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
3 2 3 SOEs and their funding 
 
SOEs are public institutions that are not supposed to receive substantial continual 
funding from national government or provincial governments. These institutions are 
fully or substantially financed from sources other than the National Revenue Fund, a 
tax, levy or other state funds.461 The National Treasury regularly emphasises that 
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“State-owned companies generally operate without direct support from the National 
Revenue Fund …”462 and that “[n]one of these public institutions should depend 
directly on the budget for revenue.”463 According to the PFMA this category consists 
of: 
- “major public entities” such as Eskom and the SABC;464  
- “national government business enterprises” such as PRASA; and  
- “provincial business enterprises” such as Ithala Development Finance Corporation 
in Kwazulu-Natal.465  
 
SOEs can obtain the funds they need to conduct their activities from various 
sources: 
a) The equity of these firms is normally exclusively or at least substantially provided 
by the state; 
b) They may borrow funds;466 
c) The activities or some activities of SOEs may be subsidised by the state; 
d) They may generate profits. 
 
The profits of SOEs are realised from their business activities.467 In some cases 
revenues of SOEs are generated according to normal business principles. SAA will 
have to compete for customers with several privately owned airlines. However, these 
profits may also be influenced by statutory measures that determine how revenue is 
earned. Eskom is regarded as having a natural monopoly and therefore the tariffs 
which it charges is regulated (they must be approved by the National Energy 
Regulator of South Africa (Nersa)). In the case of the SABC a substantial part of its 
revenue is raised through a licensing fee that has a statutory basis. Although these 
statutory provisions may be relevant to broad competition policy it is submitted that 
the price regulations that apply to Eskom and also the statutory fees of the SABC 
should not in South Africa have the effect of converting revenues into state aid.  
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The other forms of funding will have to be more carefully considered in order to 
establish the boundaries for state aid and its regulation in South Africa.  
 
3 2 3 1 Subsidisation of particular activities through national and provincial 
budgets  
 
During the annual budgetary process the government expends government revenue 
on four main categories of expenditure:468  
(i) current expenditure, which include compensation of employees, payment for 
goods and service and interest and rent on land; 
(ii) transfers and subsidies, which include transfers/subsidies to departmental 
agencies, non-profit organisations, public corporations and private enterprises; 
(iii) payments for capital assets; and 
(iv) payment for financial assets. 
 
Each one of these categories is defined in the annual Appropriation Acts.469 For 
purposes of this study, the “transfers and subsidies” category is important as 
payment made under this category could be viewed as state aid. The following table 
presents a list of selected470 transfers made from the national budget of overseeing 
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2010/11 1 828 710  36 000  181 296  290 760  306 077  
2011/12 1 856 610   116 255  143 800  180 442  
2012/13 1 879 368  350 000  118 313  215 444   
2013/14 2 141 027   57 250  256 570   
2014/15 2 948 037    227 168  50 000  
2015/16 3 613 243    172 927  115 092  
2016/17 3 526 334    182 093  240 000  
2017/18 3 846 154    173 766  240 000  
2018/19 3 262 031    187 421   
Source: National Treasury’s reply to written questions by an MP471 and the different 
Appropriation Acts 
 
The National Treasury states that funds which are transferred from a department’s 
annual budget to another entity in order for the entity to further its operations in line 
with the entity’s mandate are classified as “transfers and subsidies”.472 It is clear 
from treasury documents473 that these “transfers and subsidies”, as defined by the 
Treasury and allocated in Appropriation Acts, are always related to the SOEs 
governmental mandate. Departments with oversight of SOEs will have certain 
strategic development plans and in order to achieve those plans, it will provide 
subsidies and transfers to various entities including SOEs. These subsidies are 
given to SOEs in terms of the national or provincial budgets to allow them to conduct 
specific activities that will not be performed according to ordinary business principles. 
Although National Treasury accepts that SOEs should be able to operate without 
continual reliance on the National Revenue Fund it acknowledges that “in some 
cases their enabling statutes provide for contributions from appropriated funds”.474 
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472 National Treasury’s “Classification Circular- Classification of Transfers and Subsidies versus Goods and 
Services or Capital Assets” (available at oag.treaury.gov.za). 
473 See the Consolidated Financial Statements (CFS) which are issued by the National Treasury after the end of 
each financial year. 
474 2018 Budget Review 93 




Consecutive annual budgets (including the most recent one), for instance, make 
provision for transfers and subsidies to SOEs which are operated in accordance with 
normal business principles. The transfers and subsidies which are made to these 
SOEs form part of the appropriations made to the government department which 
have oversight over these institutions. PRASA, for example, is subject to the 
oversight of the Department of Transport.475 This department’s development plans 
include investing in road infrastructure, upgrading rail infrastructure and services and 
building as well as operating public transportation infrastructure.476 Many of these 
development plans are executed by SOEs: SANRAL executes the development 
plans in regard to road infrastructure and PRASA executes the development plans in 
regard to the upgrading of rail infrastructure. In order to achieve these objectives the 
Department of Transport will provide subsidies and transfers to the SOEs.477 Hence, 
an SOE such as PRASA has been receiving subsidies and transfers for rail 
maintenance operations as well as to refurbish coaches and signalling. Other 
examples of SOEs which have received such “transfers and subsidies” in the past 
are SAA, which received transfers and subsidies from either the Department of 
Public Enterprises or the National Treasury (while it was still under the supervision of 
the Treasury). SAA was until recently under the oversight of the National Treasury 
but has now been transferred back to the supervision of the Department of Public 
Enterprises.478 With regard to SA Express the Department of Public Enterprises 
made such transfers and subsidies.479  
  
In Europe these forms of funding would constitute state aid but could be excluded 
from scrutiny in terms of the state aid rules if the Altmark criteria are fulfilled or the 
state aid could be exempted in terms of the “SGEI package”.480 It is therefore 
proposed that these types of funding in South Africa should also be awarded special 
                                                          
475 Para 35 of the Appropriation Act of 2018. See also para 35 of the Appropriation Act of 2019. 
476 See for instance The Consolidated Financial Statements (CFS) which are issued by the National Treasury 
after the end of each financial year. The CFS’s shows the transfers and subsidies national departments make to 
certain entities.   
477 See the Consolidated Financial Statements (CFS) which are issued by the National Treasury after the end of 
each financial year. 
478 On 1 August 2018 SAA has been removed from the supervision of the National Treasury and returned to the 
supervision of the Department of Public Enterprises where it previously was. See Proclamation No 23 of 2018 
by the President of the Republic of South Africa on the “Transfer of Administration, Powers and Functions 
entrusted by the South African Airways Act, 2007” in Government Gazette 41815 (1 August 2018) Vol 638. 
479 Para 9 of the Adjustments Appropriations Bill of 2018. 




treatment. However, it is envisaged that the special treatment should take a 
somewhat different form in South Africa. Even if it is accepted that these forms of 
support should be state aid there should be a presumption that it is in the public 
interest and therefore should not be subject to scrutiny by competition authorities.  
 
3 2 3 2 Loans and credit obtained by SOEs 
 
Subject to the PFMA, most SOEs have borrowing powers in accordance with their 
enabling legislation.481 Borrowings may take various forms. It has been stated that 
Eskom, for instances, raises credit from domestic money markets, domestic and 
international markets, development finance institutions and export credit agencies. 
Various distinctions can be drawn for this purpose: 
- Loans can be short-term or long-terms loans.482  
- Borrowing can be from domestic and/or foreign lenders. Foreign credit for particular 
projects may also be obtained from international organisations such as export credit 
agencies and the World Bank. Eskom, for example, has been a recipient of loans for 
certain projects from the World Bank.483 Domestic lenders may include commercial 
banks, state-owned development finance institutions such as the Land Bank, the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Industrial Development 
Corporation.484 State-owned development finance institutions are described as “a 
financial intermediary that aims to improve social welfare, by lending to priority 
                                                          
481 Section 7 of the South African Airways Act 5 of 2007 regulates SAA’s borrowing powers; section 5 of the 
South African Express Act 34 of 2007 regulates SA Express’s borrowing powers; section 5 of the Broadband 
Infraco Act 33 of 2007 regulates Infraco’s borrowing powers; section 7 the Eskom Conversion Act 13 of 2001 
regulates Eskom’s borrowing powers; Section 23 of the Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 regulates the SABC’s 
borrowing powers.  
482 See for example section 7 of the Eskom Conversion Act 13 of 2001, which allow Eskom to borrow from 
private lenders and section 7 of the South African Airways Act 5 of 2007, which sets out SAA’s borrowing 
powers.  
483 See “South Africa's Eskom granted World Bank loan for coal plant” Power Engineering International (2010) 
18(5) 12 12.  See also “Eskom Power Investment Support Project”  
(available at http://projects.worldbank.org/P116410/eskom-investment-support-project?lang=en); and  
M Sadiki Financial Assistance to State-Owned Enterprises by the State in South Africa: A Case Study of Eskom 
MA (Public Administration) University of South Africa (2015) 1 63. 
484 The 2017 Budget Review noted that in 2016 the Land Bank helped hundreds of black farmers increase 
cultivation; the Development Bank of Southern Africa supported energy, roads, water and sanitation projects 
benefiting about 2 million urban households; and the Industrial Development Corporation approved 180 




sectors or target clientele while benefiting from some level of concessionary 
resources received from the state and/or donors.”485  
- Most importantly for state aid purposes, a distinction can be drawn between loans 
or credit provided by state institutions and the private sector. Loans that are not 
given directly by the state will not constitute state aid. The Public Investment 
Corporation, for instance, held about R85 billion in Eskom bonds in early 2018.486 It 
is proposed that loans given on normal business terms by public institutions that are 
in the business of providing credit or investment should not be regarded as state aid. 
In a small economy such as South Africa it will not be unusual for other SOEs and 
especially major public entities to also borrow from particular SOEs. However, it is 
proposed that loans that are given to SOEs from other government or government-
related sources should be covered by the state aid provision.  
 
3 2 3 3 The government acquires equity in SOEs  
 
Where National or Provincial Revenue Funds are used to obtain or increase equity in 
the form of shares or similar securities in SOEs, it should be regarded as state aid in 
terms of the proposed provisions. However, it should not be state aid where equity is 
merely acquired on ordinary business terms from SOEs that provided it in the 
ordinary course of their business. If recapitalisations are not loans made by the 
government to the SOEs, it will be made in return for equity.487 This is in light of the 
National Treasury’s definition of recapitalisations. It defines recapitalisation as the 
“injection of funds into a company or entity to aid liquidity, either as a loan or in return 
for equity.488 Therefore, if the funding comes from the National or Provincial Revenue 
Funds and if it is not indicated as being a loan in the ordinary course of business, the 
examples of recapitalisations below will constitute state aid which will be within the 
scope of the proposed state aid rules.  
                                                          
485 J Yaron “State-Owned Development Finance Institutions (SDFI): The Political Economy and Performance 
Assessment” (2006) 30(1) Savings and Development 39 39. 
486 http://www.gepf.co.za/index.php/news/article/gepf-invests-responsibly (last accessed 2019/03/15). 
487 See for example the Eskom Subordinated Loan Special Appropriation Amendment Act (2008/09-2010/11 
Financial Years) of 2015. 




- In an adjustment budget489 in 2017 “specific and exclusive” appropriations for debt 
obligations and recapitalisation was made in favour of SAA,490 a major public entity. 
The recapitalisation of SAA on at least two occasions in 2017 involved the provision 
of R10 billion to redeem maturing debt and provide working capital. In July 2017 a 
transfer of funds from the National Revenue Fund to SAA was made to prevent 
default in regard to a debt owed to Standard Chartered Bank as government wanted 
to avoid the triggering of the government guarantee which it had given in favour of 
the airline.491 Another transfer of funds was made in September 2017 to avoid a 
similar difficulty concerning debts owed to Citibank.492  
- In an adjustment budget in 2018 a “specific and exclusive” appropriation was made 
to South African Express, another major public entity;493  
- According to the 2018/2019 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement,494 SAA 
received R5 billion through a special appropriation statute to settle debt that have to 
be redeemed before March 2019, South African Express were to receive an 
additional R1.2 billion and the South African Post Office R2.9 billion. 
SAA was therefore funded on a number of occasions to help it to meet some of its 
financial obligations as they become due.495 The Budget Review of 2018 made clear 
that the National Treasury would recapitalise SAA to allow it to implement its long-
term turnaround strategy.496 Such assistance would entail the granting of funding 
support to the airline. Although SAA remains technically insolvent, as noted in the 
Budget Review 2018, the provision of working capital by the National Treasury is 
allowing the airline to continue as a business concern. However, it is proposed that 
these motivations for granting state aid should be investigated once the state aid is 
notified to the Commission, rather bases for determining what constitutes such aid. 
                                                          
489 See PFMA, section 30 on adjustment budgets and the fairly narrow grounds on which adjustment budgets 
may be tabled. 
490 See para 7 of the Adjustment Appropriation Bill of 2017. 
491 See the media statement “Recapitalisation of the South African Airways”  
(available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2017/2017070101%20SAA%20recapitalisation.pdf 
492(http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2017/2017100201%20MEDIA%20STATEMENT%20-
%20SAA.pdf). 
493 See column 9 of the Adjustment Appropriation Bill of 2018. 
494 See PFMA, section 28 on multi-year budget projections. 
495 Examples in this regard include the funds transfer by the National Treasury to SAA in July 2017 to pay back 
its debt to Standard Chartered Bank and again in September 2017 to pay back its debt to Citibank. See the 
Budget Review of 2018 102. 





The following table presents a list of selected497 recapitalisation fund tranfers granted 
to some of South Africa’s biggest SOEs which are classified by the PFMA as “major 






ESKOM  BROADBAND 
INFRANCO  
 
DENEL SAA SAPO SA 
EXPRESS 
2008/9 10 000 000 377 000  
 
   445 000  
 
2009/10 30 000 000 208 530   1 549 080    
2010/11 20 000 000 138 600      
2011/12       
2012/13   700 000     
2013/14       
2014/15       
2015/16 23 00 000      
2016/17     650 000   
2017/18    10 000 
000  
3 700 000   
2018/19 5 000 000    5 000 000 2 947 000  1 249 000  
2019/20 26 000 000       
Source: National Treasury’s reply to written questions by an MP498 and the different 
Appropriation Acts 
 
3 2 3 4 Guarantees and other security given to creditors of SOEs by the state  
 
                                                          
497 Other SOEs not mentioned in the table also received recapitalisation funds. See 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/MinAnsw/2019/PQ%20302%20-%20Sarupen%20-
%20NW1268E.pdf (last visited on 7 February 2020). 
498 See http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/MinAnsw/2019/PQ%20302%20-%20Sarupen%20-




The most pervasive form of support which the government provides to SOEs is in the 
form of security for loans or other credit provides to SOEs. These securities are 
commonly given in the form of government guarantees. Government guarantees 
allow SOEs to borrow from lenders and on terms that otherwise would not have been 
open to them, because of their weak financial positions. The following table presents 
a list of guarantees which were put in place for some of South Africa’s biggest SOEs 


















































































































































































































Source: Table 11 of the statistical annexure in the Budget Review of 2019 
 
The granting of government guarantees and other similar forms of security are 
extensively regulated. National Treasury defines a guarantee as “a commitment to 
take responsibility for a loan in the event of default. It enables the beneficiary to 
access funding that would otherwise be unavailable, or to borrow at a lower cost.”499 
                                                          





Section 218 of the Constitution allows the government to guarantee loans after the 
conditions for such guarantees have been set out in national legislation. Section 70 
of the PFMA sets out such conditions. Section 70(1)(a) establishes that: 
“A Cabinet member, with the written concurrence of the Minister (given either 
specifically in each case or generally with regard to a category of cases and subject 
to any conditions approved by the Minister), may issue a guarantee, indemnity or 
security which binds—  
(a) the National Revenue Fund in respect of a financial commitment incurred or to be 
incurred by the national executive”.500 
Section 70(2) provides that a payment under such a guarantee or security “is a direct 
charge against the National Revenue Fund, and any such payment must in the first 
instance be defrayed from the funds budgeted for the department”. Section 70(4) 
requires that the relevant “Cabinet member must at least annually report the 
circumstances relating to any payments under a guarantee … or security… to the 
National Assembly for tabling in the National Assembly”. But the Constitution in 
section 218(3) requires that “Each year, every government must publish a report on 
the guarantees it has granted”.501  
 
Although the PFMA does not explicitly require that guarantees must be given 
through the budgetary process, the court in the Comair case concluded that: 
“The crux of Comair's argument in this specific context is that the minister's decision 
bypasses the various safeguards inherent in the parliamentary appropriation 
procedure, as they put it. The Minister of Finance (Minister P Gordhan, as he then 
was) said that s 70(4) of the PFMA expressly provides for the manner in which 
parliament was required to oversee decisions taken in terms of s 70. Any guarantee 
cannot and does not circumvent parliament. It is a measure authorised by 
constitutionally enabling legislation. A guarantee in terms of s 70 is demonstrably not 
intended to bypass the ordinary budget process. Any direct funding given to SAA is 
subject to the same parliamentary oversight as any other”.502  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(accessible at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2018/review/Chapter%207.pdf).  
500 See PFMA section 70(3) on the requirements where consent from the Minister of Finance is required.  
501 For a comprehensive discussion on the position in regard to government guarantees and SOEs see  Comair 
Limited v Minister of Public Enterprises 2016 (1) SA 1 (GP) para 27. 




Perhaps the rules for the granting this form of aid do not bypass the budgetary 
process in terms of which Parliament appropriates funds that are expended by 
government. However, it may be argued that it sets adequate requirements for 
commitments that can have severe consequences both for government finances and 
for the competitors of SOEs.  
 
The major procedural hurdle for the granting of a guarantee will in terms of section 
70 of the PFMA be the written consent of the Minister of Finance. As the granting of 
a guarantee does not entail actual expenditure until it is called upon, it will not be 
allocated to the budgeted expenditures of any government department and will not 
be reflected in an appropriation act. Outstanding guarantees nevertheless will be 
reported in Budget Reviews.503 The Budget Review of 2018/2019 shows that the 
government guarantees in place for SOEs amounts to R529.4 billion, with SAA, 
SAPO, SAA Express and Eskom all beneficiaries in terms of the guarantees. It is 
projected that the guarantees in place will reach R879.6 billion on 31 March 2019.504 
An existing guarantee, with SAA as the beneficiary, was the reason why Comair 
instituted legal action against the South African government. This case is discussed 
above in this chapter505 and it suffices to state here that Comair as a competitor of 
SAA wanted to be awarded the opportunity to make representations to the 
government prior to the taking of the guarantee decision.506 It viewed the granting of 
the guarantee without giving them an opportunity to be heard, as procedurally unfair 
and in breach of their legitimate expectations.507 However, this mere reporting 
requirement means that Parliament has limited control over the granting of this aid. 
The granting of guarantees is not subject to the same strict requirements as 
expenditures that do not have the same potential for harm. Section 70(4) provides 
stricter rules where a creditor calls on a guarantee. Here reporting to Parliament is 
required. However, this requirement will be tantamount to closing the stable door 
after the horse has bolted. It does not give Parliament any powers to address the 
granting of the guarantee. 
                                                          
503 Comair Limited v Minister of Public Enterprises 2016 (1) SA 1 (GP) para 28. 
504 Budget Review 2019 78. 
505 See para 1.1 (c) of this chapter. 
506 Comair Limited v Minister of Public Enterprises 2016 (1) SA 1 (GP) para 2.5. 





Although the granting of a government guarantee is not “direct funding”, the Comair 
case illustrates why there is a need for guarantees to be covered by the scope of any 
proposed regulatory measures. Although a guarantee is only a contingent liability, it 
remains a tangible benefit which can be the difference between failure and success 
for SOEs, because it allows them to borrow money at all or in some case at lower 
rates. To that end it ensures that SOEs will always continue as business entities 
while any private competitor who might encounter similar problems might not be able 
to obtain loans at all or at competitive rates and as a result might have to exit the 
market. This justifies its inclusion under any regulatory state aid measures. 
 
3 2 3 5 Conclusion 
 
The major forms of state aid that have been granted in the past will be covered by 
the proposal in this thesis. Nevertheless, it is recognised that on this proposal some 
forms of distortive state aid could escape regulation. It will even be possible for 
SOEs and government to circumvent regulation of harmful state aid through careful 
planning and the careful drafting of corporate plans. However, it is concluded that 
this proposal, albeit considerably narrower than its EU equivalent, would be more 
appropriate and palatable in South Africa. This proposal will contribute significantly to 
free and fair competition between SOEs and their private competitors, since the body 
responsible for ensuring free and fair competition in South Africa will now have a role 
to play in regard to certain state funding. 
 
3 2 4 Other bases for determining whether particular forms of assistance to 
SOEs should be state aid 
 
Certain other criteria for determining whether forms of financial support should be 
state aid for purposes of the proposed state aid regime have been considered and 
rejected for reasons that will be set out below. 
 






Fraud, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditures might be a reason why SOEs 
require government funding. It may be argued that these practices will only be 
contained if government support to address them is made subject to scrutiny. It may 
therefore be suggested that financial support by government to address losses 
brought about by these types of practices should be regarded as state aid. 
 
Recent investigations at Eskom show the extent to which SOEs were used to commit 
fraud.508 There is no doubt that government support will at least to some extent have 
to address losses caused by fraud. 
 
In terms of the PFMA irregular expenditure means any expenditure “incurred in 
contravention of or that is not in accordance with a requirement of any applicable 
legislation”.509 In essence there is thus a contravention of legislation where irregular 
expenditures are incurred.510 Examples of irregular spending include that (i) 
competitive bidding methods are not being followed for the appointment of a 
supplier, (ii) procurement is not in line with relevant procurement policies legislation; 
and (iii) payment was made to a supplier without a contract.511 Fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure means expenditure “which was made in vain and would have been 
avoided had reasonable care been exercised.512 Fruitless and wasteful expenditure 
may result from a “simple oversight in performing an administrative task”513 The 
oversight may be due to (i) failed internal processes and systems and (ii) human 
error.514 Fruitless and wasteful expenditure may also arise due to (i) lack of planning, 
                                                          




509 Section 1 of the PFMA.  
The legislation referred to includes the PFMA, the State Tender Board Act No 86 of 1968 and any provincial 
legislation providing for procurement procedures in the provincial government. 
510 See para 8 of the National Treasury Updated Guidelines on Irregular Expenditure of April 2015.   
511 These were all examples of irregular spending within PRASA. See the PRASA Annual Report 2015-2016 
133 (accessible at https://www.prasa.com/Annual%20Reports/Prasa%20Annual%20Report%202015-16.pdf). 
512 Section 1 of the PFMA. 
513 See the National Treasury Guidelines on Fruitless and Wasteful Expenditure of May 2014(accessible at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/pfma/guidelines/Guideline%20on%20Fruitless%20and%20Wasteful%20
Expenditure%2027%20May%202014.pdf). 
514 See for example W Mtshali &  Z Ntolosi “Serious Financial Problems” (2014) 14(4)  Official Journal of the 
Institute of Municipal Finance Officers 24  24-26  where the authors argue for certain software system to be 




(ii) uninstalled hardware, and (iii) failure to follow processes during the dismissal of 
an executive.515  
 
The PFMA requires that SOEs report on these matters. Their annual reports must 
include particulars of (i) any material losses through criminal conduct and any 
irregular expenditure and fruitless and wasteful expenditure that occurred during the 
financial year; (ii) any criminal or disciplinary steps taken as a consequence of such 
losses or irregular expenditure or fruitless and wasteful expenditure; and (iii) any 
financial assistance received from the state and commitments made by the state on 
behalf of the SOE. Through the aforementioned statutory provisions the government 
gets a clear indication of the financial position of SOEs and whether there might be a 
requirement for state funding at any point during a particular financial year.516  
 
Themba Godi, the former Chairman of the Standing Committee for Public Accounts, 
was right when he said: “[we] all should have a sense of national responsibility when 
dealing with public finances.”517 It is no secret that such responsibility is absent in a 
number of SOEs, considering the money lost due to fraud and spent as irregular, 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure, as reflected in consecutive annual reports of the 
Auditor-General.518 The Auditor-General’s reports reflect a clear failure in SOEs to 
address these types of expenditures. They increase nearly every year as the latest 
Auditor-General report has shown.519 These types of expenditures may firstly, result 
in a shortfall of funds which are available for SOEs to deliver their required mandates 
and secondly, it may affect the funds available to conduct commercial operations. 
Any shortfall of funds which are due to irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure 
could be avoided through proper corporate and financial governance. 
 
                                                          
515 This was the instances which PRASA, for example listed as such expenditure. See the PRASA Annual 
Report 2015-2016 133 
 ( accessible at https://www.prasa.com/Annual%20Reports/Prasa%20Annual%20Report%202015-16.pdf). 
516 PFMA section 55(2). 
517 "South Africa: Parliament on Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa's irregular expenditure."  
Mena Report 25 February 2016 Academic  OneFile 
 http://link.galegroup.com.ez.sun.ac.za/apps/doc/A444275302/AONE?u=27uos&sid=AONE&xid=f2135eaf 
(accessed 7 September 2018). 
518 All reports from the Auditor-General can be accessed on its website: www.agsa.co.za. 




The government, however, will not allow SOEs to suspend their mandates or their 
commercial operations in the event that there is a shortfall of funds due to these 
types of expenditures. Consequently, the government frequently steps in to ensure 
that SOEs firstly, continue to deliver their goods and services uninterrupted to South 
Africans and secondly, continue to operate their commercial activities. However, 
since irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditures are always the result of 
governance failures, it is even more compelling that state aid due to these types of 
expenditure comes within the ambit of any state aid control regulation. Nevertheless, 
it will not be easy to make a clear determination in advance whether further state aid 
to SOEs is required because of fraud, irregular, fruitless or wasteful expenditure. It is 
therefore proposed that the existence of forms of governance failures should rather 
be taken into account in the evaluation of state aid by the Commission.520 
 
3 2 4 2 Should funding provided by government to make good operational 
losses automatically be included as state aid for purpose of the state aid 
regime? 
 
In recent years many SOEs have racked up large operational losses. As in the case 
of SAA, SOEs frequently require funding to address these losses. These losses 
could be the result of “the failure of people, processes and systems, and from 
external factors”.521 It could be argued that government financial support to address 
losses caused by governance failures should automatically be subject to scrutiny in 
terms of the state aid regime, in order to promote better governance of SOEs. 
 
It will be clear from the above statement that operational losses are not necessarily 
the result of governance failure. Operational losses also may be brought about by 
market circumstances. An SOE such as PRASA may suffer losses because of a 
reduction in passenger numbers,522 while SAA may suffer losses due to flying 
unprofitable or loss making routes and the SABC may suffer losses due to unpopular 
broadcasting content which may lead to advertisers ending or limiting their relations 
                                                          
520 See the discussion in para 1.2 of this chapter.  
521 I Moosa & L Li “The frequency and severity of operational losses: a cross-country comparison” (2013) 20(2) 
Applied Economics Letters 167 167. 




with the broadcaster. State aid as a result of difficult trading conditions might impact 
on competition in that it keeps the playing field uneven: while private competitors will 
have to find ways to reduce and counter operational losses, the mandates of SOEs 
basically guarantee that, even when they are recording substantial operational 
losses, state aid will be granted by the government to enable the SOEs to continue 
to provide their services and goods. Additional funds for operational losses caused 
by difficult trading conditions will thus inevitably prolong the existence of an uneven 
playing field between SOEs and their private competitors. In some situations state 
aid in this form could be justified but these types of state aid should at least be 
scrutinised in terms of the state aid regime.  
 
However, operational losses may be caused by insufficient funding by the state of 
public mandate activities. SAA may be forced to fly unprofitable routes to promote 
the integration of South Africa into the broader African economy, without support 
from government to fund this. It would make sense to include funding for failures of 
governance or even pure operational losses but not failures due to this, as these 
types of activities might in any event require government funding. 
 
Again it may in practice be too difficult to determine when financing falls into the 
categories that would justify scrutiny as mentioned above. Therefore it is proposed 
that these matters should be taken into account when evaluating conduct that has 
been classed as state aid on other bases. 
 
3 2 4 3 Should government funding be excluded from the state aid regime if it 
has been approved through the ordinary budgeting processes? 
 
Finally, it may be argued that financing that is given through the ordinary budgetary 
processes, should not be subject to the state aid regime as: 
1) It will already have been properly vetted; 
2) The institutions that will have decided that it should be provided will be 





It will be clear from the discussion above that the PFMA attempts to ensure that 
funding of SOEs take place by means of carefully planned processes.523 Apart from 
what has already been said about budgetary processes and the financing of SOEs, 
references can also be made to the role which section 52 and 55 of the PFMA plays 
in establishing proper scrutiny for the funding of SOEs. 
 
Section 52 of the PFMA helps the government to assess the potential requirement 
for any state funding by SOEs. It also helps the government to assess the borrowing 
requirement of each SOE. Because of section 52 the government will be fully 
informed whether it might have to guarantee any borrowing for SOEs during a 
particular financial year524 or have to do recapitalisations. The section requires all 
SOEs listed in schedule 2 of the PFMA and government business enterprises, which 
include for example SAA, South African Express and Infraco Broadband Ltd, to 
submit at least one month or another period agreed with the National Treasury, 
before the start of its financial year- 
(a) a projection of revenue, expenditure and borrowings for that financial year in the 
prescribed format; 
(b) a corporate plan in the prescribed format covering the affairs of that public entity 
or business enterprise for the following three financial years, and, if it has 
subsidiaries, also the affairs of the subsidiaries.525 
 
Section 55 of the PFMA assists the government with any assessments of a potential 
requirement for state funding or the potential borrowing requirements of the SOEs. In 
terms of this section SOEs have to submit their annual report and financial 
statements to the National Treasury. The annual report and financial statements 
must fairly present: 
 (i) the state of affairs of the public entity;  
(ii) its business;  
(iii) its financial results;  
(iv) its performance against predetermined objectives; and  
                                                          
523 See the discussion in para 3.2.3.1 of this chapter. 
524 The medium-term borrowing requirement of selected SOEs such as SAA, Eskom, Transnet are estimated in 
the annual Budget Review of the National Treasury.  




(v) its financial position as at the end of the financial year concerned.  
 
It may therefore be proposed that only financing provided outside of clear and 
normal budgetary scrutiny should receive scrutiny in terms of the state aid regime. 
Examples would be financing through emergency powers526 in terms of section 16 of 
the PFMA, a special appropriation statute,527 an adjustment budget in terms of 
section 30 of the PFMA,528 or a guarantee in terms of section 74 of the PFMA.529 
However, it is proposed that the ordinary processes have thus far not led to proper 
consideration of the consequences of state aid. It is therefore proposed that this 
should not be a basis for excluding state aid. However, the importance of giving 
effect to the decisions of democratically elected institutions has motivated the more 
limited proposal that the state aid regime in South Africa should merely grant the 
Competition Commission advisory powers. It is suggested that this would give better 
effect to the concern that the Competition Commission should not be allowed to 
override democratically elected institutions. 
 
It may also be proposed that financing of SOEs provided through ordinary budgetary 
processes should not necessarily be excluded from scrutiny, as long as it is covered 
by another criterion for inclusion but, at least, that financing provided by government 
outside of ordinary budgetary processes should always be included in the state aid 
regime. A strong position on this notion is not taken in this study. However, it is 
ultimately concluded that the types of state aid that will be problematic if given 
outside of ordinary budgetary processes will be adequately covered by the criteria for 
inclusion that have been developed above.  
 
3 3 The structure and operation of the proposed state aid regime for South 
Africa  
 
In this part the structure and operation of the proposed state aid regime will be set 
out in detail and the following issues will be investigated: 
                                                          
526 See the discussion in para 3.3.2.2 of this chapter on the impact of emergency powers. 
527 See for example the Eskom Special Appropriation Act of 2015.  
528 See the discussion in para 3.2.3.3 of this chapter. 




- The authority that should be responsible for evaluating state aid; 
- How proceedings by the authority responsible for evaluating state aid should 
commence; 
- How state aid will be evaluated by the relevant authority and what the effect of 
decisions of the responsible authority will be. 
  
3 3 1 Who should evaluate state aid? 
 
It is proposed that the Competition Commission be given a role when state aid as 
defined above is granted to SOEs.530 The principal responsibility of the Competition 
Commission is to be the guardian of competition in South Africa. This study has 
shown that there can be no doubt that certain state aids are distortive. It is therefore 
not unreasonable to suggest that the Competition Commission should play a central 
role in state aid matters. Furthermore, a more active role by the Competition 
Commission in state aid matters was recently alluded to by the Commissioner of the 
Competition Commission, Thembinkosi Bonakele. It was reported that Mr Bonakele 
among other things stated “There should be a clear competition policy on state-
owned enterprises which addresses, among other things, transparency in pricing, 
cross-subsidisation and bailouts.”531 These words by the highest ranked official of 
the Competition Commission show that even within the Competition Commission 
there are concerns about the impact of state aid on the competitive process. Mr 
Bonakele clearly envisaged the positive role which the Competition Commission 
could play in addressing these matters.  
 
Outside of exemptions in terms of section 10 and small and intermediate mergers in 
terms of section 13 and 14(1) of the Competition Act, the Competition Commission is 
an investigative and prosecutorial rather than an adjudicative body. In this sense the 
Competition Commission has more limited powers than the EU Commission and the 
competition authorities of most member states. However, it is submitted that the 
more limited powers proposed here would be wielded more effectively by the 
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Competition Commission. It will become apparent that the proposed powers of the 
Commission in the context of state aid are more akin to those that it will exercise in 
the context of market inquiries.532 It would overcomplicate and delay effective state 
aid decisions if the more formally judicial Tribunal were to become involved. When 
the Commission considers state aid its processes will be subject to review by the 
Tribunal and the Tribunal should have the power to decide whether a particular 
matter concerns state aid, but beyond that the Tribunal should not be involved in 
state aid investigations and decisions.  
 
South African policymakers will certainly question why the competition authorities 
which were created to investigate anti-competitive practices and regulate mergers, 
should get involved in government matters or political decisions such as the granting 
of state aid. The competition authorities already have a wide mandate. It is 
necessary that priority be given to the most egregious harms to competition. Lowe533 
correctly states that:  
 
“The system [a modern competition policy and enforcement system] should allow 
the competition authority to concentrate its limited resources on specific priorities. 
The authority must be able to determine those priorities on the basis of the 
expected direct and indirect effects of its action. The system should make it possible 
to concentrate resources on the potentially most harmful conducts and on 
precedent-setting cases. This depends crucially on knowledge of markets and the 
capacity to focus on key issues without the need for repetitive in-depth 
investigations on individual cases.” 
 
Any expectations placed on competition authorities should be limited to what is 
realistic. Their main focus should be the regulation of anticompetitive behaviour and 
mergers.  
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However, it has to be noted that firstly, the constraints placed on the competition 
authorities by their mandate and resources do not necessarily mean that they cannot 
evaluate potential distortive state aid. Ultimately, the mandate of the competition 
authorities is to protect competition generally. An active role by the guardians of 
competition in the granting of potential distortive state aid, will reassure existing 
competitors of the SOEs and also those who are considering entering markets in 
which SOEs are operating, that free and fair competition by SOEs is considered to 
be important within all sectors of the economy. In Comair Limited v Minister of Public 
Enterprises534 the applicant (Comair) attacked the decision of the Minister of Finance 
with reference to the “anti-competitive conduct, unfair advantages created by the 
impugned decision, inequality in the market, distortion of the market, SAA's 
dominance, anti-competitive effects, including price predation, dumping of excess 
volume, poaching of passengers, and the need for pro-competitive conditions for 
maintaining and protecting competition in the industry”. The court stated that: “Any 
reliance on market distortion and anticompetitive behaviour must be dealt with in 
terms of the provisions of s 65(2) of the Competition Act. This court cannot entertain 
it. I will therefore not take any such allegations and references to concepts which fall 
within the ambit of the Competition Act into account, when determining whether or 
not Comair has established the cause of action relied upon.”535 In essence, even 
while dealing with state aid (the government guarantee), the court was clear that it 
would not have the jurisdiction to hear the matter if Comair was solely relying on 
issues which the competition authorities have to investigate and determine from a 
factual and legal point of view as the Competition Act “does not contemplate 
concurrent jurisdiction.” The court thus viewed the competition authorities as the 
appropriate forum to adjudicate the matter should Comair only have relied on 
allegations of market distortion and anticompetitive behaviour resulting from the 
decision to grant the guarantee. It only continued to adjudicate the matter because 
Comair also relied on provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (PAJA) and the principle of legality. The court was of course wrong to think that 
competition matters arising from the granting of the guarantee could have been dealt 
with head-on by the competition authorities. This is because South Africa’s 
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competition law at present does not provide for the investigation, assessment and 
adjudication by the competition authorities of the anticompetitive consequences of 
state aid in any form. The court was however correct to assume that the competition 
authorities should have some role in regard to the anticompetitive effects of state aid.  
 
Secondly, any concerns that a role by the competition authorities in state aid matters 
would place them in a dominant position over other governmental authorities who 
have oversight over SOEs and as a result make them “super regulators” are 
misguided in the light of the limited proposals made here. The Competition Act 
clearly sets out the relation between the competition authorities and other regulators 
with regard to competition matters.536 The Commission is entitled by the Competition 
Act to participate in the proceedings of any regulatory authority537 or to provide 
advice to any regulatory authority,538 but the Act does not allow the competition 
authorities to force other regulators to act in a certain way, unless the government is 
acting as a firm. The new market inquiry provisions in the Competition Amendment 
18 of 2018 will strengthen the Commission’s position in regard to other regulatory 
authorities to some degree. The Commission will be allowed to investigate sectors of 
the economy over which a regulatory authority has jurisdiction in terms of a public 
regulation and may make recommendations to the regulatory authority in respect of 
competition matters on conclusion of an inquiry.539 However, it remains a reality that 
the competition authorities cannot and will not interfere with those actions which 
other regulators take in their capacity as part of the executive arm of the 
government. The Competition Tribunal was also clear on this aspect in AEC 
Electronics (Pty) Ltd v The Department of Minerals and Energy540 when it stated that 
an interpretation of the provisions of the Competition Act which elevates the tribunal 
to a super regulator with powers to remedy the actions of other regulators cannot be 
accepted.541 It further stated that: 
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 “No such interpretation is authorised by the Act and indeed the fact that a regime is 
created for regulatory agreements between the Commission and other agencies to 
manage concurrent jurisdiction over competition matters, suggests that regulators 
are equal to and not subordinate to one another unless specifically provided for 
otherwise.”542  
 
Lastly, an active role by the Competition Commission as proposed in this study 
would not undermine the state’s sovereignty in the form of its power to grant state 
aid to SOEs in the public interest, since the Commission’s inquiry powers will be 
limited in several respects: 
- They will not apply to state funding of all public entities but only those that carry on 
commercial activities; 
- They will only be triggered where state aid in the narrow sense described above is 
given; 
- The Commission will have limited powers to force the government to take steps to 
prevent harm.543  
 
In conclusion, it is noted that the right of the state to provide state aid to SOEs and a 
potential role for the Competition Commission to evaluate certain state aids are not 
incompatible if an effective process is put in place. Also, since the proposed inquiry 
powers ensures the input of the body responsible for free and fair competition, 
competitors of the SOEs will be reassured that their interest are also being protected 
in the course of state aid proceedings.  
 
3 3 2 Consequences if support is state aid and notification of state aid  
 
It is proposed that the government should follow a European-style notification 
process when state aid as described above is to be given. The notification may be 
given either by National Treasury or by the Department under whose control the 
SOE that will receive the state aid falls. 
                                                          
542 AEC Electronics (Pty) Ltd v The Department of Minerals and Energy [2009] 2 CPLR 379 (CT) 385.  






It is proposed that a final decision to grant state aid should not be made until the 
Competition Commission has concluded its evaluation of the state aid or the time for 
evaluation of the state aid has elapsed. In this respect the state aid regime could 
borrow from the rules regarding the notification of mergers. Section 14(2) of the 
Competition Act provides that an intermediate merger will be deemed to be approved 
if the Commission does not make a decision on the merger within the time or 
extended time set out in the section. The period within which state aid should be 
evaluated by the Commission should be carefully considered. It should be long 
enough to allow the Commission to do a proper analysis, but short enough to 
prevent unnecessary delays. 
 
Unlike competition merger cases, it is not adequate that the final decision to grant 
state aid should merely be suspended until the Commission has completed its 
proceedings. It will become apparent from the description of the proposed process 
that it is necessary that the government should consider the final recommendations 
of the Commission regarding particular state aid. It is therefore necessary that the 
final decision to grant such state aid should not be given prematurely. The limited 
nature of the proposals bolster the conclusion that a final decision to give state aid 
should be possible only after the matter has been considered by the Commission. 
Only in those cases can the more limited powers of the Commission to consider 
state aid be influential.  
 
3 3 2 1 Consequences of failure to notify  
 
There might be circumstances when the government neglects to give the proposed 
notification to the Competition Commission of its intention to grant state aid as 
defined. Since the EU state aid rules are the yardstick for this study, this is the first 
place to search for an answer on what to do should the government neglect its 
proposed notification obligation. In this respect the proposal follows the EU where 
failure to notify the EU Commission causes the aid to be automatically illegal.544 It 
may be argued that a domestic approach is needed due to the limited nature of the 
                                                          




proposals: that notification should not affect the legality of state aid. However, it is 
proposed that the more limited proposals rather bolster the conclusion that a final 
decision to give state aid should be possible only after it has been considered. This 
will ensure that the more limited powers of the Commission to consider state aid will 
be influential. However, it is accepted that the government might regard full illegality 
as going too far and being disruptive. Hence a compromise view is taken here. State 
aid that is given without notification will not be illegal. However, it will still be subject 
to evaluation through late notification or investigation on the initiative of the 
Commission. The Commission would then have the power to propose recovery of 
state aid that was implemented without notification. Again the grantor of the state aid 
would have to show this proposal was properly considered. If not certain legal 
consequences would ensue.545  
 
Furthermore, the levying of a fine on the government for not notifying state aid would 
not be sensible for two reasons. First, a balance needs to be maintained between 
protecting of the competitive process and public interest considerations. Government 
should not be punished for executing its constitutional obligations to South Africans 
through the use of SOEs. Secondly, fines are paid into the National Revenue Fund. 
Where a fine is imposed on government it would just pay the fine to itself. At most it 
should be considered whether officials should be held liable for disregarding the 
requirements of the state aid regime and whether the state should be held liable in 
damages for harm caused by a failure to notify. These are questions which will not 
be taken further in this study. 
 
It is further proposed that members of the South African public together with 
competitors of SOEs should be able to approach the Competition Commission to 
scrutinise the impact of state aid as defined if it was not notified.  
- This right to complain could be akin to the right which members of the public have 
to ask the Public Protector546 to investigate government actions. National 
legislation547 in South Africa allows members of the general public to report any 
matter over which the Public Protector has jurisdiction to its office. The Public 
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Protector is competent to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public 
administration in any sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be 
improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice.548 The purpose of the office of 
the Public Protector in South Africa is aptly summarised by the court in South African 
Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd v Democratic Alliance549 where it states that in 
“modern democratic constitutional states, in order to ensure governmental 
accountability, it has become necessary for the guards to require a guard.” In South 
Africa the Public Protector is that guard. All findings by the Public Protector are 
therefore binding until set aside by a court of law.550 It is not proposed that the 
Commission should be given comparable powers to that of the Public Protector with 
regard to state aid matters. However, as with the Public Protector members of the 
public should be able to approach the Commission to scrutinise any of the forms of 
state funding described above.  
- Some assistance can also be garnered from the rules in competition law that 
concern the submission of complaints concerning prohibited practices.551 However, 
the submission of complaints will also in some respects differ from requests to 
scrutinise state aid that has not been notified. The Competition Commission will not 
be required to investigate once a request has been made. It will rather have a 
discretion to decide whether it should do so. Furthermore, binding decisions 
regarding prohibited practices that are subject to complaints will be made by the 
Tribunal. Decisions regarding state aid will be made by the Commission and not the 
Tribunal and will not be binding.  
 
The proposed complaint procedure will in essence serve three purposes: 
(i) it will alert the Commission to aid that was not notified if the Commission is not 
already aware of it;  
(ii) it will be a counter measure to the government’s failure to comply with the 
proposed notification process, since competitors will certainly be aware of the aid 
even if other members of the public are still unaware of it. The existence of a 
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complaint procedure is likely to motivate government to comply with its notification 
requirement to avoid losing in the initiative in state aid proceedings; and 
(iv) it may require the government to reconsider and retake decisions regarding state 
aid once recommendations have been made by the Competition Commission. 
 
3 3 2 2 The problem of emergency funding of SOEs  
 
As previously mentioned, the National Treasury used section 16 of the PFMA to 
transfer funds to recapitalise SAA.552 Section 16 of the PFMA allows the Minister of 
Finance to authorise the use of funds from the National Revenue Fund in emergency 
situations. It may be argued that emergency funding has to be excluded from the 
operation of the suspension and perhaps also from the notification regime proposed 
here or perhaps even that emergency funding should fall completely outside the 
state aid regime. If the National Treasury did not use the “emergency section” of the 
PFMA for the granting of the funds, the creditors of SAA would have called up the 
guarantees provided in favour of SAA. The government thus had a choice between 
having the creditors call up the guarantee and recapitalising the airline. Both would 
have been significant events for competition between SAA and its competitors. 
Delays to allow for an investigation of state aid in these types of situations could be 
problematic. 
 
Conversely, the fact that the government had to use the “emergency section” of the 
PFMA in recapitalising SAA is indeed worrisome, because one would have expected 
that the maturing of the liabilities to Standard Chartered Bank and Citibank would 
have been made part of SAA’s projections in their budgets for that particular financial 
year, which would have provided the government with a clear picture of the airline’s 
financial circumstances.553  
 
It is therefore proposed that state aid to an SOE cannot be excluded from scrutiny 
merely on the basis that the government has decided to grant it as emergency 
funding. Emergency funding should not automatically be exempted from the 
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application of the proposed state aid rules and a subsequent investigation by the 
Commission on the effect of the aid on the competitive process. Such a position 
might entrench even further the uneven playing field between SOEs and their 
competitors. If emergency funding was to be exempted from the proposed state aid 
rules, it could give carte blanche to SOEs not to do apt budgeting for a particular 
financial year as they would know that any funding emergency in the SOEs was 
certainly to be funded by the National Treasury under the “emergency section” of the 
PFMA. This is not a position intended by the study. Hence, it is recommended that 
the Competition Commission should be allowed to do a basic assessment regarding 
the impact of emergency state funding on the competitive process.554 
 
At most the proposed new state aid regime should allow for: 
- the fast-tracking of the consideration of notified state aid where necessity requires 
it; or  
- even a Competition Commission power to authorise implementation before 
completion of the consideration of state aid.  
 
Section 16 of the PFMA allows for emergency funding to be granted where it could 
not be postponed to a future budget without causing serious prejudice to the public. 
Perhaps “serious prejudice to the public” if a decision is delayed, should also be the 
test in the context of the application of special rules in the context of the state aid 
provisions. 
 
3 3 3 Evaluation of state aid by the Competition Commission  
 
Since this study uses the EU state aid regime as a benchmark, this is the first place 
to look for guidance on what the powers of the Competition Commission should look 
like in regard to state aid matters and when such powers should be exercised. As 
discussed in chapter four, the EU Commission has the power to decide on the 
compatibility of all state aid with the internal market. It exercises that power after it 
receives notification from member states of their intention to grant state aid or to alter 
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existing aid. State aid that is given without notification is illegal. Cremona555 further 
points out that a national monitoring authority of a country related to the EU ought to 
have powers similar to those of the EU Commission in order to successfully enforce 
state aid rules.556    
 
As to what the Competition Commission’s powers should look like and when the 
Commission should exercise such powers, a number of factors should be borne in 
mind.  
- State aid to SOEs will remain pervasive in South African to allow them to achieve 
their public mandates. 
- The allocation of state aid in South Africa will for the most part remain a political 
decision. The focal point of these decisions will continue to be the mandates of 
SOEs and the delivery on their mandates. It is proposed that there should only be 
limited consideration of the impact of the state aid on the competitive process.  
- It is accepted that the Competition Commission will not find it easy to determine 
whether aid, will be used by the SOE for its commercial activities or its governmental 
mandate or both, even if at first sight it might seem that the aid will be used for 
commercial activities. 
- Finally, it may be difficult to establish whether state aid will, on the whole, have a 
negative effect on competition, even if it is clear that it is intended to support 
business activities. 
 
As is argued throughout, the European state aid regime would therefore in several 
respects be inappropriate for the South African context. It would be too ambitious to 
propose the conferral of a general power to determine whether state aid should be 
allowed on South Africa’s Competition Commission, as is done in the EU. 
Realistically, the South African government will not agree to submit itself to such a 
power, where it wants to grant state aid. In a developing country such as South 
Africa, it is at least arguable that there are good reasons for such refusal. 
 
                                                          
555 M Cremona “State Aid Control: Substance and Procedure in the Europe Agreements and the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements (2003) 9(3) European Law Journal 268. 




Nonetheless, this study shows that there cannot be total acceptance of all types of 
state aid, granted under all circumstances and at any time, regardless of the reasons 
for and negative impact on competition they may have. It is proposed that there are 
clearly circumstances where state aid should be scrutinised to determine whether it 
is likely that it will distort competition without sufficiently benefitting the public 
interest. Hence, this study strives to find a compromise position, which 
simultaneously is mindful that government will always grant state aid to SOEs in 
order for them to achieve their mandates but also protects the competitive process to 
some degree.  
 
It is therefore proposed that in the instances where state aid in the manner described 
above has been given, the Competition Commission should be able to determine 
whether the state aid is likely to have a distortive effect on competition. It should 
have the power to make non-binding recommendations that would limit or prevent 
the distortive effects of the state aid. The inquiry powers of the Commission in terms 
of the state aid provisions should not only apply to those SOEs which have private 
competitors, but to all those SOEs which are operated in accordance with business 
principles. The Competition Commission should also be given a broader mandate to 
make proposals on how competition can be expanded to promote efficiency of SOEs 
even in those industries where they currently operate as monopolists. SOEs such as 
SAA and the SABC, but also entities such as Eskom and PRASA, which are some of 
the worst offenders when it comes to state aid, will therefore be subject to scrutiny.  
 
3 3 3 1 How an evaluation should be done  
 
It is not suggested that the Competition Commission should undertake an in-depth 
and time consuming inquiry. Any prolonged inquiry would impact on the already 
limited time and resources which the Commission has to investigate hard-core 
anticompetitive behaviour, such as cartels. It is recommended, though, that the 
Competition Commission should make an assessment based on a basic economic 
analysis of what the impact would be. For purposes of such a basic economic 
analysis the Competition Commission could consider some general information 




is of course the Commission’s prerogative to go beyond these readily available 
factors.  
 
When the Competition Commission does an inquiry, it should determine whether the 
state aid to the SOE has the potential to distort competition in the market. Such a 
determination can be made by taking into account the following basic factors:  
(i) the number of competitors operating within the market;  
(ii) whether there has been any recent entrants into that specific market;  
(iii) whether there are any competitors that went out of business in that market in the 
recent past and if affirmative, whether there are any allegations that such failure had 
anything to do with the operations of the SOE;557  
(iv) whether the SOE has been subjected to investigation by the Commission for any 
anticompetitive behaviour;558  
(v) whether the state aid to the SOE would make any significant contribution to the 
general economy or rather impact negatively by affecting the business operations of 
well-functioning competitors in the market;  
(vi) whether the SOE has been given state aid in the past;  
(vii) any operational losses indicated in the SOE’s financial statements of the 
previous year;559 
(viii) any irregular expenditure and fruitless and wasteful expenditure stated in the 
SOE’s financial statements;560 and  
(ix) whether there were in the past or still are governance and management 
problems within the SOE.561 
 
Furthermore, the Commission could look beyond these factors to other aspects 
which it considers important to make such a determination. If the conclusion is that 
the state aid will have no or a negligible impact on competition, it should mark the 
end of the inquiry.  
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However, if the conclusion is that the negative impact on competition would be 
material, the public interest benefits that will derive from the state aid, must be 
considered. Because of the mandates of SOEs in South Africa562 and the 
rationales563 for having them as active participants of the South African economy, 
there will always be public interest considerations involved when state funding is 
granted to them. This requires that the Commission must take such public interest 
considerations into account during its determination of the potential harm. 
 
This in essence requires that the granter of the state funding should be given the 
opportunity to demonstrate the harm to public interest considerations if the state 
funding is not granted. The Commission will have to balance the competition and 
public interest consequences of the state aid.564 The recommendations made by the 
Competition Commission on how to minimise the harm to the competitive process by 
the state aid should therefore take into account any submissions on public interest 
considerations made by the granter of the state aid. A balanced inquiry by the 
Commission will ensure (i) that competition does not take preference over public 
interest considerations in a country where inequality and poverty are at high levels 
and (ii) that the recommendations made by the Commission are cognizant of those 
public interest considerations.  
 
It was proposed above565 that SOEs which have public service obligations will be 
included in the scope of the proposed state aid legislation, albeit subject to a clear 
possibility for state aid to these SOEs to be approved or more generally absolved 
from the application of the proposed rules, much like the position of providers of 
SGEI. It is proposed that this should be done by applying the public interest test as 
referred to here.  
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The type of considerations that will have to be taken into account in determining 
whether state aid can be justified in the public interest will be broadly similar to those 
that apply to determine whether aid should be allowed in terms of the Altmark criteria 
and the “SGEI package”566 or some of the the exemptions in the GBER. However, 
the proposal currently is not that aid should be ex ante exempted on a similar basis. 
In essence, there first needs to be a general framework on the regulation of state aid 
to SOEs established by the Commission and only then can further attention be given 
to exemptions and leniency in regard to SOEs which have public service obligations 
such as Eskom, PRASA, SABC and SAPO. There are currently few constraints on 
state aid to these entities and a culture of restraint with regard to the granting of aid 
still has to be established. Moreover, other aspects of the proposal will still ensure 
that the state will broadly be able to provide aid in the public interest: 1) Commission 
decisions regarding state aid will not be binding, and 2) it is proposed that aid that is 
given by state departments in terms of their normal budgetary process will not be 
regarded as regulated state aid. 
 
3 3 3 2 Steps that the Commission must take after the inquiry  
 
Every Competition Commission inquiry into state aid must conclude with the 
preparation and submission of a report. This report must be submitted to the relevant 
authority having oversight of the SOE which will receive the aid and to the National 
Treasury. If the Competition Commission concludes that there will not be a material 
impact on competition, its report should give reasons for this conclusion. If the 
Competition Commission concludes that state aid will be substantially anti-
competitive the report should state: 
- to what degree the state aid is likely to impact on competition within the market in 
which the SOE operates; 
- to what extent public interest in the granting of the state aid would outweigh the 
harm to competition; 
- whether the state aid should proceed at all in light of the competitive and public 
interest effects; 
                                                          




- if the anti-competitive consequences of the state aid can be ameliorated by means 
of special measures such as the imposition of conditions.  
In determining the last aspect, conditions for state aid proposed by the granter 
should be taken into account. In the recapitalisation of SAA, Parliament’s Standing 
Committee on Appropriations recommended in the Budget Review 2018 that the 
Minister of Finance should strengthen the conditions attached to the recapitalisation 
of SOEs such as SAA to minimise the risk to the state. The Committee567 
recommended that government should consider making conditions such as the 
following part of future recapitalisations of SOEs: 
(i) no-bailout clauses; 
(ii) stricter monitoring of the SOEs’ contingent liabilities; 
(iii) that the Minister of Finance publish potential circumstances present in SOEs 
which could negate the granting of government guarantees; and 
(iv) personal liability of boards and executives of the SOEs for failure to properly 
managed the funds of SOEs.  
If such conditions are imposed it should be considered whether they are adequate 
and even whether they would not further undermine the impact of state aid. Even 
with such conditions in place SAA will remain technically insolvent for some time into 
the future. This may mean that further state aid will have to be given and SAA will 
continue to be a drag on the South African economy. 
 
As previously mentioned, it is not proposed that the inquiry powers of the 
Commission should entitle the Commission to force the government to protect the 
competitive process, because other interests will often take priority. Proposals in the 
report of the Commission will only constitute recommendations.  
 
3 3 3 3 Response of the Government to a report 
 
Government will not be bound by recommendations of the Competition Commission 
on state aid. In Comair Limited v Minister of Public Enterprises568 the court correctly 
stated that “members of the executive have a wide discretion in selecting means to 
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achieve constitutionally permitted objectives” Considering the crucial mandates of 
SOEs and how these entities are supposed to allow the government to comply with 
its constitutional responsibilities, any proposed regulatory measures to prohibit state 
aid or impose binding conditions, in order to protect the competitive process are 
unlikely to receive political support.  
 
However, outside perhaps of some forms of emergency aid, and cases where state 
has been implemented without notification,569 the final decision to grant state aid 
may be made only once the Competition Commission has reported on it. The granter 
of state aid would therefore have to apply its mind to the Competition Commission 
report but may ultimately reject its findings and recommendations. Procedures 
should therefore be provided to ensure that recommendations of the Commission 
are taken seriously and consequences must ensue if this is not done.570 
 
The recommendations of the Commission will, hopefully guide the government to act 
in ways which will limit any potential distortion of competition when it grants the state 
aid. If the South African government is serious about pursuing the aims in the 
National Development Plan: an economy that is efficient, shows steady and inclusive 
growth, is fair and works for every South African, it will give serious consideration to 
the findings of the Commission on the impact of any state aid.  
 
As the Commission’s recommendation will serve as guidance only, there is no need 
to grant the Competition Tribunal any power to review Commission decisions 
regarding state aid. This position is of course different in the EU where any decision 
on state aid by the EU Commission is binding on the member state concerned and 
both the Commission and the relevant member state can approach the CJEU after a 
decision on state aid has been made: the EU Commission can do so if the member 
state does not comply with its decision or the member state can do so if it feels that 
the EU Commission made a wrong decision in regard to the state aid.  
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The proposed state aid powers of the Competition Commission and its impact on the 
decisions of government to grant state aid accordingly can be explained with 
reference to the most typical and arguable the most dangerous form of state aid that 
is granted in South Africa. When the government decides to issue a guarantee to an 
SOE which allows the SOEs to borrow from lenders, the Competition Commission 
will be able to look into the effect on the competitive process. In Comair Limited v 
Minister of Public Enterprises, Comair argued that they were not given an 
opportunity to make representations to the government prior to the taking of the 
guarantee decision even though the guarantee “would have a prejudicial effect on 
Comair and the domestic air transport industry.” Furthermore, Comair contended that 
the granting of the guarantee in that way was in breach of Comair's legitimate 
expectations. Comair, amongst other relief sought, wanted the court to review and 
set aside the guarantee. Comair is the first privately-owned competitor but will 
certainly not be the last to put forward the contention that the granting of a 
governmental guarantee harms competition, after it has been given to a rival SOE. 
For as long as competitors of SOEs feel that governmental guarantees impinge on 
the competitive process, the likelihood of seeing similar future cases before the 
courts is high. One way to hear the competitors of SOEs in regard to governmental 
guarantees, is to give the Competition Commission, which is the body responsible to 
ensure free and fair competition, the power to report and make recommendations on 
state aid and to force government at least to pay attention to these reports and 
recommendations. The state aid provisions do not grant a right to make 
representations directly to the authority that decides whether state aid should be 
granted but it will mean that the Commission will receive such representations, will 
have to make recommendations to the authority and the authority will have to apply 
its mind to the recommendations.  
 
3 3 4 Market Inquiry powers can supplement the state aid regime 
 
It should also be borne in mind that mechanisms outside of state aid rules may be 
used to supplement the proposed state aid regime. In particular, the newly revamped 




inquiries into the impact of state aid on the general state of competition in those 
markets in which SOEs operate.571 A market inquiry is defined as “a formal inquiry in 
respect of the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and 
structure of a market for particular goods or services, without necessarily referring to 
the conduct or activities of any particular named firm”.572 Of importance for this study 
is that the Commission will be allowed to do market inquiries into the structure of a 
market, which may include any past or current advantage of a firm that is not due the 
firm’s own commercial efforts or investments but due to state support. It is clear that 
the powers which the Competition Commission will have in regard to market 
inquiries, are wide enough to encompass an inquiry into the effect of state funding of 
SOEs which are firms and those that are operated in according to normal business 
principles.  
 
The Commission will thus be able to initiate and conduct a market inquiry as set out 
in section 43B of the Competition Act. This section, inter alia, requires the 
Commission to publish a notice in the government Gazette twenty days before the 
commencement of an inquiry which sets out the terms of reference of the inquiry and 
invites members of the public to provide information to the inquiry. Members of the 
public and the competitors of SOEs would therefore be able to make submissions to 
the Commission. 
 
Section 43C requires the Commission to publish a report of the inquiry in the 
government Gazette and submit it to the Minister of Trade and Industry with or 
without recommendations.573 The Commission has a duty to remedy adverse effects 
on competition if it is found in the inquiry that there is indeed an adverse effect on 
competition.574 In terms of the new provisions an adverse effect on competition is 
established if “any feature, or combination of features, of a market for goods or 
services impedes, restricts or distorts competition in that market.”575 The 
Commission will then be able to make non-binding recommendations to a Minister or 
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binding recommendations to any person who apparently may include any 
government officials or Ministers to address the adverse effect on competition.576 
The only limitation will be that “[a]ny action in terms of subsection (1) must be 
reasonable and practicable, taking into account” certain relevant factors listed in the 
Act.577 These provisions will allow the Commission to take firmer action than in terms 
of the proposed state aid regime, if that is required.  
 
4 Concluding Remarks  
 
South Africa currently finds itself in a precarious position. Not only does it have to 
remain economically stable, but it also has to eradicate the inequality and poverty 
caused by decades of racial discrimination laws. As a result, several markets within 
its relatively “small economy” are dominated by large SOEs which conduct 
commercial activities but also have to meet “developmental and national needs”. It is 
therefore understandable that the South African government wants to hold on to and 
continue to support SOEs which will assist it in reaching its developmental goals. 
There is thus no doubt that these entities will be around for as long as they are 
needed to assist with the enormous socio-economic challenges faced by South 
Africans. This became clear when President Cyril Ramaphosa stated in his first State 
of the Nation Address that “[we] will intervene decisively to stabilise and revitalise 
state owned enterprises.”578  
However, any view by the government that the granting of state aid to SOEs under 
all circumstances, regardless of the failures and worrisome conditions579 within the 
SOEs, will ensure that the government reaches its developmental goals and create 
an economy which will benefit all South Africans, is not convincing. The South 
African government’s persistent financial assistance to SOEs threatens not only free 
and fair competition, but the economy as a whole. It is not disputed that the demise 
of an SOE would lead to major economic disruption for South Africa, but is it always 
enough to justify perpetual state aid to SOEs by saying that their failure would be 
                                                          
576 Section 43C(3) read with 43D and 43E(1). 
577 Section 43D(4). 
578 State of the Nation Address 2018 (accessible at http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/state-of-the-nation-
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“disastrous”?580 At present it seems as if the South African government tends to 
concentrate more on providing SOEs with state aid than on implementing strategies 
which will allow SOEs to become viable entities. Such an approach cannot work in 
the long term and is not beneficial to the economy or South Africans. Hence, the 
public interest goals of SOEs should not necessarily exclude South Africa from 
having rules in place to supervise state funding of SOEs. If the government 
continues to provide state aid to SOEs, regardless of the circumstances, it should 
seriously consider the proposed position in this chapter which sets out clear 
delineated boundaries for state funding. The regulation of state aid to SOEs could 
thus be the way forward as it would not only protect the competitive process, which 
in itself will be good for the economy, but it may also improve financial management 
and governance within these entities and contribute to the promotion of the public 
interest mandates of these SOEs.  
President Ramaphosa undertook in his first inaugural State of the Nation Address in 
February 2018581 to review the funding model of SOEs after an extensive process of 
consultation with all stakeholders. The President provided no specific details as to 
how the funding of SOEs might change. Consequently, it remains to be seen how 
the funding model of SOEs, which at the moment is clearly creating significant 
pressure on the public purse, will be addressed.  
It will not be easy to convince policy makers that the discretion of the government to 
give state aid to SOEs should be constrained as proposed in this chapter. It is, 
however, clear from the whole analysis in this chapter that there is a need in South 
Africa to address the harm that is caused to the competitive process (and by 
extension the economy) by state aid to SOEs. It is also apparent that there are 
regulatory models that can accommodate the need for supervision of state aid 
without restricting the ability to utilise SOEs to achieve developmental mandates. 
 END OF CHAPTER                                        
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
1 Conclusion 
The decision to embark on this study was prompted by the unlimited state funding to 
SOEs, even while these enterprises are governed and managed in ways which are 
below the minimum standard of good governance and management required by 
different legislation. The goals of this study as stated in chapter one is to propose a 
legal framework that would contribute substantially to, first achieving proper 
regulation of state funding to SOEs and secondly, creating a level playing field 
between SOEs and their competitors. This study has shown that these goals can be 
promoted if (i) certain forms of state aid granted to SOEs are notified and assessed 
by the South African competition authorities and (ii) that the realization of state aid 
regulation for South Africa is within reach if careful consideration is given to the 
domestic reasons and circumstances for state aid to SOEs. In light of the findings in 
chapter 5 a number of important concluding remarks are made.  
First, with SOEs being such prominent role players in the South African economy, 
the government does not have to be concerned that the proposed position in this 
study will negatively impact on their continuous importance and existence to help 
shape South Africa to the benefit of all South Africans. The positive contribution by 
many SOEs is clearly visible in South Africa and this contribution has been 
acknowledged throughout the study. SOEs are major employers, they develop 
infrastructure and supply affordable products and services such as electricity, clean 
water and sanitation services to many poor South Africans who would not be able to 
acquire them through normal market mechanisms. This study therefore recognises 
throughout, the need for SOEs to be part of the South African economy to help the 
government on these fronts. Furthermore, chapter two of this study has shown that it 
is not unique to South Africa to have SOEs, which are financed by the state, as 
significant economic players. Previously, SOEs were crucial to the economies of 
many developed countries: they were used as tools for economic development after 
a major economic downturn following harmful historical events such as wars.1 In the 
USA state ownership of certain industries was a key tool of the reconstruction 
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programmes to bring that economy out of the Great Depression, while in Europe the 
devastation caused by the two World Wars saw countries use state-ownership to 
rebuild their economies.2 The governments of countries such as Britain and France 
were big proponents of state ownership of key industries after World War II.3 In 
Britain, the country which was once the governing power in most of Africa, including 
South Africa, many industries were taken into government ownership in the 1950s.4 
The British government took ownership of industries such as coal, railways, road 
transport, electricity, airlines, telecommunications and iron and steel.5 State 
ownership of key industries in France after World War II was so significant that its 
nationalisation plan was described as “the broadest set of nationalization projects 
ever undertaken at one stroke in a free market economy.”6 In recent times though, 
state ownership of enterprises in developed countries has become the exception 
rather than the norm. Britain, in particular, saw major privatization in the 1980s and 
state ownership only returned to a limited extent during the dark days of the 2008 
financial crisis.7 Like South Africa today, developed countries then also considered 
state ownership as a problem-solving tool. SOEs will therefore remain part of the 
South African government’s problem-solving tools but it is envisaged that the 
proposed position in this study will strengthened the regulatory framework regarding 
their funding not only for the benefit of the competitive process but the economy as a 
whole    
 
Second, this study has shown that some level of state aid to South Africa’s SOEs 
which have private competitors need to be allowed because these enterprises have 
                                                          
2 See E Voszka “Nationalization or Privatization? The Fragmentation of the Mainstream” (2017) 88(1) Annals 
of Public and Cooperative Economics 91 93. 
3 See chapter two for a detailed discussion on state ownership of key industries in Britain, Germany and France. 
See also WA Robson “Nationalised Industries in Britain and France” (1950) 44(2) The American Political 
Science Review 299 299-322. 
4 R Milward “Industrial organisation and economic factors in nationalisation” in R Milward & J Singleton (eds) 
The Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain, 1920-1950 (2002) 3 3.  
5 R Milward “Industrial organisation and economic factors in nationalisation” in R Milward & J Singleton (eds) 
The Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain, 1920-1950 (2002) 3 3.  
6 J-F Revel “The quiet revolution” (1981) 3 McKinsey Quarterly 48 50. 
7 In the United States, Britain and Germany the governments provided rescue measures to some of its major 
financial institutions to save them from failure. As a consequence some of these institutions were nationalised 
such as the Royal Bank of Scotland in Britain. See A Brummer “Where the credit crash came from” 2008 
Management Today 34  34-37 for an analysis on the development of the 2008 financial credit crisis and how 




crucial governmental mandates. It is therefore accepted that SOEs which have a 
general public interest role should, to some extent, be able to rely on the financial 
backing of the state. If these enterprises do not receive state aid, they might be at a 
competitive disadvantaged because they, unlike their private competitors, also have 
to incur the cost of achieving their governmental mandate. Hence, competition 
concerns should not be decisive when state aid is granted via the budgetary 
processes to help SOEs to achieve their mandates. 
 
Third, even while it is acknowledged that some level of state aid need to be allowed 
to SOEs which have private competitors, this study has shown that South African 
policy makers can no longer ignore that state aid may significantly undermine free 
and fair competition.8 This became particularly clear in one industry in which the 
South African government operates at least two SOEs.  As indicated in chapter 5, in 
the airline industry, in which the government operates SAA and SA Express, some 
privately owned competitors failed in the past and in one case9 the state supported 
beleaguered national airline was held responsible for the failure.  This has shown 
that it is not unreasonable to expect that every role player, state-owned and privately 
owned, should be expected to play its part to reach the goals of free and fair 
competition. 
 
Fourth, although competition law, as Fox correctly states, was meant to regulate the 
behaviour of private enterprises only,10 this study has shown that there is room in 
South Africa to regulate state aid to SOEs as part of competition law. This is 
especially true in light of both the findings in chapter 5 and the recent words of the 
Commissioner of the Competition Commission, Thembinkosi Bonakele: “There 
should be a clear competition policy on state-owned enterprises which addresses, 
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among other things, transparency in pricing, cross-subsidisation and bailouts.”11 
There can be no doubt that state aid in certain circumstances is a “state-initiated 
restraint” on competition which may weigh heavily on competition. It shields poorly 
governed and mismanaged SOEs against bankruptcy, disadvantages more efficient 
competitors of SOEs which could contribute significantly to the economy and 
prevents new potentially efficient competitors from entering markets in which SOEs 
operate. In this way it undermines the objectives of competition legislation. Hence 
this study is in full agreement with Lowe and Held where the authors state: “Whilst 
governments and the public sector have a crucial and legitimate role to play in many 
spheres of economic activity, competitive markets ensure that the desired range and 
quantity of goods and services which respond best to consumers' needs are 
produced at the lowest possible cost to society”.12 Currently South Africa’s 
competition legislation has broadly the same scope as most other competition laws 
outside of Europe. It does not deal directly with state aid to SOEs.  However, an 
extension of the Competition Act under influence of EU state aid rules is proposed in 
order to address the anti-competitive effects of state aid that is not properly 
constrained by the law. 
 
Fifth, this study has shown that continuous uncontrolled state aid could potentially 
prevent SOEs from being or becoming responsible and efficient market players as 
they know that they can constantly rely on the financial muscle of the state. State aid 
may also contribute to poor governance and financial mismanagement, which the 
study has shown clearly is a huge problem in the majority of SOEs. Poor governance 
and financial management creates a vicious cycle which culminates in financial 
support to SOEs.  Chapter 5 has shown that the most harmful types of state aid in 
South Africa are guarantees and recapitalizations. These types of state aid are often 
used to keep SOEs afloat. They are particularly problematic as they do not only 
harm competition but may also lead to a failure in proper governance as those in 
charge know that these enterprises will always have the financial backing of the 
                                                          
11https://www.fin24.com/Economy/competition-policy-on-soes-must-be-clear-commissioner-20170831 
(accessed on 2 April 2019). 
12 P Lowe & A Held “Modernisation and Beyond: The Role of Competition Policy in Driving Economic 




state. They represent wasting of government resources as they cannot be clearly 
tied to the governmental mandates of these enterprises. Furthermore, they weigh 
heavily on the fiscus as they frequently involve large sums that are committed 
outside of the ordinary budgeting processes.13  It is envisaged that state aid control 
rules in South Africa will lead to improved governance and financial management for 
both government and its SOEs. In this sense the aim is that state aid rules will help 
SOEs to become more efficient and their management more responsible in their 
behaviour. 
 
Sixth, this study has shown that even with all the financial support that they get, 
SOEs on many occasions still do not effectively deliver on their mandates. The 
biggest culprits regularly receive state aid such as Eskom and SAPO. Post- 
Apartheid Eskom is supposed to supply and distribute fairly priced electricity to 
power the economy and make the lives of all South Africans more comfortable. 
Nevertheless, the “loadshedding” crisis in recent years has shown the lack of 
sufficient long-term planning by Eskom. SAPO’s mandate is to provide postal 
services efficiently to all South Africans but because of reliability problems, those 
who can afford it, prefer to use the services of private providers such as DHL. South 
Africans who cannot afford the services of private postal service providers simply 
have to endure the services delivered by SAPO.14 Furthermore, the government 
envisages SAA to be the flagship national carrier for South Africa that should 
connect Africa to South Africa and the world. Nevertheless, over the years SAA has 
become such a burden on the fiscus,15 that the government took the unprecedented 
step in December 2014 to transfer16 the airline from the oversight of the Department 
                                                          
13 See for example See column  9 of the Adjustment Appropriation Bill  of 2018 on the “specific  and exclusive” 
appropriation  that was made to SA Express in 2018 and column 7 of the Adjustment Appropriation Bill of 2017 
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20170317). 
16 Such a transfer is made possible by section 97 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 
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of Public Enterprises to the National Treasury. These are clear indications that 
inefficient SOEs that are not subject to the discipline of competition when it comes to 
their market activities are at present not effective in promoting their governmental 
mandates. The cost of many SOEs does not justify the limited public interest benefits 
that derive from their activities. It is therefore suggested that properly formulated 
state aid rules could assist in ensuring that SOEs efficiently promote their 
governmental mandates. 
 
Seventh, the discussion in chapter 5 has shown that it is those SOEs which are 
classified as “national government business enterprises” such as SAA and SA 
Express and those which are operated in accordance with normal business 
principles such as PRASA and SAPO, which are weighing down the economy. They 
receive persistent state aid because of various factors such as non-performance, 
operational losses, corruption and fraud and financial maladministration. Hence, 
state aid to these SOEs should come within the ambit of the proposed regulatory 
measures.  
 
Eight, despite this study identifying serious problems within SOEs, including financial 
mismanagement, poor governance and high levels of corruption, it is recognised that 
privatisation is often not the best response. Like all other policy instruments, 
privatisation17 has it successes and failures. Koch18 states that the “knee-jerk 
reaction for paralysis in state-owned enterprises is to call for privatisation” since 
privatisation has often been seen as “a panacea for all economic ills” of SOEs. It is 
understandable that the first calls may always be for the privatisation of dysfunctional 
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SOEs19 but the following negative consequences may outweigh the benefits. First, 
privatisation is incompatible with the government mandates of SOEs. Privatisation 
may hamper the government’s ambition to achieve an equal and just society for all 
South Africans. Secondly, SOEs are major employers in key industries in South 
Africa and privatisation may lead to retrenchment and further worsening of South 
Africa’s horrific unemployment statistics.20 Lastly, privatisation without any 
government regulation may not be optimal for consumers or the competitive process. 
An SOE which becomes a privately owned dominant enterprise is likely to abuse its 
dominance and increase prices. Makando21 states  that with privatisation comes 
deregulation and that privatisation without any “regulatory reform” may lead to just 
the opposite of public benefit as the absence of any regulatory reforms may lead to 
private monopolies of the privatised SOEs. In regard to ISCOR, for example, the 
Competition Tribunal noted that its privatisation led to a “privately owned and 
unregulated monopoly”.22 After privatisation, Sasol also remained a giant in the 
South African chemical sector and as recently as in 2014 (long after its privatisation 
by the Apartheid government) its dominance was still a challenge within that sector. 
In Competition Commission of South Africa v Sasol Chemical Industries Limited23 an 
expert witness for the Competition Commission stated that the source of Sasol’s 
market power was not innovation but the benefits it enjoyed while being an SOE. 
These South African privatisations have certainly not been successful in creating 
greater competition in most of the markets in which they operate.  That privatisation 
is not the optimum solution for all the problems within SOEs is particularly important 
in regard to those SOEs which provide essential services and products to vulnerable 
South Africans. It may lead to price increases for services and products currently 
delivered by SOEs, which will put them further beyond the reach of those South 
Africans. Consequently this study comes to a conclusion that privatisation should not 
be considered as the ultimate and only viable option for non-performing and 
                                                          
19 The Democratic Alliance (DA), the main opposition party in South Africa, is one of those parties which call 
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Fundamentals (2007) 111 114.  
22 In this regard see the statement by the Competition Tribunal of South Africa  in Harmony Gold Mining 
Company Ltd and another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and another [2007] 1 CPLR 37 (CT)  73. 




dysfunctional SOEs. It is rather proposed that more should be done to ensure that 
SOEs are governed and operated effectively and a state aid control regime may 
assist in this aim. 
  
Ninth, the implementation of state aid control rules, which are guided by the EU state 
aid rules, can effectively supplement other policies and legislation in South Africa 
which is intended to encourage effective and efficient management of the finances of 
SOEs. In particular, state aid rules will support the PFMA, the Companies Act, SOE 
specific enabling legislation and other related legislative instruments. The PFMA24 is 
a strong legislative instrument which attempts to regulate government spending of 
public money. However, the identification of financial mismanagement within a 
number of SOEs proves that some of them show scant regard for the PFMA. The 
many court cases on financial mismanagement within SOEs, which were discussed 
in chapter 5, and the various Public Protector25 reports referred to in that chapter 
serve as illustration that the PFMA as a regulatory measure to ensure efficient and 
effective financial management of SOEs is not as effective as it should be 
considering the powerful provisions of the Act. Hence, a state aid regime could 
supplement the PFMA in the control of the finances of SOEs.  
 
Tenth, it is proposed in Chapter 5 that the Competition Commission should be given 
the power to scrutinise and make recommendations regarding state aid to SOEs, in 
order to ameliorate the competitive impact of that state aid. This will increase the 
transparency around state aid decisions. This transparency and the proposed right of 
competitors to approach the Competition Commission to scrutinise the impact of 
state aid if not notified by the government, may allay some of the fears of 
competitors and potential competitors.26 The involvement of the competition 
authorities in the evaluation of certain state aid to SOEs therefore may (i) encourage 
new entrants into markets and (ii) promote investment by existing competitors in 
                                                          
24 See the discussion in para 3.3.1 chapter 5. 
25 See the reference to the many Public Protector Reports on financial irregularities, even criminal conduct  and 
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para 1.2.2 of chapter 5 respectively. 




markets where SOEs operate. Through the involvement of the competition 
authorities in the granting of certain state aid, the government would also give effect 
to the “constitutional promise of transparency” referred to by Justice Sutherland in 
South African Airways SOC v BDFM Publishers (Pty) Ltd.27 It would be a historical 
day if the South African competition authorities become the first outside the EU to be 
consulted when state aid to SOEs, is considered. Not only will the competition 
authorities take charge of the fight against private restraints on competition but it will 
also become involved in governmental decisions which could possibly end up as 
public restraints on competition.  
 
Eleventh, this study shows that the absence of supranational status as in the EU is 
an obstacle which can be overcome with a carefully drafted regulatory instrument 
which takes into account the rationales for the existence of SOEs in South Africa. 
The discussion in chapter 5 has shown that it might be difficult but not completely 
impossible to implement state aid rules within a single state such as South Africa. It 
is acknowledged that a single country such as South Africa does not need a state aid 
control regime for the same reasons than the EU.28 The reasons for proposing a 
state aid control regime for South Africa are very different from those listed by the 
founders of what would later become the EU in the Spaak Report,29 for implementing 
a strict state aid control regime. Nevertheless, the EU state aid rules can still serve 
as guidance generally on how to control state aid in South Africa. 
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the current position in regard to state aid to SOEs 
cannot continue perpetually. Action needs to be taken. As much as the admirable 
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Rules 3 ed (2009) 9; and JJP Lopez The Concept of State Aid under EU Law: From internal market to 




roles of SOEs in South Africa have been acknowledge throughout this study, the 
reality is that certain state aid to commercialised SOEs and those operated in 
accordance with ordinary business principles, need to be scrutinised for the benefit 
of all South Africans and the economy as a whole and not only for the benefit of 
private competitors. At this stage in South Africa, it might be too ambitious to believe 
that the government would consider a legally binding state aid control regime. The 
South African government believes that SOEs are central to its attempts to develop 
the economy and alleviate poverty for the majority of South Africans. Moreover, 
Andreas Bartosch30 is correct when he states that “not many governments may be 
interested in the establishment of an independent control body [or in this case control 
policy] telling them how to spend their budgets.” Even so, the present situation in 
South Africa, which sees the financial mismanagement and poor governance of 
many SOEs, should be South Africa’s catalyst to move from regular state financial 
intervention in regard to SOEs to exceptional state financial intervention. Not only will 
it provide protection to competitors of SOEs but it will also contribute to the broader 
economy because the government might be able to rely on the revenues of SOEs 
instead of SOEs relying on state financial intervention all the time.  
 
The draft set of regulations below are considered as a possible legislative solution to 
the threat posed by unlimited state aid, to free and fair competition, the wider 
economy and the developmental goals of the government.  
 
2 DRAFT ACT TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR THE INPLEMENTATION OF A 
STATE AID CONTROL REGIME IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS 
PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. Definitions 
                                                          
30 A. Bartosch “Ten Years European State Aid Quarterly: A Little Jubilee and Ten Valid Reasons to Continue” 
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1. Definitions  
 In this Act- 
“advisory opinion” means the non-binding recommendations issued by the 
Commission that state aid should not be given as it does not meet the requirements 
of section 6 and 9; 
“beneficiary” means the enterprise which will or has received state aid and it may 
also refer to a private enterprise; 
“civil court” has the meaning specified in section 1 of the Competition Act; 
“constitutional institutions” means the public entities listed in Schedule 1 of the 
PFMA; 
“Commission” means the Competition Commission of South Africa as described in 
the Competition Act 89 of 1998; 
“Competition Act” means the Competition Act 89 of 1998; 
“de minimis state aid” means state aid which is deemed to be of such a negligible 
value that it is not expected to have any impact on competition within a market;  
“emergency state aid”  means state aid which is granted in terms of section 16 of 
the PFMA;  
“fruitless and wasteful expenditure” has the meaning specified in section 1 of the 
PFMA; 
“government guarantee” is an assurance made by the national government, a 
provincial or local government to a lender that a financial obligation of an SOE will be 
honoured if and when the SOEs are unable to pay if there is compliance with section 
218 of the Constitution of South Africa of 1996 and section 66 of the PFMA;31 
                                                          
31 The first part of this definition has been taken from the definition by the National Treasury in the 2019 Budget 





“interested party” means any person, whose interests might be affected by the 
granting of state aid and may include beneficiaries of state aid and competitors of the 
beneficiaries of state aid or members of the public;  
“irregular expenditure” has the meaning specified in section 1 of the PFMA; 
‘‘market inquiry’’ has the meaning specified in section 43A of the Competition Act 
as amended by the Competition Amendment Bill of 2018, which is a formal inquiry in 
respect of the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and 
structure of a market for particular goods or services, without necessarily referring to 
the conduct or activities of any particular named firm; 
“national department” has the meaning specified in section 1 of the PFMA; 
“National Revenue Fund” has the meaning specified by section 213 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; 
“National Treasury” means the National Treasury as described in section 5 of the 
PFMA; 
“provincial department” has the meaning specified in section 1 of the PFMA; 
“PFMA” means the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999; 
“Provincial Revenue Fund” has the meaning specified by section 226 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996;  
“recapitalisation” is the injection of funds into a company or entity to aid liquidity, 
either as a loan which is not made in the ordinary course of business or in return for 
equity;32   
 “state aid” means any aid granted to a state-owned enterprise by a state aid 
grantor that falls within section 3 and excludes any aid given in terms of section 6; 
“state aid grantor” means the national, provincial or local government who plans to 
or grants aid or has granted aid; 
                                                          
32 This definition is specified by the National Treasury in the 2019 Budget Review 175 and some addition was 




“state-owned development financial institutions” means a financial intermediary 
that aims to improve social welfare, by lending to priority sectors or target clientele 
while benefiting from some level of concessionary resources received from the state 
and/or donors;33 
“state-owned enterprise” means any public entity listed as a national government 
business enterprise or a provincial government enterprise in Schedule 2 and 3 of the 
PFMA and those which provide goods and services in accordance with ordinary 
business principles with exclusion of the constitutional institutions listed in Schedule 
1 of the PFMA and any board, commission, corporation, fund or other entities which 
are not a national or provincial government business enterprise or do not provide 
goods and services in accordance with ordinary business principles; 
“transfers and subsidies” has the meaning specified in the annual Appropriation 
Acts.34 
2. Purpose of this Act 
The purpose of this Act is: 
(a) to provide for a state aid regulatory regime to regulate the state funding of state-
owned enterprises, as defined in section 1, which have the potential to prevent or 
lessen competition;  
(b) to create a level playing field between state-owned enterprises and their 
competitors; and 
(c) to promote the efficient operation of state-owned enterprises. 
 
PART 2: STATE AID TO BE NOTIFIED AND EXEMPTIONS 
3. Aid which shall be notified to the Commission  
                                                          
33 For this definition, see J Yaron “State-Owned Development Finance Institutions (SDFI): The Political 
Economy and Performance Assessment” (2006) 30(1) Savings and Development 39 39. 
34 For instance, in the Appropriation Bill of 2019 “transfers and subsidies” are defined as “any payment made by 
a department classified as, or deemed to be, a transfer or subsidy payment in terms of the instructions issued in 
the Guidelines for Implementing the Economic Reporting Format (September 2009), in terms of section 76 of 




 (1) The following forms of aid will be covered by this Act as state aid- 
(a) government guarantees which enables state-owned enterprises to access 
funding that would otherwise be unavailable or to borrow at a lower cost;  
(b) recapitalisation of state-owned enterprises from the National Revenue Fund or a 
Provincial Revenue Fund; 
(c) any form of tax advantage or exemption which is exclusively granted to state-
owned enterprises and no other entities. 
4. Aid which shall be exempted from notification   
The following forms of aid will be exempted from the application of this Act and will 
not be regarded as state aid: 
(a) transfers and subsidies, that are not recapitalisation, allocated from the annual 
budget of a national or provincial department to state-owned enterprises over which 
it has oversight and which:- 
(i) enable those entities to execute their assigned mandates;   
(ii) are granted for public interest reasons as provided in section 9(4); and 
(iii) if not granted could obstruct the performance of the particular mandate assigned 
to a state-owned enterprise.35 
(b) transfers and subsidies allocated from the annual budget of a national or 
provincial department to private enterprises which assist the government to achieve 
specified public interest objectives which are expressly mentioned in the annual 
budget of the national or provincial department; 
(c) loans given to state-owned enterprises on normal business terms by state-owned 
development financial institutions that are in the business of providing credit or 
investment including the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa, the Industrial 
                                                          
35 In this regard reference can be made to the annual appropriations made to an SOE such as PRASA for rail 
maintenance operations, signalling and refurbishment of coaches. If this aid is not granted, PRASA will be 




Development Corporation of South Africa and the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa;  
(d) aid in favour of research,36 development and innovation37 within individual sectors 
of the economy which is transferred from a national or provincial department’s 
annual budget to state-owned enterprises  over which they have oversight or to 
private enterprises; 
(e) aid to remedy a serious disturbance or potential disturbance in the economy of 
South Africa, which will preserve financial stability; and 
(f) de minimis state aid. 
PART 3: PROCEDURE 
5. Notification of state aid to the Commission 
(1) Plans by a state aid grantor to grant state aid shall be notified to the Commission 
and the Commission shall confirm receipt of the notification, in formats prescribed by 
the Commission in regulation. 
(2) Instead of the state aid grantor, the notification in subsection 1 may be given 
either by the National or Provincial Treasury or by the national or provincial 
department which has oversight of the beneficiary of the state aid. 
(3) In the notification the state aid grantor shall provide all the required information 
regarding the state aid to enable the Commission to assess the impact of the state 
aid on competition in a relevant market. 
(4) The state aid grantor shall not make a final decision to grant state aid until the 
Commission has delivered the reasons for its decision to the state aid grantor as 
provided for in section 9 or the time for evaluation of the state aid as provided in 
section 7 has elapsed, whichever is first.  
                                                          
36 Examples include the state aid granted to private enterprises in terms of the government’s “Recycling 
Enterprise Support Programme” for research and implementation of waste management projects. 
37 Examples include the state aid granted to private enterprises in terms of the government’s “Support 




(5) The state aid grantor must take an advisory opinion and recommendations into 
account in making a final decision to grant state aid as set out in subsection 4. 
Where the state aid grantor grants state aid despite an advisory opinion in terms of 
section 9 not to do so or without complying with recommendations made in terms of 
section 9 it shall provide the Commission with reasons for doing so.   
(6) If the state aid grantor does not provide reasons as provided for in subsection 5 
or if those reasons indicate that the state aid grantor has not given proper 
consideration to an advisory opinion or recommendations, the Commission will issue 
a declaration, which will be published on its website and sent to the state aid grantor, 
that despite an advisory opinion or recommendations proper procedures were not 
followed during the implementation of the state aid. The Commission’s declaration 
can be used by any interested party:  
(a) who can prove harm or damage as a result of the implementation of the state aid 
to challenge the state aid in a civil court;38 or  
(b) to apply for a review of the decision to give state aid without considering the 
recommendations of the Commission.  
(7) The procedure in subsections 1 to 5 shall be followed even when the state aid is 
considered to be emergency state aid but the Commission should fast-track the 
evaluation and the issuing of its reasons as provided for in section 9(2) or the 
Commission should authorise implementation of the emergency state aid before 
completion of the evaluation and issuing of its recommendations. 
6. Basic assessment of notified state aid 
(1) The Commission must assess whether the state aid will substantially prevent or 
lessen competition in the relevant market or markets upon receipt of the notification 
in section 5 (1).  
                                                          
38 The proposed position draws from the provisions of the Competition Act which allows any person who has 
suffered loss or damage from anti-competitive behaviour to commence action for damages in a civil court under 
section 65(6) if the Commission did not issue a consent order, confirmed by the Competition Tribunal,  in terms 
of section 49D of the Act. The proposed position would be much like the position that transpired when SAA and 
the Minister of Public Enterprises were successfully sued for damages by Comair after it suffered harm as a 




(2) The Commission shall, in determining whether competition is prevented or 
lessened, inter alia, take the following into account- 
(a) the number of competitors operating in the relevant market;  
(b) recent entrants into the relevant  market;  
(c) competitors that went out of business in the relevant  market in the recent past; 
(d) any past advisory opinions in terms of this Act or findings of contraventions of the 
Competition Act  concerning the activities of the beneficiary of the state aid;  
(e) the significance of the state aid to the beneficiary  on the one hand and its 
potential impact on the business operations of well-functioning competitors in the 
relevant market on the other hand;  
(f) previous state aid to the beneficiary;  
(g) any operational losses suffered by the beneficiary during its previous financial 
year as shown by its financial statements; 
(h) irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditures identified by the Auditor-General of 
South Africa  in the beneficiary  that continue to affect the activities of the 
beneficiary; and  
(i) governance and management concerns within the beneficiary of the state aid that 
continue to affect the activities of the beneficiary. 
7. Time limit for the assessment of notified state aid 
(1) The Commission shall have 40 business days39 from the receipt of the notification 
in section 5 (1) to assess the state aid and issue its recommendations. 
                                                          
39 In regard to the proposed time periods applicable to the assessment of state aid matters in South Africa, 
guidance was sought from the time periods applicable in EU state aid law, the time periods which will apply to 
the Competition and Market Authority (CMA) in Britain after its exit from the EU in terms of the Brexit State 
Aid Regulations and the time periods applicable to the Commission in South Africa, particularly in regard to 
mergers. The EU Commission has two months for a preliminary investigation after a notification of state aid, the 
CMA in Britain will have 40 working days to make a decision on the next step after receiving a notification of 
state aid and in South Africa the Competition Act allows the Commission 20 business days for a decision 




(2) The Commission may extend the period in subsection 1 by not more than 20 
business days by informing the state aid grantor before the lapse of the time period 
provided in subsection 1 that it will extend the period within which it has to complete 
the assessment of the state aid and the issuing of its recommendations. 
(3) Failure by the Commission to conclude its assessment of the state aid within the 
period in subsection 1 or extended period in subsection 2 shall allow the state aid 
grantor to implement the state aid.40         
8. Submissions by interested parties and the state aid grantor   
(1) During the period provided for in section 7 (1), interested parties shall be allowed 
to make representations on and objections to the state aid, to the Commission.  
(2) The Commission must send to the state aid grantor any representations and 
objections it receives from interested parties, with the exception of confidential 
information and the identity of the interested party if so requested. 
(3) The state aid grantor shall be given an opportunity to respond to any objections 
against the state aid by submitting reasons for the granting of the state aid within two 
weeks of receiving the representations from the Commission. 
(4) When making the assessment provided for in section 6, the Commission shall 
take into account all representations and objections raised against the state aid by 
interested parties as well as the reasons for the granting of the state aid which were 
submitted by the aid grantor.  
9. Decision and recommendations 
(1) After completion of the assessment provided for in section 6, the Commission will 
make a decision that- 
(a) the notified state aid will significantly prevent or lessen competition in the relevant 
market or markets as provided for in section 6 and the reasons for the state aid 
which were submitted by the state aid grantor or public interest as set out in section 
                                                          
40 All proposed time periods for state aid matters are aligned with those in the Competition Act that have been 




9(4) do not outweigh it or no reasons for the state aid were given by the state aid 
grantor; 
(b) the notified state aid will significantly prevent or lessen competition in the relevant 
market as provided for in section 6 but the reasons for the state aid which were 
submitted by the state aid grantor under section 8(3) and/or public interest as set out 
in section 9(4) outweighs it; or 
(c) the state aid will not significantly prevent or lessen competition in the relevant 
market as provided for in section 6. 
(2) The Commission shall issue reasons for its decision: 
(a) If the Commission makes a decision in accordance with subsection 1 (a), its 
reasons shall include an advisory opinion that the state aid should not be granted, 
and if relevant further show how the prevention or lessening of competition can be 
minimised. 
(b) If the Commission makes a decision in accordance with subsection 1 (b) its 
reasons shall include its recommendation that the state aid may be granted and if 
relevant further shows how prevention or lessening of competition can be minimised 
without undermining the reasons for the state aid given by the state aid grantor. 
(c) If the Commission makes a decision in accordance with subsection 1(c) its 
reasons shall include a recommendation that the state aid may proceed.  
(3) The reasons as required by subsection 2 shall be delivered to the state aid 
grantor, each interested party who made submissions on the state aid as provided in 
section 8, the beneficiary of the state aid and shall also be published on the website 
of the Commission. 
(4) If the Commission makes a decision in accordance with subsection 1 (b), in 
addition to taking into account the reasons submitted by the state aid grantor, the 
Commission must also take into account the effect of the state aid on41-  
                                                          
41 The listed public interest grounds draw from the purpose clause of the Competition Act and the public interest 
grounds in section 12A(3) of the Act which needs to be considered by the competition authorities when 




(a) the social and economic welfare of South Africans including employment; 
(b) the ability of the beneficiaries to deliver their mandates effectively, which inter alia 
include the provision of water, sanitation, communications, energy and transportation 
infrastructure and services;  
(c) the government’s long term endeavour to spread ownership in the South African 
economy, in particular ownership of historically disadvantaged persons; 
(d) a particular industrial sector or region; and 
(e) the ability of the beneficiaries  to compete in international markets. 
10. Failure to notify state aid before a final decision to grant it    
(1) When a state aid grantor or others who may notify on its behalf as provided in 
section 5(2) has failed to comply with the notification obligation provided for in 
section 5: 
(a) the Commission may on its own initiative start an investigation into state aid 
which was not notified, similarly to a market inquiry; or  
(b) interested parties when becoming aware of the state aid may request that the 
Commission do an investigation into the state aid and simultaneously make 
representations and provide information from any source to the Commission on the 
state aid; 
(c) the state aid grantor or others who may notify on its behalf as provided for in 
section 5(2) may give a late notification which will have to comply with the procedural 
requirements set out in section 5(1)-5(3). 
(2) Should the Commission decide to starts an investigation of its own accord or after 
having received a request from an interested party as provided in subsection 1, the 
Commission shall notify the state aid grantor of its intention to investigate the state 
aid and it should give the state aid grantor a reasonable opportunity to give a late 
notification of the state aid.  
(3) If the state aid grantor, after having been informed by the Commission of its 




notification within two weeks of notification, the Commission may proceed with an 
investigation into the state aid.  
(4) If the Commission starts an investigation in terms of section 10(3) or a state aid 
grantor gives late notification, and any part of the state aid has not yet been 
implemented, the state aid grantor is not allowed to further implement the state aid 
until the Commission completes the investigation and issues an advisory opinion 
and/or makes recommendations as set out in section 9.  
(5) Even where the Commission has proceeded with an investigation in terms of 
section 10(3), the state aid grantor must be given an opportunity to provide the 
Commission with information during the period of the investigation on the state aid 
and the notice provided for in section 10(2) must clearly state this.  
(6) To assist the Commission with an investigation into state aid that was not notified 
in terms of section 5 or where no late notification was made in terms of section 10(2), 
the Commission may require disclosure of information from the state aid grantor to 
enable it to assess the impact of the state aid on competition in the relevant market 
or markets. 
(7) If the state aid grantor refuses to provide the information which was required 
under subsection 6, the Commission may lodge a request with the National or 
Provincial Treasury for the required information, inform the state aid grantor that 
such a request was made and upon receipt of the information from the relevant 
treasury make an assessment of the state aid as provided in section 6. 
(8) Section 6, 7, 8 and 9 will apply with the necessary changes to investigations and 
late notifications in terms of this provision. In particular: 
(a) a reference to “the notification” in these proceedings will be read to refer to a late 
notification or the commencement of an investigation in terms of section 10(3) as the 
case may be. 
(b) interested parties will include a complainant as provided for in section 10(1). 
(c) any reference to granting of state aid will be read to refer to further implementing 




(9) Where an investigation is done in terms of section 10(2) or a late notification is 
made, the state aid grantor must make a final decision whether unimplemented state 
aid should be implemented and whether state aid that has been implemented must 
be recovered.  
(10) State aid already implemented before this decision will not be illegal but it may 
be recovered if the Commission has given an advisory opinion or recommendation 
that this should be done. 
(11) In making the decision set out in section 10(9), the state aid grantor must take 
an advisory opinion and recommendations into account in making a final decision 
whether to proceed with the implementation of state aid that has not yet been 
implemented or to recover state aid that has already been implemented. Where the 
state aid grantor implements state aid or refrains from recovering state aid despite 
an advisory opinion to the contrary, it shall provide the Commission with reasons for 
doing so. 
(12) If the state aid grantor does not provide reasons as provided for in section 
10(11) or if those reasons indicate that the state aid grantor has not given proper 
consideration to an advisory opinion or recommendations, the Commission will issue 
a declaration, which will be published on its website and sent to the state aid grantor, 
that despite an advisory opinion or recommendations proper procedures were not 
followed during the implementation of the state aid. The Commission’s declaration 
can be used by any interested party: 
(a) who can prove harm or damage as a result of the implementation of the state aid 
or the failure to recover the state aid, to challenge the state aid in a civil court; or  
(b) to apply for a review of the decision to further implement or failure to recover 
state aid without considering the recommendations of the Commission.42    
 
PART: GENERAL PROVISIONS  
                                                          
42 The proposed relief provided in this provision draws from the provisions of the Competition Act which allows 
any person who has suffered loss or damage from anti-competitive behaviour to commence action for damages 
in a civil court under section 65(6) if the Commission did not issue a consent order, confirmed by the 




11. Conflict with other parliamentary acts43 
(1) In the event of conflict between this Act and an Act of Parliament which makes 
provision for state aid to SOEs, an attempt should be made to interpret this Act and 
the Act of Parliament in a manner that allows for them to be applied concurrently. 
(2) If and to the extent that a concurrent application as provided for in subsection 1 is 
not possible with regard to an Act that precedes this Act, the provisions of this Act 
will prevail in terms of the normal rules of interpretation as it is a subsequent 
enactment unless it is clearly evident from an interpretation of this Act read with the 
conflicting Act that the conflicting Act should prevail over this Act. 
(3) If and to the extent that a concurrent application as provided for in subsection 1 is 
not possible with regard to an Act that is enacted after this Act, the provisions of this 
Act will prevail unless the latter Act clearly states that it is to prevail over this Act or a 
category of Acts that includes this Act.  
(4) When the provisions of the conflicting Act must prevail in terms of subsection 2 or 
3, the supremacy of that Act does not prevent the Commission from doing on its own 
initiative an assessment of the impact of the state aid on relevant markets, similar to 
a market inquiry.  
(5) When making the assessment in subsection 4, the Commission may make any of 
the decisions set out in section 9(1) and the Commission must give reasons and may 
issue recommendations which will enable the state aid grantor to safeguard the 
relevant market against any potential negative impact of the state aid. The reasons 
and recommendations must be delivered to the state aid grantor and published in the 
manner set out in section 9(3). However, the legal consequences for 
                                                          
43 Guidance for this provision was sought from the state aid rules which will apply in Great Britain after its exit 
from the EU as any position on conflict is non-existing in EU state aid law due to the nature of EU state aid 
rules. The Brexit State Aid Regulations do deal with state aid granted or to be granted in an Act of Parliament in 
Schedule 3 of that legislation. One aspect of the Brexit State Aid Regulations that stand out is that the 
Competition and Market Authority will still be allowed to issue advice on state aid, either on its own initiative 
or on request of a Minister of the Crown, regardless of the fact that the state aid is granted or to be granted in an 
Act of Parliament. The Brexit State Aid Regulations were kept simple by just stating whether a proposal 
qualifies indeed as one to grant state aid in an Act of Parliament or whether state aid has been granted by an Act 
of Parliament. The Brexit State Aid Regulations therefore do not cover conflict with other parliamentary 
legislation. Hence, it is not of particular assistance when it comes to the matter of conflicting legislation. In this 




recommendations and advisory opinions as set out in section 5(4)-5(6) or 10(9)-
10(12) will not apply to these recommendations. 
(6) A state aid grantor must provide the Commission with information which the 
Commission may need for its own initiated assessment as provided in subsection 5. 
Should the state aid grantor also provide access to confidential information, the 
Commission is required to treat such information with confidentiality. 
(7) To avoid potential conflict between this Act and a future Act of Parliament, a state 
aid grantor who considers or proposes the granting of state aid in an Act of 
Parliament, should notify the proposed state aid to the Commission in accordance 
with section 5, where after the Commission will assessed the state aid in accordance 
with section 6 and within the time limits provided in section 7 and issue a decision 
and recommendations in terms of section 9.44   
12. Act applies only to state aid granted after the date on which this Act comes 
into effect  
(1) This Act only applies to grants of state aid that take place after its 
commencement. 
(2) Where a decision to grant state aid is made in terms of a power established by an 
Act that precedes this Act, after the commencement of this Act, it will constitute state 
aid in terms of this Act unless it is excluded in terms of section 11. If it is excluded 
the Commission is not prevented from assessing the state aid as provided in section 
11(4).  
(3) Subject to subsection 4, if state aid is granted directly in terms of legislation this 
Act will only apply to state aid granted in terms of legislation enacted after 
commencement of this Act. 
(4) Where state aid granted directly in terms of legislation enacted before this Act 
continues after the commencement of this Act, the Commission may make any of the 
decisions set out in section 9(1) and the Commission must give reasons and may 
                                                          
44 This provision is to a great degree based on the provisions in the Brexit State Aid Regulations which state 
what would happen when there is a proposal to grant state aid in an Act of Parliament or when state aid was 




issue recommendations which will enable the state aid grantor to safeguard the 
relevant market against any potential negative impact of the state aid. The reasons 
and recommendations must be delivered to the state aid grantor and published in the 
manner set out in section 9(3). However, the legal consequences for 
recommendations and advisory opinions as set out in section 5(4)-5(6) or 10(9)-
10(12) will not apply to these recommendations.45  
13. Market inquiries on the effect of state aid in markets 
(1) In addition to its powers to assess state aid listed in section 4, the Commission 
shall have the power to do market inquiries into the potential effects of state aid on 
competition and economic transformation. 
(2) The Commission shall conduct market inquiries in accordance with the procedure 
provided in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, as amended by the Competition 
Amendment Bill of 2018. 
(3) If the Commission concludes during a market inquiry on the effect of state aid in a 
relevant market that it has an adverse effect on competition, the Commission shall 
make recommendations to the state aid grantor to take action to remedy, mitigate or 
prevent the adverse effect on competition. 
14. Short title 
This Act is called the State Aid Regulation Act of 2020. 
END OF CHAPTER  
  
                                                          
45 In regard to this provision, guidance was sought from the provisions in the Brexit State Aid Regulation which 
deals with “Existing Aid Schemes”. The public interest focus of the provision brings it more in line with the 
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